The opinion
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
JALEAH FIELDS CIVIL ACTION
VERSUS NO. 25-1475
NUCOR CORPORATION, et al. SECTION M (4)
ORDER & REASONS
Before the Court is a partial motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim pursuant to Rule
12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure filed by defendants Nucor Corporation and Nucor
Steel Louisiana, LLC (together, “Nucor”).1 Plaintiff Jaleah Fields responds in opposition,2 and
Nucor replies in further support of its motion.3 Having considered the parties’ memoranda, the
record, and the applicable law, the Court issues this Order & Reasons granting the motion in part
and denying it in part.
I. BACKGROUND
This case concerns claims of employment discrimination based on race and sex. Fields, a
Black woman, worked at Nucor’s steel manufacturing plant in Convent, Louisiana, as a material
handling operator.4 On October 26, 2023, during a group conversation, a white male teammate,
Caleb Tharp, said the “N-word” in front of Fields, her crew, and supervisors Matt Lesaicherre and
Lance Gillis.5 Fields was the only Black person in the group.6 Lesaicherre and Gillis, the two
1 R. Doc. 12.
2 R. Doc. 20.
3 R. Doc. 23.
4 R. Doc. 1 at 2-3. The factual background is taken from the allegations in the complaint, which are deemed
to be true at this motion-to-dismiss stage of the proceedings.
5 Id. at 3-4.
6 Id. at 4.
supervisors present, “spun their heads to look at Ms. Fields and see her reaction.”7 Fields
responded to the remark by saying, “Excuse me?,” while everyone else “remained silent and
ducked their heads down.”8 Gillis walked away from the group, but returned “after a few
seconds.”9 Tharp insisted that “he was joking and claimed it was a ‘chant.’”10 He then said the
“N-word” again, “but this time drawing out the word,” and “tried to justify his actions by saying
he ‘has a Black girlfriend.’”11 Neither Gillis nor Lesaicherre reprimanded Tharp, but “instead
chang[ed] the subject and direct[ed] the group’s attention back to work.”12 Fields was “upset at
the comment and discouraged” that neither supervisor “said anything to Mr. Tharp after hearing
him use the N-word.”13
Shortly after the October 26 incident, Gillis, a white male, texted to Fields “a video of two
Black men repeatedly using the N-word, one of them saying ‘that’s gotta be racist’ and ‘you’re
saying it with the long R.’”14 Fields did not respond and “felt that Mr. Gillis was making light of
Mr. Tharp saying [the ‘N-word’] and treating it like a joke.”15
Lesaicherre texted Fields to ask her “if she wanted to talk about what happened with Mr.
Tharp.”16 Fields and Lesaicherre later spoke on the phone and arranged to meet in Lesaicherre’s
office the same day.17 During the meeting, Lesaicherre asked Fields what she wanted to do about
Tharp’s use of the racial slur to which Fields replied, “‘I guess nothing,’” explaining that she
thought that Lesaicherre, as Tharp’s supervisor, should have addressed the situation when it
7 Id.
8 Id.
9 Id.
10 Id.
11 Id.
12 Id.
13 Id.
14 Id.
15 Id.
16 Id. at 5.
17 Id.
occurred.18 Tharp was not disciplined and neither supervisor reported his conduct to anyone else
for further investigation.19
On November 29, 2023, Nucor issued to Fields a “First Step Warning” notice for
tardiness.20 Then, on December 27, 2023, Nucor terminated Fields for a safety violation that
occurred on December 10, 2023 – namely, speeding into the parking lot at the worksite.21 Fields
claims that she decelerated to 15 mph, the speed limit, when she entered the property.22 She also
alleges that Nucor improperly skipped the second and third levels of its progressive discipline
policy in order to fire her.23 According to Fields, Nucor did not skip any progressive disciplinary
steps or terminate employment “when white employees committed more serious safety violations
and further had a preceding history of attendance and other disciplinary issues.”24 Fields provides
two examples of white males who she says committed more serious safety violations than
speeding, but were not terminated.25
Fields timely filed a charge of discrimination with the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission (“EEOC”).26 In the charge, she stated that the discrimination was based on “Race,
Sex” and described the particulars as follows:
I was hired by Nucor Steel Louisiana on or about March 2018, most recently as an
Operator. I have been discriminated against because of my Race-Black/African
American, Sex-Female in that I was discharged for speeding through work area and
running stop sign on or about December 11, 2023; while Jason Sanders (White)
also had similar incident but was only suspended for 3 days. Also, on or about July
13, 2023; Larry M. (White) was speeding on a golf cart and suspended for 3 days.
Also, coworker Kaleb LNU (White) on or about October 26, 2023, made
inappropriate comment using the “N word” in front o[f] Supervisor Matt L. (White)
18 Id.
19 Id.
20 Id. at 5-6.
21 Id. at 6.
22 Id.
23 Id.
24 Id.
25 Id. at 6-7.
26 Id. at 3; R. Doc. 12-4.
and Lead Lance Gillis (White); I was asked by Matt what I would like him to do
about the incident, which I replied, “being that you’re asking me what I should do
about it, I guess I’ll let it go.”
According to the company, I was discharged due to egregious violations of safety
incident.27
The EEOC issued to Fields a right to sue letter, and within 90 days of her receipt of the letter, she
filed this suit against Nucor.28 Fields asserts several employment discrimination claims, including
discrimination based on race, discrimination based on sex, hostile work environment based on
race, and retaliation.29
II. PENDING MOTION
Nucor moves to dismiss Fields’s retaliation and hostile-work-environment claims for
failure to state a claim pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6).30 Nucor argues that the retaliation claim must
be dismissed for failure to exhaust administrative remedies because Fields did not include it in the
charge of discrimination she filed with the EEOC.31 Additionally, says Nucor, Fields’s retaliation
claim fails because she did not engage in a protected activity as she did not oppose a discriminatory
practice.32 Nucor also seeks dismissal of Fields’s hostile-work-environment claim, arguing that
she has not alleged sufficient facts to show pervasive discrimination that affected a term or
condition of her employment.33
In opposition, Fields argues that her pro se EEOC charge of discrimination alleged
sufficient facts regarding Nucor’s retaliatory conduct to reasonably expect the EEOC investigation
to encompass such a claim.34 Fields says that the charge suggests that her supervisor’s conduct
27 R. Doc. 12-4 at 2.
28 R. Doc. 1 at 3.
29 Id. at 7-10.
30 R. Doc. 12.
31 R. Doc. 12-3 at 3-5.
32 Id. at 5-6.
33 Id. at 6-9.
34 R. Doc. 20 at 5-8.
discouraged her from continuing to complain about Tharp’s conduct and that she was terminated
shortly afterwards for a safety violation, which according to Fields, “gives rise to the reasonable
suggestion that she contemplated a connection between the discrimination complaint to her
supervisor and the pretextual termination that quickly followed.”35 Fields further argues that she
stated a retaliation claim because she reasonably believed that the use of the “N-word” by a
coworker and a supervisor constituted an unlawful employment activity that she opposed.36 With
respect to her hostile-work-environment claim, Fields contends that the harassment by Tharp and
Gillis was enough to have affected a term, condition, or privilege of her employment because
Nucor failed to take corrective action and fired her shortly after the incident.37
Nucor replies, reurging that Fields did not exhaust her administrative remedies as to the
retaliation claim.38 Nucor points out that Fields’s EEOC charge of discrimination does not mention
retaliation or assert facts showing that she engaged in protected activity that caused an adverse
employment action.39 According to Nucor, there is no way that a retaliation claim could “grow
out of” the allegations in the EEOC charge because they did not put the EEOC or Nucor on notice
of a retaliation claim.40 With respect to Fields’s hostile-work-environment claim, Nucor argues
that Fields has not alleged sufficient facts to show the required pervasive harassment.41 Instead,
says Nucor, Fields points to isolated incidents of the use of a racial slur that were not directed at
her.42
35 Id. at 7.
36 Id. at 8-11.
37 Id. at 11-13.
38 R. Doc. 23 at 1-5.
39 Id.
40 Id.
41 Id. at 5-6.
42 Id.
III. LAW & ANALYSIS
A. Rule 12(b)(6) Standard
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure require a complaint to contain “a short and plain
statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Rule
8 “does not require ‘detailed factual allegations,’ but it demands more than an unadorned, the-
defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)
(quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). The statement of the claim must
“‘give the defendant fair notice of what the ... claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.’”
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957)). A pleading does
not comply with Rule 8 if it offers “labels and conclusions,” “a formulaic recitation of the elements
of a cause of action,” or “‘naked assertions’ devoid of ‘further factual enhancement.’” Iqbal, 556
U.S. at 678 (alteration omitted) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, 557).
Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure permits a party to move to dismiss
for “failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). “To
survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true,
to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Twombly,
550 U.S. at 570). A claim is plausible on the face of the complaint “when the plaintiff pleads
factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable
for the misconduct alleged.” Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). Plausibility does not equate
to probability, but rather “it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted
unlawfully.” Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). “Where a complaint pleads facts that are
‘merely consistent with’ a defendant’s liability, it ‘stops short of the line between possibility and
plausibility of “entitlement to relief.”’” Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557). Thus, if the facts
pleaded in the complaint “do not permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of
misconduct, the complaint has alleged – but it has not ‘shown’ – ‘that the pleader is entitled to
relief.’” Id. at 679 (alteration omitted) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2)).
In considering a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, a court employs
the two-pronged approach utilized in Twombly. The court “can choose to begin by identifying
pleadings that, because they are no more than conclusions [unsupported by factual allegations],
are not entitled to the assumption of truth.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679. However, “[w]hen there are
well-pleaded factual allegations, a court should assume their veracity and then determine whether
they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief.” Id. “‘[The] task, then, is to determine whether
the plaintiff has stated a legally cognizable claim that is plausible, not to evaluate the plaintiff’s
likelihood of success.’” Body by Cook, Inc. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins., 869 F.3d 381, 385 (5th
Cir. 2017) (quoting Doe ex rel. Magee v. Covington Cty. Sch. Dist., 675 F.3d 849, 854 (5th Cir.
2012)).
A court’s review of a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss “is limited to the complaint, any
documents attached to the complaint, and any documents attached to the motion to dismiss that
are central to the claim and referenced by the complaint.” Lone Star Fund V (U.S.), L.P. v.
Barclays Bank PLC, 594 F.3d 383, 387 (5th Cir. 2010) (citing Collins v. Morgan Stanley Dean
Witter, 224 F.3d 496, 498-99 (5th Cir. 2000)). A court may also take judicial notice of certain
matters, including public records and government websites. Dorsey v. Portfolio Equities, Inc., 540
F.3d 333, 338 (5th Cir. 2008); see also Kitty Hawk Aircargo, Inc. v. Chao, 418 F.3d 453, 457 (5th
Cir. 2005). Thus, in weighing a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, district courts primarily look to the
allegations found in the complaint, but courts may also consider “documents incorporated into the
complaint by reference or integral to the claim, items subject to judicial notice, matters of public
record, orders, items appearing in the record of the case, and exhibits attached to the complaint
whose authenticity is unquestioned.” Meyers v. Textron, Inc., 540 F. App’x 408, 409 (5th Cir.
2013) (citing Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S. 308, 322 (2007)).
B. Analysis
1. Retaliation Claim
Prior to filing suit in federal court, a plaintiff alleging discrimination claims must exhaust
administrative remedies by filing a timely charge of discrimination with the EEOC and receiving
a statutory notice of right to sue. Jones v. City of Hous., 756 F. App’x 341, 348 (5th Cir. 2018)
(citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1); Taylor v. Books A Million, Inc., 296 F.3d 376, 378-79 (5th Cir.
2002)). In a deferral state, such as Louisiana,43 a plaintiff must file a charge with the EEOC within
300 days from the date of the alleged discriminatory act to preserve the right to sue in federal court.
DeBlanc v. St. Tammany Par. Sch. Bd., 2015 WL 1245781, at *6 (E.D. La. Mar. 18, 2015) (citing
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(1), which provides that a Title VII plaintiff must file a charge within 300
days after the alleged unlawful employment practice in deferral states).
The scope of an EEOC complaint is liberally construed to determine whether a plaintiff
has administratively exhausted a particular claim. Patton v. Jacobs Eng’g Grp., Inc., 874 F.3d
437, 443 (5th Cir. 2017) (citing Pacheco v. Mineta, 448 F.3d 783, 788 (5th Cir. 2006)). “‘On the
other hand, a primary purpose of Title VII is to trigger the investigatory and conciliatory
procedures of the EEOC, in attempt[ing] to achieve non-judicial resolution of employment
discrimination claims.’” Id. (quoting Pacheco, 448 F.3d at 788-89). Balancing these
considerations requires a court to interpret “what is properly embraced in review of a Title-VII
claim somewhat broadly, not solely by the scope of the administrative charge itself, but by the
43 States with a state or local administrative mechanism are referred to as deferral states and those without
such an agency are referred to as non-deferral states.
scope of the EEOC investigation which ‘can reasonably be expected to grow out of the charge of
discrimination.’” Id. (quoting Pacheco, 448 F.3d at 789). Thus, a court engages in a “‘fact-
intensive analysis of the statement given by the plaintiff in the administrative charge, and look[s]
slightly beyond its four corners, to its substance rather than its label.’” Id. (quoting Pacheco, 448
F.3d at 789).
Fields’s EEOC charge of discrimination neither specified that she was bringing a retaliation
claim, nor did it allege facts out of which a retaliation investigation could have been expected to
grow. Fields specified that her EEOC charge was based on “Race, Sex” discrimination.44 She
then stated facts to support such claims – namely, that she, a Black female, was fired for a safety
violation whereas white male colleagues who committed similar infractions were only suspended
for three days.45 In the charge, Fields also alleged facts that support a hostile-work-environment
claim when she described Tharp’s use of the “N-word” on October 26, 2023, and her supervisor’s
response to it.46 What is missing is an allegation that she engaged in a protected activity, which is
a required element of a retaliation claim.47 Indeed, Fields alleged the opposite – specifically, that
when Lesaicherre asked her what she wanted to do about the incident with Tharp, she said that
she did not want to do anything about it.48 An investigation into retaliation cannot be expected to
arise from these allegations where there is no reference to such a claim or any mention of a
44 R. Doc. 12-4 at 2.
45 Id.
46 Id.
47 Title VII prohibits an employer from discriminating against an employee “because [s]he has opposed any
practice made an unlawful employment practice by [Title VII], or because [s]he has made a charge, testified, assisted,
or participated in any manner in an investigation, proceeding, or hearing under [Title VII].” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a);
see Brown v. Wal-Mart Stores E., L.P., 969 F.3d 571, 576-77 (5th Cir. 2020) (describing § 2000e-3(a) as Title VII’s
antiretaliation provision). The elements of a prima facie case are: (1) the plaintiff engaged in protected activity; (2)
she suffered an adverse employment action; and (3) a causal connection exists between the protected activity and the
adverse employment action. Lewis v. Bd. of Supervisors of La. State Univ. & Agric. & Mech. Coll., 134 F.4th 286,
295 (5th Cir. 2025).
48 R. Doc. 12-4 at 2.
protected activity in which the complainant engaged.49 Therefore, Fields’s retaliation claim must
be dismissed with prejudice because she failed to exhaust her administrative remedies with respect
to that claim.
2. Hostile-Work-Environment Claim
“In addition to protecting employees from race, sex, and national origin discrimination in
the workplace, Title VII also makes it unlawful for employers to require ‘people to work in a
discriminatorily hostile or abusive environment.’” Wantou v. Wal-Mart Stores Tex., L.L.C., 23
F.4th 422, 432 (5th Cir. 2022) (quoting Gardner v. CLC of Pascagoula, L.L.C., 915 F.3d 320, 325
(5th Cir. 2019)). The elements of a hostile-work-environment claim are that “(1) [the plaintiff] is
a member of a protected class; (2) [s]he suffered unwelcomed harassment; (3) the harassment was
based on [her] membership in a protected class; (4) the harassment ‘affected a term, condition, or
privilege of employment’; and (5) ‘the employer knew or should have known’ about the
harassment and ‘failed to take prompt remedial action.’” Id. at 433 (quoting West v. City of Hous.,
960 F.3d 736, 741 (5th Cir. 2020)). “For harassment to affect a term, condition, or privilege of
employment, it ‘must be sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of the victim’s
employment and create an abusive working environment.’” Id. (quoting West, 960 F.3d at 741-
42). “The environment must be ‘both objectively and subjectively offensive, one that a reasonable
person would find hostile or abusive, and one that the victim in fact did perceive to be so.’” Id.
(quoting Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 787 (1998)).
“The totality of the employment circumstances determines whether an environment is
objectively hostile.” Id. (citing Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 23 (1993)). “Although
no single factor is determinative, pertinent considerations are: (1) ‘the frequency of the
49 For example, the charge of discrimination does not state that Fields complained to her supervisors, nor
does it advert to Fields’s exclamation of “Excuse me” in reaction to the use of the racial slur.
discriminatory conduct’; (2) ‘its severity’; (3) ‘whether it is physically threatening or humiliating,
or a mere offensive utterance’; and (4) ‘whether it unreasonably interferes with an employee's
work performance.’” Id. (quoting Harris, 510 U.S. at 23). “‘Title VII, however, is not a general
civility code.’” Id. (quoting Faragher, 524 U.S. at 788) (internal quotation marks omitted). So,
“simple teasing, offhand comments, and isolated incidents (unless extremely serious) will not
amount to discriminatory changes in the terms and conditions of employment.” Faragher, 524
U.S. at 788.
Fields alleges two incidents that she says point to a hostile work environment. First, Tharp
used a racial slur in front of her and, later, Gillis texted her a video in which that same slur was
repeatedly used. While these allegations alone may not be sufficient to prevail on a motion for
summary judgment, Fields has alleged enough facts at this pleadings stage to warrant further
investigation through discovery, especially considering that Gillis is a supervisor. See Johnson v.
PRIDE Indus., Inc., 7 F.4th 392, 401 n.9 (5th Cir. 2021) (noting “that even ‘isolated incidents’ of
harassment, if ‘extremely serious,’ can create a hostile work environment,” and that other “circuits
have concluded that even the limited use of severe racial epithets can rise to the level of a hostile
work environment”). As such, Nucor’s motion to dismiss Fields’s hostile-work-environment
claim is denied.
IV. CONCLUSION
Accordingly, for the foregoing reasons,
IT IS ORDERED that Nucor’s partial motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) (R. Doc.
12) is GRANTED as to the retaliation claim, which is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the motion is DENIED as to the hostile-work-
environment claim.
New Orleans, Louisiana, this 19th day of September, 2025.
________________________________
BARRY W. ASHE
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE