Martin v. Redstone Federal Credit Union

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

NORTHEASTERN DIVISION

ALLEN-ANTHONY MARTIN, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

vs. ) Civil Action No. 5:25-cv-00548-CLS

)

REDSTONE FEDERAL CREDIT )

UNION, )

)

Defendant. )

MEMORANDUM OPINION

The plaintiff, Allen-Anthony Martin, is proceeding pro se, without the aid of

counsel. He commenced this action on April 10, 2025. The complaint filed on that

date alleged six claims against the defendant, Redstone Federal Credit Union

(“Redstone”): i.e., breach of fiduciary duty (Count I); “Trust Fraud and Malfeasance

of Office” (Count II); “Default by Non-Response and Power of Attorney for Lien

Filing” (Count III); “Violation of UCC § 9-201 — Enforcement of Security

Agreement” (Count IV); “Trespass and Unreasonable Conduct” (Count V); and,

“Violation of Constitutional Rights (Due Process) (Count VI). Doc. no. 1

(Complaint). The last two Counts, V and VI, alleged violations of plaintiff’s

constitutional rights. Accordingly, the court possesses federal question jurisdiction

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (“The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of

all civil actions arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States.”).

Redstone filed a motion to dismiss all of plaintiff’s claims on May 21, 2025.

Doc. no. 6. Plaintiff responded to the motion on May 23, 2025 (doc. no. 12), but then

filed an amended complaint on May 28, 2025 (doc. no. 14), thereby rendering the

initial motion to dismiss moot. Redstone filed a motion to dismiss the amended

complaint on May 29, 2025, and also asked the court to enter an injunction prohibiting

plaintiff from making any substantive filings (other than a response to the motion to

dismiss) without leave of court. Doc. no. 15.1 This opinion addresses defendant’s

motion to dismiss.2

I. PLAINTIFF’S ALLEGATIONS

As an initial matter, the court observes that plaintiff’s “amended complaint”

(doc. no. 14) appears to be merely a revision of the claims alleged in Count III

(“Default by Non-Response and Power of Attorney for Lien Filing”) and Count IV

(“Violation of UCC § 9-201 — Enforcement of Security Agreement”). Ordinarily,

an amended complaint supersedes the original complaint, which becomes a legal

nullity. See Hoefling v. City of Miami, 811 F.3d 1271, 1277 (11th Cir. 2016) (citing

Dresdner Bank AG v. M/V Olympia Voyager, 463 F.3d 1210, 1215 (11th Cir. 2006)).

However, the court will assume, as Redstone does, that plaintiff intended the

1 Redstone re-asserted the arguments advanced in its initial motion to dismiss and supporting

brief (doc. nos. 6 & 7).

2 The court ordered plaintiff to respond to the motion, and denied as moot Redstone’s initial

motion to dismiss. On May 30, 2025, plaintiff filed an objection to the aspect of Redstone’s motion

seeking a filing injunction. Doc. no. 17.

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allegations contained in his original complaint (doc. no. 1) to be read together with the

revisions to Counts III and IV contained in the “amended complaint” (doc. no. 14).

The two pleadings thereby constitute plaintiff’s statement of his six claims.3 See

Tannenbaum v. United States, 148 F.3d 1262, 1263 (11th Cir. 1998) (“Pro se

pleadings are held to a less stringent standard than pleadings drafted by attorneys and

will, therefore, be liberally construed.”).

As best as the court can discern, plaintiff’s lawsuit centers around a document

attached to his complaint, and entitled “UCC [Uniform Commercial Code] Financing

Statement.”4 Plaintiff apparently filed the document in the State of Florida’s “Secured

Transaction Registry” on September 11, 2023. The document lists the Debtor’s

Names as: “ALLEN ANTHONY MARTIN TRUST©”; and “ALLEN ANTHONY

MARTIN, NON-ADVERSE, NON-BELLIGERENT, NON-COMBATANT

PRIVATE FOUNDATION.” The same document lists the “Secured Party’s Name”

as “Allen-Anthony Martin.” The section of the form entitled “Collateral” contains the

following statement:

This is the entry of collateral by Trustee/Secured Party on behalf of the

Trust/Estate; ALLEN ANTHONY MARTIN TRUST© in the

Commercial Chamber under necessity to secure the rights, title(s),

3 The substance of the revisions is addressed in Part III of this opinion.

4 Doc. no. 1-1, at ECF 1. “ECF” is an acronym formed from the initial letters of the name

of a case filing system that allows parties to file and serve documents electronically (i.e., “Electronic

Case Filing”). When this court cites to pagination generated by the ECF header, it will, as here,

precede the page number(s) with the letters ECF.

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interest and value therefrom in and of the Root of Title from inception,

as well as all property held in trust including but not limited to DNA,

cDNA, cell lines, retina scans, fingerprints and all Debentures,

Indentures, Accounts, and all the pledges represented by same included

but not limited to the pignus, hypotheca, hereditments, res, the energy

and all products derived therefrom nunc pro tunc, contracts, agreements,

and signatures and/or endorsements, facsimiles, printed, typed or

photocopied of owner’s name predicated on the “Straw-man” Eris

legis/Trust/Estate described as the debtor and all property is accepted for

value and is Exempt from levy. Lien places on debtor entities is for all

outstanding property still owed but not yet returned to trust from entities

such as municipalities, governments and the like, not on trust entity

itself. Trustee is not surety to any account by explicit

reservation/indemnification. The following property is hereby registered

and liened in the same: all Certificates of Birth Document [redacted in

original], SSN/UCC Contract Trust Account-prepaid account Number

[redacted in original] Exemption Identification Number [redacted in

original], is herein liened and claimed at a sum certain $100,000,000.00,

also registered: Security Agreement No. 03131982-AAM-SA, Hold

Harmless and Indemnity Agreement No. 03131982-AAM-HHIA,

Copyright under item no.: 03131982-AAM-CLC Adjustment of this

filing is in accord with both public policy and the national Uniform

Commercial Code. Trustee/Secured Party Allen-Anthony: Martin, is

living flesh and blood human being sojourning upon the land/ground/soil

of the land known as Alabama, and not within fictional boundaries,

territories nor jurisdiction of any fictional entity including fictional

Federal geometric plane(s).

Doc. no. 1-1, at ECF 1. Plaintiff signed his name as “Secured Party.” He alleges that

the UCC form is evidence that he is a beneficiary of a “Cestui Que Vie Trust,”5 with

an enforceable security interest.6

5 That reference is characteristic of so-called “sovereign citizen” complaints. See, e.g.,

Potter v. United States, 161 Fed. Cl. 24, 28-29 (Fed. Cl. 2022) (“Sovereign citizens also sometimes

reference the ‘Cestui Que Vie Act of 1666' or a ‘cestui que vie” trust, as support for their arguments

in court.”) (footnote omitted).

6 Doc. no. 1 (Complaint), at 1.

4

Plaintiff alleges that he applied for a $10,000 loan from Redstone “under the

Cestui Que Vie Trust, a legally binding instrument that designated [Redstone] as the

Trustee responsible for administering funds on behalf of the Plaintiff.”7 Redstone

denied plaintiff’s loan application on May 6, 2024.8 Plaintiff contends that Redstone’s

denial of the loan application was a breach of fiduciary duty and fraud.9 Plaintiff also

alleges that Redstone failed to adequately respond to the requests for information and

other “notices” that he sent to defendant.10 Plaintiff further states that:

On November 1, 2024,[11] Plaintiff attempted to resolve the dispute in

person by visiting Defendant’s physical location and speaking with a

representative regarding the denial of the loan and failure to respond to

his requests.

Despite Plaintiff’s legitimate attempt to address the matter, Defendant’s

employees issued a trespass notice against Plaintiff and called law

enforcement. Plaintiff was stalled in the office for 20 minutes. Law

enforcement officers (5 of them) proceeded to aggressively handle

Plaintiff and pat him down before attempting to physically remove him

from the bank with no explanation. This action [was] done by Officer

Emani Richardson Badge #20027. Once outside, Defendant’s

representative handed Plaintiff the notice and told him it was enforceable

for all locations until legal counsel contacted him. Plaintiff did not

receive any explanation for this action.

Doc. no. 1 (Complaint), at 9-10 (alteration supplied). Plaintiff contends that

7 Id. at 2.

8 Id. at 3.

9 Id. at 4; see also doc. no. 1-1, at ECF 3-5, 7-8, 9-14.

10 Id. at 7.

11 A Redstone Federal Credit Union “Notice of Trespass Warning,” dated October 1, 2024,

is attached to the Complaint. Doc. no. 1-1, at ECF 2.

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Redstone’s conduct was unlawful.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

The relevant portion of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12 permits a party to

move to dismiss a complaint for “failure to state a claim upon which relief can be

granted.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). That rule must be read together with Rule 8(a),

which requires that a pleading contain only a “short and plain statement of the claim

showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2) (emphasis

supplied). While that pleading standard does not require “detailed factual

allegations,” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 550 (2007), it does

demand “more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.”

Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citations omitted). As the Supreme Court

stated in the Iqbal opinion:

A pleading that offers “labels and conclusions” or “a formulaic recitation

of the elements of a cause of action will not do.” [Twombly, 550 U.S. at

555]. Nor does a complaint suffice if it tenders “naked assertion[s]

devoid of “further factual enhancement.” Id. at 557.

To survive a motion to dismiss [founded upon Federal Rule of

Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), for failure to state a claim upon which relief

can be granted], a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter,

accepted as true, to “state a claim for relief that is plausible on its face.”

Id. at 570. A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads

factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that

the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged. Id. at 556. The

plausibility standard is not akin to a “probability requirement,” but it

asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted

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unlawfully. Ibid. Where a complaint pleads facts that are “merely

consistent with” a defendant’s liability, it “stops short of the line between

possibility and plausibility of ‘entitlement to relief.’” Id. at 557 (brackets

omitted).

Two working principles underlie our decision in Twombly. First,

the tenet that a court must accept as true all of the allegations contained

in a complaint is inapplicable to legal conclusions. Threadbare recitals

of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory

statements, do not suffice. Id. at 555 (Although for the purposes of a

motion to dismiss we must take all factual allegations in the complaint

as true, we “are not bound to accept as true a legal conclusion couched

as a factual allegation”) (internal quotation marks omitted)). Rule 8

marks a notable and generous departure from the hyper-technical, code-

pleading regime of a prior era, but it does not unlock the doors of

discovery for a plaintiff armed with nothing more than conclusions.

Second, only a complaint that states a plausible claim for relief survives

a motion to dismiss. Id. at 556. Determining whether a complaint states

a plausible claim for relief will, as the Court of Appeals observed, be a

context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its

judicial experience and common sense. 409 F.3d at 157-58. But where

the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more than the mere

possibility of misconduct, the complaint has alleged — but it has not

“show[n]” — “that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P.

8(a)(2).

In keeping with these principles a court considering a motion to

dismiss can choose to begin by identifying pleadings that, because they

are no more than conclusions, are not entitled to the assumption of truth.

While legal conclusions can provide the framework of a complaint, they

must be supported by factual allegations. When there are well-pleaded

factual allegations, a court should assume their veracity and then

determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement of relief.

Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678-79 (emphasis supplied, second and fourth alterations in

original, other alteration supplied).

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III. DISCUSSION

Redstone first contends that plaintiff’s complaint is an impermissible “shotgun

pleading,” because it “is a lengthy, largely repetitive collection of irrelevant facts and

citations to legal authorities that offer no apparent support for any colorable claims

against Redstone.”12 The court agrees. Even so, there are other, substantive reasons

that plaintiff’s complaint cannot survive defendant’s motion to dismiss.

A. “Sovereign Citizen” Theories

Redstone argues that plaintiff’s complaint should be dismissed in its entirety

because it relies on “sovereign citizen” theories that have been widely rejected by

courts as frivolous.13

The basis for theories espoused by adherents of the sovereign citizen movement

has been described by another district court as follows:

The foundation of [a sovereign citizen] claim is equal parts

revisionist legal history and conspiracy theory. Supposedly, prior to the

passage of the Fourteenth Amendment, there were no U.S. citizens;

instead, people were citizens only of their individual states. Even after

the passage of the Fourteenth Amendment, U.S. citizenship remains

optional. The federal government, however, has tricked the populace

into becoming U.S. citizens by entering into “contracts” embodied in

such documents as birth certificates and social security cards. With these

contracts, an individual unwittingly creates a fictitious entity (i.e., the

U.S. citizen) that represents, but is separate from, the real person.

12 Doc. no. 7 (Defendant Redstone Federal Credit Union’s Brief in Support of its Motion to

Dismiss), at 5.

13 Id. at 5-8 (collecting cases).

8

Through these contracts, individuals also unknowingly pledge

themselves and their property, through their newly created fictitious

entities, as security for the national debt in exchange for the benefits of

citizenship. However, the government cannot hold the profits it makes

from this use of its citizens and their property in the general fund of the

United States because doing so would constitute fraud, given that the

profits technically belong to the actual owners of the property being

pledged (i.e., the real people represented by the fictitious entities).

Therefore, the government holds the profits in secret, individual trust

accounts, one for each citizen.

Bryant v. Washington Mutual Bank, 524 F. Supp. 2d 753, 758-59 (W.D. Va. 2007)

(alteration supplied). Those beliefs manifest as “names written in all capital letters

and the same names written with just the initial letters capitalized.” Wood v. United

States, 161 Fed. Cl. 30, 34 (Fed. Cl. 2022). A sovereign citizen plaintiff may

reference a “cestui que vie” trust, ostensibly based upon the Cestui Que Vie Act of

1666, see id., and seek to validate the so-called trust through the filing of UCC

financing statements, in which he lists himself as both the secured party and the

debtor. See Bryant, 524 F. Supp. 2d at 759.

Although plaintiff disavows the characterization of his claims as based upon

“sovereign citizen” ideology,14 his complaint contains hallmarks of those discredited

theories, as illustrated by the contents of the UCC Financing Statement set out above.

Upon review of plaintiff’s complaint, the court concludes that Counts II (“Trust

Fraud and Malfeasance of Office), III (“Default by Non-Response and Power of

14 Doc. no. 12 (Plaintiff’s Response to Motion to Dismiss), at 1, ¶ 1.

9

Attorney for Lien Filing”), and IV (“Violation of UCC § 9-201 — Enforcement of

Security Agreement”) of plaintiff’s complaint are due to be dismissed because each

is based upon frivolous, sovereign citizen theories, as opposed to cognizable legal

claims.

1. “Trust Fraud and Malfeasance of Office” (Count II)

Plaintiff alleges in Count II that Redstone “has committed trust fraud and

malfeasance of office by intentionally denying Plaintiff access to the trust funds and

refusing to respond adequately to Plaintiff’s legitimate inquiries.”15 He further states

that:

[Redstone’s] failure to provide a written agreement or documentation

related to Plaintiff’s trust interest is a violation of the Statute of Frauds

(1666 Act), which requires contracts involving interests in land or

property rights, including trust agreements, to be evidenced in writing.

Doc. no. 1 (complaint), at 5 (alteration supplied, boldface type in original). Plaintiff

also invokes the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, 18 U.S.C. §

1961 et seq., contending that Redstone’s conduct in denying his loan application and

failing to adequately respond to his notices constitutes “a pattern of racketeering

activity,” as defined by that statute.16

Plaintiff’s claim of “Trust Fraud and Malfeasance of Office” is not based on

15 Doc. no. 1 (Complaint), at 5 (boldface type in original).

16 Id. at 6.

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any recognized cause of action under Alabama or federal law. Instead, it is

“incomprehensible and replete with the legal-sounding but meaningless verbiage

commonly used by adherents to the so-called sovereign citizen movement.” Sealey

v. Branch Banking and Trust Company, No. 2:17cv785-MHT-SMD, 2019 WL

1434065, at *2 (M.D. Ala. Feb. 21, 2019). See also Sovereign Citizens: A Cult

Movement that Demands Legislative Resistance, 17 Rutgers J. L. & Religion 153, 157

(2015) (“[Court] filings [by ‘sovereign citizens’] are written in a code-like language

that judges, lawyers, and other court staff usually cannot understand. This is because

sovereigns believe that if they find the right combination of words, punctuation, ink

color, and timing, they can obtain anything they want.”) (alterations supplied and

footnotes omitted).

Additionally, plaintiff has not alleged facts that would support a civil RICO

claim. To prevail on such a claim, a plaintiff “must prove three essential elements:

(1) a violation of [18 U.S.C. §] 1962; (2) injury to business or property; and (3) that

the violation caused the injury.” Avirgan v. Hall, 932 F.2d 1572, 1577 (11th Cir.

1991) (alteration supplied). Plaintiff has failed to allege facts that support any of the

requisite elements.

2. “Default by Non-Response and Power of Attorney for Lien Filing”

(Count III)

Count III of plaintiff’s complaint suffers from the same affliction. Plaintiff

11

states, in part:

By failing to respond within five business days to Plaintiff’s

second formal notice, Defendant’s non-response has implicitly granted

Plaintiff a Power of Attorney (POA), as allowed by law in

circumstances where a fiduciary or trustee fails to perform its duties and

obligations. This implied POA allows Plaintiff to act on Defendant’s

behalf, including the right to file a Claim of Lien against Defendant and

any third parties involved, for the amount of $1,000,000 per recipient, as

stipulated in Plaintiff’s UCC-1 filing and the fee schedule attached

hereto as Exhibit A. This claim of lien is fully enforceable by Plaintiff

as a secured party and creditor of the trust.

By failing to respond within five business days to Plaintiff’s second

formal notice, Defendant’s non-response has implicitly granted Plaintiff

a Power of Attorney (POA), as allowed by law in circumstances where

a fiduciary or trustee fails to preform its duties and obligations. This

implied POA allows Plaintiff to act on Defendant’s behalf, including the

right to file a Claim of Lien against Defendant and any third parties

involved, for the amount of $1,000,000 per recipient, as stipulated in

Plaintiff’s UCC-1 filing and the fee schedule attached hereto as Exhibit

A. This claim of lien is fully enforceable by Plaintiff as a secured party

and creditor of the trust.

Doc. no. 1 (Complaint), at 7. The “amended complaint” states, with respect to that

Count:

Plaintiff realleges and incorporates by reference the allegations in

paragraphs 1 through 11.[17]

Defendant’s failure to respond within five business days to Plaintiff’s

second notice constitutes default by non-response, which would invoke

the POA [Power of Attorney] entitling Plaintiff to take legal action. By

failing to respond to Plaintiff’s second formal notice within the

17 Plaintiff’s reference to “paragraphs 1 through 11” is confusing. The only numbered

paragraphs in the original complaint appear in the “Prayer for Relief.” See doc. no. 1 (Complaint),

at 11-13.

12

stipulated 5-business-day period, Defendant’s non-response constitutes

an implied Power of Attorney allowing Plaintiff to act on their behalf

and file a Claim of Lien, as provided in the UCC and related agreements.

This POA is invoked due to Defendant’s breach of fiduciary duty and

failure to fulfill obligations as set forth in the trust agreement and UCC

filings. Plaintiff seeks to enforce the Claim of Lien for the amount of

$1,000,000 per recipient.

Doc. no. 14 (Amended Complaint), at 1 (alterations supplied). Plaintiff’s allegations,

taken as a whole, are: incomprehensible and nonsensical; based on rejected sovereign

citizen theory; and relate to a fictional trust. For those reasons, they do not support

a cognizable claim under Alabama or federal law.

3. “Violation of UCC § 9-201 — Enforcement of Security Agreement”

(Count IV )

Plaintiff essentially recasts the claim a third time in Count IV, adding

references to the UCC, ostensibly in an attempt to bolster his “legalese.” He states:

Plaintiff is a secured party in relation to the trust and has duly filed

a UCC-1 Financing Statement (#202302477403) with the Florida

Secretary of State, which perfects Plaintiff’s security interest as the

principal creditor of the trust. Under UCC § 9-201, Defendant is legally

obligated to recognize and act upon Plaintiff’s secured interest as

evidenced by the UCC-1 filing. By denying Plaintiff access to the trust

funds and failing to respond to formal notices, Defendant has wrongfully

impaired Plaintiff’s security interest and violated Plaintiff’s rights under

the Uniform Commercial Code, including the failure to comply with

UCC § 9-609 (relating to enforcement of a security agreement. . . . The

Defendant’s actions, including the wrongful denial of access to the trust

and failure to respond to formal notices, undermine Plaintiff’s legal

rights as a secured party under the Uniform Commercial Code, thus

impairing Plaintiff’s ability to enforce the security agreement.

13

Doc. no. 1 (Complaint), at 8 (ellipsis supplied). Plaintiff’s amended complaint adds

the following:

Plaintiff is a secured party in relation to the trust and has duly filed a

UCC-1 Financing Statement (#202302477403) with the Florida

Secretary of State, which perfects Plaintiff’s security interest as the

principal creditor of the trust. Under UCC § 9-201, Defendant is legally

obligated to recognize and act upon Plaintiff’s secured interest as

evidenced by the UCC-1 filing.

By denying Plaintiff access to the trust and failing to respond to formal

notices, Defendant has wrongfully impaired Plaintiff’s security interest

and violated Plaintiff’s rights under the Uniform Commercial Code.

Furthermore, Defendant’s failure to provide a written contract constitutes

a violation of the Statute of Frauds.

Doc. no. 14 (Amended Complaint), at 2.

As defendant aptly states, “regardless of plaintiff’s legal theory, claims based

on Redstone’s failure to provide the plaintiff access to illusory trust funds or to

respond to legally meaningless notices have no merit and should be dismissed.”18 The

court agrees.

In short, Counts II, III, and IV of plaintiff’s complaint are due to be dismissed

as frivolous.

B. Breach of Fiduciary Duty (Count I)

Plaintiff alleges that Redstone breached its fiduciary duty “by denying access

to the trust funds and failing to act in Plaintiff’s best interest, resulting in financial and

18 Doc. no. 7 (Redstone’s Brief in Support of its Motion to Dismiss), at 12.

14

emotional harm” — presumably by denying plaintiff’s loan application.19 To prevail

on a claim of breach of fiduciary duty, a plaintiff must show: “(1) the existence of a

fiduciary duty between the parties; (2) the breach of that duty; and (3) damages

suffered as a result of the breach.” Regions Bank v. Lowery, 101 So. 3d 210, 219 (Ala.

2012). It is well settled under Alabama law that, absent circumstances not present

here, “the relationship between a bank and its customer [is] a creditor-debtor

relationship that does not impose a fiduciary duty on the bank.” Power Equipment

Company, Inc. v. First Alabama Bank, 585 So. 2d 1291, 1297 (Ala. 1991).

Accordingly, Redstone’s denial of plaintiff’s loan application does not support a claim

of breach of fiduciary duty, and this claim fails.

C. Claims Based Upon Constitutional Violations (Counts V and VI)

Counts V and VI of plaintiff’s complaint allege that Redstone violated his

constitutional rights. In Count V, plaintiff alleges that Redstone’s actions in

summoning law enforcement officers to remove plaintiff from Redstone’s premises

violated his Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment rights, as protected by 42 U.S.C. §

1983. Count VI alleges that Redstone deprived plaintiff of his property — i.e., the so-

called trust funds — without due process of law.

Section 1983 provides, in pertinent part, that:

19 Doc. no. 1 (Complaint), at 4.

15

Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance,

regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of

Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United

States or other person with in the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation

of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and

laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity

or other proper proceeding for redress . . . .

42 U.S.C. § 1983 (emphasis supplied). Plaintiff’s claims must fail for the simple

reason that Redstone is a private entity and cannot be sued for constitutional violations

under § 1983 or otherwise. See, e.g., Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 13 (1948)

(holding that the Fourteenth Amendment “does not erect a shield against merely

private conduct, however discriminatory or wrong”).

With respect to Count V, the fact that “law enforcement” officers were

allegedly involved in plaintiff’s removal from Redstone’s premises does not make

Redstone liable under § 1983 for any unconstitutional acts that may have occurred.

With respect to Count VI, in addition to the fact that Redstone is a private actor, there

were no “trust funds” or other property of which plaintiff could be deprived.

Accordingly, plaintiff has failed to state a claim upon which relief may be granted in

Counts V and VI.

D. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11

Finally, the court must address plaintiff’s use of non-existent case citations in

his complaint and amended complaint. Of the twelve citations to legal authority

16

contained in the complaint, eight are “fake.”20 Further, all five cases cited in

plaintiff’s amended complaint do not exist.21 As just one example, in Count I of the

complaint, plaintiff cites “Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. Bank of America, 121 Cal. Rptr.

3d 517 (2011),” and states “”[t]his case discusses the elements of a fiduciary duty and

the breach thereof, particularly in the context of corporate and financial institutions.”22

A Westlaw search of that citation leads to People v. Xinos, a case that involves a

motion to suppress information obtained from a criminal defendant’s “event data

recorder” in a vehicular manslaughter case.

As stated previously, complaints drafted by pro se plaintiffs are treated with

more leniency than those prepared by attorneys. Even so, that leniency does not

extend to the duty of candor to the court required of all parties — including pro se

litigants — imposed by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Specifically, Rule 11(b)

states that

[b]y presenting to the court a pleading, written motion or other paper —

whether by signing, filing, submitting, or later advocating it — an

attorney or unrepresented party certifies that, to the best of the person’s

20 The citations to non-existent cases that appear in plaintiff’s complaint are: Wells Fargo

Bank, N.A. v. Bank of America, 121 Cal. Rptr. 3d 517 (2011); In re Estate of Brodie, 661 P.2d 145

(1983); In re Connelly, 21 F.3d 1423 (1994); Allied Steel & Conveyor Co. v. U.S., 256 U.S. 148

(1921); Calif. State Board of Equalization v. Tarrant, 117 Cal. App. 3d 611 (1981); Citibank (South

Dakota, N.A. v. Jackson, 460 F.3d 768 (7th Cir. 2006); In re J.P. Morgan Chase Bank, 614 F.3d 290

(2d Cir. 2010); In re Safeway Stores, Inc., 99 B.R. 525 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1989). Doc. no. 1

(Complaint), at 4-9.

21 See doc. no. 14 (Amended Complaint), at 1-2.

22 Doc. no. 1 (Complaint), at 4.

17

knowledge, information, and belief, formed after an inquiry reasonable

under the circumstances:

* * * *

(2) the claims, defenses, and other legal contentions are warranted by

existing law or by a non-frivolous argument for extending, modifying,

or reversing existing law or for establishing new law[ ].

Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(b)(2) (alteration, emphasis, and ellipsis supplied). As one judicial

officer succinctly stated: “Non-existent law is indeed the opposite of existing law”

and, accordingly, violates Rule 11. Rollins v. Premier Motorcar Gallery, Inc., No.

4:24-cv-413-MW-MAF, 2025 WL 2166019, at *5 (N.D. Fla. July 15, 2025).

Although such conduct may be sanctionable under Rule 11, the court will not

take further action at this time in light of the disposition of defendant’s motion.

However, plaintiff is strongly cautioned that any future pleadings, motions, or other

papers submitted to this court or any other must comply with Rule 11.

IV. CONCLUSION

For all of the foregoing reasons, Redstone’s motion to dismiss is due to be

granted.

Further, upon review of the pleadings, Redstone’s motions to dismiss, and

plaintiff’s responses, the court concludes that plaintiff’s complaint could not be cured

by amendment. See Burger King Corp. v. Weaver, 169 F.3d 1310, 1320 (11th Cir.

1999) (“[D]enial of leave to amend is justified by futility when the ‘complaint as

18

amended is still subject to dismissal.’”’) (alteration supplied and citation omitted). A

separate order consistent with this memorandum opinion will be entered

contemporaneously herewith.

DONE and ORDERED this 19th day of September, 2025. |

United States District Judge

19