The opinion
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
EASTERN DIVISION
JEFFREY A. KEENER, ) CASE NO.: 1:25-CV-01013
)
Plaintiff, ) JUDGE BRIDGET MEEHAN BRENNAN
)
v. )
)
RONALD LEONHARDT, JR., et al., ) OPINION AND ORDER
)
Defendants. )
)
Pro se plaintiff Jeffrey A. Keener filed this civil rights action against Ronald Leonhardt,
Jr., owner of CrossCountry Mortgage; Ilya Palatnik, “Branch Owner CCM”; Tony George of
Goldwater Bank, LLC; and Bobby George, owner of TownHall and Barley House. (Doc. 1.)
Plaintiff filed an application to proceed in forma pauperis. (Doc. 2.) The application is
GRANTED. For the reasons stated herein, this case is DISMISSED.
I. BACKGROUND
Plaintiff’s complaint consists of disjointed and obscure allegations in an outline format.
His stated basis for federal jurisdiction is “political and police influence . . . went to police
multiple times. Anything to protect their evaluations.” (Doc. 1 at 3.)1 In the statement of his
claim, Plaintiff states “Assault . . . paid assailant, warned not to pursue lawsuit 2 times . . .
Harassment – telecommunications, personal hacked phone for years, collusion . . . Intimidation .
. . Bribe by force.” (Id. at 4.) The outline in the remainder of his complaint includes the
following statements: Paid assailant told “leave lawsuit alone”; spiked drink Barley House;
(PLT) Jumped TownHall; offered $100,000,000; Carlie Chepkee (sales rep CCM) trumped up
1 For ease and consistency, record citations are to the electronically stamped CM/ECF document
and PageID# rather than any internal pagination.
charges; paid ex-fiance, stripper, escort . . . to effect (PLT) life negatively; paid other females to
do the same possibly; hacked phone, cable, internet . . . couldn’t complete important phone calls
to do with bills, lawsuit, activation of service for home; anything to negatively attack the
plaintiff’s good character and integrity; and “plays” to destroy me. (Id. at 5-6.)
Finally, Plaintiff states that his claim “stem[s] from a 1999 FBI investigation into men in
and around these corporations. In an attempt to cover up their humble beginnings. These corps
tried to cover this up make me go away.” (Id. at 7.) He seeks more than $500 million in
damages. (Id.; Doc. 4 at 22-23.)
II. LAW AND ANALYSIS
“Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2), a pleading must contain a ‘short and
plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556
U.S. 662, 677-78, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 173 L. Ed. 2d 868 (2009). The factual allegations in the
pleading must be sufficient to raise the right to relief above the speculative level on the
assumption that all the allegations in the complaint are true. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550
U.S. 544, 555, 127 S. Ct. 1955, 167 L. Ed. 2d 929 (2007). The plaintiff is not required to include
detailed factual allegations, but he or she must provide more than “an unadorned, the-defendant-
unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. A pleading that offers legal
conclusions or a simple recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not meet this pleading
standard. Id. The Court is “not bound to accept as true a legal conclusion couched as a factual
allegation.” Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286, 106 S. Ct. 2932, 92 L. Ed. 2d 209 (1986)
(citations omitted).
In reviewing a complaint, the Court must construe the pleading in the light most
favorable to the plaintiff. Bibbo v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 151 F.3d 559, 561 (6th Cir.
1998). A complaint must contain either direct or inferential allegations regarding all the material
elements of some viable legal theory to satisfy federal notice pleading requirements. See Scheid
v. Fanny Farmer Candy Shops, Inc., 859 F.2d 434, 437 (6th Cir. 1988). Although specific facts
are not required, to meet the basic minimum notice pleading requirements of Rule 8 of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Plaintiff’s complaint must give the defendants fair notice of
what the Plaintiff’s legal claims are and the factual grounds on which they rest. See Bassett v.
Nat’l Collegiate Ath. Ass’n, 528 F.3d 426, 437 (6th Cir. 2008) (citing Lillard v. Shelby County
Bd. of Educ., 76 F.3d 716, 726-27 (6th Cir. 1996)).
Pro se pleadings are liberally construed. Boag v. MacDougall, 454 U.S. 364, 365, 102 S.
Ct. 700, 70 L. Ed. 2d 551 (1982) (per curiam); Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520, 92 S. Ct.
594, 30 L. Ed. 2d 652 (1972). The district court, however, is required to dismiss an in forma
pauperis action under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e) if it fails to state a claim upon which relief can be
granted, or if it lacks an arguable basis in law or fact. Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 328,
109 S. Ct. 1827, 104 L. Ed. 2d 338 (1989); Lawler v. Marshall, 898 F.2d 1196 (6th Cir. 1990);
Sistrunk v. City of Strongsville, 99 F.3d 194, 197 (6th Cir. 1996). A claim lacks an arguable
basis in law or fact when it is premised on an indisputably meritless legal theory or when the
factual contentions are clearly baseless. Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 327. An action has no arguable
factual basis when the allegations are delusional or rise to the level of the “wholly incredible.”
Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 33, 112 S. Ct. 1728, 118 L. Ed. 2d 340 (1992). A cause of
action fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted when it lacks “plausibility in th[e]
complaint.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 564.
The Court recognizes that pro se pleadings are held to a less stringent standard than
formal pleadings drafted by lawyers. El Bey v. Roop, 530 F.3d 407, 413 (6th Cir. 2008).
However, the “lenient treatment generally accorded to pro se litigants has limits.” Pilgrim v.
Littlefield, 92 F.3d 413, 416 (6th Cir. 1996). Liberal construction for pro se litigants does not
“abrogate basic pleading essentials.” Wells v. Brown, 891 F.2d 591, 594 (6th Cir. 1989).
Additionally, the Court has discretion to refuse to accept without question the truth of Plaintiff's
allegations when they are “clearly baseless,” a term encompassing claims that may be fairly
described as fanciful, fantastic, wholly incredible, or irrational. Denton, 504 at 32-33.
Here, Plaintiff's complaint fails to meet even the most liberal reading of the Rule 8
pleading standard. His complaint fails to contain any viable federal civil claims within the
jurisdiction of this Court or cite to any recognized legal authority. His references to 42 U.S.C. §
1983, “2921.02,” 47 U.S.C. § 223, and “Civil Code 52.1” are insufficient to invoke jurisdiction
or state plausible claims for relief. (Doc. 1 at 4-6.) Plaintiffs limited factual allegations are
similarly insufficient. Plaintiff therefore fails to meet the minimum pleading requirements of
Rule 8, and his complaint must be dismissed.
IH. CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated herein, Plaintiff's application to proceed in forma pauperis (Doc.
2) is GRANTED, and this case is DISMISSED pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §1915(e). Further, the
Court certifies, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3), that an appeal from this decision could not be
taken in good faith
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Date: September 23, 2025 ¢
UNITED STA DISTRICT JUDGE