Whitfield v. Brady

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

JACKSONVILLE DIVISION

REGINALD B. WHITFIELD,

Plaintiff,

v. Case No. 3:25-cv-920-MMH-SJH

J. BRADY, et al.,

Defendants.

___________________________

ORDER OF DISMISSAL WITHOUT PREJUDICE

Plaintiff, Reginald B. Whitfield, an inmate of the Florida penal system,

is proceeding on a pro se Civil Rights Complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Doc.

1; Complaint). He also filed a request to proceed as a pauper (Doc. 2). In the

Complaint, Whitfield raises claims stemming from his pretrial detention in the

Putnam County Jail between March and April 2025. See Complaint at 4. He

names the following individuals as Defendants: (1) J. Brady, Medical

Supervisor; (2) C. Stagner, Medical Staff; (3) C. Owens, Medical Staff; and (4)

Salgado, Medical Staff. Id. at 2-3.

According to Whitfield, on March 14, 2025, he “wrote medical about

having side-effects from one of the medications” he was taking. Id. at 6. He

“experiment[ed]” with his medications to determine which medication was

causing his issues, and he determined it was “Truvada,” which he takes for

HIV. Id. He wrote to medical again on March 24, 2025, “telling them that the

Truvada that their doctor prescribed for [him] was giving [him] side-effects,”

such as “insomnia, anxiety, and depression.” Id. He requested a change in his

prescription. Id. The following day, March 25, 2025, Defendant Brady told him

“that the side-effects were not from the Truvada, and that was the only

medication that [he] was going to be given.” Id. at 7. That same day, Whitfield

wrote to medical again “telling them that [he] knew for sure that it was the

Truvada” and requested, among other things, that he be given the medications

he was prescribed before his incarceration. Id. In response, Defendant Brady

once more advised Whitfield that the Truvada was not responsible for his

symptoms “and that the issue would no longer be addressed.” Id. Defendant

Brady further told Whitfield to wait for his next doctor appointment. Id. at 7-

8.

Whitfield wrote another request to medical asking them “to please not

let [him] die of aids here in the jail,” and Defendant Stagner responded that

the issue had already been addressed. Id. at 8. Whitfield advised medical “that

they were on the verge of medical neglect, as well as medical malpractice.” Id.

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Whitfield quit taking the Truvada and has not been given another medication

for his HIV. Id.1

On April 4, 2025, Defendant Brady responded to Whitfield’s request,

stating that Whitfield’s “medical issues have been addressed, and nothing

more would be done because [Whitfield] was non-compliant with two (2) of [his]

prescribed medications.” Id. at 9. Whitfield asserts that he was only “non-

compliant with the Truvada, . . . which has left [him] with re-occurring side-

effects that [he] continue[s] to struggle with on a daily and nightly basis.” Id.

He contends that “them denying to examine [him] by physical exam, or x-ray

constitutes medical malpractice and shows improper diagnostic techniques.”

Id.

In the section of the Complaint addressing Whitfield’s injuries, he lists:

“negligent infliction of emotional distress” for which he is “taking medication.”

Id. at 10. He seeks monetary damages as relief. Id.

The Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA) requires the Court to dismiss

this case at any time if the Court determines that the action is frivolous,

1 According to the website of the Florida Department of Corrections (FDOC),

Whitfield was received into FDOC custody on April 23, 2025. See Corrections

Offender Network, Florida Department of Corrections, available at

https://pubapps.fdc.myflorida.com/OffenderSearch/search.aspx (last visited Sept. 16,

2025).

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malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted or seeks

monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief. See 28

U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). As to whether a complaint “fails to state a claim on

which relief may be granted,” the language of the PLRA mirrors the language

of Rule 12(b)(6), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and therefore courts apply

the same standard in both contexts.2 Mitchell v. Farcass, 112 F.3d 1483, 1490

(11th Cir. 1997); see also Alba v. Montford, 517 F.3d 1249, 1252 (11th Cir.

2008).

To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege that (1)

the defendant deprived him of a right secured under the United States

Constitution or federal law, and (2) such deprivation occurred under color of

state law. Salvato v. Miley, 790 F.3d 1286, 1295 (11th Cir. 2015); Bingham v.

Thomas, 654 F.3d 1171, 1175 (11th Cir. 2011) (per curiam) (citation omitted);

Richardson v. Johnson, 598 F.3d 734, 737 (11th Cir. 2010) (per curiam)

(citations omitted). Moreover, under Eleventh Circuit precedent, to prevail in

a § 1983 action, a plaintiff must show “an affirmative causal connection

between the official’s acts or omissions and the alleged constitutional

2 “To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter,

accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v.

Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570

(2007)).

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deprivation.” Zatler v. Wainwright, 802 F.2d 397, 401 (11th Cir. 1986) (citation

omitted); Porter v. White, 483 F.3d 1294, 1306 n.10 (11th Cir. 2007).

Under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a complaint need only

contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is

entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. (8)(a)(2). In addition, all reasonable inferences

should be drawn in favor of the plaintiff. See Randall v. Scott, 610 F.3d 701,

705 (11th Cir. 2010). Nonetheless, the plaintiff still must meet some minimal

pleading requirements. Jackson v. BellSouth Telecomm., 372 F.3d 1250, 1262-

63 (11th Cir. 2004) (citations omitted). Indeed, while “[s]pecific facts are not

necessary[,]” the complaint should “‘give the defendant fair notice of what

the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.’” Erickson v. Pardus, 551

U.S. 89, 93 (2007) (per curiam) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S.

544, 555 (2007)). Further, the plaintiff must allege “enough facts to state a

claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. “A claim

has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the

court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the

misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). While not

required to include detailed factual allegations, a complaint must allege “more

than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Id.

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A “plaintiff’s obligation to provide the grounds of his entitlement to relief

requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the

elements of a cause of action will not do[.]” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555

(alternation and internal quotations omitted); see also Jackson, 372 F.3d at

1262 (explaining that “conclusory allegations, unwarranted deductions of facts

or legal conclusions masquerading as facts will not prevent dismissal”)

(internal citation and quotations omitted). Indeed, “the tenet that a court must

accept as true all of the allegations contained in a complaint is inapplicable to

legal conclusions[,]” which simply “are not entitled to [an] assumption of truth.”

Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678, 679. In the absence of well-pled facts suggesting a

federal constitutional deprivation or violation of a federal right, a plaintiff

cannot sustain a cause of action against the defendant.

In assessing the Complaint, the Court must read Whitfield’s pro se

allegations in a liberal fashion. Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520-21 (1972);

Bingham, 654 F.3d at 1175. And, while “[p]ro se pleadings are held to a less

stringent standard than pleadings drafted by attorneys and will, therefore, be

liberally construed,” Tannenbaum v. United States, 148 F.3d 1262, 1263 (11th

Cir. 1998), “‘this leniency does not give a court license to serve as de facto

counsel for a party or to rewrite an otherwise deficient pleading in order to

sustain an action.’” Alford v. Consol. Gov’t of Columbus, Ga., 438 F. App’x 837,

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839 (11th Cir. 2011)3 (quoting GJR Invs., Inc. v. Cnty. of Escambia, Fla., 132

F.3d 1359, 1369 (11th Cir. 1998) (internal citation omitted), overruled in part

on other grounds as recognized in Randall, 610 F.3d at 709).

Here, Whitfield’s Complaint is due to be dismissed under this Court’s

screening obligation. Initially, the Court finds that all claims against

Defendants Owens and Salgado are due to be dismissed because Whitfield fails

to attribute any factual allegations to these two Defendants. Thus, he fails to

state a plausible claim for relief against them.

With respect to the remaining Defendants, at the time of the alleged

incidents, Whitfield was a pretrial detainee; thus, his claims arise under the

Fourteenth Amendment instead of the Eighth Amendment. Nevertheless,

Whitfield’s Fourteenth Amendment claims are “‘evaluated under the same

standard as a prisoner’s claim . . . under the Eighth Amendment.’” Swain v.

Junior, 961 F.3d 1276, 1285 (11th Cir. 2020) (quoting Dang ex rel. Dang v.

Sheriff, Seminole Cnty. Fla., 871 F.3d 1272, 1279 (11th Cir. 2017)). As such,

3 The Court does not rely on unpublished opinions as binding precedent; however,

they may be cited in this Order when the Court finds them persuasive on a particular

point. See McNamara v. GEICO, 30 F.4th 1055, 1060-61 (11th Cir. 2022); see

generally Fed. R. App. P. 32.1; 11th Cir. R. 36-2 (“Unpublished opinions are not

considered binding precedent, but they may be cited as persuasive authority.”).

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the Court’s discussion of Eighth Amendment law is equally applicable to

Whitfield’s Fourteenth Amendment claims.

The Eighth Amendment “imposes duties on [prison] officials, who must

provide humane conditions of confinement; prison officials must ensure that

inmates receive adequate food, clothing, shelter, and medical care, and must

‘take reasonable measures to guarantee the safety of the inmates.’” Farmer v.

Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 832 (1994) (quoting Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517,

526-27 (1984)). To establish an Eighth Amendment violation, a prisoner must

satisfy both an objective and subjective inquiry regarding a prison official’s

conduct. Swain v. Junior, 961 F.3d 1276, 1285 (11th Cir. 2020) (citing Farmer,

511 U.S. at 834). As it relates to medical care, “the Supreme Court has held

that prison officials violate the bar on cruel and unusual punishments when

they display ‘deliberate indifference to serious medical needs of prisoners.’”

Keohane v. Fla. Dep’t of Corr. Sec’y, 952 F.3d 1257, 1265 (11th Cir. 2020)

(quoting Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976)). Specifically, the Eleventh

Circuit has instructed that to establish liability on an Eighth Amendment

deliberate indifference claim, the plaintiff must show:

First . . . as a threshold matter, that he suffered

a deprivation that was, “objectively, ‘sufficiently

serious.’” [Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834].

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Second, . . . that the defendant acted with

“subjective recklessness as used in the criminal law,”

id. at 839, and to do so he must show that the

defendant was actually, subjectively aware that his

own conduct caused a substantial risk of serious harm

to the plaintiff—with the caveat, again, that even if

the defendant “actually knew of a substantial risk to

inmate health or safety,” he “cannot be found liable

under the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause” if

he “responded reasonably to the risk.” Id. at 844-45.

Wade v. McDade, 106 F.4th 1251, 1261 (11th Cir. 2024) (enumeration and

emphasis omitted);4 see Stalley v. Cumbie, 124 F.4th 1273, 1283 (11th Cir.

2024) (recognizing that to prevail on a deliberate indifference claim, a plaintiff

must show that he suffered “an objectively serious medical need,” and that the

defendant acted with deliberate indifference to that need, meaning that the

defendant “(1) had subjective knowledge of a risk of serious harm, (2)

disregarded that risk, and (3) engaged in conduct that amounts to subjective

recklessness” (internal quotation marks and citations omitted)).

4 For decades, the Eleventh Circuit has described a “more than mere negligence” or

“more than gross negligence” standard in determining whether an official acted with

deliberate indifference to an inmate’s serious medical need. Wade, 106 F.4th at 1255.

In Wade, the Eleventh Circuit determined that those standards conflicted with the

Supreme Court’s decision in Farmer and clarified that courts in this circuit should

apply the “subjective recklessness” standard “as used in the criminal law.” Id. at 1253.

The Court notes that the Honorable Adalberto Jordan wrote a concurrence to the

majority’s opinion in Wade, finding that to the extent prior Eleventh Circuit

deliberate indifference cases are not inconsistent with Wade, “they should continue

to be cited as binding precedent.” Id. at 1265 (Jordan, J., concurring).

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“As applied in the prison context, the deliberate-indifference standard

sets an appropriately high bar.” Swain, 961 F.3d at 1285. Importantly, medical

treatment gives rise to a constitutional violation “only when it is so grossly

incompetent, inadequate, or excessive as to shock the conscience or to be

intolerable to fundamental fairness.” Hoffer v. Sec’y, Fla. Dep’t of Corr., 973

F.3d 1263, 1271 (11th Cir. 2020) (quotations omitted). Indeed, the law is well

settled that the Constitution is not implicated by the negligent acts of

corrections officials and medical personnel. Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327,

330-31 (1986); Davidson v. Cannon, 474 U.S. 344, 348 (1986) (“As we held in

Daniels, the protections of the Due Process Clause, whether procedural or

substantive, are just not triggered by lack of due care by prison officials.”).

Thus, a complaint that a medical provider has been negligent “in diagnosing

or treating a medical condition does not state a valid claim of medical

mistreatment under the Eighth Amendment.” Bingham v. Thomas, 654 F.3d

1171, 1176 (11th Cir. 2011) (quotations and citation omitted).

Here, Whitfield’s allegations fail to state a plausible deliberate

indifference claim against Defendants Brady and Stagner. First, Whitfield

sues each Defendant in his individual and official capacities, but Whitfield fails

to state an official capacity claim. If an officer is sued under § 1983 in an official

capacity, the claim is considered a claim against the entity for which the officer

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is an agent. Busby v. City of Orlando, 931 F.2d 764, 776 (11th Cir. 1991). Thus,

suing Defendants Brady and Stagner in their official capacities is equivalent

to suing their employer, but to do so, Whitfield must allege that a custom,

policy, or practice of these Defendants’ employer was the “moving force” behind

any alleged constitutional violation. Monell v. Dept. of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S.

658, 694 (1978); see McDowell v. Brown, 392 F.3d 1283, 1289 (11th Cir. 2004).

He has not done so. Therefore, all official capacity claims are due to be

dismissed.

Second, to the extent he raises a claim based on medical malpractice or

negligence, neither arise to the level of a constitutional violation. See Ireland

v. Prummell, 53 F.4th 1274, 1302 (11th Cir. 2022); Bingham, 654 F.3d at 1176.

Therefore, any negligence-based claim fails to rise to the level of a

constitutional violation and is due to be dismissed.

Third, the Eleventh Circuit has noted that “[n]othing in our case law

would derive a constitutional deprivation from a prison physician’s failure to

subordinate his own professional judgment to that of another doctor.” Bismark

v. Fisher, 213 F. App’x 892, 897 (11th Cir. 2007) (quoting Waldrop, 871 F.2d at

1033). Similarly, “‘a simple difference in medical opinion between the prison’s

medical staff and the inmate as to the latter’s diagnosis or course of treatment

[fails to] support a claim of cruel and unusual punishment.’” Hoffer v. Sec’y,

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Fla. Dep’t of Corr., 973 F.3d 1263, 1273 (11th Cir. 2020) (quoting Harris v.

Thigpen, 941 F.2d 1495, 1505 (11th Cir. 1991)). Whitfield’s allegations stem

from his disagreement with his medical professionals regarding his course of

treatment. Such disagreement is insufficient to state a plausible claim for

relief.

In light of the foregoing, this case will be dismissed without prejudice for

Whitfield’s failure to state a claim. Whitfield may refile his claims with factual

allegations sufficient to support a claim for relief if he elects to do so. Notably,

pro se litigants are subject to the same law and rules of court that govern other

litigants who are represented by counsel. See Moon v. Newsome, 863 F.2d 835,

837 (11th Cir. 1989). All filings with the Court must be made in accordance

with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and this Court’s Local Rules.

Accordingly, it is

ORDERED:

1. This case is DISMISSED without prejudice.

2. The Clerk of Court shall enter judgment dismissing this case

without prejudice, terminate any pending motions, and close the file.

3. The Clerk of Court shall send Whitfield a civil rights complaint

form and an application to proceed in forma pauperis (prisoner filings) form. If

Whitfield chooses to refile his claims, he may complete and file the appropriate

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forms. He should not include this case number on any form, as the Clerk will

assign a new case number upon receipt. In initiating such a case, Whitfield

should either file a fully completed application to proceed in forma pauperis or

pay the $405 filing fee.

DONE AND ORDERED at Jacksonville, Florida, this 18 day of

September, 2025.

MARCIA MORALES HOWARD

United States District Judge

JAX-3 9/16

C:

Reginald B. Whitfield, #750336

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