The opinion
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
EASTERN DIVISION
CEDRIC A. GLAZE,
Plaintiff,
Case No. 2:22-cv-2855
v. Judge Edmund A. Sargus, Jr.
Magistrate Judge Elizabeth P. Deavers
DONALD MORGAN, et al.,
Defendants.
OPINION AND ORDER
This matter is before the Court on an Order and Report and Recommendation issued by the
Magistrate Judge on July 23, 2025 (ECF No. 83) and on Plaintiff Cedric A. Glaze’s Objection to
Report and Recommendations (ECF No. 84). Also before the Court are several ancillary motions
filed by Mr. Glaze. (ECF Nos. 61, 70, 71, and 79.)
For the reasons stated in this Opinion and Order, the Court SUSTAINS in part and
OVERRULES in part Mr. Glaze’s Objection and MODIFIES the Order and Report and
Recommendation accordingly. The Court otherwise ADOPTS and AFFIRMS the Order and
Report and Recommendation. The Court summarizes the disposition of the case in Part VI of the
Analysis section and addresses Mr. Glaze’s motions in the Conclusion section.
BACKGROUND
In a Report and Recommendation issued on February 3, 2023, the Magistrate Judge
discussed the factual background of this case in detail. (ECF No. 6, PageID 127–35.) The
Magistrate Judge added more factual and procedural background in her Order and Report and
Recommendation issued on July 23, 2025. (R&R, ECF No. 83, PageID 863–64.) The Court adopts
the background facts as discussed in both Reports and Recommendations and summarizes the facts
and procedural history most relevant to this Opinion and Order.
I. Procedural History
Mr. Glaze, a current prisoner at Southern Ohio Correctional Facility, filed a pro se
Complaint raising various civil rights claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against more than thirty
defendants for violations of the U.S. Constitution and state law. (ECF No. 5.) His claims relate to
his time as a prisoner at Ross Correctional Institution (“RCI”) under the supervision of Ohio
Department of Rehabilitation and Corrections (“ODRC”) officials. (Id.) After a screen of Mr.
Glaze’s Complaint under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B), the Court dismissed several of Mr. Glaze’s
claims and terminated several defendants from this case. (ECF No. 6, PageID 138–42; ECF No.
11.) The Court permitted Mr. Glaze to continue his First and Eighth Amendment claims as to most
Defendants named in the Complaint. (ECF No. 11.)
The Court granted Mr. Glaze leave to amend his Complaint. (ECF No. 49.) Mr. Glaze filed
an Amended Complaint. (ECF No. 53.) The Court construed the Complaint (ECF No. 5) and the
Amended Complaint (ECF No. 53) together as the Operative Complaint (ECF No. 56). (See ECF
No. 55.) Mr. Glaze’s Operative Complaint spans 58 pages and is difficult to decipher. Construed
generously, Mr. Glaze brings claims against twenty-nine Defendants, all in their individual
capacities, under the First, Fourth, Fifth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S.
Constitution, and several state law claims.1 (See R&R, PageID 864.) Generally, he alleges
Defendants physically assaulted him, destroyed his property and legal documents, held him under
inhumane conditions, and retaliated against him for protected conduct including filing grievances
against them. (See ECF No. 56.)
1 The Court previously dismissed all of Mr. Glaze’s claims against Defendants in their official
capacities for monetary damages on grounds of Eleventh Amendment immunity. (ECF No. 6,
PageID 137–38; ECF No. 11.)
Among the multiple assaults alleged by Mr. Glaze, three assaults are most relevant here.
First, on March 13, 2021, Mr. Glaze alleges several Defendants assaulted him, including by
punching and kicking him, throwing him into a door frame and file cabinet, and macing him. (Id.
PageID 677–80.) Second, on March 19, 2021, Mr. Glaze alleges Defendant Ewry
“windmill slammed” Mr. Glaze into the ground, causing Mr. Glaze to bleed, and put his knee on
Mr. Glaze’s neck for at least five minutes. (Id. PageID 686.) Third, on May 13, 2021, Mr. Glaze
alleges Defendant Spitnagel punched him after entering his cell with several correctional officers
in response to a hunger strike led by Mr. Glaze. (Id. PageID 691–92.)
Defendants, represented by counsel from Interested Party the State of Ohio, moved to
dismiss some of Mr. Glaze’s claims. (ECF No. 57.) Mr. Glaze responded in opposition. (ECF No.
72.) Defendants replied. (ECF No. 77.) Mr. Glaze filed several motions: a Motion for Preliminary
Injunction or Declaratory Judgment Relief (ECF No. 61), a Motion for Leave to Compile More
Than 25 Interrogatories (ECF No. 70), a Motion to Compel Defendants to Respond to Admissions
Interrogatory and Production (ECF No. 71), and a Motion for Settlement Conference/Arbitration
(ECF No. 79).
II. The Magistrate Judge’s Order and Report and Recommendation
In the Magistrate Judge’s Order and Report and Recommendation, she conducted a fresh
screen of the Operative Complaint under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) and considered the briefing on
Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 57). (R&R.) The Magistrate Judge made the following
recommendations:
• Mr. Glaze’s claims for retaliation in violation of the First Amendment
regarding the revocation of Mr. Glaze’s phone and JPAY privileges can
continue against Defendants Morgan, Diehl, and Mr. Wellinghoff.2
2 Mr. Glaze also named “Mrs. Wellinghoff” as a Defendant but stated no claims against her. (See
R&R, PageID 868.)
• Mr. Glaze’s claims for retaliation in violation of the First Amendment
regarding physical assaults on Mr. Glaze because he filed grievances can
continue against Defendants Spitnagel and Shoemaker.
• Mr. Glaze’s claims for excessive force in violation of the Eighth
Amendment can continue against Defendants Pinson, Bailey, Charlton,
Sexton, Ewry, Tedesko, Knight, Angelo, Brown, Sheppard, Spitnagel,
Cash, Stevens, John Doe #4, and Raypole.
• The Court should dismiss with prejudice all other federal law claims against
all Defendants.
• The Court should dismiss with prejudice all state law claims against
Defendants Morgan, Pinson, Bailey, Charlton, Sexton, Shoemaker, Ewry,
Knight, Angelo, Brown, Sheppard, Spitnagel, Wellinghoff, Cash, Starvers,
John Doe #4, and Raypole.
• The Court should decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the
state law claims against Defendants Linsey, Doughty, Ragland, and
Koveleski and should dismiss those claims without prejudice.
• Mr. Glaze’s various motions (ECF Nos. 61, 70, 71, 79) should be denied as
moot.
(R&R, PageID 892–93.) The Magistrate Judge also concluded that Mr. Glaze had failed to serve
Defendants Wellinghoff, Shoemaker, Sexton, Knight, and Starvers. (Id. PageID 893.) She ordered
Mr. Glaze to submit service copies of his Operative Complaint, summons, and U.S. Marshal forms
within 30 days of the Order and Report and Recommendation, or, in the alternative, to effectuate
service within 60 days. (Id.)
III. Mr. Glaze’s Objections
Mr. Glaze objected to the Order and Report and Recommendations on some, but not all the
Magistrate Judge’s recommendations. (Obj., ECF No. 84.)
First, Mr. Glaze corrected the name of Defendant Cline to Canters and objected to the
Magistrate Judge’s conclusion that he did not state any constitutional claims against Defendant
Canters. (Id., PageID 896.) He restates facts stated in the Operative Complaint that Defendant
Canters threatened to mace him and beat him if Mr. Glaze did not clean up his own vomit and
argues he stated a claim for retaliation in violation of the First Amendment. (Id.)
Second, Mr. Glaze objects to the recommended dismissal of his excessive force claims
against Defendants Doughty and Walters and alleges additional factual allegations about their
participation in a physical assault on him on March 19, 2021. (Id. PageID 896–97.) He argues that
although “their actions were not detailed in” the Operative Complaint, their participation in the
assault “can be easily construed” from the Operative Complaint. (Id.) Mr. Glaze also states the
Court should grant him leave to amend the complaint to add more detail. (Id.)
Third, Mr. Glaze objects to the recommended dismissal of his First Amendment retaliation
claims against Defendants Gibson and Linsey based on their acts alleged in the Operative
Complaint and their participation in “a continuous pattern of retaliation” against him and makes
additional factual allegations against them. (Id. PageID 897.) Mr. Glaze states that Defendants
Gibson and Linsey “did not assault” him. (Id.)
Fourth, Mr. Glaze objects to the recommended dismissal of the First Amendment
retaliation claim against Defendant Raypole and states he “concedes that the retaliation claim
against Defendant Raypole was not address in the Court[’]s Order and Report as Defendant
Raypole and others assaulted [him] on 3-13-2021.” (Id. PageID 898 (citing ECF No. 5, PageID
88).)
Fifth, Mr. Glaze objects to the recommended dismissal of his First Amendment retaliation
claims against Defendants Cash and Starvers. (ECF No. 84, PageID 898.) He claims Defendants
Cash and Starvers “stated while assaulting [him] that their intention was that they would make
sure that [he] ‘wasn’t able to write grievances.’” (Id.) Mr. Glaze also states that the alleged assault
on him by Defendants Cash and Starvers (which is alleged to have occurred on February 23, 2021)
was “10 days after [he] wrote a grievance on their supervisor Lt. Linsey.” (Id.; see ECF No. 56,
PageID 672–73.) He makes additional factual allegations regarding the February 23, 2021 assault.
(ECF No. 84, PageID 898.)
Mr. Glaze also states that he “does not contest to the rest of the Honorable Magistrate
Judge’s Order and Report and Recommendation.” (Id. PageID 899.)
After Mr. Glaze filed his Objection, he filed a Motion to Appoint Counsel and/or for
Investigator for Assistance. (ECF No. 85.)
LEGAL STANDARD
A litigant who is the subject of an adverse report and recommendation from a magistrate
judge is entitled to de novo review of those portions of the report to which proper objections are
made. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b). Upon review, the Court “may accept,
reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or recommendations made by the magistrate
judge.” 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1).
To state a claim upon which relief may be granted, plaintiffs must satisfy the pleading
requirements set forth in Rule 8(a), which requires a pleading to contain a “short and plain
statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2).
Accordingly, “[t]o survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter,
accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S.
662, 677–78 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). “A claim has
facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the
reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. at 678 (clarifying
the plausibility standard from Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). Furthermore, “[a]lthough for purposes
of a motion to dismiss [a court] must take all the factual allegations in the complaint as true, ‘[the
court is] not bound to accept as true a legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation.’” Id. at 678
(quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555) (internal quotations omitted).
Courts liberally construe pleadings by pro se litigants, and such pleadings are subject to
“‘less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers’ and can only be dismissed for
failure to state a claim if it appears ‘beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in
support of his claim which would entitle him to relief.’” Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976)
(quoting Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520–21 (1972) (cleaned up)). The Court must “construe
the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff [and] accept all well-pleaded factual
allegations as true.” Trzebuckowski v. City of Cleveland, 319 F.3d 853, 855 (6th Cir. 2003).
ANALYSIS
The Court reviews Mr. Glaze’s five objections and concludes by summarizing the status of
Mr. Glaze’s case.
I. Objection Regarding Defendant Canters
The Magistrate Judge correctly concluded that Mr. Glaze failed to state a claim for First
Amendment retaliation against Defendant Canters. Mr. Glaze restates the same facts about
Defendant Canters as he stated in the Operative Complaint: Defendant Canters threatened to beat
him and to mace him if he did not clean up his own vomit. (ECF No. 84, PageID 896; ECF No.
56, PageID 682.)
As the Magistrate Judge observed in her screen of Defendant’s Complaint (ECF No. 5),
“[i]t is well-settled that ‘verbal harassment or idle threats by a state actor do not create a
constitutional violation and are insufficient to support a section 1983 claim for relief.’” (ECF No.
6, PageID 138 (quoting Wingo v. Tenneessee Dep’t of Corr., 499 F. App’x 453, 455 (6th Cir. 2012)
(per curiam)).) In the Order and Report and Recommendation, the Magistrate Judge concluded
that Mr. Glaze’s similar allegations regarding Defendant Canters in the Operative Complaint failed
to state a claim for relief. (R&R, PageID 868.) The Court agrees, and Mr. Glaze’s first objection
is OVERRULED.
II. Objection Regarding Defendants Doughty and Walters
Mr. Glaze objects to the dismissal of his excessive force claims against Defendants
Doughty and Walters. (ECF No. 84, PageID 896–97.) He asserts additional facts regarding these
Defendants in the Objection that were not stated in the Operative Complaint and asks for leave of
Court to amend the Operative Complaint to add those facts. (Id.)
A. The Magistrate Judge correctly dismissed the claims on the facts alleged.
Mr. Glaze alleges that, during the incident on March 19, 2021, Defendant Doughty “started
to yell and get irate” and that he “stated what you say, and tried to grab me.” (ECF No. 56, PageID
683, 686.) He also alleged that Defendant Doughty, speaking to Defendant Ewry, “yelled get your
god damn knee out his neck.” (Id. PageID 686.) Mr. Glaze’s sole allegation against Defendant
Walters is that he told another inmate during the incident to stop talking and mind his own business.
(Id.) Mr. Glaze objects on the ground that the Court should have inferred the Defendants’
participation in an assault on him based on these facts.
The Magistrate Judge correctly concluded that these facts fail to state a claim for relief.
These facts do not sufficiently allege that Defendants Doughty or Walters caused harm to Mr.
Glaze or used excessive force. And the Court “should not have to guess at the nature of the claim
asserted.” Wells v. Brown, 891 F.2d 591, 594 (6th Cir. 1989); see also Hawkins-Bivins v. Michigan,
No. 2:25-CV-22, 2025 WL 464702, at *3 (W.D. Mich. Feb. 12, 2025) (“Where a person is named
as a defendant without an allegation of specific conduct, the complaint is subject to dismissal, even
under the liberal construction afforded to pro se complaints.”) On the facts as pled in the Operative
Complaint, Mr. Glaze’s Objection is OVERRULED.
B. Mr. Glaze’s motion for leave to amend his complaint is not well taken.
In his Objection, Mr. Glaze states new facts. He alleges “it was 7 officers total all holding
[him] down by placing knees on the back of [his] body while being choked they were twisting
[his] arms behind his back holding his legs and arms to the ground with knees and hands in which
Defendants Doughty and Walters were of the 7 Correctional Officers[.]” (ECF No. 84, PageID
896.) He makes no such allegations against Defendants Doughty and Walters in the Operative
Complaint.
Mr. Glaze’s assertion of new facts in his Objection equates to an attempt to amend the
allegations in the Operative Complaint. An objection to a magistrate judge’s report and
recommendation is not a new complaint nor an opportunity to supplement the complaint. Mr.
Glaze essentially concedes that he needs leave to amend the Operative Complaint to avoid
dismissal by asking the Court for leave to amend the Operative Complaint.
Rule 15 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides, in situations other than amending
a pleading as a matter of course under Rule 15(a)(1), “a party may amend its pleading only with
the opposing party’s written consent or the court’s leave. The court should freely give leave when
justice so requires.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2). “In deciding whether to allow an amendment, the
court should consider the delay in filing, the lack of notice to the opposing party, bad faith by the
moving party, repeated failure to cure deficiencies by previous amendments, undue prejudice to
the opposing party, and futility of amendment.” Perkins v. Am. Elec. Power Fuel Supply, Inc., 246
F.3d 593, 605 (6th Cir. 2001); see also Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962).
To the extent Mr. Glaze moves to amend the Operative Complaint this late in the litigation,
he fails to state grounds for such extraordinary relief. Mr. Glaze filed his Complaint in June 2022,
more than three years ago. (ECF Nos. 1, 5.) The Court already granted him leave to amend once
(more than two years after he filed his original Complaint) and repeatedly instructed him on the
proper procedure to file an Amended Complaint. (See ECF Nos. 43, 46, 47, 49, 52.) When he did
file an Amended Complaint (ECF No. 53), it did not substantially differ from the original
Complaint, and the Court generously construed his Amended Complaint together with his original
Complaint as the Operative Complaint. (ECF No. 55.) Now, Mr. Glaze again seeks leave to amend
the complaint, more than four years after the incidents in question. He asserts no basis for why he
could not have stated these additional facts years ago, and they are not newly discovered facts or
new occurrences. Granting leave to amend again to add new facts this late in the litigation would
cause further delay and be highly prejudicial to Defendants, and the interests of justice do not
require it.
To the extent Mr. Glaze moves for leave to amend the Operative Complaint, his motion is
DENIED. His objection to the Order and Report and Recommendation regarding Defendants
Doughty and Walters is OVERRULED.
III. Objection Regarding Defendants Linsey and Gibson
Next, Mr. Glaze objects to the recommended dismissal of his First Amendment retaliation
claims against Defendants Linsey and Gibson. To plead a claim for retaliation in violation of the
First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, a plaintiff must plead each of the following:
(1) the plaintiff engaged in protected conduct; (2) an adverse action was taken
against the plaintiff that would deter a person of ordinary firmness from continuing
to engage in that conduct; and (3) there is a causal connection between elements
one and two—that is, the adverse action was motivated at least in part by the
plaintiff’s protected conduct.
Muhammad v. Close, 379 F.3d 413, 416 (6th Cir. 2004) (emphasis added).
A. Defendant Linsey
Mr. Glaze alleges he filed a grievance against Defendant Linsey, a correctional officer, on
February 13, 2021 for improperly handling confiscated property in violation of ODRC policy.
(ECF No. 56, PageID 672.) Mr. Glaze also alleges that he filed a grievance on March 12, 2021,
against Defendants Raypole, Pinson, Bailey, and Tedesko “for brutally assaulting me and planting
drugs on my person to cover their assault.” (Id. PageID 691–93.) On May 13, 2021, after Mr. Glaze
coordinated a hunger strike, Defendant Spitnagel physically assaulted Mr. Glaze after Defendant
Raypole stated “alright Glaze your turn.” (ECF No. 56, PageID 691–92.)
Generously construed, the Operative Complaint alleges that, after the May 13, 2021 hunger
strike and assault, Defendant Linsey, on the same day, moved Mr. Glaze to a cell with “inhumane”
and unsanitary conditions, including remnants of pepper spray that burned his skin, a non-
functioning toilet filled with urine and feces, and a temperature “so cold I was shaking
uncontrollably and every time I tried to use my body heat it activated the [pepper] spray.” (Id.
PageID 693.) He was moved to another cell “just as deplorable” with black mold and was kept
there for more than 90 days. (Id. PageID 693–94.) During this time, he was not provided clothing,
underwear, socks, or shirts and was given cleaning chemicals (but no rags) just once. (Id.)
Additionally, Mr. Glaze alleges he told Defendant Linsey about the assault and Defendant
Linsey told him to file a grievance, but no officers allowed him to file a complaint. (Id.) Construing
the complaint generously, the Court can infer that Mr. Glaze alleges Defendant Linsey refused Mr.
Glaze’s request to file a formal grievance.
i. Protected Conduct
“It is well-settled that ‘an inmate has an undisputed First Amendment right to file
grievances against prison officials on his own behalf.’” Hardrick v. Huss, __F. 4th __, No. 24-
1456, 2025 WL 2599938, at *4 (6th Cir. Sept. 9, 2025) (per curiam) (quoting Maben v. Thelen,
887 F.3d 252, 264 (6th Cir. 2018)); see Maben, 887 F.3d at 265 (“An inmate has a right to file
‘non-frivolous’ grievances against prison officials on his own behalf, whether written or oral.”
(quoting Mack v. Warden Loretto FCI, 839 F.3d 286, 299 (3d Cir. 2016))). Mr. Glaze filed
grievances against Defendant Linsey and other Defendants before he was moved to isolation. The
first element is sufficiently alleged.
ii. Adverse Action
“To evaluate whether conduct constitutes an ‘adverse action,’ [courts] ask whether the
alleged action would deter a person of ‘ordinary firmness’ from engaging in protected activity.”
Hardrick, 2025 WL 2599938, at *5 (quoting Bell v. Johnson, 308 F.3d 594, 603 (6th Cir. 2002)).
At this stage, “the plaintiff need only establish that ‘the retaliatory acts amounted to more than a
de minimis injury.’” Id. (quoting Hill v. Lappin, 630 F.3d 468, 472 (6th Cir. 2010)). Mr. Glaze
alleges Defendant Linsey moved him to a cell with unsanitary conditions, as described above, and
refused to take his grievance report. The unsanitary conditions described are more than de minimis
and are sufficiently deterrent, and it is too early to resolve any factual disputes about the nature
and length of the conditions suffered by Mr. Glaze. The loss of his filing privileges and the increase
in restrictions in his conditions of confinement as alleged are sufficiently adverse. See Maben, 887
F.3d at 267. The second element is met.
iii. Causal Connection
Mr. Glaze also sufficiently alleges a causal connection between the protected conduct of
filing grievances against Defendant Linsey and others and Defendant Linsey’s adverse actions.
“[I]f a defendant retaliates based on protected activity aimed at other officials, it’s still retaliation
based on conduct protected by the First Amendment.” Hardrick, 2025 WL 2599938, at *4 (citing
Thomas v. Eby, 481 F.3d 434, 437, 440 (6th Cir. 2007)). The Operative Complaint alleges that the
move to the unsanitary cell and the refusal to take his grievance report occurred after the grievances
Mr. Glaze filed against Defendants Linsey, Raypole, and others.
The causal connection element is admittedly a close call. And Mr. Glaze’s Operative
Complaint is not artfully drafted to connect all the dots between his protected conduct and the
adverse actions Defendant Linsey took against him. But at this stage, before discovery, he does
not need to do so. Mr. Glaze alleges that he engaged in specific protected conduct by filing
grievances, that Defendant Linsey acted adversely against him by placing him in an unsanitary
isolation cell because of that protected conduct, and that the adverse actions occurred within two
to three months after the protected conduct. See Maben, 887 F.3d at 268 (citing cases holding that
temporal proximity between protected conduct and an adverse action can be evidence of retaliatory
motive). As alleged, in the interim, he faced physical assaults, losses in privileges, and increases
in restrictions relating to his filing of grievances and preparation to file a federal lawsuit. Further
argument that Defendant Linsey’s actions were in response to unrelated disruptive conduct by Mr.
Glaze or were taken for other justifiable reasons wades too heavily into a factual dispute for the
motion to dismiss stage.
Accordingly, Mr. Glaze has sufficiently pled a First Amendment retaliation claim against
Defendant Linsey, and his Objection is SUSTAINED on this claim against him.
B. Defendant Gibson
Mr. Glaze alleges Defendant Gibson, a correctional officer, “turned my water off [and]
wrote me a retaliatory conduct report to further harass me and made false statements in the body
of the report” after he discovered Mr. Glaze in his cell with water on the floor about an hour after
he was assaulted by other correctional officers on May 13, 2021. (ECF No. 56, PageID 693.) Mr.
Glaze appears to state this is the isolation cell Defendant Linsey placed him in after the hunger
strike and assault. He also alleges Defendant Gibson “destroyed my property and legal materials
and documents to prevent evidence of wrongdoing by staff,” referring to items left behind in his
cell when he was moved to the isolation cell. (Id. PageID 694.) Defendant Gibson allegedly
removed from Mr. Glaze’s cell various materials relating to administrative appeals and a federal
court case he was preparing to file, including statements obtained from other inmates, legal
motions, appeal papers, evidentiary documents, religious materials, and other items “because there
were documents that prove staff was fabricating conduct reports, grievances and disciplinary
hearings and classification hearings.” (Id.)
i. Protected Conduct
Mr. Glaze alleges that Defendant Gibson’s actions were in retaliation for him filing a
grievance against Defendant Linsey, which is protected conduct. (Id. PageID 693.) Furthermore,
it is plausibly inferred from the Operative Complaint that Mr. Glaze also alleges Defendant
Gibson’s actions related to other grievance filings and his preparation for a lawsuit regarding his
treatment in prison. The first element is sufficiently pled.
ii. Adverse Action
As the Magistrate Judge observed regarding Mr. Glaze’s retaliation claim against
Defendant Shoemaker, “[c]ell searches can amount to adverse actions that would deter a person of
ordinary firmness, particularly when combined with destruction of property.” (R&R, PageID 874
(citing Alexander v. Makela, No. 2:16-CV-49, 2017 WL 6887037, at *3 (W.D. Mich. Oct. 18,
2017), report and recommendation adopted, No. 2:16-CV-49, 2018 WL 354534 (W.D. Mich. Jan.
9, 2018)).) The same is true regarding Defendant Gibson’s search of Mr. Glaze’s cell, which
allegedly included destruction or removal of evidentiary documents, legal papers, and other
property. The second element is sufficiently pled.
iii. Causal Connection
Last, Mr. Glaze adequately alleges a causal connection between his grievance against
Defendant Linsey and other protected conduct and Defendant Gibson’s retaliatory action. Mr.
Glaze alleges that after he filed a grievance against Defendant Linsey, Defendant Linsey came to
his cell to move him to an isolation pod and threatened to mace him if he did not leave property
behind in his cell. (ECF No. 56, PageID 693.) He then alleges Defendant Gibson “destroyed my
property and legal material and documents” in retaliation “after numerous attempts to retrieve my
property I have been denied.” (Id.)
“At this stage, [the plaintiff] must provide enough facts to show that ‘the adverse action
was motivated at least in part by [his] protected conduct.’” Hardrick, 2025 WL 2599938, at *5
(quoting Heyward v. Cooper, 88 F.4th 648, 657 (6th Cir. 2023)). Construing the allegations
liberally, Mr. Glaze has adequately alleged that Defendant Gibson’s destruction of his property
was motivated at least in part by Mr. Glaze’s filing of grievances and his preparation of a lawsuit
against correctional officers.
Mr. Glaze’s Objection regarding Defendant Gibson is SUSTAINED, and his First
Amendment retaliation claim against Defendant Gibson can continue.
IV. Objection Regarding Defendant Raypole
Mr. Glaze objects to the Magistrate Judge’s conclusion that Mr. Glaze did not state a claim
for relief against Defendant Raypole for First Amendment retaliation. On March 12, 2021, Mr.
Glaze alleges that he told correctional officers Shoemaker, Pinson, Smith, Tackett, and Ewry that
he would be filing a grievance against them for making threats to mace him and beat him and for
“inappropriate supervision.” (ECF No. 56, PageID 675–76.) Mr. Glaze alleges that Defendant
Raypole searched him on his way to breakfast the next day, March 13, 2021, and Defendant
Raypole said he searched him “because you wont stop writing these stupid ass grievances.” (Id.
PageID 676.) After the search, Defendant Raypole ordered Mr. Glaze to return to his cell rather
than go to breakfast, and several correctional officers “started to box [Mr. Glaze] in.” (Id.) Mr.
Glaze threatened to file a grievance against them “for abuse of power and harassment and
retaliation.” (Id. PageID 677.) After some argument, several correctional officers beat Mr. Glaze.
(Id.) Defendant Raypole punched, kneed, and kicked him and rammed his head into a steel file
cabinet. (ECF No. 56, PageID 678–79.)
The Magistrate Judge recommended that Mr. Glaze’s excessive force claim against
Defendant Raypole should continue. She concluded that although Mr. Glaze did not expressly raise
a First Amendment retaliation claim against defendant Raypole, even if he did, the search did not
rise the level of an adverse action. (R&R, PageID 877.) Mr. Glaze admits he did not expressly list
a First Amendment retaliation claim against Defendant Raypole, but he objects to the Order and
Report and Recommendation on the basis that Defendant Raypole’s physical assault on him was
based on him filing grievances and that he adequately states a retaliation claim. (ECF No. 84,
PageID 898.)
The facts alleged in the Operative Complaint are sufficient to put Defendant Raypole on
notice that he is being sued for retaliation in violation of the First Amendment, and the facts alleged
are sufficient to state such a claim. Mr. Glaze alleges Defendant Raypole beat him after he
threatened to file grievances against Defendant Raypole and others. Filing grievances is protected
conduct. The physical assault on Mr. Glaze is an adverse action. And the causal connection is
plausibly inferred from the facts pled.
Mr. Glaze’s Objection regarding Defendant Raypole is SUSTAINED, and his First
Amendment retaliation claim against Defendant Raypole can continue.
V. Objection Regarding Defendants Cash and Starvers
Last, Mr. Glaze objects to the recommended dismissal of his First Amendment retaliation
claims against Defendant Cash and Starvers. In the Operative Complaint, Mr. Glaze alleges
Defendants Cash and Starvers assaulted him on February 23, 2021, in retaliation for a grievance
he filed against their supervisor, Defendant Linsey, ten days earlier. (ECF No. 56, PageID 672–
73.) Defendant Cash harassed Mr. Glaze about his Islamic head wear, pulled him in an area off
camera, and “rammed [his] face into a concrete pillar twice in an attempt to break [his] prescription
eyeglasses.” (Id.) Defendant Starvers “grabbed my other arm and started to twist my arm behind
my back” and “started to bend my fingers back on my right hand trying to break them.” (Id. PageID
673.) Defendant Starvers stated he was going to break Mr. Glaze’s hand to “make sure [he] wasn’t
able to write any lawsuits,” and stated he would give Mr. Glaze “a reason to sue him cause he was
going to break” his hand. (Id.)
The allegations against Defendants Cash and Starvers are sufficient to state a claim for
First Amendment retaliation for many of the same reasons stated above. Mr. Glaze engaged in the
protected conduct of filing a grievance against Defendant Linsey regarding the mishandling of
contraband. Defendants Cash and Starvers assaulted him shortly after that grievance, a clear
adverse action. And the assault is sufficiently causally linked to the grievance to survive a motion
to dismiss. Mr. Glaze alleged Defendant Starvers expressly stated he would break his hand to
prevent him from filing “lawsuits” as Defendants Cash and Starvers assaulted him. (Id.)
Generously construing the facts as alleged and accepting them as true, as this Court must at this
stage, the Court can make a plausible inference of causal connection.
Mr. Glaze’s Objection regarding his First Amendment retaliation claims against
Defendants Cash and Starvers is SUSTAINED, and those claims can continue.
VI. Summary of Disposition
The Court SUSTAINS Mr. Glaze’s Objection as to the recommended dismissal of his First
Amendment retaliation claims against Defendants Linsey, Gibson, Raypole, Cash, and Starvers.
Those claims can continue. The Court OVERRULES Mr. Glaze’s Objection as to the
recommended dismissal of his claims against Defendants Canters, Doughty, and Walters.
Mr. Glaze expressly declined to otherwise object to the Order and Report and
Recommendation after being warned of the consequences of not objecting. (R&R, PageID 893–
94.) Accordingly, he has waived a de novo determination by the district court of any other issues
addressed in the report and recommendation. Thomas v. Arn, 728 F.2d 813 (6th Cir. 1984), aff’d,
474 U.S. 140 (1985); see also United States v. Walters, 638 F.2d 947, 949–50 (6th Cir. 1981).
The Order and Report and Recommendation is MODIFIED to reflect the Objections
sustained as described above and is otherwise ADOPTED and AFFIRMED. Mr. Glaze’s
following claims can continue:
• First Amendment retaliation claims against Defendants Diehl, Morgan, and Mr.
Wellinghoff relating to their revocation of Mr. Glaze’s phone and JPAY privileges;
• First Amendment retaliation claims against Defendants Cash, Gibson, Linsey,
Raypole, Shoemaker, Spitnagel, and Starvers for adverse actions taken because
Mr. Glaze filed or attempted to filed grievances or engaged in other protected
conduct; and
• Eighth Amendment excessive force claims against Defendants Angelo, Bailey,
Brown, Cash, Charlton, John Doe #4, Ewry, Knight, Pinson, Raypole, Sexton,
Sheppard, Spitnagel, Starvers, and Tedesko.
All of Mr. Glaze’s other federal claims are DISMISSED with prejudice.
Regarding Mr. Glaze’s state law claims, the Magistrate Judge recommended that the Court
decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1367 over the claims against
Defendants Linsey, Doughty, Koveleski, and Ragland and should dismiss them without prejudice,
because she also recommended that the Court dismiss all Mr. Glaze’s federal law claims against
those Defendants. (R&R, PageID 891.) Because federal law claims will now continue against
Defendants Linsey and Doughty, the reasoning of that recommendation no longer applies to those
two Defendants.
The Magistrate Judge otherwise recommended that the Court dismiss with prejudice all of
Mr. Glaze’s other state law claims against all other Defendants for failure to state a claim upon
which relief may be granted. (Id. PageID 892.) The Court finds that the reasoning behind that
recommendation applies equally to the state law claims against Defendants Doughty and Linsey.
Mr. Glaze did not object to any of the Magistrate Judge’s recommendations regarding his state law
claims. (See ECF No. 84.)
The Order and Report and Recommendation is thus MODIFIED to reflect that the state
law claims against Defendants Linsey and Doughty are DISMISSED with prejudice, as restated
below. The Order and Report and Recommendation is otherwise ADOPTED and AFFIRMED.
The Court declines to exercise supplementation jurisdiction over the state claims against
Defendants Koveleski and Ragland, and those claims are DISMISSED without prejudice. Mr.
Glaze’s state law claims against all other Defendants are DISMISSED with prejudice.
In sum, individual capacity federal claims remain against Defendants Morgan, Linsey,
Pinson, Bailey, Charlton, Sexton (corrected from “Braxton”), Shoemaker, Ewry, Tedesko, Knight,
Angelo, Brown, Sheppard, Spitnagel, Mr. Wellinghoff, Cash, Starvers, Gibson, John Doe #4,
Diehl (corrected from “Deihl”) and Raypole. No claims remain against Defendants Doughty,
Lyons, Ragland, Koveleski, Mrs. Wellinghoff, John Doe #3 (now identified as Defendant Canters
and previously identified as Defendant Cline), Walters, and Smith.
CONCLUSION
The Court SUSTAINS in part and OVERRULES in part Plaintiff Cedric A. Glaze’s
Objection. (ECF No. 84.) The Court MODIFIES the Magistrate Judge’s Order and Report and
Recommendation (ECF No. 83) regarding the First Amendment retaliation claims against
Defendants Linsey, Gibson, Raypole, Cash, and Starvers as described in this Opinion and Order.
Those claims can continue. The Court also MODIFIES the Order and Report and
Recommendation as to the state law claims against Defendants Linsey and Doughty. The state law
claims against them are DISMISSED with prejudice. The Order and Report and
Recommendation (ECF No. 83) is otherwise ADOPTED and AFFIRMED without additional
modifications.
The Court GRANTS in part and DENIES in part Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss for
Failure to State a Claim. (ECF No. 57.) The Court DENIES as moot Plaintiff’s Motion for
Preliminary Injunction or Declaratory Judgment Relief (ECF No. 61), Plaintiff’s Motion for Leave
to Compile More Than 25 Interrogatories (ECF No. 70), Plaintiff’s Motion to Compel Defendants
to Respond to Admissions Interrogatory and Production (ECF No. 71), and Plaintiff’s Motion for
Settlement Conference/Arbitration (ECF No. 79).
The Clerk is DIRECTED to change the name of Defendant Braxton to Sexton, to change
the name of Defendant Deihl to Diehl, and to change the name of Defendant John Doe #3 to
Canters. The Clerk is also DIRECTED to terminate from the case Defendants Doughty, Lyons,
Ragland, Koveleski, Mrs. Wellinghoff, Canters, Walters, and Smith.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
9/23/2025 s/Edmund A. Sargus, Jr.
DATE EDMUND A. SARGUS, JR.
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE