Kneitel v. The City of New York

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

MICHAEL J. KNEITEL, MEMORANDUM & ORDER

Plaintiff, 15-CV-6942 (NGG) (LKE)

-against-

THE CITY OF NEW YORK, MARK RYVKIN (in

his professional and individual capacity), DET.

WILLIAM GREER (in his official and individual

capacity), DET. ALI SALAH (in his official and

individual capacity), SGT. ERIC DARGENIO (in

his official and individual capacity), SGT.

WILLIAM BARBIERI (in his official and

individual capacity), SGT. ALAN SOLOMON (in

his individual and official capacity), VINCENT

MOLININI (TAX NO 904598) in his individual

and official capacity), P.O.M. DAVID YAN (in

his individual and official capacity),

LIEUTENANT ROBERT DELANY (in his official

and individual capacity), DEPUTY INSPECTOR

MICHAEL DEDO (in his official and individual

capacity), JOHN AND JANE DOE POLICE

OFFICERS (in their official and individual

capacities), COURTNEY HOGG (in his

individual and official investigative capacity),

KRYSTEN TENDY (in her individual and official

investigative capacity), EMILY SPERLING (in

her official and investigative screening

capacity),

Defendants.

NICHOLAS G. GARAUFIS, United States District Judge.

Pro se Plaintiff Michael J. Kneitel brings this action against De-

fendants the City of New York (“City”), Mark Ryvkin,' Detective

William Greer, Detective Ali Salah, Sergeant Eric Dargenio, Ser-

geant William Barbieri, Sergeant Alan Solomon (“Alan”), Vincent

Molinini, David Yan, Lieutenant Robert Delany, * Deputy Inspec-

tor Michael Dedo,? John and Jane Doe Police Officers, Courtney

Hogg, Krysten Tendy, and Emily Sperling.* (See Am. Compl. at

3-4.) Kneitel pleaded a total of 13 counts, contending: violations

of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (“Section 1983”) (Counts 1-5), malicious

prosecution (Count 6), malicious abuse of process (Count 7),

false arrest and imprisonment (Count 8), battery (Count 9), con-

spiracy (Count 10), intentional infliction of emotional distress

(Count 11), negligence (Count 12), and negligent infliction of

emotional distress (Count 13). Ud. at 8-18.) Pending before the

court is Defendants City, Barbieri, Dargenio, Dedo, Delaney,

1 The Clerk of Court entered a default against Mark Ryvkin on May 5,

2020. (See Entry of Default (Dkt. 145).)

2 The court notes that City Defendants refer to Defendant Lieutenant Rob-

ert Delany as Lieutenant Robert “Delaney.” (See City Defs.’ Not. of Mot.

(Dkt. 167).) The court uses Plaintiffs spelling as alleged in the Amended

Complaint. (See Am. Compl. (Dkt. 32).)

3 The court notes that City Defendants refer to Defendant Deputy Inspector

Michael Dedo as Deputy Inspector Michael “Deddo.” (See City Defs.’ Not.

of Mot.) The court uses Plaintiffs spelling as alleged in the Amended Com-

plaint. (See Am. Compl. (Dkt. 32).)

4 The court dismissed all claims against Emily Sperling, concluding that

she is entitled to absolute prosecutorial immunity. See Kneitel v. City of New

York, No. 15-CV-6942 (NGG) (LB), 2017 WL 5508367, at *5 (E.D.N.Y.

Nov. 15, 2017).

Greer, Hogg, Officer Colin Miskowitz,° Molinini, Salah, Alan, De-

tective Joseph Solomon (“Joseph”), © Tendy, and Yan’s

(collectively, “City Defendants”) motion for summary judgment

filed pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56, which

Kneitel opposes. (City Defs.’ Not. of Mot.; City Defs.’ Mem. in

Supp. of Mot. (“Mot.”) (Dkt. 170); Pl.’s Mem. in Opp’n to Mot.

(“Opp.”) (Dkt. 163 at ECF pp. 10-42); Reply in Supp. of Mot.

(“Reply”) (Dkt. 173).) For the reasons set forth below, City De-

fendants’ motion for summary judgment is GRANTED.

I. BACKGROUND

A. Factual Background’

Kneitel first met Mark Ryvkin in 2010. (City Defs.’ Rule 56.1

Stmt. { 1.) Since then, Ryvkin has lived in the Brooklyn, New

> The court granted Kneitel leave to amend his complaint to add Officer

Colin Miskowitz as a Defendant on March 7, 2017. (See Mar. 7, 2017 Order

(Dkt. 45).)

6 The court granted Kneitel leave to amend his complaint to add Detective

Joseph Solomon as a Defendant on October 17, 2016. (See Oct. 17, 2016

Order (Dkt. 9).)

7 The following facts are drawn from the parties’ respective Local Civil Rule

56.1 statements. The relevant Rule 56.1 statements include City Defend-

ants’ Rule 56.1 Statement in support of the instant motion for summary

judgment, (City Defs” Rule 56.1 Stmt. (Dkt. 169)), and Kneitel’s response

(see Pl.’s General Obs. and Opp. to City Defs.’ Mot (“Pl.’s Stmt. of Facts”)

(Dkt. 163 at ECF pp. 1-9)). While Kneitel’s Statement of Facts fails to com-

ply with Local Rule 56.1 because it does not contain “correspondingly

numbered paragraph[s]” responding to City Defendants’ Rule 56.1 State-

ment, (see Joint Local Rules, $.D.N.Y. & E.D.N.Y. Loc. Civ. R. 56.1(c)), its

paragraphs are numbered and many of Plaintiffs facts contain citations to

attached evidence, (see Joint Local Rules, S.D.N.Y. & E.D.N.Y. Loc. Civ. R.

56.1(d)). The court accordingly disregards Kneitel’s failure to fully comply

with Local Civil Rule 56.1. See Gaft v. Mitsubishi Motor Credit of Am., No.

7-CV-527 (NG) (LB), 2009 WL 3148764, at *4 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 29, 2009)

(reasoning that where a pro se party opposes an adverse party’s Rule 56.1

York apartment unit located above Kneitel’s apartment. (Id. { 2.)

Kneitel asserts that “[f]rom January 2010 through December

2012 dozens of complaints regarding the noise coming from

Mark Ryvkin’s apartment had been reported to the NYPD.” (PI.’s

Stmt. of Facts { 8 (citing Nov. 17, 2024 Kings County Supreme

Court Hrg Tr. 27-31 (Dkt. 163 at ECF pp. 50-51) (Assistant Dis-

trict Attorney reporting to the court that Kneitel lodged “dozens”

of complaints against Ryvkin about noise coming from Ryvkin’s

apartment)).)® A few days prior to January 23, 2013, Kneitel

called the police on Ryvkin because Ryvkin allegedly stuck a

toothpick in Kneitel’s doorbell. (See Pl.’s Stmt. of Facts { 9.)

On January 23, 2013, Kneitel waited for Ryvkin by the lobby of

their apartment building and confronted Ryvkin about noise em-

anating from Ryvkin’s apartment, using profanity to threaten

Ryvkin with eviction. (City Defs.’ Rule 56.1 Stmt. 13.) According

to Kneitel’s deposition testimony, Kneitel was “annoyed” with

Ryvkin’s behavior, noting that it was “the kind of behavior where,

you know. . . you’re asking to get punched in the face.” (Id. 4 4

(quoting Kneitel Dep. Tr. (Dkt. 168-1) 91:10-16).)

statement, “the court has discretion to overlook failures to conform to the

Local Rules, including Rule 56.1”).

Unless otherwise noted, the facts are undisputed. However, to the extent

an assertion or denial of fact is not supported by admissible evidence, the

court will disregard that assertion or denial. See Joint Local Rules, S.D.N.Y.

& E.D.N.Y. Loc. Civ. R. 56.1(d) (“Each statement by the movant or oppo-

nent under Rule 56.1(a) and (b), including each statement denying and

controverting any statement of material fact, must be followed by citation

to evidence that would be admissible.”); Holtz v. Rockefeller & Co., Inc., 258

F.3d 62, 73 (2d Cir. 2001) (“[Wlhere there are no citations or where the

cited materials do not support the factual assertions in the [Rule 56.1]

Statements, the Court is free to disregard the assertion[s].”), abrogated on

other grounds by Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., Inc., 557 U.S. 167 (2009).

8 The court takes notice of the hearing transcript cited by Kneitel, but notes

that “the arguments of counsel are not evidence.” Pretzantzin v. Holder,

736 F.3d 641, 651 (2d Cir. 2013).

1. Kneitel’s January 24, 2013 arrest

On January 24, 2013, Ryvkin called 911 and reported to New

York Police Department (“NYPD”) officer Defendant Yan that he

had been punched by Kneitel. (City Defs.’ Rule 56.1 Stmt. 45; see

Ryvkin 911 Report Audio Recording (Opp., Ex. D (Ryvkin com-

plaining to 911 dispatcher of back pain from the attack).)°

According to Ryvkin’s testimony before the Grand Jury, Kneitel

struck Ryvkin in the face and proceeded to “beat [Ryvkin’s] face

and then beat [Ryvkin’s] body.” (City Defs.’ Rule 56.1 Stmt. { 6;

Sept. 10, 2013 Grand Jury Tr. 1 (Dkt. 168-4) 8:17-25, 9:4-13

(Ryvkin testifying that he was injured and subsequently taken to

Maimonides Medical Center for treatment).) Ryvkin was later re-

leased from the hospital on that day with a “Primary Diagnosis”

of “pain - back.” (Ryvkin Medical Records (Dkt. 163 at ECF p.

68); Pl.’s Stmt. of Facts 4 11 (“There was no evidence of bruising,

swelling, lacerations etc.”) (citing Ryvkin Medical Records at ECF

p. 73).) At the time of the incident, Ryvkin was 66 years old and

Kneitel was approximately 51 years old. (City Defs.’ Rule 56.1

Stmt. { 7.)

Later that day, Ryvkin appeared at the NYPD’s 66th Precinct for

an interview with the detective assigned to the case, Detective

Greer. (City Defs.’ Rule 56.1 Stmt. { 9; Pl.’s Stmt. of Facts 4 12.)

During that interview, Ryvkin corroborated the story he reported

to the 911 dispatcher regarding Kneitel’s attack on him earlier

that day. (See Ryvkin Compl. Follow-Up Rprt. (“Follow-Up

Rprt.”) (Dkt. 168-7) at ECF p. 2 (“Mr. Ryvkin advises that he

wants an order of protection against [Kneitel].”)) At around 1

P.M. that day, Detective Greer and another detective appeared at

Kneitel’s apartment and transported Kneitel to the 66th Precinct

? With the court’s permission, Kneitel submitted a USB-drive with the au-

dio recording of his 911 call as Exhibit D to his opposition to City

Defendants’ motion for summary judgment. (See Nov. 7, 2024 Order (di-

recting Kneitel to serve a copy of the USB-drive on City Defendants).)

for questioning. (See Pl.’s Stmt. of Facts 4 13 (citing Kneitel Writ-

ten Stmt. (Dkt. 163 at ECF p. 98).) During Kneitel’s questioning

at the precinct, Kneitel told Detective Greer that Ryvkin was lying

about the assault and asked Detective Greer to check the build-

ing’s video cameras. (See id. { 14 (citing Greer Dep. Tr. (Dkt. 163

at ECF pp. 99-106) (testifying that the NYPD tried to retrieve the

footage from the building’s video camera but was unsuccess-

ful)).) On or about 5 P.M. that day, Detective Greer arrested

Kneitel for assault in the second degree on a person who is 65

years of age or older in violation of New York Penal Law §

120.05(12). (See Kneitel Dep. Tr. 109:1-21; City Defs.’ Rule 56.1

Stmt. § 11.) Detective Greer did not handcuff Kneitel when he

drove Kneitel to the 66th Precinct, or when he took Kneitel to a

cell in the precinct. (See City Defs.’ Rule 56.1 Stmt. 4 13.)

Detective Greer later signed a criminal court complaint alleging

that Kneitel committed assault in the second degree in violation

of New York Penal Law § 120.05(12), assault in the third degree

in violation of New York Penal Law § 120.00(1), attempted as-

sault in the third degree in violation of New York Penal Law §

110/120.00(1), menacing in the third degree in violation of New

York Penal Law § 120.15, and harassment in the second degree

in violation of New York Penal Law § 240.26(1). Ud. 4 12 (citing

Jan. 24, 2013 Crim. Court Compl. (“Jan. 24 Crim. Compl.”) (Dkt.

168-8)).)

On January 25, 2013, an NYPD officer that Kneitel described as

“white,” “short,” and “nasty” handcuffed Kneitel inside the pre-

cinct and brought Kneitel to Central Booking, where Kneitel

alleges that he was strip searched. (Id. (4 14-15.) Later that day,

Kneitel was arraigned and released on his own recognizance af-

ter approximately 18 hours in custody. (Id. 4 16.) Also on

January 25, 2013, the Kings County Supreme Court issued an

Order of Protection against Kneitel ordering him to refrain from

assaulting, harassing, menacing, intimidating, or threatening

Ryvkin. (Id. 4 17.)!° The Order of Protection was in effect until

July 26, 2013. (id. § 18.) On February 4, 2013, the Kings County

District Attorney charged Kneitel with assault in the third degree

in violation of New York Penal Law § 120.00(1), attempted as-

sault in the third degree in violation of New York Penal Law §

110/120.00(1), menacing in the third degree in violation of New

York Penal Law § 120.15, and harassment in the second degree

in violation of New York Penal Law § 240.26(1). Ud. 9 19; Feb.

4, 2013 Crim. Court Compl. (“Feb. 4 Crim. Compl.”) (Dkt. 168-

12).)1 On April 21, 2013, Ryvkin called 911 and reported that

Kneitel was following him and took pictures. (See Pl.’s Stmt. of

Facts { 16 (alleging that Ryvkin fabricated this story but citing

only a one-page Incident Record which Kneitel described as a

“NYPD printout”); Apr. 21, 2013 Incident Record (Dkt. 163 at

ECF p. 224) (“NEIGHBOR FOLLOWED HIM. . TOOK PICS”).)

2. Kneitel’s July 7, 2013 arrest

On June 30, 2013, Ryvkin reported to the NYPD, including Of

ficer Salah, that Kneitel called Ryvkin and said “I’m gonna get

you.” (See City Defs.’ Rule 56.1 Stmt. 4 20; Pl.’s Stmt. of Facts 4

17.) On July 7, 2013, Officer Salah arrested Kneitel for violating

10 City Defendants cite, inter alia, to Exhibit L of the Declaration of Bailey

Forcier (“Forcier Decl.”) (Dkt. 168) filed in support of their motion. (See

City Defs.’ Rule 56.1 Stmt. { 17 (citing “July 7, 2013 Criminal Court Com-

_plaint, annexed to Forcier Decl. as Ex. L”).) However, the July 7, 2013

Criminal Court Complaint is actually annexed to the Forcier Declaration as

Exhibit K. (See Forcier Decl. € 12 (“Annexed hereto as ‘Exhibit K’ is a true

and correct copy of the July 7, 2013 Criminal Court Complaint.”); Jul. 7,

2013 Crim. Court Compl. (Dkt. 168-11).)

1 City Defendants cite to Exhibit M of the Forcier Declaration. (See City

Defs.’ Rule 56.1 Stmt. 419 (“February 4, 2013 Criminal Court Complaint,

annexed to Forcier Decl. as Ex. M”).) However, the February 4, 2013 Crim-

inal Court Complaint is actually annexed to the Forcier Declaration as

Exhibit L. (See Forcier Decl. 4 13 (“Annexed hereto as ‘Exhibit L’ is a true

and correct copy of the February 4, 2013 Criminal Court Complaint”); Feb.

4 Crim. Compl.)

the Order of Protection. (City Defs.’ Rule 56.1 Stmt. 4 21.) On

that date, Kneitel was first brought to the precinct and then later

brought to Central Booking by two unknown NYPD officers. (Id.

{{ 22-23.) Kneitel was not handcuffed until the NYPD trans-

ported him to Central Booking. (See id.) Later that day, Kneitel

was arraigned at the Kings County Supreme Court and that court

issued a “full stay away order of protection” against Kneitel and

in favor of Ryvkin. (Id. 25-26.) Kneitel was then released on

his own recognizance after approximately 11 hours in custody.

Ud. 25.)

On July 7, 2013, Officer Salah signed a criminal court complaint

alleging that Kneitel had committed criminal contempt in the

first degree in violation of New York Penal Law §§ 215.51(B)(V)

and 215.51(B)(VI), criminal contempt in the second degree in

violation of New York Penal Law § 215.50(3), aggravated har-

assment in the second degree in violation of New York Penal Law

§ 240.30(1)(A), menacing in the third degree in violation of New

York Penal Law § 120.15, and harassment in the second degree

in violation of New York Penal Law § 240.26(1). (Id. § 27.)

Kneitel was subsequently indicted!* and charged with crimes re-

lated to the arrests on January 24, 2013 and July 7, 2013,

12 Kneitel asserts that during Grand Jury proceedings, Assistant District At-

torney Tendy “knew from the medical reports that Ryvkin did not have a

lacerated lip, yet she elicited the false and misleading information anyway”

but ultimately never submitted assault charges to the Grand Jury for con-

sideration because she “knew that Mr. Ryvkin was never assaulted.” (See

Pl’s Stmt. of Facts § 20 (citing Sept. 10, 2013 Grand Jury Hrg Tr. 2 (Dkt.

163 at ECF pp. 225-234)).) The court disregards this assertion because the

cited transcript excerpt of Ryvkin’s Grand Jury testimony does not support

Kneitel’s factual assertions regarding what Assistant District Attorney

Tendy knew during the Grand Jury proceedings. See Holtz, 258 F.3d 62 at

73. The court also disregards Kneitel’s other factual assertions regarding

Assistant District Attorney Tendy’s knowledge during the Grand Jury be-

cause the cited documents do not support Kneitel’s assertions. (See Pl.’s

Stmt. of Facts {4 21-22.) See Holtz, 258 F.3d 62 at 73.

including attempted assault in the second degree, attempted as-

sault in the third degree, harassment in the second degree,

aggravated harassment in the second degree, criminal contempt

in the first degree, and criminal contempt in the second degree.

dd. { 28.) On November 17, 2014, upon Assistant District Attor-

ney Tendy’s application, the Kings County Supreme Court

dismissed the criminal contempt and aggravated harassment

charges against Kneitel because the prosecutors failed to

promptly notify Kneitel’s criminal defense counsel when they

learned that the date of the phone call that was the basis for the

charges was June 25, 2013, and not June 26, 2013, as alleged in

the indictment. (See PI.’s Stmt. of Facts € 23.) On November 19,

2014, the Kings County Supreme Court dismissed the case

against Kneitel on speedy trial grounds pursuant to N.Y. Crim.

Proc. Law § 30.30. (City Defs.’ Rule 56.1 Stmt. □ 29; Pl.’s Stmt.

of Facts 4 24.)

Kneitel never sought any medical treatment because of these in-

cidents. (City Defs.’ Rule 56.1 Stmt. { 30.) On December 16,

2014, Kneitel filed a Notice of Claim against the City. dd. § 31.)

B. Procedural Background

On December 4, 2015, Kneitel filed his initial Complaint. (See

generally Complaint (“Compl.”) (Dkt. 1).) On January 13, 2017,

Kneitel amended his complaint. (See generally Am. Compl.)

On May 24, 2017, City Defendants filed an unopposed motion to

dismiss Kneitel’s claims against Assistant District Attorney Emily

Sperling. (See Mot. to Dismiss (Dkt. 74).) On November 15,

2017, the court granted City Defendants’ motion and dismissed

Kneitel’s claims against Sperling because she is entitled to abso-

lute prosecutorial immunity. Kneitel, 2017 WL 5508367, at *5.

On January 18, 2018, City Defendants filed their answer. (See

Answer (Dkt. 96).)

After approximately two years of discovery and a change in coun-

sel for City Defendants, City Defendants filed their fully-briefed

motion for summary judgment on December 6, 2024. (See Mot.;

Opp.; Reply.) That motion is now pending before the court.

II. LEGAL STANDARD

To obtain Rule 56(a) relief, movants must “identify[] each claim

or defense — or the part of each claim or defense — on which sum-

mary judgment is sought.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). Movants are

entitled to summary judgment if they “show[] that there is no

genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled

to judgment as a matter of law.” Id.; Kemp v. Regeneron Pharms.,

Inc., 117 F.4th 63, 68 (2d Cir. 2024). A fact is material when it

“might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law,”

Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986), and a

dispute of fact is genuine “if the evidence is such that a reasona-

ble jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party,” Gayle v.

Gonyea, 313 F. 3d 677, 682 (2d Cir. 2002).!° “For a genuine dis-

pute regarding a material fact to warrant a jury trial, there must

be sufficient evidence supporting the claimed factual dispute ‘to

require a jury or judge to resolve the parties’ differing versions of

the truth at trial.” Goldberg v. City of New York, No. 19-CV-4241

(GBD) (KHP), 2021 WL 4482149, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 30,

2021) (quoting Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249). However, “[w]hen

no rational jury could find in favor of the nonmoving party be-

cause the evidence to support its case is so slight, there is no

genuine issue of material fact and a grant of summary judgment

is proper.” Gallo v. Prudential Residential Servs., Ltd. P’ship, 22

F.3d 1219, 1224 (2d Cir. 1994).

“The movant carries the burden of proving that no genuine fac-

tual dispute exists.” Arce v. Sovereign Indus. Grp. Inc., No. 19-CV-

13 When quoting cases, unless otherwise noted, all citations and internal

quotation marks are omitted, and all alterations are adopted.

10

489 (NGG) URC), 2025 WL 102449, at *3 (E.D.N.Y. Jan. 15,

2025) (citing Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23

(1986)). In reviewing a summary judgment motion, the court re-

solves “all ambiguities and draw[s] all permissible factual

inferences in favor of the party against whom summary judgment

is sought.” Patterson v. Cnty. of Oneida, 375 F.3d 206, 219 (2d

Cir. 2004). However, the court need not draw any inference that

is “blatantly contradicted by the record, so that no reasonable

jury could believe it.” Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 380 (2007).

Before the court may enter summary judgment, it must “ensure

that each statement of material fact is supported by record evi-

dence sufficient to satisfy the movant’s burden of production

even if the statement is unopposed.” Jackson v. Fed. Express, 766

F.3d 189, 194 (2d Cir. 2014) (citing Vt. Teddy Bear v. 1-800-

BEARGRAM, 373 F.3d 241, 244 (2d Cir. 2004) (explaining that

the court “may not rely solely on the statement of undisputed

facts contained in the moving party’s Rule 56.1 statement”). “In

doing so, the court may rely on other evidence in the record even

if uncited.” Id (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(3)). “If the evidence

submitted in support of the summary judgment motion does not

meet the movant’s burden of production, then summary judg-

ment must be denied even if no opposing evidentiary matter is

presented.” Vt. Teddy Bear, 373 F.3d at 244 (emphasis in origi-

nal).

To defeat a motion for summary judgment, the nonmoving party

must provide “hard evidence,” D’Amico v. City of New York, 132

F.3d 145, 149 (2d Cir. 1998) (collecting cases), “from which a

reasonable inference in [its] favor may be drawn,” Binder &

Binder PC v. Barnhart, 481 F.3d 141, 148 (2d Cir. 2007). Parties

“cannot rely on inadmissible hearsay in opposing a motion for

summary judgment.” Burlington Coat Factory Warehouse Corp. v.

Esprit De Corp., 769 F.2d 919, 924 (2d Cir. 1985). The court re-

lies on “the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories,

and admissions on file, together with the affidavits” to determine

11

whether summary judgment is appropriate. See Ford v. Reynolds,

316 F.3d 351, 354 (2d Cir. 2003); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c).

In a pro se case, courts liberally construe the pro se party’s plead-

ings “to raise the strongest arguments that they suggest.”

McPherson v. Coombe, 174 F.3d 276, 280 (2d Cir. 1999). Gener-

ally, where facts stated in a moving party’s Rule 56.1 Statement

are supported by evidence and denied only by the non-moving

party’s conclusory statement, courts are “directed to find such

facts to be true.” Bob v. Madison Sec. Grp., Inc., No. 14-CV-9727

(KPF), 2016 WL 6952259, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 28, 2016) (citing

Joint Local Rules, S.D.N.Y. & E.D.N.Y. Loc. Civ. R. 56.1). While

pro se litigants “are .. . not excused from meeting the require-

ments of Local Rule 56.1,” Wali v. One Source Co., 678 F. Supp.

2d 170, 178 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) (citing Vt. Teddy Bear, 373 F.3d at

246), “even where there is incomplete compliance with the Local

Rules, a court retains discretion to consider the substance of the

plaintiffs arguments.” Bob, 2016 WL 6952259, at *5; see also

Hayes v. Cnty. of Sullivan, 853 F. Supp. 2d 400, 406 n.1 (S.D.N.Y.

2012) (“In light of Plaintiffs pro se status, the Court overlooks his

failure to file a Local Rule 56.1 Statement and conducts its own

independent review of the record.”).

Ili. DISCUSSION

City Defendants move for summary judgment as to all of Kneitel’s

claims. (See Mot. at 1 (“All of plaintiffs claims fail as a matter of

law.”).) The court first addresses Kneitel’s arguments that he was

not provided with the discovery materials he requested and that

City Defendants’ motion is untimely, then turns to address the

merits of Kneitel’s claims against City Defendants.

A. Kneitel’s discovery requests

Kneitel asserts that City Defendants “have not fully complied with

[his] discovery demands and [Ryvkin] has not only failed to an-

swer the summons and complaint but has refused [Kneitel’s]

12

request for him to appear for the purposes [sic] of being de-

posed.” (See Pl.’s Stmt. of Facts {{ 1, 3, 4, 6.) The court rejects

Kneitel’s request that City Defendants’ motion should be dis-

missed on this ground for two reasons. First, then-Magistrate

Judge Sanket J. Bulsara aptly managed discovery in this case for

a period of almost two years, granting several extensions of the

fact discovery deadline to accommodate Kneitel’s numerous mo-

tions to compel. (See February 21, 2019 Order; May 9, 2019;

October 16, 2019 Minute Entry and Order; January 24, 2020 Or-

der; August 24, 2020 Order; October 30, 2020 Order.) Second,

to the extent that Kneitel argues that he has been prejudiced by

Ryvkin’s failure to appear in this action, the court has already

advised Kneitel that the law provides Kneitel with a remedy

against Ryvkin for Ryvkin’s lack of participation: default judg-

ment. (See October 30, 2020 Order (“Plaintiff also seeks to revisit

the Court’s decisions with respect to Defendant Ryvkin. The re-

quest is denied. . . . Following the conclusion of the case against

the litigating Defendants, Plaintiff may seek a default judgment

against Defendant Ryvkin.”); February 1, 2021 Order (“As to De-

fendant Ryvkin, while the Court is sympathetic to Plaintiffs

inability to obtain records, statements or other evidence from this

Defendant Ryvkin, the only remedy at this point is for him to seek

a default judgment.”).) Accordingly, the court declines to deny

City Defendants’ motion on the grounds that Kneitel was alleg-

edly unable to collect information relevant to his claims during

discovery.

B. City Defendants’ motion is timely

Kneitel’s argument that City Defendants’ motion is untimely be-

cause discovery closed years ago is unavailing. (See Opp. at ECF

p. 3 (citing Fed R. Civ. P. 56(b) (“Time to File a Motion. Unless

a different time is set by local rule or the court orders otherwise,

a party may file a motion for summary judgment at any time until

13

30 days after the close of all discovery.”)).)'4 On August 24,

2020, the court held a status conference and issued an order con-

cluding that “[t]he close of fact discovery shall be extended to

9/30/2020 and the final date to take the first step in dispositive

motion practice shall be 11/2/2020.” (Min. Entry and Order

Dated Aug. 24, 2020 (emphasis in original).) City Defendants

took the first step in dispositive motion practice when they filed

their motion for a pre-motion conference on October 29, 2020

concerning their anticipated motion for summary judgment. (See

City Defs.’ Mot. for Pre-Mot. Conf. (Dkt. 152).) While Kneitel is

correct that discovery closed years ago, (see id; Feb. 1, 2021 Or-

der (“At this point, discovery has closed, and the parties have

taken steps towards summary judgment practice.”), Rule 56(b)

gives the court discretion to make exceptions to the default rule

that parties must file motions for summary judgment within 30

days of the close of discovery. See Fed R. Civ. P. 56(b) (“Unless .

.. the court orders otherwise, a party may file a motion for sum-

mary judgment at any time until 30 days after the close of all

discovery.”) (emphasis added). The court granted City Defend-

ants’ motion for a pre-motion conference on August 6, 2021.

(Aug. 6, 2021 Order.)!° The court set a briefing schedule on City

M4 Kneitel cites “Local Rule 56(b),” but the specific language he discusses

comports to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(b), not to any of the local

civil rules. (See Opp. at 3; see generally Joint Local Rules, S.D.N.Y. &

E.D.N.Y.) Accordingly, the court construes Kneitel’s argument as an asser-

tion that City Defendants’ motion is untimely under Rule 56(b) of the

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See Coombe, 174 F.3d at 280.

15 On September 23, 2021, counsel for City Defendants filed a motion to

substitute attorney, which the court granted the following day. (See City

Defs.’ Mot. to Substitute Attorney (Dkt. 155) (requesting substitution of

Morgan McKinney for Christopher D. DeLuca as counsel for City Defend-

ants); Sept. 24, 2021 Order (granting motion).) On October 12, 2023, new

counsel for City Defendants, Bailey Forcier, filed a notice of appearance.

(See Not. of Appearance (Dkt. 156).) On December 11, 2023, City Defend-

ants reported to the court that “the reason for [the] two-year delay in

14

Defendants’ motion during a pre-motion conference held on May

22, 2024, and later granted Kneitel an extension of time to file

his opposition to City Defendants’ motion. (See Min. Entry Dated

May 22, 2024; Nov. 7, 2024 Order (“The Court GRANTS pro se

Plaintiff Kneitel’s motion and sets the following schedule: Plain-

tifPs opposition due November 15, 2024; and [City] Defendants’

reply, if any, due December 6, 2024.”).) City Defendants filed

their fully-briefed motion for summary judgment on December

6, 2024. (See City Defs.’ Not. of Mot.) Accordingly, because the

court exercised its authority to set aside Rule 56(b)’s 30-day

deadline and City Defendants filed their motion by the court-or-

dered deadline, City Defendants’ motion is timely.

C. False arrest and imprisonment (Counts 1, 2, 8)

Kneitel alleges that: (1) Defendants Greer, Salah, John Doe Po-

lice Officer, Dargenio, Barbieri, Alan, Molinini, and Yan deprived

him of liberty in violation of his rights under the Fifth and Four-

teenth Amendments to the Constitution through their “concerted

unlawful and malicious arrest,” (see Am. Compl. at 10 (bringing

Count 1 under Section 1983)); (2) Defendants Greer and Salah

deprived him of liberty through their “concerted unlawful and

malicious detention and confinement,” (see id. at 11 (bringing

Count 2 under Section 1983)); and (3) Defendants City,

Dargenio, Barbieri, Alan, Molinini and Dedo falsely arrested and

imprisoned Kneitel and are “liable under the doctrine of re-

spondeat superior,” (see id. at 14-15 (Count 8)). City Defendants

argue that these claims fail as a matter of law, and that at a min-

imum, Defendants Greer and Salah are entitled to qualified

immunity. (See Mot. at 8-16.) City Defendants argue further that

providing the Court with dates for a pre-motion conference is that the pre-

vious attorneys assigned to represent defendants were unable to reach

plaintiff to discuss scheduling, despite numerous attempts.” (See Defs.’ Feb.

29, 2024 Ltr. to Court (Dkt. 157) at ECF p. 8 (email from counsel for City

Defendants to court proposing pre-motion conference date).)

15

Kneitel’s claims against Dargenio, Barbieri, Alan, Molini, Yan,

Delaney, and Dedo fail for lack of personal involvement. (See id.

at 6-8.)

“Under New York law, the elements of a false arrest and false ©

imprisonment claim are: (1) the defendant intended to confine

the plaintiff, (2) the plaintiff was conscious of the confinement,

(3) the plaintiff did not consent to the confinement and (4) the

confinement was not otherwise privileged.” Hernandez v. United

States, 939 F.3d 191, 199 (2d Cir. 2019); Caraballo v. City of New

York, 726 F. Supp. 3d 140, 152 (E.D.N.Y. 2024) (noting that Sec-

tion 1983 claims for false arrest and false imprisonment are

“substantially the same” as false arrest and false imprisonment

claims brought under New York law), on reconsideration in part

sub nom. Caraballo v. Surriga, No. 21-CV-285 (ARR) (VMS),

2024 WL 2701644 (E.D.N.Y. May 24, 2024).

“Probable cause is a complete defense to both federal and state

law claims for false arrest and false imprisonment.” Ortiz v. Hen-

riquez, No. 99-CV-3268 (LMM), 2001 WL 1029411, at *4

(S.D.N.Y. Sept. 7, 2001), affd, 41 F. App’x 516 (2d Cir. 2002)

(citing Weyant v. Okst, 101 F.3d 845, 852 (2d Cir. 1996)). An

officer has probable cause to arrest when he or she has

“knowledge or reasonably trustworthy information of facts and

circumstances that are sufficient to warrant a person of reasona-

ble caution in the belief that the person to be arrested has

committed or is committing a crime.” Jaegly v. Couch, 439 F.3d

149, 152 (2d Cir. 2006). “When information is received from a

putative victim or an eyewitness, probable cause exists... unless

the circumstances raise doubt as to the person’s veracity.” Curley

v. Vill. of Suffern, 268 F.3d 65, 70 (2d Cir. 2001). And “[o]nce a

police officer has a reasonable basis for believing there is proba-

ble cause, he is not required to explore and eliminate every

theoretically plausible claim of innocence before making an ar-

rest.” Ricciuti v. N.Y.C. Transit Auth., 124 F.3d 123, 128 (2d Cir.

16

1997). When assessing whether an officer has probable cause to

arrest a suspect, the court considers “only the facts available to

the officer at the time of the arrest and immediately before it.”

Kee v. City of New York, 12 F.4th 150, 158 (2d Cir. 2021).

1. Kneitel’s January 24, 2013 arrest

Based on Ryvkin’s 911 call and Detective Greer’s interview of

Ryvkin on January 24, 2013, the City Defendants had probable

cause to arrest Kneitel on January 24, 2013. According to Detec-

tive Greer’s summary of his interview with Ryvkin, Ryvkin

reported to Detective Greer as follows:

Mr. Ryvkin states early this morning, [Kneitel] approached

him as [Ryvkin], exited the lobby of his residence, and yelled

stop making noise[.] [Ryvkin] advises at this point he tried

to ignore [Kneitel], and kept walking and [Kneitel] punched

[Ryvkin] in the back and then to the face, causing him to fall

to the ground, and hurt his back, he advises he went to Mai-

monides Hospital and was treated for his injuries. [Ryvkin]

states he is now having a lot of back pain. He also confirmed

he is 66 years old... Mr. Ryvkin advises that he wants and

[sic] order of protection against [Kneitel].

(Follow-Up Rprt. at ECF p. 2.) Detective Greer had probable

cause to arrest and confine Kneitel based on his interview with

Ryvkin. Because “[p]robable cause is a complete defense to both

federal and state law claims for false arrest and false imprison-

ment,” Henriquez, 2001 WL 1029411, at *4, the court finds that

City Defendants are entitled to summary judgment for Kneitel’s

false arrest and false imprisonment claims arising from his Janu-

ary 24, 2013 arrest.

2. Kneitel’s July 7, 2013 arrest

On June 30, 2013, Ryvkin reported to the NYPD that Kneitel

called Ryvkin on the phone threatening him:

17

On June 30, 2013, at approximately 1320 hours I did inter-

view Ryvkin, Mark in regards to this case and he states that

Michael Kneital [sic] did call [Ryvkin] on his cell phone and

stated “Im [sic] gonna get you” putting [Ryvkin] in fear.

[Ryvkin] has a valid order of protection against [Kneitel].

Docket #2013KN008147, EXP. 7/26/13 which states that

Michael Kneital [sic] must refrain from contacting [Ryvkin].”

(See June 30 2013 Interview Rprt (Dkt. 168-14) (Officer Salah’s

report documenting his interview with Ryvkin).) Because Officer

Salah had no information undermining the veracity of Ryvkin’s

report to Officer Salah on June 30, 2013, Officer Salah had prob-

able cause to arrest Kneitel on July 7, 2013 for violating the

Order of Protection. See Curley, 268 F.3d at 70. The court there-

fore concludes that City Defendants are also entitled to summary

judgment for Kneitel’s false arrest and false imprisonment claims

arising from his July 7, 2013 arrest. See Henriquez, 2001 WL

1029411, at *4. The court grants City Defendants’ motion for

summary judgment as to Counts 1, 2, and 8 of Kneitel’s Amended

Complaint.!®

D. Strip search (Count 3)

Kneitel alleges that Defendants Greer, Salah, and John Doe Po-

lice Officer caused “[him] to be subjected in the Kings County

Central Booking County jail to a strip search of his body,” in vio-

lation of the Fourth, Fifth, Ninth, and Fourteenth Amendments

to the Constitution. (See Am. Compl. at 11 (bringing Count 3 un-

der Section 1983).) City Defendants argue that these claims fail

16 As Kneitel’s false arrest and imprisonment claims fail as a matter of law,

the court need not address City Defendants’ argument that Detective Greer

and Officer Salah are entitled to qualified immunity. (See Mot. at 13-16.)

See Rera v. Gualtieri, No. 14-CV-3123 (JS) (AKT), 2017 WL 590325, at *5

n.12 (E.D.N.Y. Feb. 14, 2017) (“Because Plaintiffs false arrest claim is

without merit, it is unnecessary for the Court to determine whether quali-

fied immunity applies.”).

18

because Defendants Greer and Salah were not present at Central

Booking during his alleged strip search. (See Mot. at 22-23.)

The Supreme Court has upheld jail policies that require “all ar-

riving detainees to undergo a visual body cavity search before

entering the jail’s general population,” regardless of the circum-

stances. See Murphy v. Hughson, 82 F.4th 177, 184-85 (2d Cir.

2023) (discussing Florence v. Bd. of Chosen Freeholders of Cnty. of

Burlington, 566 U.S. 318, 324-25 (2012)) (emphasis in original).

Furthermore, “[t]he ‘personal involvement of defendants in al-

leged constitutional deprivations is a prerequisite to an award of

damages under [Section] 1983.” Jimenez on behalf of J.M. v.

Cnty. of Suffolk, No. 23-CV-9476 (AMD) (RLM), 2025 WL

948348, at *5 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 28, 2025) (quoting Back v. Hastings

On Hudson Union Free Sch. Dist., 365 F.3d 107, 122 (2d Cir.

2004)). “Simply being a supervisor is not enough to impute per-

sonal involvement onto a defendant; liability exists only where

the ‘defendant, through the official’s own individual actions, has

violated the Constitution.” Tarrant v. City of Mount Vernon, No.

20-CV-9004 (PMH), 2022 WL 17070062, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Nov.

17, 2022) (quoting Tangreti v. Bachmann, 983 F.3d 609, 618 (2d

Cir. 2020)). Speculative assertions of personal involvement are

“Snsufficient to establish a triable issue of fact.” Tarrant, 2022 WL

17070062, at *4.

Kneitel’s Statement of Facts lacks evidentiary support for his as-

sertion that he was subject to an unlawful strip search. (See Pl.’s

Stmt. of Facts at ECF p. 9 (citing People v. Hall, 10 N.Y.3d 303

(N.Y. 2008) and attaching “various news articles” concerning the

“NYPD’s illegal policy of strip searching detainees”).) Only in his

memorandum of law opposing City Defendants’ motion does

Kneitel describe his alleged strip search. (See Opp. at ECF p. 29-

30 (arguing that an officer at Central Booking asked him to un-

dress, “pull down his under wear, squat, lift his penis, then get

dressed”).) Although Kneitel cites no evidence for this assertion,

19

even if the court were to credit his recounting of what happened,

Kneitel underwent a “visual body cavity search.” See Murphy, 82

F.4th at 181 n.3 (2d Cir. 2023) (defining “visual body cavity

search” as “the inspection of a person’s body cavities without con-

tact, such as by having the person manipulate his anatomy, bend

over, or squat and cough”). And the Supreme Court has upheld

a similar New Jersey policy that required “all arriving detainees

to undergo a visual body cavity search before entering the jail’s

general population, ‘regardless of the circumstances of the arrest,

the suspected offense, or the detainee’s behavior, demeanor, or

criminal history.” Id. (quoting Florence, 566 U.S. at 324-25). Ac-

cordingly, Kneitel’s claim that he was unlawfully searched at

Central Booking fails as a matter of law.!” The court grants City

Defendants’ motion for summary judgment as to Count 3 of

Kneitel’s Amended Complaint.

E. Monell claim (Count 5)

Kneitel alleges that the City Defendants violated Section 1983

by “[a]cting under color of law and pursuant to official policy

or custom.” (Am. Compl. at 12-13.) Although Kneitel’s

Amended Complaint does not mention Monell v. Dep’t of Soc.

Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978), the court construes his claim as a

Monell claim. (See Opp. at ECF p. 37 (“Plaintiff, while not an

attorney and untrained in the artful expression of legal argu-

ment and innuendo does make a [Monell] claim over and over

again.”).) See Coombe, 174 F.3d at 280. City Defendants assert

that Kneitel’s Monell claim fails as a matter of law because

“there is no evidence in the record of any municipal practices,

17 Kneitel’s reliance on Hall is inapposite because that case concerned a

“manual body cavity search,” 10 N.Y.3d at 313, which the Second Circuit

noted is “more intrusive than a [visual body cavity search],” Murphy, 82

F.4th at 181 n.3 (noting that “manual body cavity search[es]” entail “phys-

ical inspection of body cavities”).

20

polices, training programs, or anything else that could possibly

support a Monell claim.” (Mot. at 27 (emphasis in original).)

To hold a city liable under Section 1983, a plaintiff must es-

tablish three elements: “(1) an official policy or custom that

(2) causes the plaintiff to be subjected to (3) a denial of a con-

stitutional right.” Wray v. City of New York, 490 F.3d 189, 195

(2d Cir. 2007). A plaintiff can prove this by asserting that a

city’s officers “implement[ed] or execute[ed] a policy state-

ment, ordinance, regulation, or decision officially adopted and

promulgated by that body’s officers” that is unconstitutional.

See Monell, 436 U.S. at 690-91 (noting that unwritten govern-

mental “custom[s]” can still give rise to liability because

“[a]lthough not authorized by written law, such practices of

state officials could well be so permanent and well settled as

to constitute a ‘custom or usage’ with the force of law”) (quot-

ing Adickes v. S. H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 167-168 (1970)

(discussing Section 1983)).

Kneitel alleges that “[a]cting under color of law and pursuant

to official policy or custom,” City Defendants violated his con-

stitutional rights by: (1) “unlawfully and maliciously

harassing” him; (2) “unlawfully and maliciously arresting, im-

prisoning and prosecuting” him, (3) “conspiring” to violate his

constitutional rights; and (4) “otherwise depriving [him] of his

constitutional and statutory rights, privileges, and immuni-

ties.” (See Am. Compl. at 12.) However, as the court explains

throughout this Memorandum & Order, City Defendants had

probable cause to arrest and prosecute Kneitel. His Monell claim

must fail because he has not made the requisite evidentiary

showing at this stage to establish an “official policy or custom”

that existed at the NYPD or the Brooklyn District Attorney’s Office

that violated his constitutional rights. (See generally Am. Compl.)

See Jimenez v. City of New York, No. 21-CV-6133 (RPK) (JRC),

21

2024 WL 198319, at *8 (E.D.N.Y. Jan. 18, 2024) (granting sum-

mary judgment for the City of New York because plaintiffs

“summary judgment brief points to no evidence” of an official

policy of unlawful arrests or prosecutions), aff'd sub nom. Jimenez

v. Bogle, No. 24-323, 2025 WL 883211 (2d Cir. Mar. 21, 2025).

While Kneitel argues in opposition to City Defendants’ motion

that “[a]ccording to the Federal Criminal Justice System, a per-

son is arrested at the conclusion of the investigation” and “NO

INVESTIGATION EVER TOOK PLACE,” (Opp. at ECF p. 37-38),

that assertion is not supported by the law or the facts. Accord-

ingly, the court grants City Defendants’ motion for summary

judgment as to Count 5 of Kneitel’s Amended Complaint.

F. Malicious prosecution (Count 6)

Kneitel asserts that the City Defendants are liable for malicious

prosecution. (See Am. Compl. at 13-14 (“Defendants instituted

criminal process against the plaintiff with malice.”).) City De-

fendants argue that Kneitel’s malicious prosecution claim fails

because there was probable cause to prosecute Kneitel, Kneitel

cannot establish “malice,” and Assistant District Attorneys Hogg

and Tendy are entitled to absolute immunity. (Mot. at 16-22.)

“Under New York State law, a plaintiff seeking to pursue a claim

of malicious prosecution must prove the following four elements:

‘(1) the initiation or continuation of a criminal proceeding

against plaintiff; (2) termination of the proceeding in plaintiffs

favor; (3) lack of probable cause for commencing the proceeding;

and (4) actual malice as a motivation for defendant’s action.”

Dispenza v. City of New York, No. 19-CV-5645 (DG) (CLP), 2023

WL 11845608, at *16 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 7, 2023) (quoting Russell v.

Smith, 68 F.3d 33, 36 (2d Cir. 1995)); Anderson v. City of New

York, 817 F. Supp. 2d 77, 90 (E.D.N.Y. 2011) (“The elements of

a malicious prosecution claim brought under Section 1983 are

substantially the same as in malicious prosecution claims brought

under New York law.”). The Second Circuit has reasoned that a

22.

plaintiff seeking Section 1983 relief for malicious prosecution

“must [also] show some post-arraignment deprivation of liberty

that rises to the level of a constitutional violation.” Singer v. Ful-

ton Cnty. Sheriff, 63 F.3d 110, 117 (2d Cir. 1995).

“[P]robable cause is a complete defense to a claim of malicious

prosecution.” Manganiello v. City of New York, 612 F.3d 149, 161-

62 (2d Cir. 2010) (noting that a grand jury indictment “creates a

presumption of probable cause” that may be rebutted only by

“evidence that the indictment was procured by fraud, perjury, the

suppression of evidence or other police conduct undertaken in

bad faith.”). And “arguable probable cause” is sufficient to grant

qualified immunity on malicious prosecution claims. See Betts v.

Shearman, 751 F.3d 78, 82-83 (2d Cir. 2014).

Kneitel’s malicious prosecution claim fails because he cannot es-

tablish that City Defendants “lack[ed] probable cause for

commencing the proceeding.” See Dispenza, 2023 WL 11845608,

at *16. As discussed supra, City Defendants had probable cause

to arrest him on January 24, 2013 and July 7, 2013. A Grand

Jury also indicted Kneitel on charges arising from his arrests: at-

tempted assault in the second degree, attempted assault in the

third degree, harassment in the second degree, aggravated har-

assment in the second degree, criminal contempt in the first -

degree, and criminal contempt in the second degree. (See City

Defs.’ Rule 56.1 Stmt. § 28.) Kneitel’s unsupported assertion that

Assistant District Attorney Tendy lied at the Grand Jury proceed-

ings is insufficient to rebut the presumption of probable cause for

Kneitel’s prosecution. See supra Part L.A.2 n. 12; Manganiello, 612

F.3d at 161-62. Kneitel’s conclusory assertions about City De-

fendants’ motivations falls short of the “hard evidence” required

to show malice and defeat City Defendants’ motion at this stage.

See D’Amico, 132 F.3d at 149; Fulton v. Robinson, 289 F.3d 188,

198-99 (2d Cir. 2002) (affirming dismissal of malicious prosecu-

tion claim for lack of malice, and because plaintiffs evidence did

23

not rebut the presumption of probable cause created by the in-

dictment). Additionally, the fact that the criminal charges against

Kneitel were dismissed on speedy trial grounds “does not affirm-

atively indicate his innocence, as required under Section 1983.”

See e.g., Roger v. Cnty. of Suffolk, No. 13-CV-5290 (JS) (ARL),

2020 WL 2063415, at *2 (E.D.N.Y. Apr. 29, 2020); Jamison v.

Cavada, No. 17-CV-1764 (LTS) (SDA), 2019 WL 6619328, at *5

(S.D.N.Y. Dec. 5, 2019), as clarified on reconsideration, No. 17-

CV-1764 (LTS) (SDA), 2020 WL 3073234 (S.D.N.Y. June 10,

2020). Accordingly, the court grants City Defendants’ motion for

summary judgment as to Count 6 of Kneitel’s Amended Com-

plaint.1®

G. Malicious abuse of process (Count 7)

Kneitel claims that Defendants Greer, Salah, Hogg, and Tendy

maliciously abused the judicial process. (See Am. Compl. at 14.)

City Defendants argue that this claim fails as a matter of law.

(Mot. at 24-25.)

“In New York, a malicious abuse-of-process claim lies against a

defendant who (1) employs regularly issued legal process to

compel performance or forbearance of some act (2) with intent

' to do harm without excuse or justification, and (3) in order to

obtain a collateral objective that is outside the legitimate ends of

the process.” Savino v. City of New York, 331 F.3d 63, 76 (2d Cir.

18 As Kneitel’s malicious prosecution claim fails as a matter of law, the

court need not address City Defendants’ argument that Assistant District

Attorneys Hogg and Tendy are entitled to absolute immunity. (See Mot. at

20-22.) See Ortiz v. City of New York, No. 97-CV-1596 (DAB), 1998 WL

78288, at *2 n.2 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 24, 1998) (declining to address absolute

immunity issue because plaintiff failed to state a Section 1983 claim

against the prosecutor, but nevertheless noting that “prosecutors are gen-

erally absolutely immune from liability under section 1983 for conduct

‘initiating a prosecution and in presenting the state’s case”) (quoting Im-

bler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 425-28 (1976)).

24

2003) (“Malicious abuse of criminal process also supports liabil-

ity under [Section] 1983.”) (id. at 76-77); Cook v. Sheldon, 41

F.3d 73, 80 (2d Cir. 1994) (“While malicious prosecution con-

cerns the improper issuance of process, the gist of abuse of

process is the improper use of process after it is regularly is-

sued.”). “The crux of a malicious abuse of process claim is the

collateral objective element.” Kraft v. City of New York, 696

F.Supp.2d 403, 416 (S.D.N.Y. 2010), aff'd, 441 Fed. Appx. 24 (2d

Cir. 2011). To establish a collateral objective, a plaintiff must

prove “not that a defendant acted with an improper motive, but

rather an improper purpose — that is, he must claim that a de-

fendant aimed to achieve a collateral purpose beyond or in

addition to his criminal prosecution.” Besedin v. Cnty. of Nassau,

No. 18-CV-819 (NRM) (ST), 2024 WL 4225956, at *15 (E.D.N.Y.

Sept. 18, 2024).

Courts throughout this Circuit “have recognized that probable

cause defeats a claim for abuse of process by demonstrating that

a defendant acted with excuse or justification.” Cruz v. Reiner,

No. 11-CV-2131 (BMC) (SMG), 2011 WL 6204101, at *2

(E.D.N.Y. Dec. 12, 2011) (collecting cases).

Kneitel’s malicious abuse of process claim fails as a matter of law

because, as discussed supra, City Defendants had probable cause

to arrest and prosecute him. Therefore, City Defendants acted

with justification, precluding establishment of the second ele-

ment of a malicious abuse of process claim. See id. Kneitel has

put forward no credible evidence that City Defendants improp-

erly used the judicial process “after it [was] regularly issued.” See

Cook, 41 F.3d at 80. Accordingly, the court grants City Defend-

ants’ motion for summary judgment as to Count 7 of Kneitel’s

Amended Complaint.

H. Battery (Count 9)

Kneitel claims that the City Defendants committed battery

against him by handcuffing him and strip-searching his body.

25

(See Am. Compl. at 15.) City Defendants argue that this claim

fails on the merits. (See Mot. at 28-30.)

Under New York law, a battery claim requires a showing of “bod-

ily contact, made with intent, [that is] offensive in nature.”

Fugazy v. Corbetta, 825 N.Y.S.2d 120, 122 (2d Dep’t 2006). State

law claims for battery are “subject to the same analysis the court

employs to address the excessive force claims.” S.B. v. City of New

York, No. 14-CV-1021 (KAM) (PK), 2016 WL 4530455, at *12

(E.D.N.Y. Aug. 29, 2016). The Supreme Court has held that un-

der the Fourth Amendment, police officers are permitted to use

“objectively reasonable” force to effectuate an arrest. Graham v.

Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 397 (1989). Courts evaluate the reasona-

bleness of handcuffing by considering whether: “1) the handcuffs

were unreasonably tight; 2) the defendants ignored the arrestee’s

pleas that the handcuffs were too tight; and 3) the degree of in-

jury to the wrists.” Esmont v. City of New York, 371 F. Supp. 2d

202, 215 (E.D.N.Y. 2005) (collecting cases). “There is a consen-

sus among courts in this circuit that tight handcuffing does not

constitute excessive force unless it causes some injury beyond

temporary discomfort.” Lynch v. City of Mount Vernon, 567 F.

Supp. 2d 459, 468 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) (collecting cases).

Aside from arguing generally this his “state law claims are valid,”

Kneitel’s opposition brief does not address City Defendants’ argu-

ment that his battery claim fails on the merits. (See generally

Opp.) Kneitel has not made a showing that he was subjected to

unreasonable force when he was handcuffed on January 23,

2014 or July 7, 2013. See Connor, 490 U.S. at 397; Freshwater,

623 F.3d at 96. The NYPD’s handcuffing of Kneitel, arrested on

charges of violent assault, was “objectively reasonable.” See Con-

nor, 490 U.S. at 397. Kneitel has not alleged that the handcuffs

were unreasonably tight or that he suffered injury to his wrists.

See Esmont, 371 F. Supp. at 215. Indeed, Kneitel never sought

26

any medical treatment because of his interactions with City De-

fendants. (City Defs.’ Rule 56.1 Stmt. 30.) And Kneitel’s alleged

strip search cannot support a battery claim because the search

was a visual body cavity search and therefore did not involve City

Defendants physically touching Kneitel. See Corbetta, 825

N.Y.S.2d at 122. Accordingly, the court grants City Defendants’

motion for summary judgment as to Count 9 of Kneitel’s

Amended Complaint.

I. Conspiracy (Counts 4, 10)

Kneitel alleges that City Defendants engaged in an unlawful con-

spiracy to wrongfully arrest, confine, and prosecute Kneitel. (See

Am. Compl. at 11-12, 15-16.) City Defendants argue that there

is no evidentiary support for this assertion. (See Mot. at 23-24.)

Under New York law, to state a civil conspiracy claim a plaintiff

must allege the primary tort and the specific elements of a con-

spiracy: “(a) a corrupt agreement between two or more persons,

(b) an overt act in furtherance of the agreement, (c) the parties’

intentional participation in the furtherance of a plan or purpose,

and (d) the resulting damage or injury.” Chrysler Cap. Corp. v.

Century Power Corp., 778 F. Supp. 1260, 1267 (S.D.N.Y. 1991)

(citing Kashi v. Gratsos, 790 F.2d 1050, 1055 (2d Cir.1986)). “In

order to survive a motion to dismiss on a [Section] 1983 conspir-

acy claim, the plaintiff must allege (1) an agreement between

two or more state actors, (2) concerted acts to inflict an uncon-

stitutional injury, and (3) an overt act in furtherance of the goal.”

Carmody v. City of New York, No. 5-CV-8084 (HB), 2006 WL

1283125, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. May 11, 2006) (citing Ciambriello v.

Cnty. of Nassau, 292 F.3d 307, 324-25 (2d Cir. 2002)).

Kneitel’s argument in opposition to City Defendants’ motion for

summary judgment on his conspiracy claims is conclusory and

unsupported by the evidence. (See Opp. at ECF pp. 32-35.) Ra-

ther than attempting to set forth arguments as to why the record

supports his conspiracy claims brought under New York law or

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Section 1983, Kneitel merely presents a timeline of events, ar-

gues that City Defendants wrongfully chose to believe Ryvkin’s

report, and turns to denigrating the victim and the prosecution.

(dd. at ECF p. 34 (describing Ryvkin as a “narcissistic socio-

path”).) No rational jury could find in favor of Kneitel because

Kneitel’s conspiracy claims are unmoored from and completely

unsupported by the record before this court. Thus, “there is no

genuine issue of material fact and a grant of summary judgment

is proper.” Gallo, 22 F.3d at 1224. Accordingly, the court grants

City Defendants’ motion for summary judgment as to Counts 4

and 10 of Kneitel’s Amended Complaint.

J. Intentional infliction of emotional distress (Count

11)

Kneitel alleges that City Defendants intentionally inflicted emo-

tional distress on Kneitel. (See Am. Compl. at 16-17.) City

Defendants argue that this claim fails because “(1) the alleged

conduct here is insufficiently extreme and outrageous to state a

plausible claim for relief and (2) public policy bars claims sound-

ing in [intentional infliction of emotional distress] against the

City.” (Mot. at 30.)

Plaintiffs must establish the following elements to prove inten-

tional infliction of emotional distress: “(1) extreme and

outrageous conduct; (2) the intent to cause, or the disregard of

a substantial likelihood of causing, severe emotional distress; (3)

causation; and (4) severe emotional distress.” Brunache v. MV

Transp., Inc., 59 N.Y.S.3d 37, 40 (2d Dep’t 2017).

Kneitel’s Amended Complaint pleads the elements of an inten-

tional infliction of emotional distress claim by setting forth legal

conclusions that neatly map onto the cause of action’s elements.

(See Am. Compl. at 16-17.) However, “[m]ere conclusory allega-

tions are insufficient as a matter of law to support a claim for

intentional infliction of emotional distress.” Davis v. City of New

York, No. CV-4309 (SAS), 2000 WL 1877045, at *10 (S.D.N.Y.

28

Dec. 27, 2000). Aside from arguing generally this his “state law

claims are valid,” Kneitel’s opposition brief does not address City

Defendants’ argument that his intentional infliction of emotional

distress claim fails on the merits. (See generally Opp.) And there

is no evidence that City Defendants engaged in extreme or out-

rageous conduct. See Goolden v. Wardak, No. 19-CV-6257 (JPO),

2020 WL 4271695, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. July 23, 2020) (‘New York

sets a high threshold for conduct that is ‘extreme and outrageous’

enough to constitute intentional infliction of emotional dis-

tress.”). Thus, Kneitel’s intentional infliction of emotional distress

claim fails as a matter of law. Accordingly, the court grants City

Defendants’ motion for summary judgment as to Count 11 of

Kneitel’s Amended Complaint.

K. Negligence (Counts 12-13)

Kneitel brings two other claims: negligence and negligent inflic-

tion of emotional distress. (See Am. Compl. at 17-18.) The court

presumes that Kneitel brings these claims under New York state

law because, unlike Kneitel’s other claims, “[S]ection 1983 liabil-

ity may not be premised upon negligence.” See Moffitt v. Town of

Brookfield, 950 F.2d 880, 886 n.5 (2d Cir. 1991) (collecting Su-

preme Court cases). City Defendants assert that all Kneitel’s

claims against the City Defendants premised on state law, includ-

ing his two negligence claims, fail as a matter of law because

Kneitel failed to serve a timely notice of claim on the City. (See

Mot. at 28.) The court finds that Kneitel’s negligence and negli-

gent infliction of emotional distress claims are barred because he

failed to comply with Sections 50-e and 50-i of the New York

Municipal Law.

“New York Municipal Law Section 50-e requires a plaintiff to

serve notice of a tort claim upon a municipality within 90 days

after the claim arises.” Jackson v. City of New York, 29 F. Supp.

3d 161, 181-82 (E.D.N.Y. 2014) (citing N.Y. Gen. Mun. L. §

e(1)). This requirement also extends to claims brought against

29

“any officer, appointee or employee thereof.” N.Y. Gen. Mun. L.

§ 50-e(1)(a). New York Municipal Law Section 50-i generally

requires that such actions be filed “within one year and ninety

days after the happening of the event upon which the claim is

based.” N.Y. Gen. Mun. L. § 50-i(1). New York state courts con-

strue the notice of claim requirements “strictly.” See Humphrey v.

Cnty. of Nassau, No. 6-CV-3682 (JFB) (AKT), 2009 WL 875534,

at *20 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 30, 2009). Although courts must construe

pro se plaintiffs’ complaints “liberally,” federal courts “cannot ex-

empt [pro se plaintiffs] from the notice of claim requirements

under New York law.” Ransom v. Banks, No. 20-CV-10232

(MKV), 2022 WL 769344, at *8 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 14, 2022); Gren-

nan v. Nassau Cnty., No. 4-CV-2158 (DRH) (WDW), 2007 WL

952067, at *17 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 29, 2007) (“The notice of claim

requirements apply equally to state tort claims brought as pen-

dent claims in a federal civil rights action.”).

Kneitel’s claims arise from arrests that took place on January 24,

2013 and July 7, 2013. (See Am. Compl. at 6-7; City Defs.’ Rule

56.1 Stmt. {f 11, 21.) As to Kneitel’s negligence and negligent

infliction of emotional distress claims against the City Defend-

ants, Kneitel was required to comply with the rules concerning

notices of claim because the City Defendants are “public corpo-

ration[s]” (ie, the City) or “officer[s], appointee[s] or

employee[s] thereof’ (i.e. all individual defendants in this matter

other than Ryvkin). See N.Y. Gen. Mun. Law § 50-e(1)(a).

Kneitel also has not alleged that the officers were acting outside

the scope of their employment such that a notice would not be

required. Wharton v. Cnty. of Nassau, No. 10-CV-265 (JS) (AKT),

2013 WL 4851713, at *15 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 10, 2013) (concluding

that where plaintiffs alleged that municipal employees commit-

ted intentional torts, those employees were not acting within the

scope of their employment and such plaintiffs are “not required

to file a notice of claim” as to those defendants).

30

Kneitel was therefore required to serve a notice of claim on City

Defendants for his negligence and negligent infliction of emo-

tional distress claims stemming from his January 24, 2013 arrest

by April 24, 2013 and file a complaint by April 24, 2014. See N.Y.

Gen. Mun. L. 88 50-e(1) and 50-i(1). With respect to Kneitel’s

negligence and negligent infliction of emotional distress claims

against the City Defendants arising from his July 7, 2013 arrest,

Kneitel was required to serve a notice of claim on the City by

October 5, 2013 and file a complaint by October 5, 2014. See id.

However, Kneitel did not submit his Notice of Claim to the City

until December 16, 2014, (see Not. of Claim (Dkt. 168-17)), and

he filed this action on December 4, 2025, (see Compl.). Accord-

ingly, under New York law, Kneitel failed to timely serve the City

with a notice of claim and bring this action. For this reason, the

court grants City Defendants’ motion for summary judgment as

to Kneitel’s negligence claim (Count 12) and negligent infliction

of emotional distress claim (Count 13) against City Defendants.

See Hardy v. N.Y.C. Health & Hosps. Corp., 164 F.3d 789, 794 (2d

Cir. 1999) (“Failure to comply with these requirements ordinar-

ily requires a dismissal for failure to state a cause of action.”);

Smith v. Reid, No. 98-CV-1429 (SJ), 2004 WL 528437, at *11

(E.D.N.Y. Mar. 9, 2004) (granting defendants’ motion for sum-

mary judgment because “Plaintiff failed to file a timely notice of

claim”).

IV. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the court GRANTS City Defendants’

motion for summary judgment in its entirety. The Clerk of Court

is respectfully DIRECTED to enter judgment dismissing all of

Kneitel’s claims against Defendants City of New York, William

Greer, Ali Salah, Eric Dargenio, William Barbieri, Alan Solomon,

Vincent Molinini, David Yan, Robert Delany, Michael Dedo,

Courtney Hogg, Krysten Tendy, Colin Miskowitz, and Joseph Sol-

omon. As this case has now concluded as to the litigating

31

defendants, Plaintiff is now permitted to seek default judgment

against Defendant Mark Ryvkin if he so chooses. The Clerk of

Court is respectfully DIRECTED to send a copy of this Memoran-

dum & Order to pro se Plaintiff at his mailing address.

SO ORDERED.

Dated: — Brooklyn, New York

September 13, 2025

s/Nicholas G. Garaufis

NICHOLAS G. GARAUFIS

United States District Judge

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