Morrison v. Dible

[Cite as Morrison v. Dible, 2025-Ohio-4415.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO

THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT

WYANDOT COUNTY

CHRISTI M. MORRISON,

CASE NO. 16-25-01

PETITIONER-APPELLEE,

v.

JEFFREY A. DIBLE, OPINION AND

JUDGMENT ENTRY

RESPONDENT-APPELLANT.

Appeal from Wyandot County Common Pleas Court

Domestic Relations Division

Trial Court No. 24-DR-87

Judgment Affirmed

Date of Decision: September 22, 2025

APPEARANCES:

Sagan Kahler for Appellant

Kelle Saull and Douglas M. Morehart for Appellee

Case No. 16-25-01

WALDICK, P.J.

{¶1} Respondent-appellant, Jeffrey Dible (“Dible”), appeals the judgment of

the Wyandot County Court of Common Pleas granting a domestic violence civil

protection order (“CPO”) pursuant to R.C. 3113.31 in favor of petitioner-appellee,

C.M. For the reasons set forth below, we affirm.

Procedural History

{¶2} Dible and C.M. are an ex-boyfriend and ex-girlfriend who resided

together in 2024. On November 12, 2024, C.M. filed a petition in the trial court for

a domestic violence CPO against Dible, requesting the court issue an ex parte

emergency CPO. On November 12, 2024, the trial court issued an ex parte

protection order and scheduled a full hearing on the petition for November 22, 2024.

{¶3} On November 22, 2024, Dible did not appear for the full hearing, nor

did counsel appear on his behalf. The trial court found that Dible had not been

served, and therefore continued the matter until proper service could be made. The

trial court also reassigned the full hearing for January 10, 2025.

{¶4} On January 10, 2025, the trial court held a full hearing on C.M.’s

petition. C.M. testified in support of her request for a CPO. In opposition, Dible

presented the testimony of two witnesses: himself and his sister, Lisa

Browning. The trial court then ruled from the bench, granting the CPO. On January

13, 2025, the trial court journalized the CPO against Dible, effective until November

12, 2029.

-2-

Case No. 16-25-01

{¶5} On January 31, 2025, Dible filed the instant appeal, in which he raises

one assignment of error.

Assignment of Error

The trial court erred as a matter of law when it granted the

appellee’s petition for domestic violence civil protection order

against the appellant because the pattern of conduct giving rise to

the protection order is protected by the respondent’s right to free

speech.

{¶6} In the sole assignment of error, Dible asserts that the trial court erred in

granting the CPO, arguing that his conduct giving rise to the CPO is constitutionally

protected speech under the First Amendment to the United States Constitution.

{¶7} We review a trial court’s decision to grant or deny a CPO for an abuse

of discretion. Hamon v. Weeks, 2021-Ohio-1770, ¶ 7 (3d Dist.), citing Montgomery

v. Kleman, 2019-Ohio-4526, ¶ 8 (3d Dist). A trial court abuses its discretion when

its decision is unreasonable, arbitrary, or unconscionable. Blakemore v. Blakemore,

5 Ohio St.3d 217, 219 (1983). “If there is some competent, credible evidence to

support the trial court’s decision, there is no abuse of discretion.” Hamon v. Weeks,

supra, at ¶ 7, citing Ross v. Ross, 64 Ohio St.2d 203, 204 (1980); Warnecke v.

Whitaker, 2011-Ohio-5442, ¶ 12 (3d Dist.).

{¶8} The issuance of a domestic violence civil protection order is governed

by R.C. 3113.31, which allows a court to grant a protection order after a full hearing

“to bring about a cessation of domestic violence against * * * family or household

-3-

Case No. 16-25-01

members or persons with whom the respondent is or was in a dating relationship.”

R.C. 3113.31(E)(1).

{¶9} Pursuant to R.C. 3113.31(A)(1), “domestic violence’, as used in that

statutory section, means any of the following:

(a) The occurrence of one or more of the following acts against a

family or household member:

(i) Attempting to cause or recklessly causing bodily injury;

(ii) Placing another person by the threat of force in fear of imminent

serious physical harm or committing a violation of

section 2903.211 or 2911.211 of the Revised Code;

(iii) Committing any act with respect to a child that would result in

the child being an abused child, as defined in section 2151.031 of the

Revised Code;

(iv) Committing a sexually oriented offense.

(b) The occurrence of one or more of the acts identified in divisions

(A)(1)(a)(i) to (iv) of this section against a person with whom the

respondent is or was in a dating relationship.

R.C. 2903.211, referenced in R.C. 3113.31(A)(1)(a)(ii), prohibits menacing

by stalking and provides, in relevant part:

(A)(1) No person by engaging in a pattern of conduct shall knowingly

cause another person to believe that the offender will cause physical

harm to the other person or a family or household member of the other

person or cause mental distress to the other person or a family or

household member of the other person. In addition to any other basis

for the other person’s belief that the offender will cause physical harm

to the other person or the other person’s family or household member

or mental distress to the other person or the other person’s family or

household member, the other person’s belief or mental distress may

be based on words or conduct of the offender that are directed at or

-4-

Case No. 16-25-01

identify a corporation, association, or other organization that employs

the other person or to which the other person belongs.

(2) No person, through the use of any form of written communication

or any electronic method of remotely transferring information,

including, but not limited to, any computer, computer network,

computer program, computer system, or telecommunication device

shall post a message or use any intentionally written or verbal graphic

gesture with purpose to do either of the following:

(a) Violate division (A)(1) of this section;

(b) Urge or incite another to commit a violation of division (A)(1) of

this section.

{¶10} Pursuant to R.C. 2903.211(D)(1), “pattern of conduct” means “two or

more actions or incidents closely related in time, whether or not there has been a

prior conviction based on any of those actions of incidents[.]” Pursuant to R.C.

2903.211(D)(2), “mental distress” means (a) “[a]ny mental illness or condition that

involves some temporary substantial incapacity”, or (b) “[a]ny mental illness or

condition that would normally require psychiatric treatment, psychological

treatment, or other mental health services, whether or not any person requested or

received psychiatric treatment, psychological treatment, or other mental health

services.”

{¶11} At the full hearing held on the CPO petition in the instant case, C.M.

testified that she and Dible began an official dating relationship on November 8,

2023, which lasted until C.M. ended the relationship on August 2, 2024. C.M. ended

the relationship due to Dible being verbally and emotionally abusive. C.M. testified

that there was also domestic violence in the relationship. After C.M. broke off the

-5-

Case No. 16-25-01

relationship and requested that Dible move out of the home they had been sharing,

Dible mounted a smear campaign against C.M. C.M. testified that the initial

incident involved Dible parking his car outside of the Upper Sandusky post office

for three days straight, after having written a message about C.M. in window marker

on the car’s back window. The message read, “I survived living with [C.M.] after

being beaten and stabbed to death and dog poop thrown on me, * * * asking one just

people and exes to confirm she’s a nut job.” Dible’s car was parked at the post

office so that the message in the back window was on display to any persons passing

by on the street, and C.M. recognized the handwriting as Dible’s.

{¶12} After the incident involving Dible’s car at the post office, his car was

moved around the corner and was parked in front of the museum for three days, with

a message on the window reading, “After being * * * beat up multiple times, * * *

dog shit thrown on me and * * * had to go to the ER after cutting my eye, * * *

domestic violence is never the answer * * * . She has a history of doing this to men.

She is a nut job, just ask others. Just ask other men in her past.” C.M. testified that

she recognized that message to have been in Dible’s daughter’s handwriting. The

message on Dible’s car when parked at the museum also included C.M.’s home

address.

{¶13} C.M. testified that after the car had been parked at the museum for

three days, it was moved to a local bank, where it was parked for approximately

twelve hours with the same message displayed.

-6-

Case No. 16-25-01

{¶14} C.M. testified that Dible’s car was then moved back to the

museum. After that, the car was parked in front of the Methodist church, with a

similar message about C.M. displayed on poster board on the inside of the back

window. That message also contained C.M.’s address and phone number. Dible

then subsequently parked the car in front of C.M.’s house for three days with a

similar message displayed. C.M. testified that Dible continued moving his car, and

the messages contained on or in it, to various locations for a period of nearly three

weeks.

{¶15} In addition to displaying messages about C.M. posted on his car, C.M.

testified that Dible also posted large signs on poster board all down the street near

her place of employment, Mennel Milling. C.M. recognized the writing on those

signs to be that of both Dible and his daughter. One sign, posted directly outside

the door of Mennel Milling, read, “[C.M.] is Mennel community pussy. Just go to

the closest cemetery by Seminole 5:00 p.m. and you will get a great view of Google

maps.” Another sign posted near her work place said, “[C.M.] has had more last

names than kids. She has been married five times. She even married a pedophile *

* * and let him be around * * * her kids.”

{¶16} C.M. testified that Dible specifically told her in messages sent to her

that he wanted her to look like a laughing stock and that he would ruin her life. C.M.

testified that her coworkers and her operations manager saw the posters put up near

her place of employment, and C.M. felt her job may be in jeopardy.

-7-

Case No. 16-25-01

{¶17} Finally, C.M. testified that Dible’s stalking-type behavior had caused

her mental anguish, that she had begun mental health counseling as a direct result

of his behavior, and that she would be starting medication as recommended by her

mental health professional in order to help cope with the emotional stress caused by

Dible.

{¶18} Based on that evidence, the trial court issued the domestic violence

civil protection order after making the determination that Dible engaged in a pattern

of conduct that knowingly caused mental distress to C.M.

{¶19} On appeal, as in the trial court, Dible does not dispute that he engaged

in most of the conduct at issue. Rather, Dible argues that such behavior amounted

to free speech protected by the First Amendment to the United States Constitution.

{¶20} The First Amendment to the United States Constitution, applicable to

the states through the Fourteenth Amendment, provides:

Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion,

or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of

speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to

assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances.

{¶21} However, as Dible acknowledges in his merit brief, the protections of

the First Amendment are not absolute and it is well established that the government

may regulate certain categories of expression consistent with the Constitution.

Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 358 (2003).

-8-

Case No. 16-25-01

{¶22} This Court addressed a First Amendment challenge to a civil stalking

protection order in Bey v. Rasawehr, 2019-Ohio-57 (3d Dist.) (judgment rev’d in

part by Bey v. Rasawehr, 2020-Ohio-3301). In our preliminary analysis of the

general constitutional issues involved in that case, where the protection order was

based on a violation of R.C. 2903.211 as in the instant case, this Court stated as

follows:

At the outset we note that several Ohio appellate districts have

addressed constitutional challenges to R.C. 2903.11, Ohio’s menacing

by stalking statute, on the grounds that its proscription of conduct is

vague, arbitrary, or violates the First Amendment, and have been

found [sic] such arguments to be meritless. See e.g., State v. Plants,

5th Dist. Tuscarawas No. 2009 AP 10 0054, 2010-Ohio-2930; State

v. Barnhardt, 9th Dist. Lorain No. 05CA008706, 2006-Ohio-4531;

State v. Werfel, 11th Dist. Lake Nos. 2002-L-101, 2002-L-102, 2003-

Ohio-6958.

As aptly stated by the Fifth Appellate District, underpinning the

rationale stated in these cases is the acknowledgement that “although

we all hold dear the First Amendment protections, we are all aware

that freedom of speech is not absolute. As such, there are classes of

unprotected speech i.e., threatening words, obscene speech, fighting

words, speech that interferes with the rights of others, speech that

creates a clear and present danger, and defamatory speech.” State v.

Wieger, 5th Dist. Stark No. 2008CA00132, 2009-Ohio-1391, ¶ 19.

Likewise, the United States Supreme Court has long held that

“otherwise proscribable criminal conduct does not become protected

by the First Amendment simply because the conduct happens to

involve the written or spoken word. See e.g., United States v. Alvarez,

567 U.S. 709, 721 (2012) (plurality opinion) (noting that “speech

integral to criminal conduct” remains a category of historically

unprotected speech; accord Giboney v. Empire Storage & Ice Co., 336

U.S. 490, 502 (1949) (“[I]t has never been deemed an abridgment of

freedom of speech or press to make a course of conduct illegal merely

because the conduct was in part initiated, evidenced, or carried out by

means of language, either spoken, written, or printed.” (citations

-9-

Case No. 16-25-01

omitted)); see also R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 389 (1992)

(“[W]ords can in some circumstances violate laws directed not against

speech but against conduct (a law against treason, for example, is

violated by telling the enemy the Nation’s defense secrets) ....”).

Further, the United States Supreme Court recognized that not all

speech is of equal First Amendment importance. It is speech on

“‘matters of public concern’” that is “at the heart of the First

Amendment’s protection.” Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss

Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 758 (1985), quoting First National Bank

of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 776 (1978), citing Thornhill v.

Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 101 (1940). Rather, the First Amendment

“was fashioned to assure unfettered interchange of ideas for the

bringing about of political and social changes desired by the people.”

Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 484 (1957); New York Times Co.

v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 269 (1964). “[S]peech concerning public

affairs is more than self-expression; it is the essence of self-

government.” Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 74-75 (1964). In

contrast, speech on matters of purely private concern is of less First

Amendment concern. Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 146-47.

Here, R.C. 2903.211 clearly criminalizes specific conduct directed

toward another person when done for an illegitimate purpose. As

explained above, the unrefuted evidence presented by the petitioners

supported the trial court’s finding that the specific conduct, for which

Rasawehr now asserts is expressive of a public concern and protected

by the First Amendment, was not engaged in for a legitimate reason,

but instead for an illegitimate reason born out of a vendetta seeking to

cause mental distress to his mother and sister and to exact personal

revenge.

Bey, supra, at ¶¶ 38-42.

{¶23} While our decision in Bey was subsequently reversed by the Supreme

Court of Ohio as it related to the propriety of a specific clause in the protection order

at issue, the general constitutional principles set forth in our opinion remain valid.

Furthermore, those principles are equally applicable to the case before us.

-10-

Case No. 16-25-01

{¶24} As our judicial colleagues of the Seventh District Court of Appeals

aptly noted in Miller v. Leone, 2024-Ohio-1325 (7th Dist.), “‘[i]t has been

recognized that threats which intimidate or cause fear or apprehension by the

recipient are unprotected by the First Amendment.’” Id., at ¶ 33, quoting State v.

Myers, 2000 WL 327238, *3 (3d Dist. Mar. 30, 2000), citing Dayton v. Dunnigan,

103 Ohio App.3d 67, 71 (1995). “It is not ‘within the protection of the First

Amendment’s guarantee of free speech to knowingly cause another to believe one

will cause physical harm or mental distress to him or her by engaging in two or more

actions or incidents closely related in time.’” Id., quoting State v. Bilder, 99 Ohio

App.3d 653, 664 (9th Dist.1994).

{¶25} On the basis of the legal authority cited above, and in light of the

nature of the conduct upon which the trial court granted the protection order in this

case, we find Dible’s First Amendment argument to be without merit.

{¶26} The assignment of error is overruled.

Conclusion

{¶27} Having found no error prejudicial to the respondent-appellant, Jeffrey

Dible, in the particulars assigned and argued, the judgment of the Wyandot County

Court of Common Pleas is affirmed.

Judgment affirmed

MILLER and WILLAMOWSKI, J.J., concur.

-11-

Case No. 16-25-01

JUDGMENT ENTRY

For the reasons stated in the opinion of this Court, the assignment of error is

overruled and it is the judgment and order of this Court that the judgment of the trial

court is affirmed with costs assessed to Appellant for which judgment is hereby

rendered. The cause is hereby remanded to the trial court for execution of the

judgment for costs.

It is further ordered that the Clerk of this Court certify a copy of this Court’s

judgment entry and opinion to the trial court as the mandate prescribed by App.R.

27; and serve a copy of this Court’s judgment entry and opinion on each party to the

proceedings and note the date of service in the docket. See App.R. 30.

Juergen A. Waldick, Judge

Mark C. Miller, Judge

John R. Willamowski, Judge

DATED:

/jlm

-12-