Honey v. Kijakazi

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

LISA A. HONEY, : No. 3:23-CV-1382

Plaintiff : (Caraballo, M.J.)

Vv. :

FRANK BISIGNANO,! :

Commissioner of Social :

Security, :

Defendant :

MEMORANDUM

I. Introduction

Plaintiff Lisa A. Honey seeks judicial review of the final decision

of the Commissioner of Social Security (the “Commissioner”) denying

her application for disability benefits under Title IT of the Social

Security Act. The Court has jurisdiction pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g).

This matter comes before the Court on Honey’s claims that the

Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) erred when she: (1) failed to perform

an adequate function-by-function analysis and evaluation of the medical

opinion evidence in determining Honey’s residual functional capacity;

Frank Bisignano was confirmed as the Commissioner of the Social Security

Administration on May 6, 2025. Pursuant to Rule 25(d) of the Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure and 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), Frank Bisignano is substituted for Kilolo Kijakazi

as the defendant in this suit.

(2) omitted a sitting, standing, or walking limitation from Honey’s

residual functional capacity, despite relying on two physicians’ opinions

containing such limitations; and (3) deemed unpersuasive the medical

opinion of a treating physician that Honey was limited to sedentary

work or less. Doc. 13 at 5-17. The matter is fully briefed and ripe for

decision.

As explained below, the ALJ’s conclusions when addressing all

three challenged issues were supported by substantial evidence in the

record, coupled with sufficient reasoning to permit meaningful judicial

review. Accordingly, the Court will affirm the Commissioner’s decision

to deny Honey’s claim for social security disability benefits.

II. Background

On December 16, 2020, Honey applied for Title II social security

disability benefits, alleging complete disability from a myriad of

impairments, including padendul neuralgia, anal spasms, pelvic nerve

pain, myalgia of the pelvic floor, pelvic pain, and dyspareunia female.

Doc. 9 at 16, 128 (hereinafter referred to as “Tr.”). The Social Security

Administration initially denied Honey’s application in March 2021, and

upon reconsideration in June 2021. Tr. 123, 131. Honey thereafter

requested a hearing before an ALJ. Id. at 141.

On December 9, 2021, ALJ Michelle Wolfe presided over Honey’s

hearing. The hearing concerned whether Honey was disabled within the

meaning of the Social Security Act since January 9, 2020. Id. at 1212—

14. At the hearing, ALJ Wolfe received various evidence of record,

including clinical records, medical history, medical expert reports,

vocational expert testimony, and Honey’s own testimony. Jd. at 1213-—

27. On January 6, 2022, ALJ Wolfe issued a decision concluding that

Honey was not disabled. Tr. 13-28. ALJ Wolfe reached that conclusion

by employing the five-step analytical process required under the Social

Security Act to evaluate disability insurance and supplement security

income claims. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4).

The process requires sequential consideration of: (1) whether the

claimant is engaged in substantial gainful work activity; (2) the medical

severity of the claimant's impairments; (8) whether the impairment

meets or equals a defined list of impairments; (4) a comparison between

the claimant’s past relevant work and residual functional capacity, 1.e.,

the most work that a claimant can perform despite his or her

limitations on a regular and continuing basis, see 20 C.F.R.

§ 404.1545(a); and (5) an assessment of the claimant’s residual

functional capacity and his or her age, education, and work experience.

20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(@)-(v). Should a claimant proceed past the

first three steps of the analysis, the Commissioner will not find the

claimant disabled when he or she can perform past relevant work, or

adjust to other work, under the third and fourth steps, respectively. Id.

at § 404.1520(a)(4)(iv)-(v), ), (g).

Applying that analysis, ALJ Wolfe first determined that Honey

met the insurance requirements of the Social Security Act, see 20 C.F.R.

§ 404.130, through December 31, 2023. Tr. 18. ALJ Wolfe also found

that Honey had not engaged in substantial gainful activity between her

alleged disability onset date of January 9, 2020, through the date of the

decision. Jd.

At the second step of the analysis, ALJ Wolfe found that Honey

suffered from two severe impairments: pudendal neuralgia and

myofascial pain dysfunction syndrome. Id. ALJ Wolfe also identified

several non-severe impairments, including multinodular goiter; status

post hiatal hernia repair; gastroesophageal reflux disease; dysphagia;

esophageal obstruction; dysphonia; deviated septum; dermatitis;

insomnia; hypertension; sinusitis; viral infection; osteopenia; vitamin D

deficiency; folliculitis; and major depressive disorder. Jd. at 18-19. She

found that these maladies caused “no more than ‘mild’ limitation in any

of the functional areas” and that the evidence did not “otherwise

indicate that there is more than a minimal limitation in the claimant’s

ability to do basic work activities.” Id. at 20.

Moving to the third step of the analysis, ALJ Wolfe determined

that Honey’s severe impairments failed to meet or medically equal one

of the impairments listed in the Social Security Administration’s

regulations. Id. at 21. Honey thus did not automatically qualify as

disabled. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)Gii) (If you have an

impairment(s) that meets or equals one of our listings in appendix 1 of

this subpart and meets the duration requirement, we will find that you

are disabled.”).

Accordingly, ALJ Wolfe proceeded to determine Honey’s residual

functional capacity, before addressing the final two steps in the

sequential analysis. Based on the medical evidence of record, ALJ Wolfe

concluded that Honey could perform light work:

[T]he claimant has the residual functional capacity to perform

light work as defined in 20 CFR 404.1567(b) with the

following limitations: She is limited to occasional balancing,

stooping, crouching, crawling, kneeling, and climbing, but

never climb on ladders ropes or scaffolds, or push or pull with

the lower extremities including foot controls. Further, she is

limited to occasional exposure to vibrations and hazards,

including moving machinery and unprotected heights. Lastly,

she requires a sit/stand option with each interval up to 1/2

hour, but she is not off task while transferring.

Tr. 21-22.

In reaching that conclusion, ALJ Wolfe analyzed three factors

germane to this opinion. First, ALJ Wolfe considered Honey’s testimony

regarding her impairment symptoms:

The claimant testified that she is unable to work due to a

severe pelvic condition that limits her mobility, and it affects

her mental state as she is depressed because of what she is

unable to do, and her pain. She also said that it is hard for her

to focus and concentrate, and that her medications make her

mind foggy, and she has word finding difficulty. In addition,

she said that she is generally homebound, as it is difficult for

her to drive or be in a car, as being in a seated position puts a

lot of stress on her pelvic muscles and nerves. Further, she

said due to the pelvic issues now her sacroiliac joint is affected

as is the bone density in her hips and pelvis. Moreover, the

claimant testified that her medical appointments would

interfere with her ability to work. She said that she sees her

primary care physician once every three months and goes for

internal therapy three to four times a month. Additionally,

she said that approximately every three months, she goes for

CT guided injections under anesthesia for which she is

admitted to the hospital, and following the same, that she has

a recovery/downtime of 2-4 weeks where she is unable to do

any activity other than self-care, as she said that normal

activity including walking, increases her risk for falling. The

claimant also said that she is limited to sitting 20 minutes at

one time, and that when she goes from a seated to standing

position, that it is very painful and she uses her lift chair.

Lastly, she said that she spends more than half of her day

lying down (Hearing Record). Overall, the claimant alleges

she has been unable to sustain any type of full time work due

to her combination of impairments and alleged level of

symptomatology

Id. at 22-28.

In reviewing that testimony, in comparison to the record,

ALJ Wolfe concluded “that the claimant’s medically determinable

impairments could reasonably be expected to cause the alleged

symptoms.” Id. at 23. The ALJ found, however, that “the

claimant’s statements concerning the intensity, persistence and

limiting effects of these symptoms are not entirely consistent with

the medical evidence and other evidence in the record.” Id.

Second, ALJ Wolfe conducted a detailed review of the clinical

evidence concerning Honey’s impairments and compared it to her

alleged symptoms, to explain their inconsistencies:

[T]he record reflects that the claimant treated for pudendal

neuralgia and myofascial pain dysfunction syndrome

(Exhibits B3F/11, 24). While these impairments cause some

continued functional limitations, they do not support greater

limitations than those set forth in the above finding.

To illustrate, since the alleged onset date, the claimant

reports constant pain, to the left mons and vulvovaginal area,

that radiates to the left flank and leg at times but is also on

the right side and in the sacroiliac region, which is better with

rest and lying down, and exacerbated with sitting and activity

(Exhibits B3F/7-8, 25-26, 35-36, 52, 58-59, B12F/9, B13F/1).

Notably, these complaints have been the same since before the

alleged onset date to the present. What is noted to change is

the reports regarding her pain relief following the CT guided

injections. Specifically, in January of 2020, the record reflects

that the claimant obtains 3-4 months of reasonable relief

following the injections. That said, in April of 2020, she did

report some worsening of her pain. Of note, when the claimant

reported worsening pain in April, she also had reported that

she was trying to care for her grandchildren in December of

2019, January of 2020, and May of 2020. Thereafter, she

reported that the injections were helping to address her pain,

in May, August, and November of 2020 (Exhibits B3F/8, 18,

26, 34, 36, 46, 50, 61, 63, 69, B4F/52, 58, B12F/22-23). And

while the claimant testified that she is limited in the amount

of activity she could engage in for 2-4 weeks following her

injections, there is no indication of any such limitation being

imposed by any of her providers (Hearing Record). What is

reflected in the record is her self-report to her physical

therapist that she is sore for the first two weeks following her

injections. Additionally, while the claimant stated that she

has fallen following receipt of the injections, the only

reference to her falling is in December of 2019, which is prior

to the alleged onset date, and in September of 2021, when she

told her physical therapist that she fell while walking in her

yard, and that the same thing had happened to her a year

prior (Exhibits B3F/66-67, B17F/11). Moreover, there is no

indication in the record that the claimant’s gait was antalgic,

or that she had any lower extremity weakness. In fact the only

reference to her difficulty walking was a subjective report she

gave to the physical therapist in October of 2021 (Exhibit

B17E/13). Furthermore, the claimant consistently reports

that her bladder and bowel symptoms are stable (Exhibits

B3F/8, 26, 36, 48, 52, 59, B12F/9, B13F/1). Lastly, while the

claimant testified to an inability to sit for more than 20

minutes, she told her physical therapist in May of 2021 that

her pain was exacerbated within one hour of driving, and in

April of 2021, she reported that she was going to Ocean City

Maryland in May (Exhibits B17F/1, 5).

Taking the foregoing into consideration, a review of the record

as a whole does not support greater limitations. Overall, the

longitudinal evidence of record does not support the

claimant’s allegations concerning the intensity, persistence,

and limiting effects of her symptoms. Notably, in terms of her

daily activities, she is able to perform a wide array of activities

despite her impairments. To demonstrate, she is generally

independent in her activities of daily living. Also, she is able

to prepare simple meals, do some light housework, is able to

drive when needed, go online, watch television, socialize with

family and friends, attend church, and for a while during the

relevant time she was able to care for her grandchildren

(Exhibits B38E, B38F/46, 61, B8F, B9F). While the undersigned

acknowledges that the claimant has some limitations

performing these activities, and while none of these activities

is dispositive, taken together and considered in conjunction

with the above medical evidence of record, they suggest that

the claimant can perform work within the above parameters

on a sustained and continuous basis.

Moreover, while the claimant testified to her treatment

interfering with her ability to work, aside from her receiving

injections every three to four months, the records do not

correlate with the amount of treatment she outlined. Notably,

her physical therapy appears to be sporadic rather than

consistently 3-4 times a month as she indicates. Also, as

discussed above, there is nothing in the record which reflects

that the claimant is unable to work for 2-4 weeks following

each injection.

That said, giving the claimant every benefit of the doubt as

supported by the record with respect to her physical

impairments, the residual functional capacity above

accommodates the claimant’s severe impairments by limiting

her to light work. The residual functional capacity further

adds a sit/stand option, as well as postural, environmental,

and push/pull lower extremity limitations to guard against

exacerbations, and for her comfort. Furthermore, the above

limitations accommodate the side effects claimant testified to

having from her medication. The result is that the record as a

whole does not support any greater limitations than those

outlined above.

Id. at 23-24.

Third, ALJ Wolfe evaluated the persuasiveness of various

medical opinions in determining the limitations imposed by Honey’s

physical impairments. Of relevance to this report and recommendation,

the ALJ specifically considered:

[T]he state agency physical assessments of Dr. Charles

Michael Manganiello and Dr. Catherine S. Smith and found

them persuasive (Exhibits B2A, B4A). The doctors indicate

the claimant is limited to light work, with the ability to

occasionally, climb ramps and stairs, balance, stoop, kneel,

crouch and crawl, but may never climb ladders, ropes, or

scaffolds. In general, the doctor’s opinions are consistent with,

and supported by the longitudinal record. Specifically, there

is nothing in the record to reflect that the claimant would be

unable to lift and carry in the light exertional category, as she

does not have any sensory or strength deficits and does not

use any assistive devices to ambulate. Moreover, as the

10

claimant testified that sitting is the most painful position, a

limitation to sedentary work would result in an exacerbation

of her pain. Furthermore, while the claimant testified that she

lies down half of the day, there is nothing in the record to

support this allegation. Additionally, there is nothing in the

record supporting that the claimant is limited physically for

2-4 weeks following receipt of the CT guided injections. Lastly,

when the undersigned considers the claimant’s testimony and

the longitudinal record, all benefit was given to the claimant

and additional limitations, such as the sit/stand option, the

lower extremity push/pull limitation and the environmental

limitations were added.

The opinion of Dr. Ziba Monfared was considered by the

undersigned and is not persuasive (Exhibit B9F). Dr.

Monfared indicates that the claimant could lift 21 to 50

pounds occasionally, sit 8 hours, stand 7 hours in 4-hour

increments, and walk for 7 hours in 4-hour increments. She

also indicates that the claimant could frequently use her

bilateral feet to operate foot controls. Additionally, she notes

that the claimant could occasionally climb ramps and stairs,

stoop, kneel, crouch, and crawl, but may never climb ladders,

scaffolds, or balance. Environmentally, she limits the

claimant to loud heavy traffic, and occasionally exposure to

unprotected heights, extreme cold and vibrations. The

doctor’s opinion is not consistent with or supported by the

longitudinal record. Specifically, the doctor’s opinion that the

claimant can lift and carry in the medium exertional category,

is an overestimate of her capabilities. Notably, when the

claimant’s treatment record of consistent CT injections every

three to four months is considered, as well as her repeated

complaints of pain, the undersigned finds that the record

supports limiting the claimant to light work so as to avoid any

exacerbation and aggravation of claimant’s pain. Moreover,

the light limitation is supported as the claimant has no

sensory or strength deficits and does not use any assistive

devices to ambulate. Furthermore, as the claimant testified

that sitting is the most painful position, an indication that the

11

claimant is capable of sitting for 8 hours would result in an

exacerbation of her pain. Lastly, there is nothing in the record

to support limiting the claimant’s exposure to noise.

The undersigned considered the opinion of Dr. Joseph E.

Patruno from November 2020 and did not find it persuasive

(Exhibit B2F). Dr. Patruno indicates the claimant can lift and

carry less than 10 pounds frequently, 10 pounds occasionally,

and 20 pounds rarely. Further, he indicates the claimant can

sit, stand, and walk for less than 2 hours during an 8-hour

workday, and that she may sit in 10-minute increments and

stand in 20-minute increments. He also indicates she requires

a job that allows her to alternate positions between sitting,

standing, and walking, and that she will require 2-3

unscheduled breaks during the workday to lie down. Also, he

indicates the claimant can rarely twist, stoop, bend, crouch,

squat, climb stairs and ladders, but that she may frequently

look down, turn her head right or left, look up and hold her

head in a static position. Furthermore, he indicates the

claimant will be off task 10 percent of the workday, is capable

of moderate stress, and that she will have good days and bad

days, but he was uncertain how often they would result in her

being absent from work during a month. Finally, he states the

claimant is unable to work full time (8 hours a day, 5 days a

week) in any capacity. The doctor’s opinion is not consistent

with or supported by the longitudinal record. First, a

statement by a medical source that a claimant is “disabled” is

an issue reserved to the Commissioner (20 CFR 404.1527(d)).

Second, when the claimant’s testimony is considered, which

indicates that sitting aggravates her pain, a limitation to

sedentary would aggravate her condition. As such, the

undersigned find that the record supports limiting the

claimant to light work with a sit/stand option is instead

supported. Moreover, the light limitation is supported as the

claimant has no sensory or strength deficits and does not use

any assistive devices to ambulate. And while the doctor

indicates that the claimant may need to lie down during the

day, there is nothing in the record to support this limitation.

12

Furthermore, there is nothing in the record supporting that

the claimant is limited physically for 2-4 weeks following

receipt of the CT guided injections. Lastly, when the

claimant’s activities are considered, such as her ability to

prepare simple meals, do some light housework, to drive as

needed, and her ability to go online, the same does not support

a finding that the claimant would be off task 10 percent of the

workday.

In sum, the above residual functional capacity assessment is

supported by the record as a whole, including the claimant's

treatment notes, the findings of the state agency assessments,

and the reliable portions of the claimant’s statements.

Overall, the objective evidence does not support the alleged

intensity and persistence of symptoms. Therefore, the

undersigned finds that the claimant is capable of performing

work in accordance with the residual functional capacity

described above.

Id. at 25-26.

Having determined Honey’s residual functional capacity to

perform light work subject to limitations, and rejected several grounds

for further limitation, ALJ Wolfe proceeded to the fourth step of the

analysis to determine whether Honey was disabled within the meaning

of the Social Security Act. Here, with assistance from a vocational

expert’s testimony, ALJ Wolfe compared Honey’s past relevant work

and residual functional capacity, finding that Honey was unable to

perform her prior employment as a teacher’s aide and eligibility

specialist. Id. at 26.

13

Finally, in the fifth step of the sequential analysis process, ALJ

Wolfe considered Honey’s age, education, work experience, and residual

functional capacity to perform light work, concluding that “there are

jobs that exist in significant numbers in the national economy that the

claimant can perform|.|” Id. at 27. Here, ALJ Wolfe again leveraged

testimony from a vocational expert, reaching the specific conclusion that

an individual fitting Honey’s parameters could perform the occupational

requirements of a cashier, small products assembler, or conveyor line

bakery worker. Tr. 27.

As a result of this analysis, ALJ Wolfe determined that Honey was

not disabled and denied her application for disability benefits. Id. at 28.

Honey unsuccessfully appealed the decision to the Social Security

Administration’s Appeals Council, which denied Honey’s request to

review ALJ Wolfe’s decision on June 26, 2023. Id. at 1. Having

exhausted her administrative remedies, Honey’s instant appeal to the

district court followed.

Honey initiated this action with the Court on August 19, 2028.

Doc. 1. The Commissioner filed an answer denying Honey’s claim of

error and provided the requisite transcripts from the disability

14

proceedings on October 26, 2023, and December 20, 2023. Docs. 9, 12.

The parties then filed their respective briefs, Docs. 13, 17-18, with

Honey alleging three errors warranting reversal or remand, Doc. 13 at

5-17.

Specifically, Honey alleges that ALJ Wolfe: (1) failed to undertake

an adequate “function-by-function assessment|] and evaluation of the

medical opinion evidence” to facilitate meaningful judicial review; (2)

erred when she found Honey “capable of sitting, standing, and walking

without limitation” “[d]espite finding the state agency medical

consultants’ opinions” persuasive “and purporting to adopt the

limitations therein,” and (8) erred when she rejected the opinion of

Honey’s treating physician. Id. at 5, 11, 18.

III. Discussion

A. Standard of Review

Review of the Commissioner’s decision denying a claimant’s

application for social security disability benefits is limited to

determining whether the factual findings of the final decisionmaker are

supported by substantial evidence in the record. See 42 U.S.C. § 405(g);

Johnson v. Comm’ of Soc. Sec., 529 F.3d 198, 200 (8d Cir. 2008).

15

Substantial in this context is “more than a mere scintilla of evidence

but may be less than a preponderance.” Brown v. Bowen, 845 F.2d 1211,

1218 (8d Cir. 1988) (citation omitted). Put more pointedly, it is “such

relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to

support a conclusion.” Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U.S. 552, 565 (1988)

(quoting Consol. Edison Co. v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197, 229 (1988)). In an

adequately developed record, this can mean “something less than the

weight of the evidence, and the possibility of drawing two inconsistent

conclusions from the evidence does not prevent [an ALJ’s decision] from

being supported by substantial evidence.” Consolo v. Fed. Mar.

Comm’n., 383 U.S. 607, 620 (1966) (citations omitted).

Under this deferential standard, “[flactual findings which are

supported by substantial evidence must be upheld.” Ficca v. Astrue, 901

F. Supp. 2d 5338, 536 (M.D. Pa. 2012) (citations omitted); 42 U.S.C.

§ 405(g). This court’s role is not to reweigh the evidence and make

factual determinations, but to simply review the record and ensure that

the ALJ provided “a discussion of the evidence and an explanation of

reasoning for his conclusion sufficient to enable meaningful judicial

review.” Diaz v. Comm’ of Soc. Sec., 577 F.3d 500, 504 (8d Cir. 2009)

16

(citations and quotations omitted). An ALJ meets that standard by

stating “in his decision which evidence he has rejected and which he is

relying on as the basis for his finding.” Schaudeck v. Comm’r of SSA,

181 F.3d 429, 433 (8d Cir. 1999) (citations omitted). Moreover, when

there is countervailing evidence, an ALJ must “give some reason for

discounting the evidence she rejects.” Plummer v. Apfel, 186 F.3d 422,

429 (8d Cir. 1999) (citation omitted); Mason v. Shalala, 994 F.2d 1058,

1064 (8d Cir. 1993) (holding that substantial evidence standard is

unmet when ALJ fails to resolve conflicts created by countervailing

evidence).

Here, ALJ Wolfe’s factual findings were supported by substantial

evidence in the record, and the reasoning underlying those conclusions

was sufficient to enable judicial review.

B. The ALJ’s Residual Functional Capacity Finding

Honey first contends that ALJ Wolfe did not provide an

explanation for her alleged decision to exclude walking, sitting, and

standing limitations from Honey’s residual functional capacity, and that

it violated the duty to conduct an adequate function-by-function

assessment. Doc. 13 at 5-8. According to Honey, not only does this error

17

frustrate meaningful judicial review, but because the inclusion of such

functional limitations may have impacted the vocational expert’s

testimony on Honey’s employment prospects, it was not harmless. Id. at

9-11. A review of the record, however, finds that ALJ Wolfe explicitly

included walking, sitting, and standing limitations in Honey’s residual

functional capacity, and conducted an adequate function-by-function

assessment in compliance with the applicable regulations.

When crafting a claimant’s residual functional capacity and

assessing whether a claimant can perform their past work at step four

of the sequential evaluation process, an ALJ must explain which level of

work the claimant is currently capable of performing. 20 C.F.R.

§ 404.1520(a)(4)G)—(Gv); 20 C.F.R. § 404.1545(a)(5)G)—Gi); Heckler v.

Campbell, 461 U.S. 458, 460-62 (1983). The Social Security regulations

include a tiered series of work capacities, ranging from “sedentary

work” to “very heavy work.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1567(a)—(e). Of relevance

here, the regulations include a definition for “light work” that expressly

addresses walking, sitting, and standing:

Light work involves lifting no more than 20 pounds at a time

with frequent lifting or carrying of objects weighing up to 10

pounds. Even though the weight lifted may be very little, a job

is in this category when it requires a good deal of walking or

18

standing, or when it involves sitting most of the time with

some pushing and pulling of arm or leg controls. To be

considered capable of performing a full or wide range of light

work, you must have the ability to do substantially all of these

activities. If someone can do light work, we determine that he

or she can also do sedentary work, unless there are additional

limiting factors such as loss of fine dexterity or inability to sit

for long periods of time.

20 C.F.R. § 404.1567(b).

In determining Honey’s residual functional capacity, ALJ Wolfe

concluded that she was limited to performing “light work as defined in

20 CFR 404.1567(b) except for the following limitations.” Tr. 21. The

ALJ then proceeded to list further limitations on Honey’s ability to

perform certain activities, including, among others, her ability to sit

and stand. Id. at 22. As highlighted by the Commissioner, see Doc. 17 at

1-2, the ALJ explicitly provided that Honey “requires a sit/stand option

with each interval up to 1/2 hour, but she is not off task while

transferring.” Id. Honey does not reference those limitations, claiming

instead that ALJ Wolfe made neither any findings concerning her

walking, sitting, and standing abilities, nor provided for any limitations

regarding them. Doc. 138 at 6, 8, 10.

Yet, by the plain language of the ALJ’s decision, she found that

Honey’s physical maladies limited her to performing “light work as

19

defined in 20 CFR 404.1567(b)[,]” Tr. 21, a category that by definition

limits her to no more than “frequent lifting or carrying of objects

weighing up to 10 pounds[,]” and a “good deal of walking or standing”

during the work day. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1567(b). The social security

regulations further instruct that “ ‘[f]requent’ means occurring from

one-third to two-thirds of the time. Since frequent lifting or carrying

requires being on one’s feet up to two-thirds of a workday, the full range

of light work requires standing or walking, off and on, for a total of

approximately 6 hours of an 8-hour workday.” SSR 83-10, 1983 WL

31251, at *6. Thus, by limiting Honey to light work, ALJ Wolfe found □

that Honey was, at a minimum, limited to walking off and on for

approximately 6 hours of the workday. Id.; 20 C.F.R. § 404.1567(b).

In addition to this conventional limitation, ALJ Wolfe also found

that Honey’s limitations in the areas of sitting and standing required

she have a further “sit/stand option with each interval up to 1/2 hour,

but she is not off task while transferring.” Tr. 22. The Social Security

regulations expressly provide for the incorporation of this type of

limitation where “the medical facts lead to an assessment of RFC which

[is] compatible with the performance of either sedentary or light work

20

except that the person must alternate periods of sitting and standing.

The individual may be able to sit for [a] time, but must then get up and

stand or walk for awhile before returning to sitting.” SSR 83-12, 1983

WL 31258, at *4. Accordingly, the ALJ provided special limitations to

accommodate Honey’s more limited ability to sit and stand, which were

more restrictive than the definition of “light work.”

Honey relies on SSR 96-8p to support her assertion that ALJ

Wolfe’s findings were in error. Doc. 18 at 7—8. Specifically, Honey

leverages the “Exertion Capacity” section of the ruling, which provides,

in pertinent part, that

Each function must be considered separately (e.g., “the

individual can walk for 5 out of 8 hours and stand for 6 out of

8 hours”), even if the final RFC assessment will combine

activities (e.g., “walk/stand, lift/carry, push/pull”). Although

the regulations describing the exertional levels of work and

the Dictionary of Occupational Titles and its related volumes

pair some functions, it is not invariably the case that treating

the activities together will result in the same decisional

outcome as treating them separately.

SSR 96-8p, 61 Fed. Reg. 34474, 34477 (July 2, 1996).

Conducting a “function-by-function assessment” requires that an

ALJ “articulate how the evidence in the record supports the RFC

determination, discuss the claimant’s ability to perform sustained work-

21

related activities, and explain the resolution of any inconsistencies in

the record.” Brooks v. Saul, 2019 WL 7048794, *7 (E.D. Pa. 2019)

(quoting Bencivengo v. Comm’ of Soc. Sec., 251 F.3d 153 (8d Cir.

2000)). This does not mean the ALJ must “make specific, written

findings on dozens of individual work function categories.” Brooks, 2019

WL at *7. Rather, it simply means the ALJ’s “RFC determination must

include an explanation of the substantial evidence upon which it relies.”

Id.

The limitation findings an ALJ makes during a residual functional

capacity assessment are subject to the general duty of articulation

standard set forth above. See Fargnoli v. Massanari, 247 F.3d 34, 41 (8d

Cir. 2001) [T]he ALJ’s finding of residual functional capacity must ‘be

accompanied by a clear and satisfactory explication of the basis on

which it rests.”) (quoting Cotter v. Harris, 642 F.2d 700 (8d Cir. 1981)).

This means that well-articulated residual functional capacity

assessments supported by substantial evidence are permitted to

include, in the absence of or in addition to their individually tailored

limitation findings, ones pulled from the regulation’s tiered series of

work capacities. See Chiaradio v. Comm’ of Soc. Sec., 425 F. App’x 158,

22

161 (8d Cir. 2011) (affirming a residual functional capacity assessment

with a “light work” functional limitation that did not engage in a “task

by task analysis,” but was well-articulated and supported “by

substantial evidence on the record.”).

That is precisely what ALJ Wolfe did here, enumerating a

comprehensive discussion of the substantial evidence upon which her

residual functional capacity determination relied. Her discussion

included consideration of Honey’s symptom allegations, her clinical

records, her examination evaluations, her treatment records, and the

available opinion evidence—in other words, it addressed all the

pertinent evidence of record. Tr. 22-26. ALJ Wolfe explained that based

on certain evidence, specifically treatment notes, history of treatment,

pain, and some limitations in performing daily activities, Honey, in

addition to standard light work limitations, required individualized

work limitations in the areas of standing, sitting, climbing, balancing,

stooping, kneeling, crouching, crawling, pushing, and pulling. Id. at 21—

22, 24. Those additional limitations, coupled with the inherent

limitations of the “light work” definition, were consistent with the

evidence and physicians’ opinions in the record that the ALJ deemed

23

persuasive. Id. at 25-26, 92, 111. The Court will refrain from

reweighing those factual determinations. Diaz, 577 F.3d at 504.

ALJ Wolfe also found that because the record lacked sufficient

evidence supporting Honey’s allegations of pain after treatment, near

total inability to perform daily functions, and trouble walking, no

additional limitations beyond those already outlined were necessary.

Tr. at 22-24. That well-articulated “explication of the basis on which”

ALJ Wolfe’s function-by-function assessment relied was substantially

supported by the evidence of record (see id. at 92-97, 111-16, 266-79,

339, 349-411, 440, 730, 736, 884-97, 898-916, 977-78, 990-91, 1039,

1050, 1195-96, 1201, 1203), and does not give rise to any analytical

error. Fargnoli, 247 F.3d at 41.

Honey further argues that the factually analogous matters of

Barbour v. Kijakazi, 2021 WL 44783382 (M.D. Pa. 2021), and Mattox v.

Kyakazi, 2023 WL 5943135 (M.D. Pa. 2023), militate in favor of remand

here. Doc. 18 at 7-11. A review of those decisions—neither of which is

binding precedent—finds that they are inapposite to those facts now

before the Court.

24

In Barbour, the Court rejected an ALJ’s residual functional

capacity determination because “the inadequacies in the ALJ’s function-

by-function assessment, and evaluation of the medical opinion evidence”

frustrated meaningful judicial review. 2021 WL 4478332, at *5.

Specifically, the ALJ made no specific findings regarding the claimant’s

ability to stand and walk, despite lingering record inconsistencies

concerning those functional capacities. Id. This, the Court found, was

significant because it may have impacted the testimony elicited from

the vocational expert. Id. at *6,

Likewise, in Mattox, the Court remanded a disability benefits

denial because the ALJ’s decision had inadvertently and materially

mischaracterized a medical opinion on which it relied when fashioning

the claimant’s residual functional capacity limitations. 2023 WL

5943135, at *7. The Court found that not only did this error frustrate

judicial review, but it was harmful because, similar to the facts in

Barbour, it had a potential impact on the testimony delivered by the

vocational expert. Id. at *8.

Unlike the circumstances in Barbour and Mattox, here, ALJ Wolfe

accurately summarized the medical opinions she considered when

25

fashioning the claimant’s residual functional capacity limitations in the

areas of walking, standing, and sitting (see Tr. 25, 92-94, 111-13), and

ALJ Wolfe made specific findings regarding the claimant’s ability in

those same three areas (id. at 21-22). Accordingly, because ALJ Wolfe’s

function-by-function assessment in her residual functional capacity

determination was premised on substantial evidence and was

sufficiently articulated to permit judicial review, it will be left

undisturbed. Fargnoli, 247 F.3d at 41; Chiaradio, 425 F. App’x at 161.

C. The ALJ’s Evaluation of the Medical Opinions of Dr.

Charles Manganiello and Dr. Catherine Smith

Honey additionally contends that because ALJ Wolfe found the

medical opinions of consultative examiners Dr. Charles Manganiello

and Dr. Catherine Smith persuasive, it gave rise to a duty to explain

any failure to include the sitting, standing, and walking limitations in

those opinions when crafting Honey’s residual functional capacity. Doc.

13 at 11-12; Doc. 18 at 5—7. As set forth above, that characterization is

inconsistent with the limitations set forth in ALJ Wolfe’s residual

functional capacity determination.

An ALJ has no obligation to model a residual functional capacity

assessment after any medical opinion, including those deemed

26

persuasive. See Kertesz v. Crescent Hills Coal Co., 788 F.2d 158, 163 (8d

Cir. 1986) (‘The ALJ is not bound to accept the opinion or theory of any

medical expert, but may weigh the medical evidence and draw its own

inferences.”). To enable meaningful judicial review at the residual

functional capacity stage, an ALJ need not “use particular language or

adhere to a particular format in conducting his analysis.” Jones v.

Barnhart, 364 F.3d 501, 505 (8d Cir. 2004). An ALJ must instead

simply explain his or her findings and sufficiently develop the record.

Id. To allow them the latitude to do this, an ALJ is given sole authority

over “surveying the medical evidence to craft a[] [residual functional

capacity].” Titterington v. Barnhart, 174 F. App’x 6, 11 (8d Cir. 2006).

And as it relates to making findings, “[t]here is no legal requirement

that a physician have made the particular findings that an ALJ adopts

in the course of determining a[] [residual functional capacity].” Id.

In her evaluation of the evidence, ALJ Wolfe assessed the opinions

of Dr. Manganiello and Dr. Smith and found them persuasive, saying

that “[i]Jn general, the doctor’s opinions are consistent with, and

supported by the longitudinal record.” Tr. 25. Those findings specified

that Honey was able to perform light work under 20 C.F.R.

27

§ 404.1567(b), with additional limitations in the areas of climbing,

balancing, stooping, kneeling, crouching, and crawling. Id. at 92-97,

111-16. Both physicians opined that Honey would be limited to

standing or walking for six hours out of an eight-hour workday. Tr. 92,

111.

As discussed supra, ALJ Wolfe’s own residual functional capacity

determination found Honey was limited to light work, the definition of

which “requires standing or walking, off and on, for a total of

approximately 6 hours of an 8-hour workday,” SSR 83-10, 1983 WL

31251, at *6, and thus tracked Dr. Manganiello’s and Dr. Smith’s —

findings. Indeed, in the interest of crediting Honey’s statements about

the negative impact of her symptoms, ALJ Wolfe added additional

limitations in the areas of sitting and standing, including that any job

obtained include “a sit/stand option with each interval up to % hour.”

Tr. at 21-22, 24. Those additional limitations went above those

suggested by Dr. Manganiello and Dr. Smith, thus placing this scenario

beyond Honey’s cited authority. See Doc. 13 at 12-18 (citing Hines v.

Colvin, 2015 WL 8489970 (M.D. Pa. 2015)).

28

Coupled with ALJ Wolfe’s otherwise comprehensive discussion of

the substantial evidence upon which her residual functional capacity

determination relied, see supra at 23-25, her deviation here from the

limitation findings of Dr. Manganiello and Dr. Smith was wholly

permissible, articulated, and even in Honey’s favor. Jones, 364 F.3d at

505; Titterington, 174 F. App’x at 11. Because ALJ Wolfe’s overarching

approach to crafting a residual functional capacity was premised on

substantial evidence and sufficiently articulated to permit judicial

review, it will not be disturbed. Jones, 364 F.3d at 505; Johnson, 529

F.3d at 200.

D. The ALJ’s Evaluation of the Medical Opinion of Dr.

Joseph Patruno

Honey further contends that ALJ Wolfe erred in rejecting the

medical opinion of Dr. Joseph Patruno, a treating physician. Doc. 13 at

13-16. But Honey’s disagreement with the ALJ’s assessment of Dr.

Patruno’s opinion does not warrant remand where, as here, that

evaluation comported with all applicable regulatory requirements.

On November 13, 2020, Dr. Patruno completed a medical

statement related to his treatment of Honey. Tr. 337—41. Of relevance,

he opined that Honey could only sit for 10 minutes at a time, stand for

29

20 minutes at a time, that she could sit, stand, and walk for less than

two hours total during an eight-hour workday, that she required a job

that permitted her to shift from walking, sitting, and standing, that she

needed several unscheduled breaks to lie down, and that she could lift

and carry less than 10 pounds frequently, 10 pounds occasionally, and

20 pounds rarely. Id. at 338-40.

Under the current regulations, medical opinions are not entitled

to any specific weighting, and are instead evaluated based on their

persuasiveness. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520c(a), 404.1520c(b). An ALJ

determines the persuasiveness of a prior medical finding or medical

opinion by assessing five factors: (1) supportability; (2) consistency; (8)

relationship with the claimant; (4) specialization; and (5) other factors.

20 C.F. R. § 404.1520c(a)—(c). The factors related to the substance of

medical opinions—supportability and consistency—are the “most

important factors” for consideration. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520c(b)(2).

Examining supportability entails a review of the opinion’s basis in

relevant “objective medical evidence and supporting explanations

presented by a medical source”; consistency is assessed based on how

consistent a finding or opinion is “with the evidence from other medical

30

sources and nonmedical sources in the claim[.]” 20 C.F.R.

§ 404.1520c(c)(1)-(2).

The Court of Appeals explained in Cotter v. Harris that when

weighing the record, an ALJ “cannot reject evidence for no reason or the

wrong reason” and must explain “why probative evidence has been

rejected ... so that a reviewing court can determine whether the

reasons for rejection were improper.” 642 F.2d 700, 706-07 (8d Cir.

1981). This does not mean, however, that the ALJ must undertake an

exhaustive discussion of all of the evidence. See, e.g., Fargnoli v.

Massanari, 247 F.3d 34, 42 (8d Cir. 2001); Hur v. Barnhart, 94 F. App’x

130, 133 (8d Cir. 2004) (non-precedential) (“There is no requirement

that the ALJ discuss in her opinion every tidbit of evidence included in

the record.”).

Here, ALJ Wolfe found Dr. Patruno’s opinion unpersuasive

because it lacked significant support in and was inconsistent with the

weight of the evidence. She explained that Dr. Patruno’s severe

limitation findings, which, as Honey admits, essentially limited her to

sedentary work or less, Doc. 13 at 14, were neither fully supported by

the record nor adequately tailored to Honey’s condition. Tr. 26. Rather,

31

the ALJ found “that the record supports limiting the claimant to light

work with a sit/stand option,” and noted that “a limitation to sedentary

would aggravate her condition,” as she testified “that sitting aggravates

her pain.” Id.

ALJ Wolfe explained that a light work limitation was more

consistent with the record because, while Honey had some physical

deficits in areas like standing and sitting, she had “no sensory or

strength deficits[,]” and she did “not use any assistive devices to

ambulate.” Id. In accordance with this determination, the ALJ found

that the record did not support limitations beyond the sedentary level in

Honey’s residual functional capacity, including Dr. Patruno’s .

recommendation that she have an option to lie down during the day,

and observation that she was physically limited for weeks following

pain injections. Id. That determination was bolstered by the evidence of

record showing that Honey engaged in standard life activities, such as

preparing meals, doing housework, and driving. Id.

That analysis readily met ALJ Wolfe’s regulatory duty to consider

the consistency and supportability of Dr. Patruno’s opinion, in arriving

at the conclusion that it did not merit persuasive weight. See, e.g., Jones

32

v. Sullivan, 954 F.2d 125, 129 (8d Cir. 1991) (holding medical opinions

that are inconsistent with and unsupported by the medical evidence are

not persuasive or controlling); Wright v. Sullivan, 900 F.2d 675, 683 (8d

Cir. 1990) (same). Furthermore, this Court’s role is not to re-weigh the

evidence to make its own factual determinations. Chandler v. Comm’ of

Soc. Sec., 667 F.3d 356, 359 (8d Cir. 2011). As such, because ALJ Wolfe

evaluated Dr. Patruno’s opinion pursuant to her regulatory duty in

finding it unpersuasive, that finding will not be disturbed.

IV. Conclusion

Accordingly, the Court will affirm the decision of the

Commissioner and deny the Plaintiff's request for relief. A separate

order shall be issued.

Date: September 238, 2025 s/ Phillip J. Caraballo

Phillip J. Caraballo

United States Magistrate Judge

33