The opinion
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
STEVEN JAY SENCIAL CIVIL ACTION
VERSUS NO. 22-4235
JEFFERSON PARISH SHERIFF SECTION “O”
JOSEPH LOPINTO, III, ET AL.
ORDER AND REASONS
Before the Court in this civil-rights case is Plaintiff Steven Jay Sencial’s
motion1 to strike numerous affirmative defenses advanced by the Jefferson Parish
Sheriff’s Office (“JPSO”) defendants, or in the alternative, to provide a more definite
statement of such defenses. For the following reasons, Sencial’s motion is DENIED.
I. BACKGROUND
Plaintiff Steven Jay Sencial, a former inmate at the Jefferson Parish
Correctional Center (“JPCC”), initially filed this civil action pro se.2 However, with
the assistance of (briefly) appointed counsel, he subsequently filed a Second Amended
and Superseding Complaint (“Second Amended Complaint”), which is now the
operative complaint in this matter.3 In that pleading, Sencial asserts federal and
state claims against JPCC personnel, including Jefferson Parish Sheriff Joseph P.
Lopinto, III, Deputy Chad Lachney, Deputy Marialaina Horton, Deputy Joseph
Trosclair, Sgt. Kelly Kline, Lt. Timothy Berrian, Sgt. Scott Rose, Deputy Adrian
1 ECF No. 98. The JPSO Defendants did not file a response to Sencial’s motion.
2 ECF No. 1.
3 ECF No. 43.
Arabie, Deputy Charles Whitley, Capt. Aaron Wilkie, Deputy Duston Johnson, and
Deputy Terrence Holmes (together, the “JPSO Defendants”).
Sencial alleges that while he was being detained at JPCC, the JPSO
Defendants failed to protect him from his own suicidal impulses, failed to protect him
from other inmates, and used excessive and unnecessary force against him.4 Sencial
alleges that the JPSO Defendants are thus liable pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for
violations of his rights under the 8th and the 14th Amendments.5 Sencial also alleges
the state law torts of assault, battery, intentional infliction of emotional distress,
breach of duty to protect, and negligence against the JPSO Defendants.6 Sencial
alleges that Sheriff Lopinto is liable for the state law torts under the doctrine of
respondeat superior.7
In response to Sencial’s Second Amended Complaint, the JPSO Defendants
filed answers and affirmative defenses on August 16, 2023, October 13, 2023, and
November 16, 2023, respectively.8 Sencial now moves to strike a litany of those
defenses, or in the alternative, he moves for an order requiring that the JPSO
Defendants provide a more definite statement.
II. LEGAL STANDARDS
The Federal Rules embrace “a simplified pleading system, which was adopted
to focus litigation on the merits of a claim.” Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S.
4 See generally id.
5 Id. at 12–13.
6 Id. at 13.
7 Id.
8 ECF Nos. 59, 82, 89.
506, 514 (2002) (citation omitted). Like “[o]ther provisions of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure” subsections (e) and (f) of Rule 12 are “inextricably linked to Rule
8(a)’s simplified notice pleading standard[,]” which is amplified by Rule 8(e)(1)’s
rejection of “technical forms of pleadings” as well as Rule 8(f)’s mandate to “construe[
] … [all pleadings] to do substantial justice.” Id. at 513-14.
A. Rule 12(f) Motion to Strike from a Pleading An “Insufficient
Defense” or “Scandalous” Material
Rule 12(f) allows the Court to “strike from a pleading an insufficient defense
or any redundant, immaterial, impertinent, or scandalous matter.” FED. R. CIV. P.
12(f). Though the Court, sua sponte, may strike such insufficient defenses or
scandalous matters, any motion by a party requesting that the Court do so must be
filed within 21 days after being served with the pleading containing the objectional
defense or material. Id.
“Striking an affirmative defense is warranted if it cannot, as a matter of law,
succeed under any circumstance.” United States v. Renda, 709 F.3d 472, 479 (5th Cir.
2013) (citing Cambridge Toxicology Grp., Inc. v. Excnicios, 495 F.3d 169, 178 (5th Cir.
2007)). Generally speaking, such motions to strike “should be granted only when the
pleading to be stricken has no possible relation to the controversy.” United States v.
Coney, 689 F.3d 365, 379 (5th Cir. 2012) (quoting Augustus v. Bd. of Pub. Instruction
of Escambia Cnty., Fla., 306 F.2d 862, 868 (5th Cir. 1962) (internal quotations and
citation omitted)).
Motions to strike defenses are disfavored. Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. Sales,
Inc. v. Avondale Shipyards, Inc., 677 F.2d 1045, 1057 (5th Cir. 1982). So disfavored
that striking a pleading is considered “a drastic remedy to be resorted to only when
required for the purposes of justice.” Augustus, 306 F.2d at 868 (quoting Brown v.
Williamson Tobacco Corp v. United States, 201 F.2d 819, 822 (6th Cir. 1953)). Such a
motion may be appropriate, however, “when the allegations are prejudicial to the
opposing party or immaterial to the lawsuit,” such as “when the challenged
allegations do not bear on the subject matter of the litigation.” Sewell v. St. Bernard
Par. Gov’t, No. CV 21-2376, 2022 WL 1184504, at *1 (E.D. La. Apr. 21, 2022) (Vitter,
J.) (quotations omitted).
“Even when technically appropriate and well-founded,” other sections of this
Court have recognized that disfavored “motions to strike are not [to] be granted in
the absence of a showing of prejudice to the moving party.” See Perry v. H.J. Heinz
Co. Brands, LLC, No. 19-280, 2019 WL 2423231, at *3 (E.D. La. June 10, 2019)
(Feldman, J.) citing Abene v. Jaybar, LLC, 802 F. Supp. 2d 716, 723 (E.D. La. 2011)
(Fallon, J.) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted)); see also Securities and
Exchange Commission v. Jacobson, No. 23-5650, 2024 WL 1217308, at *2 (E.D. La.
Mar. 21, 2024) (Milazzo, J.) (denying motion to strike due to movant’s failure to show
prejudice). The decision to grant or deny a motion to strike is reserved to the Court's
discretion. FED. R. CIV. P. 12(f) (utilizing the permissive “may”).
B. Rule 12(e) Motion for a More Definite Statement
A party unable to frame a response to an opponent’s pleading may seek an
order requiring his opponent who filed the indefinite pleading to lodge a more definite
statement. That is, “[a] party may move for a more definite statement of a pleading
to which a responsive pleading is allowed but which is so vague or ambiguous that a
party cannot reasonably prepare a response.” FED. R. CIV. P. 12(e) (emphasis
added). A Rule 12(e) motion “must be made before filing a responsive pleading and
must point out the defects complained of and the details desired.” Id. Limited in scope,
by its own terms, Rule 12(e) is restricted to those challenged pleadings to which a
response is owed. See id.; see also 5C Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal
Practice and Procedure § 1376 (3d ed. Supp.2025). To be sure, if no responsive
pleading is allowed, then Rule 12(e) is not needed as a means of enabling the moving
party to frame its response and thus the Rule has no application. See id.
Accordingly, a party is only eligible to seek relief under Rule 12(e) if he is
allowed or required to respond to the challenged pleading.
III. ANALYSIS
Construing his motion liberally, Sencial seeks to strike the JPSO Defendants’
second, third, fourth, seventh, eighth, ninth, tenth, eleventh, and twelfth affirmative
defenses, contending that these defenses are insufficient, inapplicable, not
adequately pleaded, redundant, or frivolous.9 Alternatively, Sencial seeks a more
definite statement. He fails to demonstrate entitlement to either form of relief.
A. Rule 12(f) Motion to Strike
Sencial does not specify which answer(s) contain the objectionable affirmative
defenses he moves to strike. And, the JPSO Defendants filed three total Answers,
9 ECF No. 98. These defenses assert vicarious liability/respondeat superior,
negligence/contributory negligence, lack of diversity jurisdiction, frivolity, qualified immunity, lack of
control, good faith, proximate cause, and a response admitting and denying some allegations by Deputy
Terrence Holmes.
ECF Nos. 59, 82, 89.10 Considering the answers are nearly identical, the Court
construes Sencial’s motion as challenging all three.
As a threshold matter, insofar as Sencial moves to strike defenses contained in
all three answers, as for those answers filed on August 16, 2023 (ECF No. 59) and
October 13, 2013 (ECF No. 82), his request is untimely. Sencial filed his motion on
December 7, 2023, but the deadline to move to strike these answers lapsed 21 days
after they were filed.
Nevertheless, the Court construes his motion as timely as to each materially
identical answer. Even so, as to most of the affirmative defenses he seeks to strike,
Sencial fails to meet his burden to show that these defenses are “insufficient,” much
less redundant or scandalous. Specifically, applying the above-referenced standard to
the defendants’ second, third, seventh, eighth, ninth, tenth, eleventh, and twelfth
defenses, it cannot be said that these defenses have “no possible relation to the
controversy,” and thus the Court exercises its ample discretion to deny Sencial’s
unsupported request to strike these defenses. Augustus, 306 F.2d at 868.
Sencial’s motion to strike the fourth defense, however, warrants closer
scrutiny. Though Sencial offers no grounds for striking this fourth defense, review of
this defense indicates that, there, the JPSO Defendants allege that the Court lacks
diversity jurisdiction because the amount in controversy is less than $75,000.
Assuming that this is indeed advanced as a defense, it appears to qualify as
10 ECF No. 59 includes the majority of the JPSO Defendants, whereas ECF No. 82 is an Answer
on behalf of Deputy Terrence Holmes and ECF No, 89 is an Answer on behalf of Deputy Dustin
Johnson. The three Answers are essentially identical, apart from one paragraph and the identity of
the parties filing them.
impertinent or immaterial given the jurisdictional predicate for this case. That is,
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331, this Court has federal question jurisdiction over
Sencial’s lawsuit because certain of his claims arise under federal law, namely, his
civil rights claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Diversity jurisdiction is not implicated and
thus a defense premised on its absence technically “has no possible relation to the
controversy” and is necessarily immaterial. See Augustus, 306 F.2d at 868; see also
Hardy v. Scandinavian Airlines Sys., No. CV 21-1591, 2025 WL 437588, at *4 (E.D.
La. Feb. 7, 2025) (Morgan, J.) (striking affirmative defense that the court lacked
subject matter jurisdiction as insufficient because the court had subject matter
jurisdiction over the case).
That does not end the inquiry. Technical immateriality aside, Sencial offers no
suggestion that he is prejudiced by the mere presence of this fourth defense. And the
Court cannot conceive of how the presence of this immaterial subject matter
jurisdiction “defense” (such as it is) has or would necessitate a response from Sencial,
require Sencial to engage in burdensome discovery, or otherwise require him to
advance resources responding to a non-issue. In other words, the immaterial (and
legally incorrect) jurisdictional allegation has not (and cannot) harm Sencial. Absent
prejudice (see, e.g., Abene, 802 F. Supp. 2d at 723), the Court is not persuaded that
resort to the “drastic remedy” of striking this singular defense serves any useful or
appropriate purpose, much less achieves justice.11 Accordingly, the Court exercises
its ample discretion to deny Sencial’s disfavored motion.
11 On the other hand, motions to strike are disfavored precisely because, when misused, they
serve only to harass and prolong delay (and, in this instance, waste judicial resources). See generally
B. Alternative Request for a More Definite Statement
Turning to Sencial’s alternative request that the JPSO Defendants should be
ordered to provide a more definite statement of certain defenses, the request is
without merit. Sencial is not entitled to a more definite statement from the
defendants. As indicated above, Rule 12(e) does not apply in this context.
By its clear text, Rule 12(e) applies only to a “pleading to which a responsive
pleading is permitted.” And, unless the Court orders a response, Rule 7(a) does not
allow a responsive pleading to an affirmative defense or an answer. Here, the Court
has not ordered that Sencial file any response to the JPSO Defendants’ answer and
affirmative defenses. There being no response required from Sencial, the purpose of
the rule is not implicated because Sencial need not attempt to frame a response to
the JPSO Defendants’ allegedly indefinite defenses. A more definite statement would
not advance the purpose of the rule and would thus be futile. Because Rule 12(e) is
not implicated, Sencial’s alternative request for relief is without merit.
IV. CONCLUSION
IT IS ORDERED that Sencial’s motion? to strike is DENIED.
New Orleans, Louisiana, this 24th day of September, 2025.
Hie S
BRANDON S. LONG □□
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
5C Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1381 (8d ed.2025)
(citations omitted).
12 ECF No, 98.