Robledo v. City of Tampa

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

TAMPA DIVISION

RACHEL ROBLEDO,

Plaintiff,

Case No. 8:25-cv-0609-WFJ-SPF

v.

CITY OF TAMPA, et al.

Defendants.

___________________________________/

ORDER

Before the Court are Defendants Shadai Cunningham, in her individual

capacity; Joseph Estrada, in his individual capacity; Shannon Murphy, in his

individual capacity; Neal Smith, in his individual capacity; Kevin Schoolmeesters,

in his individual capacity; Robin Sarrasin, in her individual capacity; and the City of

Tampa’s (the “City”) Motions to Dismiss. Dkts. 10, 16, and 17. Plaintiff Rachel

Robledo has responded in opposition. Dkts. 18, 21, and 22. After careful

consideration, the Court grants Defendants’ motions to dismiss.

BACKGROUND

This dispute arises out of the shooting of Plaintiff Robledo’s unleashed pit

bull by the Tampa Police Department (the “TPD”).1 On March 17, 2021, Ms.

Robledo called 911 to report that a suspicious person armed with a long gun was on

1 In Plaintiff’s responses, Ms. Robledo makes several references to the “body-worn camera” recordings from the

various Defendant-officers. See e.g., Dkt. 18 at 3. Plaintiff states that she has possession of these recordings. Id. at 13.

These recordings are neither attached to the Complaint nor anywhere else in the record. As such, the Court only

considers and recounts the factual allegations within the four corners of Plaintiff’s Complaint. See Dkt. 1.

a balcony of a building within her apartment complex. Dkt. 1 ¶ 31. TPD dispatched

Defendant-officers Estrada and Cunningham in response to the 911 call. Id. When

the officers arrived at the Bowery Bayside Complex, they did not encounter or find

anyone armed with a gun. Id. ¶¶ 32–40. Ms. Robledo observed the officers’ arrival

and the fact that they never encountered anyone with a gun. Id. ¶¶ 41–43.

After Officers Estrada and Cunningham left the apartment complex, Ms.

Robledo called 911 again and informed dispatch that the officers had failed to

properly investigate the unknown individual with a gun. Id. ¶¶ 40, 42. TPD

dispatched Officers Estrada and Cunningham back to Plaintiff’s apartment complex,

with Officer Estrada calling Ms. Robledo to obtain additional information about the

suspicious person. Id. ¶¶ 44–49. Officers Estrada and Cunningham then went to

Plaintiff’s apartment and “took a tactical approach outside” her door. Id. ¶ 51. When

officers knocked on her door, Ms. Robledo alleges that she was “extremely scared

to go outside.” Id. ¶ 52. In the process of answering the door, Plaintiff’s unleashed

dog, Nala, “accidentally got out.” Id. At this point, Officer Cunningham “instantly

fired two shots at” Nala, hitting the dog in the head and left shoulder. Id. ¶ 53. Officer

Estrada was hit by one of Officer Cunningham’s bullets. Id. ¶ 55.

Minutes after the shooting, Ms. Robledo and her neighbors found Nala and

placed her into Plaintiff’s vehicle with the intention of getting her to the animal

hospital. Id. ¶ 68. Officer Estrada stopped her, stating “[w]e need you to stay.” Id. ¶

70. Ms. Robledo replied, “I’m not staying,” and went back into her apartment to grab

her purse without interference from Officer Estrada. Id. ¶ 71. During this time, other

officers were arriving on scene, including Defendant-officer Robin Sarrasin, who

allegedly blocked Plaintiff from leaving with her police vehicle. Id. ¶ 80. Bystanders

appeared and joined in the affair, instructing the officers. Id. ¶¶ 81–89. Officer

Sarrasin told Ms. Robledo that “an ambulance [is] coming for the dog.” Id. ¶ 85.

Following more verbal altercations, Officer Sarrasin radioed her supervisor asking,

“Are we allowing the owner of the dog to transport the dog to a vet[,] or are we

having paramedics check it?” Id. ¶ 90. The supervisor responded, “Paramedics aren’t

going to work on a dog.” Id. ¶ 91.

At some undetermined point, Defendant Shannon Murphy (a sergeant with

the TPD) arrived on scene. Id. ¶¶ 107–109. When Ms. Robledo asked to speak with

Sergeant Murphy, Officer Sarrasin told her that Sergeant Murphy was “on the phone,

he’s trying to talk to someone else to find out if we can let you leave.” Id. ¶¶ 107–

108. During this time, Officers Estrada and Sergeant Murphy obtained Ms.

Robledo’s full name and date of birth. Id. ¶ 109. Plaintiff was permitted to leave,

and Nala was brought to the veterinarian’s hospital, where she was treated for her

gunshot wounds, which were not fatal. Id. ¶ 115. Ms. Robledo estimates that she was

“illegally detained” for twelve minutes. Id. ¶ 111.

On March 26, 2021, Plaintiff filed an online complaint with the TPD against

Defendant-officers Cunningham, Estrada, Sarrasin, and Murphy. Id. ¶ 154. The

complaint was assigned to Defendant-detective Neal Smith. Id. ¶ 159.

Approximately one week after submitting the online complaint, Plaintiff noted that

the status of the complaint had been closed. Id. ¶ 157. She was informed that her

complaint was still open. Id. ¶ 159. On April 28, 2021, Plaintiff spoke to Defendant

Smith over the phone. Id. ¶ 160. Following this phone call, Plaintiff emailed Smith,

copying Defendant-Captain Kevin Schoolmeesters. Id. On May 12, 2021, Ms.

Robledo emailed Defendants Smith and Schoolmeesters a second time about her

complaint. Id. ¶ 161. In June 2021, Defendant Smith conducted a recorded telephone

interview with the Plaintiff. Id. ¶ 162. Plaintiff states Defendant Smith would not

listen or let her talk on the call, id. ¶¶ 163–64, and Defendants Schoolmeesters and

Smith would not investigate her complaint. Id. ¶¶ 167–70. On October 4, 2021, Ms.

Robledo received an email from Defendant Schoolmeesters indicating that her

complaint was closed, along with some accompanying documents. Id. ¶ 162–165.

On March 13, 2025, Plaintiff Robledo filed suit, alleging Fourth Amendment

violations under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for unlawful detention by Cunningham, Estrada,

Sarrasin, and Murphy (Count I); failure to intervene to stop the unlawful detention

by Cunningham, Estrada, Sarrasin, and Murphy (Count II); failure to investigate her

internal affairs complaint and deprivation of due process by Smith and

Schoolmeesters (Count III); and a Monell claim against the City for failure to train

and supervise (Count IV). See Dkt. 1. Defendants responded by filing the instant

motions to dismiss, contending that all officers are entitled to qualified immunity

and that the City is not the moving force behind any constitutional violation. See

Dkts. 10, 16, and 17.

LEGAL STANDARD

A complaint withstands dismissal under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure

12(b)(6) if the alleged facts state a claim for relief that is “plausible on its face.”

Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550

U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). This standard does not require detailed factual allegations but

demands more than an unadorned accusation. Id. All facts are accepted as true and

viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Pielage v. McConnell, 516 F.3d

1282, 1284 (11th Cir. 2008).

However, because Ms. Robledo is proceeding pro se, her pleadings are held

to a less stringent standard than pleadings drafted by an attorney and will be liberally

construed. See Tannenbaum v. United States, 148 F.3d 1262, 1263 (11th Cir. 1998).

While the Court applies less stringent pleading standards to complaints in pro se

actions, a pro se plaintiff remains subject to the same laws and rules of the Court,

including the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and the Local Rules for the Middle

District of Florida, as a litigant represented by counsel. See Moon v. Newsome, 863

F.2d 835, 837 (11th Cir. 1989).

DISCUSSION

For the reasons discussed below, the Court grants Defendants’ motions to

dismiss. As pled, the Court finds that all Defendant-officers are entitled to qualified

immunity and each count is due to be dismissed.

I. Qualified Immunity

The qualified immunity defense shields “government officials performing

discretionary functions . . . from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct

does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a

reasonable person would have known.” Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818,

(1982); Loftus v. Clark-Moore, 690 F.3d 1200, 1204 (11th Cir. 2012). “[E]ntitlement

to qualified immunity is for the court to decide as a matter of law.” Simmons v.

Bradshaw, 879 F.3d 1157, 1163 (11th Cir. 2018).

The Eleventh Circuit teaches that: “As an immunity from suit, qualified

immunity is not, as the district court stated, ‘more appropriately resolved at the

summary judgment sta[g]e or later in the proceedings.’ To the contrary, our

precedents mandate its resolution ‘at the earliest possible stage in litigation.’” Miller

v. Palm Beach Cnty. Sheriff’s Off., 129 F.4th 1329, 1334 (11th Cir. 2025) (quoting

Jordan v. Doe, 38 F.3d 1559, 1565 (11th Cir. 1994)).

Generally, it is proper to grant a motion to dismiss on qualified immunity

grounds when the “complaint fails to allege the violation of a clearly established

constitutional right.” Id.; see also Quiller v. Barclays Am./Credit, Inc., 727 F.2d

1067, 1069 (11th Cir. 1984). This is a question of law, and the Court accepts “the

facts alleged in the complaint as true and draw[s] all reasonable inferences in the

plaintiff’s favor.” St. George v. Pinellas Cnty., 285 F.3d 1334, 1337 (11th Cir. 2002).

“Once an officer has raised the defense of qualified immunity, the burden of

persuasion on that issue is on the plaintiff.” Id.

To receive qualified immunity, an official must first “establish that he or she

acted within the scope of discretionary authority when the allegedly wrongful acts

occurred.” Robinson v. Sauls, 46 F.4th 1332, 1340 (11th Cir. 2022) (citations and

internal quotations omitted). Once this showing is made, the burden shifts to the

plaintiff to show that (1) the defendant violated a constitutional right and (2) this

right was clearly established at the time of the alleged violation. Id. at 1340–41.

As an initial matter, there is no dispute that Defendant-officers Cunningham,

Estrada, Sarrasin, Murphy, Smith, and Schoolmeesters were acting within the scope

of their discretionary authority when interacting with Ms. Robledo. Plaintiff’s

Complaint concedes that each Defendant “acted under the color of law and within

the scope of their employment at all times relevant to this lawsuit.” Dkt. 1 ¶ 28.

Indeed, accepting the facts alleged in the Complaint as true, each Defendant had

been “performing a function that, but for the alleged constitutional infirmity, would

have fallen within his [or her] legitimate job description” with the TPD. Holloman

ex rel. Holloman v. Harland, 370 F.3d 1252, 1266 (11th Cir. 2004). As such,

Plaintiff has the burden to show that the officers violated a constitutional right and

that this right was clearly established at the time of the alleged violation. The Court

begins with the claims of illegal detention and failure to intervene in Counts I and

II, then considers the due process claim in Count III, and concludes with Plaintiff’s

Monell claim against the City of Tampa in Count IV.

a. Illegal Detention Claim—Count I

Beginning with Plaintiff’s “illegal detention” claim, Defendants argue that

Ms. Robledo was not “seized” under the Fourth Amendment when officers requested

she stay on scene following the shooting of Nala and Officer Estrada. Dkt. 10 at 5.

The Fourth Amendment guarantees “[t]he right of the people to be secure in their

persons . . . against unreasonable searches and seizures.” U.S. Const. amend IV. “A

person is seized by the police and thus entitled to challenge the government’s action

under the Fourth Amendment when the officer, by means of physical force or show

of authority, terminates or restrains [the person’s] freedom of movement.” Brendlin

v. California, 551 U.S. 249, 254 (2007) (internal quotation marks omitted). Even a

temporary detention for only a brief period of time constitutes a “seizure” within the

meaning of the Fourth Amendment. Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 809–10

(1996).

“The test for whether the officer restrained a citizen’s liberty is whether ‘a

reasonable person would feel free to terminate the encounter.’” United States v.

Knights, 989 F.3d 1281, 1286 (11th Cir. 2021) (quoting United States v. Drayton,

536 U.S. 194, 201 (2002)). The Court “must imagine how an objective, reasonable,

and innocent person would feel, not how the particular suspect felt.” Id. (citations

omitted). “All the circumstances are relevant, including whether a citizen’s path is

blocked or impeded; whether the officers retained the individual’s identification; the

suspect’s age, education and intelligence; the length of the . . . detention and

questioning; the number of police officers present; whether the officers displayed

their weapons; any physical touching of the suspect; and the language and tone of

voice of the police.” Id. (citation and internal quotations omitted). The Court will

address each Defendant separately as it pertains to their actions towards Plaintiff

following Nala’s shooting.

Here, accepting the factual allegations in the Complaint as true, Ms. Robledo

has not alleged that Defendant Cunningham participated in any “illegal detention.”

As Defendants’ motion to dismiss correctly articulates, “[t]he allegations in

paragraphs 67 through 120 do not mention or reference[] Cunningham. The

Complaint does not indicate where Cunningham was at the time that Plaintiff was

detained. The Complaint does not allege that Cunningham told Plaintiff she could

not leave. The Complaint does not allege that Cunningham blocked or restricted

Plaintiff’s movements.” Dkt. 10 at 6; see also Dkt. 1 ¶¶ 67–120. Plaintiff’s vague

and conclusory allegation that “other on-scene Tampa Police Officers continued to

illegally detain Ms. Robledo” is insufficient to include Defendant Cunningham in

her “illegal detention” claim. Dkt. 1 ¶ 102. Because there are no allegations that

Defendant Cunningham used physical force or a show of authority to restrain

Plaintiff’s freedom of movement, the Court finds that Defendant Cunningham is

entitled to qualified immunity as to Count I.

Next, even liberally construing the factual allegations, the Court cannot say

that a reasonable person would not have felt free to leave during the encounter with

Defendant Estrada, who had just been injured in the shooting. Ms. Robledo alleges

that Defendant Estrada told her, “We need you to stay.” Dkt. 1 ¶ 70. But, there are

no other factual allegations that Defendant Estrada used physical force or a show of

authority to prevent Plaintiff from leaving the scene. For example, the Complaint

never recounts that Defendant Estrada physically touched Plaintiff, that Estrada

displayed his service weapon when telling the Plaintiff to stay, that Estrada used

coercive language or a tone of voice suggesting Plaintiff was not free to leave, that

Estrada retained Ms. Robledo’s identification, or that Estrada blocked or impeded

Ms. Robledo’s car. On the contrary, the Complaint appears to allege that Plaintiff

was free to leave, as Ms. Robledo told Defendant Estrada, “I’m not staying,” and

then freely returned to her apartment to retrieve her car keys and purse. Dkt. 1 ¶ 71.

After getting those items, Plaintiff entered her vehicle without any interference from

Defendant Estrada. Id.; see also Knights, 989 F.3d at 1286–87 (“Knights was

physically capable of walking away. He also could have driven away, and the

officers did not display their weapons, touch Knights, or even speak to him—let

alone issue any commands or ask him for his identification and retain it. And before

the officers approached Knights, they did not activate the lightbar or siren on the

patrol car, and as we have mentioned, they allowed Keaton to leave the car, ignore

their invitation to talk, and enter the home where the car was parked.”); United States

v. Ligon, No. 21-11351, 2022 WL 2091598, at *2 (11th Cir. June 10, 2022) (“The

record shows a reasonable person would have felt free to leave prior to this command

because, in the beginning of the interaction, Ligon walked away from Griffin.”).

Thus, the Court finds that Defendant Estrada is entitled to qualified immunity as to

Count I.

As to Defendants Murphy and Sarrasin, the Complaint sufficiently alleges that

a reasonable person would not feel free to leave based on their actions. Plaintiff

recounts that Defendant Sarrasin “positioned herself to obstruct Ms. Robledo’s car .

. . from leaving to go to the emergency veterinary hospital” and repeatedly

disregarded Plaintiff’s requests to leave. Dkt. 1 ¶¶ 80–109; see Ligon, 2022 WL

2091598, at *2. While not entirely clear, Plaintiff also seems to allege that Defendant

Sarrasin was acting on orders from Defendant Murphy when preventing Plaintiff

from leaving the scene. Id. ¶¶ 96–110. Thus, liberally construing the Complaint and

accepting the factual allegations as true, Defendants Murphy and Sarrasin, by using

physical force and a show of authority, “seized” Plaintiff by restraining her freedom

of movement. As such, the Court must determine whether the “seizure” violated the

Fourth Amendment.

As pled in the Complaint, the officers never arrested Ms. Robledo; rather, the

officers briefly detained her following Nala and Officer Estrada’s shooting. See Dkt.

1 ¶¶ 68–111. However, the Court still applies a “seizure” analysis under the Fourth

Amendment because “whenever a police officer accosts an individual and restrains

his freedom to walk away, he has seized that person.” Corbitt v. Vickers, 929 F.3d

1304, 1313 (11th Cir. 2019) (quoting Michigan v. Summers, 452 U.S. 692, 696 n.5

(1981)). Put differently, “an innocent bystander who is not suspected of any

wrongdoing may be seized—in some cases reasonably and in other cases potentially

unreasonably—within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.” Id.

To determine whether Ms. Robledo’s twelve-minute “seizure” was

reasonable, the Court applies the test outlined in Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 16 (1968)

for a seizure that “lack[s] the essential attributes of full, custodial arrests.” Croom v.

Balkwill, 645 F.3d 1240, 1246 (11th Cir. 2011). In Terry, the Supreme Court set out

a two-part inquiry to evaluate the reasonableness of an investigative stop. United

States v. Acosta, 363 F.3d 1141, 1144 (11th Cir. 2004). First, the Court must

“examine whether the officer’s action was justified at its inception, which turns on

whether the officers had a reasonable suspicion that the defendant had engaged, or

was about to engage, in a crime.” Id. at 1144–45 (internal quotation marks and

citations omitted). Second, a court must “determine[] whether the stop went too far

and matured into arrest before there was probable cause” by considering “whether

[the stop] was reasonably related in scope to the circumstances which justified the

interference in the first place.” Id. at 1145 (internal quotation marks and citations

omitted).

Under the first prong of the Terry inquiry, the Eleventh Circuit has noted that

reasonable suspicion “is not concerned with ‘hard certainties, but with

probabilities.’” United States v. Lewis, 674 F.3d 1298, 1304 (11th Cir. 2012)

(quoting United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 418 (1981)). “To show that an officer

has reasonable suspicion, the officer must be able to articulate more than an inchoate

and unparticularized suspicion or hunch of criminal activity.” United States v.

Gonzalez-Zea, 995 F.3d 1297, 1302 (11th Cir. 2021) (citations and internal

quotations omitted). Further, reasonable suspicion may “be based on commonsense

judgments and inferences about human behavior.” Id. at 1303 (citation omitted).

“[W]e look to the totality of the circumstances to determine the existence of

reasonable suspicion.” Id. (quoting United States v. Jordan, 635 F.3d 1181, 1186

(11th Cir. 2011)).

Here, based on the allegations in the Complaint and the totality of the

circumstances, Officer Sarrasin (and, by extension, Sergeant Murphy as the

supervisor on scene)2 had reasonable suspicion to briefly detain Ms. Robledo

following a shooting after dark, where a possible sniper-type subject was reported,

and an unleashed dog and an officer had been shot.

First, Defendants Sarrasin and Murphy were responding (at night)3 to an

apartment complex that has a history of “a high volume of calls for service,” Dkt. 1

¶¶ 31–32, (i.e., a high-crime area).4 An unknown individual had been reported with

a “long gun on a balcony,” and an officer and an unleashed dog had just been shot.

Dkt. 1 ¶¶ 3, 31, 32, 42, 60–65.

Second, arriving only minutes after the shooting, Officer Sarrasin was faced

with a confusing, evolving, and escalating situation where a distraught Ms. Robledo

and neighbors were getting vocal and frustrated with law enforcement. Id. ¶¶ 75–

109. Plaintiff has been screaming. Id. ¶ 56. Plaintiff also told neighbors Officer

2 Officers are allowed to conduct a Terry stop on an individual based on “the collective knowledge of the officers

involved in the stop.” United States v. Acosta, 363 F.3d 1141, 1145 (11th Cir. 2004) (quoting United States v. Williams,

876 F.2d 1521, 1524 (11th Cir. 1989)). As such, the information Officer Sarrasin observed can be extended to Sergeant

Murphy.

3 See Dkt. 10 at 22 (Plaintiff’s response describing Defendant Sarrasin’s actions as occurring at “night”); Dkt. 1 ¶ 35

(stating Officer Estrada used a flashlight at the scene).

4 Indeed, the Complaint even references a news article—two months before Nala’s shooting—about TPD officers

responding to the Bowery Bayside apartment complex following 911 calls about a man with a gun. Dkt. 1 ¶ 3. TPD

officers ultimately shot the individual they encountered. Id.

Cunningham “was almost going to shoot me.” Id. ¶ 57. Ms. Robledo’s refusal to

cooperate with Officer Sarrasin and confusion about whether the paramedics would

treat Nala once they arrived only exacerbated tensions. Id. ¶¶ 81–91; see United

States v. Heard, 725 F. App’x 743, 754 (11th Cir. 2018) (“Factors like known

criminal activity in an area; time of day; proximity, both temporal and geographic,

to reported suspicious activity; unusual nervousness; and refusal to cooperate can

certainly contribute to reasonable suspicion.”).

Third, and perhaps most importantly, once learning that it was an unleashed

dog that was shot, Officer Sarrasin articulated that Plaintiff was required to keep her

dog on a leash, as per the City of Tampa’s local ordinances. Dkt. 1 ¶ 79; see also

Tampa, Fla., Ordinances ch. 19, art. I, § 19-75 (2025) (“It is unlawful for an owner

of an animal to permit the animal to run at large upon any public place or upon

unenclosed lands or upon the premises of another person within the limits of the

city.”); Tampa, Fla., Ordinances ch. 16, art. I § 16-38(a)–(b) (2025) (“All such

animals must be restrained by the handler and the handler must be in direct control

at all times at a distance not greater than six (6) feet in length from the handler

[animal], unless in a designated off-leash area. . . . (b) As used herein, the term

‘direct control’ means immediate, continuous physical control of an animal at all

times such as by means of a fence, leash, cord or chain, or other means, of such

strength to restrain the animal.”).5 At a minimum, Defendants were permitted to

temporarily detain Ms. Robledo to investigate whether the loose pit bull violated the

City of Tampa’s leash ordinance. See United States v. Allen, 447 F. App’x 118, 121

(11th Cir. 2011) (“[T]he officers had a reasonable and articulable suspicion that

Allen had just violated Atlanta’s ordinances by crossing a street in front of oncoming

traffic.”).

When considering the totality of the circumstances—i.e., “the whole

picture”—the Court finds the “detaining officers [had] a particularized and objective

basis for suspecting” some criminal activity was afoot. Cortez, 449 U.S. at 417.

While reports of a shooting in a high-crime area at night (standing alone) might be

insufficient to tip the balance to reasonable suspicion, Heard, 725 F. App’x at 752,

the additional fact that Officer Sarrasin learned that Nala was off-leash in the

moments right before the shooting means the responding officers had a specific,

articulable, objective basis for conducting an investigatory Terry stop into the

incident that transpired just minutes before. And it was night when Plaintiff insisted

on a suspect nearby on a balcony with a long gun. At a minimum, this is “arguable”

5 Hillsborough County has similar leash ordinances. Hillsborough Cnty., Fla., Ordinances ch. 6, art. II, § 6-28 (a), (d)

(2025); “[N]o dog or cat shall be allowed to stray, run or go, at large upon any public property or street, sidewalk,

park, or on the private property of another without the consent of the property owner. . . . (d) In order for a dog or cat

to be allowed on a public street, road, park or other public property, . . . the dog or cat shall be under the direct control

of the owner or keeper.”); Hillsborough Cnty., Fla., Ordinances ch. 38, art. II, § 38-26(d) (“All domestic animals must,

unless otherwise posted, be restrained at all times at a distance of not greater than six feet in length from their

owner/handler and must be under the immediate and continuous physical control of such animal's owner/handler by

means of a leash, cord, chain, cage, fence or other appropriate restraining device that is of sufficient strength to

restrain/contain the animal.”).

reasonable suspicion. See Jackson v. Sauls, 206 F.3d 1156, 1166 (11th Cir. 2000)

(“When an officer asserts qualified immunity, the issue is not whether reasonable

suspicion existed in fact, but whether the officer had ‘arguable’ reasonable suspicion

to support an investigatory stop.”). Defendants Sarrasin and Murphy do not lose their

entitlement to qualified immunity where they “reasonably but mistakenly concludes

that reasonable suspicion is present.” Id. at 1165–66.

Once the first prong of the Terry inquiry is met, the Court must then consider

the second step—“whether the stop was reasonably related in scope to the

circumstances which justified the interference in the first place[.]” Gonzalez-Zea,

995 F.3d at 1304. “[A]n initially lawful investigatory stop may become unlawful if

it is ‘prolonged beyond the time reasonably required to complete’ the purpose of the

stop.” Id. at 1305 (quoting Rodriguez v. United States, 575 U.S. 348, 355–57

(2015)); see also Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 500 (1983) (plurality opinion) (“An

investigative detention must be temporary and last no longer than is necessary to

effectuate the purpose of the stop.”). “[T]he reasonableness of the duration of an

investigative stop cannot be delineated exactly . . . [and] ‘common sense and

ordinary human experience must govern over rigid criteria.’” Courson v. McMillian,

939 F.2d 1479, 1491 (11th Cir. 1991) (quoting United States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S.

675, 685 (1985)).

Here, the Court readily finds that Defendants Sarrasin and Murphy’s twelve-

minute stop of Ms. Robledo was reasonable and not prolonged beyond the time

necessary to complete the purposes of the stop. Ms. Robledo was not touched,

restrained, or physically moved. Because Plaintiff was an eyewitness to the incident

in which her dog and an officer were shot, it was not unreasonable for Officer

Sarrasin to temporarily detain Ms. Robledo to get her name, birthdate, address, and

phone number. Dkt. 1 ¶ 109. These identification questions were related in scope to

the circumstances that justified the stop in the first place, confirming whether Ms.

Robledo was an eyewitness to the shooting and the owner of the unleashed dog. See

Gonzalez-Zea, 995 F.3d at 1305 (“These identification questions were related in

scope to the circumstances that justified the stop in the first place—confirming

whether the driver of the vehicle was the fugitive.”). In the Complaint, Plaintiff

assumes that law enforcement must have already obtained all that information based

on her initial 911 call, but there are no allegations that such information was

conveyed to Defendants Sarrasin and Murphy when they arrived on scene. Dkt. 1 ¶

113.

Importantly, the Supreme Court has also warned that courts “should take care

to consider whether the police are acting in a swiftly developing situation, and in

such cases the court should not indulge in unrealistic second-guessing.” Sharpe, 470

U.S. at 686.6 With this warning in mind, the alleged facts demonstrate that

Defendants Sarrasin and Murphy “diligently pursued a means of investigation that

was likely to confirm or dispel their suspicions quickly” by obtaining Ms. Robledo’s

identification and detaining her only long enough for emergency services to arrive

on the scene, where paramedics informed Ms. Robledo and law enforcement that

Nala needed to be taken to a veterinarian. Id.; Dkt. 1 ¶¶ 83–101, 109. Indeed, because

the investigatory stop was not unreasonably prolonged, Nala survived her injuries.

Dkt. 1 ¶ 115.

Nor does the Court believe a twelve-minute stop (that did not ripen into an

arrest or even resemble one) to be unreasonable under the circumstances. See Acosta,

363 F.3d at 1148 (“Thirty minutes duration is not beyond the pale of reasonableness

for Terry stops, as our prior decisions make clear.”); United States v. Gil, 204 F.3d

1347, 1351 (11th Cir. 2000) (finding a detention for approximately seventy-five

minutes in handcuffs in the back of a patrol car did not exceed the duration allowable

under Terry); Courson, 939 F.2d at 1491 (finding “approximately thirty minutes, the

majority of the time having been spent awaiting assistance, was not unreasonable for

an investigatory stop”); United States v. Hardy, 855 F.2d 753, 761 (11th Cir. 1988)

(permitting fifty minute detention); United States v. Willis, 759 F.2d 1486, 1497

6 While this case does not involve the use of excessive force, the Supreme Court has also noted “[t]he calculus of

reasonableness must embody allowance for the fact that police officers are often forced to make split-second

judgments—in circumstances that are tense, uncertain, and rapidly evolving[.]” Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386,

396–97 (1989).

(11th Cir. 1985) (finding a twenty-five minute investigatory detention to be

reasonable under the circumstances and not an arrest). Unlike the twelve-minute stop

at issue in this case, considerably longer periods of time for investigatory detentions

have been deemed unreasonable. See United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 700

(1983) (finding ninety minutes too long); United States v. Puglisi, 723 F.2d 779, 783

(11th Cir. 1984) (finding 140 minutes too long).

Therefore, the Court finds that Ms. Robledo’s unrestrained delay in departing

for approximately twelve minutes, the majority of which was spent awaiting

emergency services and confirming that Ms. Robledo was free to leave the scene to

take Nala to the veterinarian, was not unreasonable for an investigatory stop.

Because Ms. Robledo’s brief detention was reasonable under Terry, she failed to

carry her burden of showing that Defendants Sarrasin and Murphy’s conduct

violated her Fourth Amendment rights. Defendants Sarrasin and Murphy are also

entitled to qualified immunity on Plaintiff’s illegal detention claim in Count I.

b. Failure to Intervene Claim—Count II

A law enforcement officer can be directly liable under § 1983 when he “fails

or refuses to intervene when a constitutional violation . . . takes place in his

presence.” Sebastian v. Ortiz, 918 F.3d 1301, 1312 (11th Cir. 2019) (citation

omitted). “An officer’s duty to intervene is triggered when he sees a fellow officer

use excessive force.” Callwood v. Jones, 727 F. App’x 552, 560 (11th Cir. 2018). In

other words, when an officer “observed no use of excessive force which might have

given rise to a duty to intervene to stop it,” the officer is under no duty to intervene.

Riley v. Newton, 94 F.3d 632, 635 (11th Cir. 1996). A failure to intervene claim

stems from and is “wholly dependent” on an underlying constitutional violation.

Sebastian, 918 F.3d at 1312. If no constitutional violation was being committed, then

an officer cannot be liable for failing to intervene. Id. (“Plainly, an officer cannot be

liable for failing to stop or intervene when there was no constitutional violation being

committed.”).

Here, Ms. Robledo’s failure to intervene claim against Defendants

Cunningham, Estrada, Sarrasin, and Murphy is predicated on her claim of illegal

detention, not excessive force. See Dkt. 1 ¶ 186. As such, Plaintiff’s failure to

intervene claim is improper when the underlying constitutional violation is not

excessive force. See Callwood, 727 F. App’x at 560; Priester v. City of Riviera

Beach, Fla., 208 F.3d 919, 927 (11th Cir. 2000) (“That a police officer had a duty to

intervene when he witnessed the use of excessive force and had the ability to

intervene was clearly established in February 1994.” (emphasis added)). Regardless,

even if “illegal detention” was a proper underlying violation, for the reasons

discussed above, the Court has found that no constitutional violation was committed

that required intervention. See Sebastian, 918 F.3d at 1312. The Court grants

Defendants’ motions to dismiss Count II against Cunningham, Estrada, Sarrasin, and

Murphy.

c. Due Process Claims—Count III

Turning to Plaintiff’s due process claim under the Fourteenth Amendment,

Ms. Robledo alleges that Defendants Smith and Schoolmeesters “engaged in

misconduct by refusing to investigate Ms. Robledo’s citizen complaints against”

Defendants Cunningham, Estrada, Sarrasin, and Murphy. Dkt. 1 ¶ 191.

The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment guarantees citizens

that no State shall deprive them of “life, liberty, or property, without due process of

law.” U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1. The Due Process Clause has been interpreted to

provide two distinct guarantees: substantive due process and procedural due process.

Zinermon v. Burch, 494 U.S. 113, 125 (1990). Plaintiff’s Complaint does not

articulate which type of due process claims she is bringing against Defendants Smith

and Schoolmeesters. Under either type of due process claim, Count III is due to be

dismissed.

Substantive due process protects rights that “are fundamental, that is, rights

that are implicit in the concept of ordered liberty.” McKinney v. Pate, 20 F.3d 1550,

1556 (11th Cir. 1994). The Constitution creates substantive due process rights, and

“no amount of process can justify [their] infringement.” Id. When examining a

substantive due process violation, a court must first identify the asserted right and

then determine whether that right is fundamental. Doe v. Moore, 410 F.3d 1337,

1343 (11th Cir. 2005). Fundamental rights include “most—but not all—of the rights

enumerated in the Bill of Rights” and certain unenumerated rights. McKinney, 20

F.3d at 1556.

Here, as to any alleged substantive due process violation, the Court readily

finds that Ms. Robledo does not have a fundamental right to the investigation of her

misconduct claims against the various TPD officers. See, e.g., Linda R.S. v. Richard

D., 410 U.S. 614, 619 (1973) (concluding that “a private citizen lacks a judicially

cognizable interest in the prosecution or nonprosecution of another”); Vinyard v.

Wilson, 311 F.3d 1340, 1356 (11th Cir. 2002) (finding that the plaintiff had “no

substantive right of any kind to an investigation of her excessive force complaint . .

. much less one created by the Constitution”); Walker v. Dixon, 840 F. App’x 397,

403 (11th Cir. 2020) (finding that a family services agency’s failure to properly

investigate and uncover sexual abuse was not a substantive due process violation);

Stringer v. Doe, 503 F. App’x 888, 890–91 (11th Cir. 2013) (finding the plaintiff

“failed to state claims against the sheriff or deputy sheriff because Stringer did not

have a substantive due process right to an internal investigation by the Sheriff’s

Department or law enforcement”); Koger v. Fla., 130 F. App’x 327, 335 (11th Cir.

2005) (citing Vinyard and finding “a plaintiff had no substantive due process right

to an investigation of a constitutional claim by a sheriff’s office”). Because Ms.

Robledo does not have a constitutionally protected right at stake, she has failed to

state a plausible claim for relief under section 1983.

As to Plaintiff’s procedural due process claim, these rights “are created and

their dimensions are defined by existing rules or understandings that stem from an

independent source such as state law.” Morley’s Auto Body, Inc. v. Hunter, 70 F.3d

1209, 1213 (11th Cir. 1996) (citation omitted). These rights may be rescinded “so

long as the elements of procedural—not substantive—due process are observed.”

McKinney, 20 F.3d at 1556. In other words, procedural due process guarantees fair

procedure and “requires notice and an opportunity to be heard before any

governmental deprivation of a [constitutionally-protected] interest.” Zipperer v. City

of Fort Myers, 41 F.3d 619, 623 (11th Cir. 1995). “[O]nly when the state refuses to

provide a process sufficient to remedy the procedural deprivation does a

constitutional violation actionable under section 1983 arise.” McKinney, 20 F.3d at

1557; see also Cotton v. Jackson, 216 F.3d 1328, 1330–31 (11th Cir. 2000).

“[A] [section] 1983 claim alleging a denial of procedural due process requires

proof of three elements: (1) a deprivation of a constitutionally-protected liberty or

property interest; (2) state action; and (3) constitutionally-inadequate process.”

Grayden v. Rhodes, 345 F.3d 1225, 1232 (11th Cir. 2003) (citing Cryder v.

Oxendine, 24 F.3d 175, 177 (11th Cir. 1994)). Under the first element, “[p]roperty

interests stem not from the Constitution, but from such sources as statutes,

regulations, ordinances, and contracts.” Arrington v. Helms, 438 F.3d 1336, 1348

(11th Cir. 2006) (citation omitted). “Whether these sources create a property interest

must be decided by reference to state law.” Id.

Here, Plaintiff does not cite any federal or state court decision, statute,

regulation, or other source of law that confers a constitutionally protected interest in

the investigation of her police misconduct claim. As Defendants correctly point out,

Florida law outlines the rights that sworn law enforcement officers have during an

internal affairs investigation, as set forth in Florida Statutes § 112.531–112.534. Dkt.

10 at 11. Conversely, the Court cannot find any statute, law, regulation, or rule in

Florida that establishes the right of any citizen to an internal affairs investigation of

law enforcement officers following a citizen complaint. Without such an interest,

Ms. Robledo cannot maintain a procedural due process claim against Defendants

Smith and Schoolmeesters. See Vineyard, 311 F.3d at 1356 (finding no procedural

due process violation because there is no “federal or state court decision, statute,

regulation or other source of law that gives [the plaintiff] an entitlement to an internal

investigation by the Sheriff's Office of her complaints of police brutality”); Koger,

130 F. App’x at 335 (holding the plaintiff “failed to identify in his amended

complaint a federal or state law under which he was entitled to an internal

investigation”); Merriweather v. Stringer, No. 2:21-CV-145-MHT-SMD, 2021 WL

6137515, at *6 (M.D. Ala. Dec. 9, 2021), report and recommendation adopted, 2021

WL 6137389 (M.D. Ala. Dec. 29, 2021) (finding no procedural due process violation

under section 1983 when “no federal or state court decision, statute, regulation, or

other source of law that gives him a constitutionally protected interest in the

investigation of his assault claim or to the arrest of his alleged assailants”). Because

Plaintiff cannot demonstrate that Defendants Smith and Schoolmeesters’ actions or

inactions deprived her of due process, Plaintiff’s claim against Smith and

Schoolmeesters in Count III is dismissed.

d. Monell Claim—Count IV

Finally, Plaintiff alleges a Monell violation by the City of Tampa in Count IV.

Dkt. 1 ¶ 198. Municipal entities may be held liable under section 1983 only where

“action pursuant to official municipal policy of some nature caused a constitutional

tort.” Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 691 (1978). This standard

requires a plaintiff to show that (1) “his constitutional rights were violated”; (2) “the

municipality had a custom or policy that constituted deliberate indifference to that

constitutional right”; and (3) “the policy or custom caused the violation.” McDowell

v. Brown, 392 F.3d 1283, 1289 (11th Cir. 2004). “Absent a formal policy, the

plaintiff may satisfy the second element by identifying ‘an unofficial custom or

widespread practice that is so permanent and well settled as to constitute a custom

and usage with the force of law’ or ‘a municipal official with final policymaking

authority whose decision violated the plaintiff’s constitutional rights.’” Plowright v.

Miami Dade Cnty., 102 F.4th 1358, 1370 (11th Cir. 2024) (quoting Chabad Chayil,

Inc. v. Sch. Bd. of Miami-Dade Cnty., 48 F.4th 1222, 1229 (11th Cir. 2022)).

Here, Plaintiff’s Complaint raises several arguments for why the City should

be liable, including under a theory of respondeat superior, inadequate training, and

inadequate supervision. Dkt. 1 ¶¶ 27, 198–221. As an initial matter, it has long been

held that a city cannot be liable under a theory of respondeat superior. Monell, 436

U.S. at 691. As for the other allegations against the City, they do not satisfy the

second element of a Monell claim. First, Plaintiff alleges that the City had

promulgated and permitted the following unconstitutional policies and customs:

the training and retention of officers-not limited to probationary

officers, the use of body-worn cameras, the internal investigations of

officer misconduct and performance failures, the proper handling of

citizen complaints, the production of public records, and the discipline

and termination of officers who engage in misconduct or demonstrate

incompetence. . . .

(1) Field Training officers were pressured to pass failing probationary

officers who were not ready to be on the streets; (2) officers did not

properly investigate and clear calls for service (3) officers in the

professional standards division did not properly investigate the

misconduct and performance failures of their fellow officers; (4)

officers in the professional standards division did not properly

investigate or document citizen complaints against officers; (5) officers

illegally detained citizens and committed other constitutional violations

and misconduct and were not adequately trained, supervised,

investigated, or disciplined.

Dkt. 1 ¶¶ 200–01. However, Plaintiff’s Complaint does not identify any policy by

the City that permits the TPD to detain a person without reasonable suspicion or

probable cause, nor does it allege a custom via prior incidents where citizens were

unlawfully detained following a shooting. Without such a showing, Ms. Robledo has

failed to allege facts plausibly indicating that there was a custom or, even if there

was, that the custom “constituted deliberate indifference to [her] constitutional

right[s].” McDowell, 392 F.3d at 1289. Plaintiff’s conclusory reference to

unidentified “final policymakers in the City of Tampa” also fails to save her Monell

claim from dismissal. Dkt. 1 ¶ 220; see Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (recognizing that

“formulaic recitation[s] of the elements of a cause of action” and “naked assertions

devoid of further factual enhancement” are insufficient to state a claim for relief

(alteration adopted and internal quotation marks omitted)).

Second, Plaintiff’s claim against the City for inadequate training and

supervision fares no better. Although a municipality can be held liable under section

1983 for a “policy- or custom-based failure to adequately train or supervise its

employees,” Plaintiff alleges no facts indicating that the City “was aware of the need

to train or supervise its employees” on encounters with bystanders following a TPD

officer’s use of deadly force.7 Am. Fed’n of Lab. & Cong. of Indus. Orgs. v. City of

Miami, 637 F.3d 1178, 1188–89 (11th Cir. 2011). Indeed, there are no allegations in

the Complaint that the City was on notice of a “widespread pattern of prior abuse”

7 Plaintiff’s reference to an (irrelevant) lawsuit by non-party John Fitzgerald concerning his retaliation and

whistleblower suit against the TPD also fails to save her failure to train and supervise claim under Monell. See Dkt. 1

¶¶ 124–33. The lawsuit involves TPD officers who are not part of this lawsuit and involves different circumstances

from the alleged constitutional violation in this case.

or even a single earlier constitutional violation involving an unlawful detention

following a shooting. Gold v. City of Miami, 151 F.3d 1346, 1351 (11th Cir. 1998).

While there are allegations that Defendants Cunningham and Estrada were

“negligently passed” by the TPD during their probationary periods as new officers,

Dkt. 1 ¶¶ 134–52, these allegations are wholly unrelated to the alleged constitutional

violation at hand and provide no “evidence that the [City] knew of a need to train

and/or supervise in a particular area and the [City] made a deliberate choice not to

take any action.” Gold, 151 F.3d at 1350 (emphasis added). To the extent that Ms.

Robledo seeks to rely on news articles cited in the Complaint, that attempt also fails.

See Dkt 1 ¶¶ 205–10. These articles involve incidents that occurred after Plaintiff’s

detention by TPD in March 2021, and they do not involve circumstances where a

TPD officer unlawfully detained a person without reasonable suspicion or probable

cause following a shooting. See Plowright, 102 F.4th at 1371 (rejecting a news

article attached to a complaint because “[t]he article does not show that these

incidents happened before [the alleged constitutional violation] or that they involved

[similar] circumstances . . .”).

Finally, the Court previously found that no underlying constitutional violation

was committed by any Defendant-officer in this case. The lack of an underlying

constitutional violation is dispositive of Plaintiff’s claim for municipal liability. See

Swinford v. Santos, 121 F.4th 179, 191 (11th Cir. 2024) (“[B]ecause we determine

that no underlying constitutional violation occurred, [the plaintiff’s] supervisory

liability claim against the chief of police and his Monell claim against the county fail

as a matter of law.”); Paez v. Mulvey, 915 F.3d 1276, 1291 (11th Cir. 2019)

(“[B]ecause [the officers] committed no constitutional violations, their supervisors .

. . cannot be found liable . . . for violating § 1983.”); Knight ex rel. Kerr v. Miami-

Dade Cnty., 856 F.3d 795, 821 (11th Cir. 2017) (“There can be no policy-based

liability . . . when there is no underlying constitutional violation.”); City of Los

Angeles v. Heller, 475 U.S. 796, 799 (1986) (noting that the city of Los Angeles and

the Police Commission could not be held liable under § 1983 if the individual officer

“inflicted no constitutional injury” on the plaintiff). Because Plaintiff has failed to

state a claim for municipal liability under Monell, the Court dismisses Count IV.

CONCLUSION

Accordingly, it is hereby ORDERED and ADJUDGED that:

1. Defendants’ Motions to Dismiss, Dkts. 10, 16, and 17, are GRANTED.

2. Plaintiff’s Complaint, Dkt. 1, is DISMISSED:

a. Plaintiff Robledo’s claims against Officers Cunningham, Estrada,

Murphy, and Sarrasin in Counts I and II (42 U.S.C. § 1983 Illegal

Detention and Failure to Intervene) are DISMISSED;

b. Plaintiff Robledo’s claims against Officers Smith and Schoolmeesters

in Count III (42 U.S.C. § 1983 Procedural and Substantive Due

Process) are DISMISSED; and

c. Plaintiff Robledo’s claim against the City of Tampa in Count IV (42

U.S.C. § 1983 Municipal Liability) is DISMISSED.

DONE AND ORDERED at Tampa, Florida, on September 19, 2025.

/s/ William F. Jung

WILLIAM F. JUNG

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

COPIES FURNISHED TO:

Counsel of Record

Plaintiff, pro se