Com. v. Lawrence, J.

J-S24015-25

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

: PENNSYLVANIA

:

v. :

:

:

JAMES LAWRENCE :

:

Appellant : No. 1335 WDA 2024

Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered October 22, 2024

In the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County Criminal Division at

No(s): CP-02-CR-0012037-2013

BEFORE: NICHOLS, J., McLAUGHLIN, J., and LANE, J.

MEMORANDUM BY NICHOLS, J.: FILED: September 19, 2025

Appellant James Lawrence appeals from the order dismissing his first

Post Conviction Relief Act1 (PCRA) petition after an evidentiary hearing.

Appellant claims that the PCRA court erred by failing to allow him to amend

his PCRA petition before dismissal, dismissing his Brady2 claim and claims of

trial counsel’s ineffective assistance, and by failing to hold an evidentiary

hearing after this Court’s previous remand. After careful review, we affirm.

A previous panel of this court set forth the facts of the case as follows:

On March 29, 2013, Steven Lee and Latia Lee joined family

members to celebrate Lateesha Lee Jones’s birthday. As part of

the celebration, the family rented a “party bus” limo to transport

family and friends to different bars in Pittsburgh. The party bus

initially parked in front of Craig’s Bar on Chartiers Avenue in the

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1 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 9541-9546.

2 Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963).

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West End neighborhood of the City of Pittsburgh at 11:00 P.M. to

allow family and friends to board.

One of the family members, Matthew Sherrell, invited Summer

Kerley and her friends, Clarissa Clark and Samantha Powe, to join

the party. Kerley, Clark and Powe arrived at Craig’s Bar and

boarded the party bus, but left shortly thereafter because the bus

was not leaving at that time. Powe drove Kerley and Clark to

Homewood, where they met [Appellant], Michael Lyons, and

Jerrick Lane-Bryant at the Lang Bar. Kerley and [Appellant] were

dating at the time, and [Appellant] was using Kerley’s vehicle.

At 12:30 A.M., the party bus left Craig’s Bar and traveled to the

Caravan Club in Pittsburgh’s South Side. Sherrell called Kerley to

inform her of the new location of the party bus, and to invite the

three women back onto the bus. Powe then drove Kerley and

Clark to the South Side and the three women rejoined the group

on the party bus around 2:00 A.M. [Appellant], Lane-Bryant, and

Lyons remained at the Lang Bar.

Sometime after 2:00 A.M., once everyone had re-boarded the

party bus, the driver began to drive back to the West End and

Craig’s Bar. During the drive back to Craig’s Bar, an argument

broke out between the female members of the Lee family and

Clark, Powe, and Kerley. The argument progressed into a physical

fight between the females. Steven Lee unsuccessfully attempted

to remove his sister Latia Lee from the fight.

During the altercation, Powe called [Appellant] and urged [him]

to “come get these n***as.” In response, [Appellant] had Lane-

Bryant drive [Appellant] and Lyons to the West End, using Kerley’s

vehicle. Clark moved to the front of the bus and spoke with the

bus driver about where he was driving, and was also on the phone

to [Appellant] while he was en route to the West End. In the

aftermath of the phone call to [Appellant], Clark announced to the

occupants of the bus, “it’s not over, my bro’s are on the way

coming to spank him and her,” referring to Steven Lee and Latia

Lee. [Appellant] and his cohorts arrived as the bus was arriving

in the vicinity of Craig’s Bar. The bus driver stopped the party

bus, and parked it fifty feet from Craig’s Bar. Lane-Bryant parked

in front of the bus.

Sensing trouble, the bus driver ran off the bus and fled the

immediate area. Clark also left the bus and ran to Kerley’s vehicle,

and yelled at [Appellant], Lyons, and Lane-Bryant, “Bros, what

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took you so long? Brother, brother, get out of the car. These

n***as and b***hes jumped us.”

[Appellant], Lyons, and Lane-Bryant exited the vehicle.

[Appellant] told Lane-Bryant to grab a thirty round 40 caliber clip,

and both Lyons and [Appellant] exited the vehicle with their

respective 40 caliber firearms. [Appellant] and Lyons ran onto the

bus with their firearms. [Appellant] remained at the front of the

bus, Lyons ran to the back of the bus. [Appellant] yelled, “I want

my b***h and my sister off this bus.” Lyons asked Powe, “Where

them n***as?” Powe pointed to Steven Lee and Latia Lee, near

the front of the bus, and said, “them right there.” Clark added

that she wanted Latia and Steven “spanked.”

[Appellant] and Lyons then forced Steven Lee and Latia Lee off

the bus at gunpoint. Latia clung to her brother as they were

dragged off the bus. When they reached the steps, Kerley and

Lane-Bryant helped force them off the bus. Once they reached

the sidewalk, [Appellant] and Lyons grabbed Steven Lee,

separating him from Latia, and dragged him around the front of

the bus. Latia Lee tried to chase after her brother, but Kerley and

Lane-Bryant stopped her. Kerley hit Latia repeatedly, and Lane-

Bryant struck Latia repeatedly with the thirty round clip.

[Appellant] and Lyons moved Steven Lee to the driver’s side

(street side) of the bus, and started to beat him. Steven Lee broke

free and tried to run away towards the back of the bus.

[Appellant] raised his firearm and shot Steven Lee several times.

Steven Lee suffered four gunshot wounds. The first gunshot

entered his left chest, striking a rib and the left ventricle of his

heart, causing massive hemorrhaging and heart failure. The

second gunshot entered his upper back and exited his neck,

severing his spinal cord and perforating his left lung. The third

gunshot struck his left hand, and the fourth gunshot grazed his

right knee.

Sherrell, having run off the bus into a nearby parking lot to

retrieve a firearm when [Appellant] arrived, walked back towards

the bus with a 9mm firearm. At the same time, [Appellant] ran

around the back of the bus towards Kerley, who was still beating

Latia Lee with Lane-Bryant. [Appellant] tapped Kerley on the

shoulder and told her it was time to leave. Kerley, [Appellant],

and Lane-Bryant started to make their way back to Kerley’s

vehicle on the passenger’s side of the bus as Sherrell fired at

them. Latia ran back onto the bus for cover. Lyons ran with

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Kerley, [Appellant], and Lane-Bryant, and shot back at Sherrell as

he approached the vehicle.

[Appellant] and Kerley jumped into the front passenger seat of

the vehicle, and [Appellant] leaned over Kerley to protect her.

Lane-Bryant jumped into the driver’s seat and ducked for cover.

Sherrell continued to shoot at them, striking the vehicle and

shooting out all four tires and the windows. Lyons jumped into

the back seat and continued to shoot at Sherrell until his firearm

was empty. [Appellant] gave Lyons his firearm so that Lyons

could continue to shoot back at Sherrell. Lyons replaced the clip

in [Appellant’s] gun with the thirty round clip that Lane-Bryant

had been holding. When Lyons exchanged clips, he dropped

[Appellant’s] clip onto the street. [Appellant] told Lane-Bryant to

retrieve the dropped clip, but Lane-Bryant did not retrieve the clip

because Sherrell and Lyons were still exchanging gunfire.

Lane-Bryant placed the keys in the ignition and attempted to drive

away, but the vehicle did not move because all four tires were

flattened from gunshots. Sherrell was still shooting at the vehicle,

and Lyons exited the vehicle and fled to Kerley’s nearby residence,

at 1111 Sutherland Street. Lane-Bryant continued to attempt to

drive the vehicle, and was able to gain enough momentum to

make it to Kerley’s home.

The shooting stopped after Lane-Bryant drove away. On the bus,

Latia told Lateesha that they took Steven off of her and got him.

Lateesha and Latia ran off the bus together to find Steven. They

found Steven lying in the middle of the street at the back of the

bus. Lateesha gave Steven CPR and held his bleeding wounds

until the ambulance arrived, but he was generally unresponsive.

Steven Lee was emergently transported to the hospital, where

life-saving surgeries were attempted, but they were to no avail.

Steven Lee was pronounced dead at the hospital.

At Kerley’s residence, Lane-Bryant, Kerley, and [Appellant] met

Powe, Clark and Lyons. Once inside the house, [Appellant] asked

Lane-Bryant whether he picked up [Appellant’s] clip as instructed.

Lane-Bryant responded that he did not. [Appellant] told Lane-

Bryant to get the clip, but Powe responded that Lane-Bryant could

not go back outside since the man from the bus was dead, and

the police were there. [Appellant] attacked Lane-Bryant and

punched him until Kerley, Powe, and Clark were able to pull him

off. Fearful of [Appellant], Lane-Bryant went back toward the

scene to retrieve the clip, but by that time police had arrived on

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the scene, and Lane-Bryant returned to Kerley’s without retrieving

the clip.

At the same time, Kerley took [Appellant] upstairs to calm him

down. [Appellant] told Kerley that he pointed his gun at Steven

Lee and told him “to go ahead and he wouldn’t go ahead, so he

shot.” Kerley asked [Appellant] why he shot Steven Lee, and

[Appellant] responded that it looked like Steven Lee was grabbing

something and was going to run away, so [Appellant] shot him.

The group at Kerley’s home collected the two firearms, placed

them in a bag, and Lyons walked them to Clark’s nearby home to

be disposed of. Powe, Clark, and Kerley left at 11:00 A.M. to

retrieve Powe’s vehicle from the South Side, where it had been

parked earlier that morning. [Appellant] also left, leaving behind

Lane-Bryant.

Officers at the scene of the killing recovered window glass from a

vehicle and a part of a vehicle door, which belonged to Kerley’s

vehicle. Officers canvassed the area and eventually discovered

Kerley’s heavily damaged vehicle behind her residence at 1111

Sutherland Street. SWAT entered the residence later that

morning and took Lane-Bryant into custody, whereupon he was

interviewed and he provided a statement [of] the events

surrounding the shooting of Lee.

The ensuing investigation led officers to confirm [Appellant] as the

shooter in the death of Steven Lee and a warrant was issued for

his arrest. [Appellant] became aware of the warrant and

thereupon had Kerley drive him to Atlanta, Georgia. The US

Marshals Fugitive Task Force finally arrested [Appellant] on

August 21, 2013.

Commonwealth v. Lawrence, 1878 WDA 2015, 2016 WL 5210840, at *1-3

(Pa. Super. filed Sept. 20, 2016) (unpublished mem.) (citing Trial Ct. Op.,

2/8/16, at 4-11) (some formatting altered).

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Appellant was convicted of third-degree murder and carrying a firearm

without a license after a jury trial held on March 23, 2015.3,4 PCRA Ct. Op.,

12/13/24, at 2. Appellant filed a direct appeal challenging the weight of the

evidence, and this Court affirmed the judgment of sentence. See Lawrence,

2016 WL 5210840, at *5.

Appellant filed a timely PCRA petition, which was dismissed on July 20,

2022. On appeal, this Court vacated the order dismissing Appellant’s PCRA

petition and remanded for the PCRA court to consider claims of PCRA counsel’s

ineffective assistance that Appellant raised in this Court pursuant to

Commonwealth v. Bradley, 261 A.3d 381 (Pa. 2021). See

Commonwealth v. Lawrence, 309 A.3d 152 (Pa. Super. 2024).

The PCRA court summarized the post-remand procedural history as

follows:

Appellant filed an amended PCRA [petition] on June 7, 2024, and

the Commonwealth responded on July 5, 2024. This court found

no issues of arguable merit and issued a [Pa.R.Crim.P. 907] notice

of intent to dismiss order on July 10, 2024. Appellant filed a

response on September 30, 2024, to which the Commonwealth

filed an answer on October 17, 2024. This court dismissed the

petition [on] October 2[2], 2024.

PCRA Ct. Op. at 2-3 (some formatting altered).

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3 18 Pa.C.S. §§ 2502(c) & 6106, respectively.

4 Appellant was initially tried in January 2015. However, that trial ended in a

mistrial after a hung jury. See N.T. First Trial, 1/8-20/15, at 819.

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Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal. Both Appellant and the PCRA

court complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925.

Appellant raises the following issues for our review:5

1. Did the PCRA court err in dismissing [Appellant’s] PCRA petition

prior to granting [Appellant’s] request for leave to amend his

PCRA petition as outlined within [Appellant’s] response to the

court’s notice of intent to dismiss?

2. Did the PCRA court err in concluding that [Appellant] was not

entitled to relief on his claim that the Commonwealth violated

Due Process of law when it obfuscated that four of its trial

witnesses were incentivized to testify by undisclosed

consideration or alternatively, trial counsel rendered ineffective

assistance of counsel in violation of the Sixth Amendment to

the United States Constitution and Article I, Section 9 of the

Pennsylvania Constitution by failing to clarify the nature of

consideration that each witness received?

3. Did the PCRA court err in concluding that [Appellant] was not

entitled to relief on his claim that trial counsel rendered

ineffective assistance of counsel in violation of the Sixth

Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I,

Section 9 of the Pennsylvania Constitution by failing to properly

impeach witness Lateesha Jones on cross-examination

regarding her crimen falsi conviction?

4. Did the PCRA court err in concluding that [Appellant] was not

entitled to relief on his claim that trial counsel rendered

ineffective assistance of counsel in violation of the Sixth

Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I,

Section 9 of the Pennsylvania Constitution by failing to properly

and fully investigate and litigate [Appellant’s] alibi?

5. Did the PCRA court err in concluding that [Appellant] was not

entitled to relief on his claim that trial counsel rendered

ineffective assistance of counsel in violation of the Sixth

Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I,

Section 9 of the Pennsylvania Constitution by failing to request

a specific witness identification instruction that addressed all

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5 Appellant’s claims have been reordered for ease of analysis.

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material and relevant factors related to Ms. Jones’[s]

identification of [Appellant]?

6. Did the PCRA court err in dismissing [Appellant’s] PCRA petition

without an evidentiary hearing, despite this Court’s remand to

consider new claims of ineffective assistance of counsel raised

pursuant to Commonwealth v. Bradley, 261 A.3d 381 (Pa.

2021), and where the PCRA court [had] been satisfied that an

evidentiary hearing on said claims was appropriate?

Appellant’s Brief at 2-4 (some formatting altered).

In reviewing an order denying a PCRA petition, our standard of review

is well settled:

Our review of a PCRA court’s decision is limited to examining

whether the PCRA court’s findings of fact are supported by the

record, and whether its conclusions of law are free from legal

error. We view the record in the light most favorable to the

prevailing party in the PCRA court. We are bound by any

credibility determinations made by the PCRA court where they are

supported by the record. However, we review the PCRA court’s

legal conclusions de novo.

Commonwealth v. Staton, 184 A.3d 949, 954 (Pa. 2018) (citation and

quotation marks omitted). A PCRA petitioner “has the burden to persuade

this Court that the PCRA court erred and that such error requires relief.”

Commonwealth v. Wholaver, 177 A.3d 136, 144-45 (Pa. 2018) (citations

omitted).

PCRA Amendment

Appellant’s first claim is that the PCRA court erred by dismissing his

petition without granting leave to amend, which Appellant sought in his

response to the PCRA court’s Rule 907 notice. Appellant’s Brief at 59.

Appellant explains that he sought leave to amend his PCRA petition “to cure

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material defects in claim one of [his] PCRA petition, and to add an additional

claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel.” Id. Specifically, Appellant

sought to add an expert report to his PCRA petition to support his claim that

trial counsel was ineffective for failing to call an expert to examine the photo

that allegedly supported his alibi. Id. at 61-62. Further, Appellant sought to

add an additional claim of trial counsel ineffectiveness for failing to call an

expert witness in the area of eyewitness identification. Id. at 63.

Generally, claims raised in unauthorized PCRA supplements and

amendments are subject to waiver. See Commonwealth v. Reid, 99 A.3d

427, 437 (Pa. 2014). However, a PCRA court can implicitly permit an

amendment or supplement where it does not strike the filing and considers

the claims raised in the amendment or supplement prior to disposing of the

PCRA petition. See Commonwealth v. Brown, 141 A.3d 491, 503 (Pa.

Super. 2016); see also Commonwealth v. Boyd, 835 A.2d 812, 815-16

(Pa. Super. 2003). “PCRA courts are invested with great discretion to permit

the amendment of a [PCRA] petition.” Commonwealth v. Mojica, 242 A.3d

949, 954 (Pa. Super. 2020) (citations omitted).

The PCRA court addressed this claim as follows:

[T]he record reflects that on June 7, 2024, Appellant filed an

amended PCRA petition. The Commonwealth responded on July

5, 2024. This court issued a notice of intention to dismiss on July

10, 2024. Appellant filed a response on October 10, 2024. In his

response, Appellant raised a new issue, eyewitness identification,

and added additional argument to previous claims. This court

considered the response to have amended the PCRA petition and

ordered the Commonwealth to file an answer. The

Commonwealth complied on October 17, 2024. The

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Commonwealth’s answer addressed the issues contained in

[Appellant’s] response to the extent that this court did not need

further argument or testimony to determine that the issues raised

did not have arguable merit. Since this court had given notice of

intent to dismiss, and fully considered all of the arguments of

Appellant, including those contained in his response, this

court did not err in dismissing the PCRA petition.

PCRA Ct. Op. at 7 (emphasis added and some formatting altered).

Based on our review of the record, we discern no error of law or abuse

of discretion by the PCRA court. See Staton, 184 A.3d at 954. Since the

PCRA court did not strike Appellant’s amendment and considered it before

disposing of his PCRA petition, the PCRA court implicitly permitted Appellant’s

amendment. See Brown, 141 A.3d at 503; Boyd, 835 A.2d at 815-16.

Accordingly, the PCRA court did not err in failing to grant Appellant leave to

amend his PCRA petition. See Mojica, 242 A.3d at 954. Therefore, Appellant

is not entitled to relief on this claim.

Brady Claim

Appellant’s next claim is that the Commonwealth committed a Brady

violation by “intentionally hid[ing] and obfuscat[ing] the nature of the

consideration” that each of his co-conspirators received in exchange for their

testimony. Appellant’s Brief at 47-48. Appellant contends that the structure

of the plea agreements “allows the witnesses to testify against [him], without

having to admit to any final agreements regarding their side of the plea

bargain.” Id. at 50. Appellant concedes that the Commonwealth disclosed

the agreements but not the “full nature of the plea agreements.” Id. at 47,

50-51. Appellant claims that he was prejudiced by this failure to disclose

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because the impeachment evidence of the deals would have been material to

the credibility of his co-conspirators’ testimony.6 Id. at 51.

As this Court has previously explained:

To succeed on a Brady claim, a defendant must show that: (1)

the evidence at issue was favorable to the accused, either because

it is exculpatory or because it impeaches; (2) the evidence was

suppressed by the prosecution, either willfully or inadvertently;

and (3) prejudice ensued. The defendant carries the burden to

prove, by reference to the record, that evidence was withheld or

suppressed by the prosecution. Additionally, the evidence at issue

must have been material evidence that deprived the defendant of

a fair trial. Favorable evidence is material, and constitutional error

results from its suppression by the government, if there is a

reasonable probability that, had the evidence been disclosed to

the defense, the result of the proceeding would have been

different.

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6 Appellant also claims that he was prejudiced by the Commonwealth’s failure

to correct false testimony of these witnesses. Appellant’s Brief at 51.

However, Appellant failed to include this claim in his Rule 1925(b) statement.

See Rule 1925(b) Statement, 11/26/24, at 3-4. Additionally, the PCRA court

did not address this issue in its Rule 1925(a) opinion. See PCRA Ct. Op. at 7.

Accordingly, the claim is waived. See Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b)(4)(vii) (providing

that issues not raised in a Rule 1925(b) statement or in accordance with that

Rule are waived); see also Commonwealth v. Jackson, 215 A.3d 972, 978

(Pa. Super. 2019) (explaining that a Rule 1925(b) statement must properly

specify the error to be addressed on appeal, and a Rule 1925(b) statement

that is too vague to allow the court to identify the issues raised on appeal is

the functional equivalent of no statement and may result in waiver).

Even if the claim was properly included in Appellant’s Rule 1925(b) statement,

since we conclude that Appellant has failed to show that the Commonwealth

suppressed the agreements with these witnesses and because trial counsel

did not object to any of the alleged false testimony, this claim is waived. See

Commonwealth v. Pruitt, 162 A.3d 394, 403-04 (Pa. 2017) (addressing a

claim alleging the Commonwealth failed to correct false testimony and holding

that, where counsel knows the underlying information but fails to object to

the testimony, the claim is waived for PCRA review).

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* * *

Brady does not require the disclosure of information that is not

exculpatory but might merely form the groundwork for possible

arguments or defenses, nor does Brady require the prosecution

to disclose every fruitless lead considered during a criminal

investigation. The duty to disclose is limited to information in the

possession of the government bringing the prosecution, and the

duty does extend to exculpatory evidence in the files of police

agencies of the government bringing the prosecution. Brady is

not violated when the appellant knew or, with reasonable

diligence, could have uncovered the evidence in question, or when

the evidence was available to the defense from other sources.

Commonwealth v. Sandusky, 203 A.3d 1033, 1061-62 (Pa. Super. 2019)

(citations and quotation marks omitted).

Here, the PCRA court concludes that “[t]rial counsel cross-examined

each witness regarding the details of any plea agreement” they had with the

Commonwealth. PCRA Ct. Op. at 7. We agree that the record confirms that

trial counsel cross-examined each witness regarding their plea agreement.

See Staton, 184 A.3d at 954. Accordingly, Appellant fails to establish that

the Commonwealth suppressed the deals it made with these witnesses. See

Sandusky, 203 A.3d at 1061-62.

Initially, we note that Appellant appears to concede that the

Commonwealth turned over the written plea agreements in his PCRA petition,

which stated “[t]rial and appellate counsel were both aware and/or should

have been aware of the . . . plea letters.”7 PCRA Pet., 8/19/19, at 24.

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7 In his brief, Appellant fails to state when he became aware of the plea

agreements. See Appellant’s Brief at 38-53. To the extent that Appellant is

(Footnote Continued Next Page)

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Nonetheless, the testimony at the evidentiary hearing and Appellant’s first

trial clearly establishes that trial counsel was aware of the witnesses’ deals

with the Commonwealth.8

At the evidentiary hearing, Deputy District Attorney Kevin Chernosky

testified that he was the person responsible for the prosecution of witnesses

Kerley and Clark. See N.T. Evidentiary Hr’g, 2/14/22, at 38-39. He testified

that he extended offers to both women that would reduce the charges against

them in exchange for their testimony at Appellant’s trial. See id. at 47-50,

58-60. Attorney Chernosky stated that he drafted the plea agreement letters

to both women’s attorneys before Appellant’s trial. See id. at 40-42, 46-47.

Attorney Chernosky stated that the women only needed to testify at

Appellant’s trial in order to get the benefit of the deal. See id. at 58-60.

Appellant’s trial attorney, who represented him at both of his trials,

testified at the evidentiary hearing that he had no independent recollection of

the trials and that he would defer to what was reflected in the record. See

id. at 29-30, 35. Further, he stated that he did not specifically recall the

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conceding that trial counsel was aware of the alleged Brady material, we note

that, if the Brady material was disclosed to counsel and Appellant did not

raise the issue on direct appeal, this claim is waived. See Commonwealth

v. Roney, 79 A.3d 595, 609 (Pa. 2013) (stating “all of the Brady violations

[the] appellant alleges in this issue could have been raised at trial and/or on

direct appeal. . . . Accordingly, this issue is waived” (some formatting

altered).

8Appellant had the same trial counsel for his first and second trials. See

Appellant’s Brief at 4-5.

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written plea agreements between Kerley and Clark but that he was “certain”

that he would have been aware of them at Appellant’s trial. See id. at 30.

During the first trial, Appellant’s trial counsel was clearly aware of the

Commonwealth’s agreements with Kerley and Clark. Trial counsel’s opening

statement addressed Kerley and Clark’s deals with the Commonwealth. See

N.T. First Trial, 1/8-20/15, at 67-68. During his cross-examination of Kerly

during the first trial, trial counsel questioned her regarding the deal that she

was receiving. See id. at 336-38. Trial counsel also questioned Clark

regarding her agreement as well. See id. at 382-83. Accordingly, the record

is clear that, by the time of Appellant’s first trial, the Commonwealth had

already disclosed the deals it had with Kerley and Clark to Appellant’s trial

counsel.

As to the agreements made with Lane-Bryant and Lyons, former Deputy

District Attorney Robert Schupansky, who was the prosecutor in charge of

Appellant’s trial, testified at the evidentiary hearing that there was no written

agreement between the Commonwealth and Lane-Bryant or Lyons. See N.T.

Evidentiary Hr’g, 2/14/22, at 80, 101-02, 105-06. He stated that he spoke to

Appellant’s trial counsel prior to trial and explained to him that the

Commonwealth had offered a reduction in charges to both men in exchange

for their testimony. See id. at 101-02, 105-06. Former Deputy District

Attorney Schupansky testified that he explained the exact nature of the

agreement to trial counsel prior to trial. See id.

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Further, the record from Appellant’s first trial makes clear that trial

counsel was aware of the agreements with Lane-Bryant and Lyons. Trial

counsel’s opening statement referred to the pleas of both Lane-Bryant and

Lyons as trial counsel characterized their deals as attempts to “save their own

lives and throw [Appellant] under the bus.” See N.T. First Trial, 1/8-20/15,

at 67-68. Trial counsel later cross-examined both men regarding their deals

with the Commonwealth. See id. at 294, 298-301, 494-95. Trial counsel also

closed by stating that Kerley, Clark, Lane-Bryant, and Lyons all “lied their

pants off to save their lives” pursuant to the deals that they made with the

Commonwealth. See id. at 681.

Accordingly, the record is clear that, at the time of Appellant’s first trial,

trial counsel, who was Appellant’s counsel at both trials, was well aware of

the deals each of these witnesses had with the Commonwealth. 9 Since the

record establishes that trial counsel was aware of these deals by the beginning

of Appellant’s first trial, Appellant has failed to show that the Commonwealth

suppressed the plea agreements with these witnesses. See Sandusky, 203

A.3d at 1061-62.

Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Claims

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9 We also note that, consistent with Former Deputy District Attorney

Schupansky’s testimony at the evidentiary hearing, Lyons did not decide to

testify until just before the beginning of Appellant’s first trial. Compare N.T.

Evidentiary Hr’g, 2/14/22, at 102-03, 105-06 with N.T. First Trial, 1/8-20/15,

at 14-27. During the exchange regarding Lyons’ testimony, trial counsel did

not voice any concerns about whether Lyons would be testifying pursuant to

an agreement with the Commonwealth. See N.T. First Trial, 1/8-20/15, at

14-27.

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Most of Appellant’s remaining claims allege ineffective assistance of trial

counsel. See Appellant’s Brief at 2-4.

It is well established that:

to establish a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a

defendant must show, by a preponderance of the evidence,

ineffective assistance of counsel which, in the circumstances of

the particular case, so undermined the truth-determining process

that no reliable adjudication of guilt or innocence could have taken

place. The burden is on the defendant to prove all three of the

following prongs: (1) the underlying claim is of arguable merit;

(2) that counsel had no reasonable strategic basis for his or her

action or inaction; and (3) but for the errors and omissions of

counsel, there is a reasonable probability that the outcome of the

proceedings would have been different.

* * *

Boilerplate allegations and bald assertions of no reasonable basis

and/or ensuing prejudice cannot satisfy a petitioner’s burden to

prove that counsel was ineffective. Moreover, a failure to satisfy

any prong of the ineffectiveness test requires rejection of the

claim of ineffectiveness.

Sandusky, 203 A.3d at 1043-44 (citations and quotations omitted and

formatting altered). Additionally, “[c]ounsel cannot be found ineffective for

failing to pursue a baseless or meritless claim.” Commonwealth v. Davis,

262 A.3d 589, 596 (Pa. Super. 2021) (citation omitted).

Failure to Impeach Claims

Two of Appellant’s claims allege trial counsel was ineffective for failing

to impeach certain witnesses. See Appellant’s Brief at 34, 52.

“It is well settled that a witness may be cross-examined as to any matter

tending to show the interest or bias of that witness.” Commonwealth v.

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Solano, 129 A.3d 1156, 1175 (Pa. 2015). The defendant is entitled to

“challenge the witness’s self-interest by questioning him about possible or

actual favored treatment by the prosecuting authority.” Commonwealth v.

Causey, 833 A.2d 165, 169 (Pa. Super. 2003) (citation and internal

quotations omitted).

Additionally, evidence of a witness’s conviction for a crime involving

dishonesty or a false statement is generally admissible. Pa.R.E. 609(a).

Specifically, “evidence of prior convictions can be introduced for the purpose

of impeaching the credibility of a witness if the conviction was for an offense

involving dishonesty or false statement, and the date of conviction . . . is

within ten years of the trial date.” Solano, 129 A.3d at 1175 (citation omitted

and some formatting altered).

However, where counsel impeaches a witness regarding their motive

and bias, the failure to impeach the witness with her crimen falsi conviction is

not prejudicial. See id. at 1176 (citing Commonwealth v. Small, 980 A.2d

549, 565-66 (Pa. 2009)). Further, counsel is not ineffective for failing to

impeach a witness in a particular way, if counsel impeached the witness in

other ways. See id. at 1176 (citing Commonwealth v. Dennis, 715 A.2d

404, 408–09 (Pa. 1998)).

Impeachment of Witnesses with Their Plea Deals

Appellant claims that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to impeach

his co-conspirators with the details of their agreements with the

Commonwealth. Appellant’s Brief at 52. Appellant argues that “while trial

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counsel attempted to impeach on cross examination, it is apparent that trial

counsel failed to clarify the nature of consideration each of the four

‘incentivized’ witnesses received in exchange for their testimony, nor did [trial

counsel] object to closing argument of the Commonwealth that used the

testimony of the four witnesses.” See id. Appellant contends that trial

counsel “focused very little on the actual language of the plea letters received

by Ms. Kerley and Ms. Clark” and that “no competent lawyer that would have

chosen not to use these documents to further impeach the witnesses

regarding the true nature of their plea agreements.” See id. at 52-53.

Appellant asserts that there is a reasonable probability that the outcome of

the trial would have been different had counsel “further impeach[ed] the

witnesses in this manner.” See id. at 53.

Here, the PCRA court concluded that “[t]rial counsel cross-examined

each witness regarding the details of any plea agreements and the witnesses’

potential for testifying against Appellant” PCRA Ct. Op. at 7.

Based on our review of the record, we discern no error of law or abuse

of discretion by the PCRA court. See Staton, 184 A.3d at 954. At Appellant’s

second trial, Clark testified that she “technically” did not have a deal with the

Commonwealth because she had not accepted it yet. See N.T. Second Trial,

3/23/15, at 241.10 She testified that her charges had been reduced by the

____________________________________________

10 Appellant’s second trial began on March 23, 2015 and concluded on March

26, 2015. The notes of testimony are continuously paginated but are dated

(Footnote Continued Next Page)

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Commonwealth. See id. at 240-41. Trial counsel later impeached Clark with

the letter the Commonwealth sent to her attorney setting forth her plea

agreement. See id. at 244. At that time, Clark admitted she had a “tentative”

deal with the Commonwealth. See id. at 244-45. Further, trial counsel also

impeached Clark regarding a motive to fabricate. See id. at 242. Specifically,

whether she was lying to protect her friend’s little brother. See id.

Trial counsel also inquired about the charges that Kerley initially faced.

See id. at 317-18. He then asked her if she was still charged with the most

serious charges she faced, which were conspiracy and solicitation to commit

murder. See id. at 318. Kerley replied that she was no longer facing those

charges because she “didn’t commit a murder.” See id. Trial counsel later

questioned Kerley about the inconsistency of her prior statements to police

and, particularly, why her story changed once she was charged by police. See

id. at 327-29, 331-32. Additionally, trial counsel raised Kerley’s alleged

motive to fabricate by inquiring about the relationship between the father of

her child and Appellant. See id. at 322, 325-37, 330. Trial counsel also

impeached her with her prior inconsistent statements to police. See id. at

327-29. At the conclusion of Kerley’s testimony, trial counsel confirmed that

Kerley’s version of events changed after she was charged by police. See id.

at 331-32.

____________________________________________

separately and split into two volumes. Since the pagination is continuous

throughout the dates and volumes, we refer only to the date the trial began

and omit the volume numbers from the citation.

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At Appellant’s second trial, trial counsel asked Lane-Bryant why he was

no longer facing a homicide charge after initially being charged with it. See

id. at 271-72. Lane-Bryant initially denied having a plea agreement with the

Commonwealth. See id. at 272. Trial counsel attempted to impeach Lane-

Bryant with his prior testimony regarding the reduction of his charges from

Appellant’s first trial. See id. at 281-82. However, Appellant interrupted trial

counsel’s questioning resulting in Appellant being removed from the

courtroom. See id. at 282. On recross, trial counsel again inquired whether

it was a coincidence that Lane-Bryant was facing reduced charges now that

he decided to testify. See id. at 291-92. Additionally, trial counsel cross-

examined Lane-Bryant about his prior inconsistent statements to police and

the presence of his DNA in the getaway vehicle. See id. at 273-82, 291.

Finally, trial counsel inquired about Lane-Bryant’s motive to fabricate and

biases by confirming that Lane-Bryant’s statements to police changed after he

was charged with homicide and inquiring about Lane-Bryant’s animosity

towards Appellant. See id. at 280-81.

Trial counsel also inquired at the second trial regarding Lyons’ plea

agreement. See id. at 379-80. Lyons admitted that he had a tentative deal

with the Commonwealth to face reduced charges. See id. Trial counsel also

questioned Lyons’ regarding his ability to recall the events. See id. at 373-

74. Additionally, as he did with the other witnesses, trial counsel inquired

about Lyons’ prior inconsistent statements and the fact that his version of

events changed once he was charged. See id. at 371-72.

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Accordingly, the record supports the PCRA court’s conclusion that trial

counsel inquired about each of these witnesses’ plea agreements with the

Commonwealth. See Staton, 184 A.3d at 954. Further, the record reflects

that counsel thoroughly cross-examined and impeached each witness in other

ways such as with their motives to fabricate, prior inconsistent statements,

and the effect being charged by police had on their versions of events. See

Solano, 129 A.3d at 1176. No relief is due.

Impeachment of Lateesha Jones’s with Her Conviction

Appellant’s next claim is that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to

impeach eyewitness Lateesha Jones with her prior conviction for forged

securities. Appellant’s Brief at 34. Appellant contends that forged securities

is a crime of crimen falsi and that, by not impeaching her with it, he was

prejudiced because only two witnesses, Lateesha Jones and co-conspirator

Michale Lyons, testified that Appellant was the shooter. Id. at 34-38.

Here, the PCRA court concluded:

Although [trial] counsel failed to cross-examine the witness on her

prior conviction for uttering forged securities, counsel thoroughly

cross-examined the witness regarding her sobriety, biases, and

inconsistencies. Any further undermining of the witness’

credibility through the introduction of the unrelated crim[e]n

falsi[] would have been minimal and would have to be considered

in relation to the nine other witnesses who testified for the

Commonwealth consistent with Jones’[s] testimony. Appellant

was not prejudiced by counsel failing to introduce this crimen

falsi[] evidence.

PCRA Ct. Op. at 5.

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After a review of Jones’s testimony,11 we discern no abuse of discretion

with the PCRA court’s conclusion as it is supported by the record and free of

legal error. See Staton, 184 A.3d at 954. Trial counsel thoroughly cross-

examined Jones as to her sobriety and ability to observe at the time of the

shooting, biases, and prior inconsistent statements. See N.T. Second Trial,

3/23/15, at 107-27. Since counsel thoroughly impeached Jones in other ways,

he could not be ineffective for failing to introduce Jones’s crimen falsi

conviction. See Solano, 129 A.3d at 1176.

Failure to Investigate Alibi

Appellant claims that trial counsel was ineffective for “failing to

investigate and litigate [Appellant’s] alibi properly and fully.” Appellant’s Brief

at 19. Specifically, Appellant’s argument revolves around a photo, allegedly

taken by Appellant’s paramour at her apartment, which shows Appellant

asleep on the couch. Id. at 19-20. The photo, along with testimony from

Appellant’s paramour, was admitted at trial to establish that Appellant could

not have committed the murder because he was asleep on the couch at the

time of the shooting. Id. This theory was undermined at trial by the

testimony of Officer James McGee, who testified that he believed that the

photo was fabricated based upon his search of Appellant’s paramour’s house

as well as the fact that Appellant’s paramour’s phone settings could be used

____________________________________________

11 We note that the beginning of the Commonwealth’s direct examination of

Lateesha Jones was missing from the certified record on appeal. However,

since Appellant’s claim regarded trial counsel’s failure to impeach Jones, the

missing pages did not prevent our review.

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to manipulate the metadata of the photo. Id. at 20-21. Appellant argues that

trial counsel should have “consult[ed] with or offer[ed] testimony of an expert

witness at trial to verify [his] alibi.” Id. at 22.

Our Supreme Court has stated:

Where a claim is made of counsel’s ineffectiveness for failing to

call witnesses, it is the appellant’s burden to show that the witness

existed and was available; counsel was aware of, or had a duty to

know of the witness; the witness was willing and able to appear;

and the proposed testimony was necessary in order to avoid

prejudice to the appellant. . . . [The] appellant must demonstrate

that an expert witness was available who would have offered

testimony designed to advance [the] appellant’s cause.

Commonwealth v. Chimel, 30 A.3d 1111, 1143 (Pa. 2011) (citing

Commonwealth v. Wayne, 720 A.2d 456, 470 (Pa. 1998)) (some formatting

altered).

Here, the PCRA court addressed this claim as follows:

Appellant has not produced an expert who has examined the

phone in question. Appellant has merely speculated that

evaluation of the phone would produce favorable evidence. Such

evidence would then be measured against Det. McGee’s testimony

that the background of the photo does not match any area in

[Appellant’s paramour’s] residence where the photo was

purportedly taken. Furthermore, Det. McGee testified that he had

the same model of phone as [Appellant’s paramour] and was able

to manipulate the date and time. [Trial] counsel could have

reasonably believed that the alibi was not Appellant’s best

argument and the failure to go down the rabbit hole of forensic

evaluation constituted the judicious use of limited resources. As

such, [trial] counsel’s failure to have the phone forensically

evaluated does not meet the standard for ineffectiveness.

PCRA Ct. Op. at 4-5 (some formatting altered).

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The PCRA court’s factual findings and legal conclusions are supported

by the record and free of legal error. See Staton, 184 A.3d at 954. Appellant

fails to demonstrate that there was an available expert whose testimony would

have advanced Appellant’s alleged alibi defense. See Chimel, 30 A.3d at

1143. While Appellant submitted an expert report, the expert report merely

establishes that there was an expert available who would have been able to

verify whether the alibi photo contained any fraudulently generated or

manipulated metadata, if they examined the phone. See Appellant’s Rule 907

Response, 9/30/24, Ex. A. In the report, the expert conceded that “the testing

Det. McGee[] described in his testimony successfully demonstrated that

fraudulent date and time stamps can be generated by manipulating the date

and time setting on [the particular phone used] before taking a photo.” Id.

The expert stated that, before concluding whether the alleged alibi photo was

manipulated, he would have examined the phone used to take the photo. Id.

Therefore, Appellant merely presents the report of an expert who would be

able to examine the alibi photograph and not an expert who determined the

photograph was authentic and not manipulated. Accordingly, Appellant fails

to demonstrate that there was an expert available to rebut the suggestion that

the alibi photo was manipulated. See Chimel, 30 A.3d at 1143.

Additionally, based upon the evidence adduced at trial, as the PCRA

court noted,12 counsel may have reasonably believed that wasting additional

____________________________________________

12 See PCRA Ct. Op. at 5.

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resources on a weak alibi defense was not a good tactical decision and,

furthermore, Appellant cannot show prejudice. See Sandusky, 203 A.3d at

1043-44. Numerous witnesses placed Appellant at the scene of the crime.

Lateesha Jones identified defendant as one of the men at the scene of the

shooting. See N.T. Second Trial, 3/23/15, at 94-95. All four of Appellant’s

alleged coconspirators who testified placed Appellant at the scene. See id. at

226-28, 254-57, 303-04, 361. Additionally, Tyray Frenzley, who at the time

of the incident knew Appellant through one of Appellant’s alleged

coconspirators, placed Appellant at the scene. See id. at 347-48.

Accordingly, it was a reasonable tactical decision for counsel to forgo retaining

an expert to definitively determine whether the alleged alibi photo was

authentic and unmanipulated. See Sandusky, 203 A.3d at 1043-44. In any

event, based upon the overwhelming evidence of Appellant’s guilt including

the witness testimony presented at trial, Appellant cannot show that trial

counsel’s failure to obtain an expert witness to verify his alleged alibi caused

him prejudice. See id.; see also Davis, 262 A.3d at 596.

Failure to Request Witness Identification Instruction

Appellant’s next claim is that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to

“request specific witness identification instruction relating to whether

[Lateesha] Jones’[s] identification was affected by the presence of a gun,

whether [Jones] was intoxicated at the time of the identification, and whether

the high levels of stress during the incident affected [Jones’s] ability to give

an accurate identification.” Appellant’s Brief at 54-55. Appellant argues that

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the identification instruction given at trial “left out material and relevant

factors that were contemplated by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court prior to

the time of [Appellant’s] trial and are now deemed standard by the

Pennsylvania Standard Jury Instructions following revisions of the Eyewitness

Identification Instruction in 2019.” Id. at 55. While Appellant concedes that

the standard jury instruction was not revised until 2019, after he had been

convicted, he argues that counsel should have been aware of

Commonwealth v. Walker, 92 A.3d 766 (Pa. 2014), which was decided

approximately ten months prior to his trial. Id. at 56-57. Appellant argues

that, had trial counsel been aware of Walker, he would have known “cross-

examination coupled with closing arguments is insufficient ‘to convey the

possibility of mistaken identification to the jury.’” Id. at 57-58 (quoting

Walker, 92 A.3d at 786). Appellant argues that he was prejudiced by

counsel’s failure to request the instruction because Jones was “the key witness

to [his] identification [as the shooter].” Id. at 58.

As this Court has previously stated:

We must review the jury charge as a whole to determine if it is

fair and complete. A trial court has wide discretion in phrasing its

jury instructions, and can choose its own words as long as the law

is clearly, adequately, and accurately presented to the jury for its

consideration. The trial court commits an abuse of discretion only

when there is an inaccurate statement of the law.

A jury charge will be deemed erroneous only if the charge as a

whole is inadequate, not clear or has a tendency to mislead or

confuse, rather than clarify, a material issue. A charge is

considered adequate unless the jury was palpably misled by what

the trial judge said or there is an omission which is tantamount to

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fundamental error. Consequently, the trial court has wide

discretion in fashioning jury instructions.

Commonwealth v. Postie, 200 A.3d 1015, 1026 (Pa. Super. 2018) (citations

omitted and some formatting altered). Trial counsel cannot be deemed

ineffective “for failing to object to jury instruction where instruction is

justifiable or not otherwise improper.” Id. at 1027.

Here, the PCRA court concluded that the jury instruction given “clearly,

adequately, and accurately states the law, [and] gives detailed instructions on

how to parse testimony and factors to be considered when evaluating

identification testimony.” PCRA Ct. Op. at 6. The jury instruction given at

trial reads as follows:13

There was testimony that a witness or witnesses have identified

[Appellant] as the person that committed the crimes. In

evaluating that testimony, in addition to the criteria I just provided

you with in judging the testimony of any witness, you should

consider the following factors: Did the witness have a good

opportunity to observe the perpetrator of the offense? Was there

sufficient lighting for him or her to make his or her observations?

Was the witness close enough to the individual to note any

____________________________________________

13 We note that the jury instructions for Appellant’s second trial are not part

of the certified record on appeal. See Commonwealth v. Lopez, 57 A.3d

74, 82 (Pa. Super. 2012) (stating that “it is an appellant’s duty to ensure that

the certified record is complete for purposes of review” and that “a failure to

ensure that the record provides sufficient information to conduct a meaningful

review constitutes waiver of the issue sought to be reviewed). However, the

PCRA court quoted the entirety of the identification instruction in its Rule

1925(a) opinion and Appellant cites the exact language in his appellate brief.

Compare PCRA Ct. Op. at 6 with Appellant’s Brief at 53-54. Accordingly, we

rely on the PCRA court’s restatement of the instruction for our review. See

Commonwealth v. Harper, 890 A.2d 1078, 1080 n.1 (Pa. 2006) (relying on

the trial court’s representation of testimony where a transcript was missing

from the certified record on appeal).

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particular characteristics, physical, clothing or otherwise? Has the

witness made prior identification of the perpetrator of these

crimes in any other proceeding? Was the identification positive or

was it qualified by hinging on inconsistencies?

During the course of the case, did the witness identify anyone else

as the perpetrator? How often and on how many occasions has

the witness been in the company of the alleged perpetrator? You

may have received identification testimony with caution if you

determine that any of the factors is compromised to the extent

that it leads to belief the witness or witnesses. In considering

whether or not to accept the testimony of an identification

witness, you should consider all the circumstances under which

the identification or identifications are made including the

presence or absence of those factors. Furthermore, you should

consider all the relevance of the evidence, including the testimony

of any witness to which identity or non-identity of the perpetrator

of the crimes is inferred. You must not find [Appellant] guilty

unless you are satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt from all the

evidence, direct and circumstantial, including identification

testimony, not only that the crime was committed but it was

[Appellant] that committed it.

PCRA Ct. Op. at 6 (citation omitted).

We agree with the PCRA court that the jury instruction clearly,

adequately, and accurately stated the law at the time of Appellant’s trial in

2015. While Appellant is correct that the current jury instruction was revised

to include factors “contemplated” in Commonwealth v. Walker in 2019,

nothing in Walker suggests that a trial court was required to include these

items in a jury instruction. See generally Walker, 92 A.3d 766. Accordingly,

had trial counsel requested a more detailed instruction, it was within the trial

court’s discretion to grant the request and the failure to grant such a request

would not have been an abuse of discretion as the jury instruction given

accurately stated the law. See Postie, 200 A.3d at 1026. Since the jury

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instruction was proper, trial counsel could not have been ineffective for failing

to request a more detailed instruction or by failing to object to the jury

instruction as given. See id. at 1027; see also Davis, 262 A.3d at 596.

PCRA Court’s Failure to Grant an Evidentiary Hearing

Appellant’s final claim is that the PCRA court erred by dismissing his

petition without conducting an additional evidentiary hearing after this Court’s

prior remand for the PCRA court to consider Appellant’s new claims of

ineffective assistance of counsel pursuant to Bradley, 261 A.3d 381 (Pa.

2021). Appellant’s Brief at 65. Appellant argues that the PCRA court’s

scheduling of a hearing, before ultimately not holding one, suggests that the

PCRA court believed there were genuine issues of material fact that required

an additional hearing. Id. at 66. Appellant claims that at the hearing he could

have questioned trial counsel about his rationale for not hiring an expert

witness. Id. at 68-69. Further, Appellant claims that he could have explored

the merits of his Bradley claims at the hearing. Id. at 68.

It is well settled that

[t]here is no absolute right to an evidentiary hearing on a PCRA

petition, and if the PCRA court can determine from the record that

no genuine issues of material fact exist, then a hearing is not

necessary. To obtain reversal of a PCRA court’s decision to

dismiss a petition without a hearing, an appellant must show that

he raised a genuine issue of fact which, if resolved in his favor,

would have entitled him to relief, or that the court otherwise

abused its discretion in denying a hearing.

Commonwealth v. Maddrey, 205 A.3d 323, 328 (Pa. Super. 2019) (citations

and quotation marks omitted), appeal denied, 218 A.3d 380 (Pa. 2019).

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A previous panel of this Court remanded this case with the following

instruction:

Therefore, we conclude that the best course of action is to vacate

the July 26, 2022 order denying Appellant’s PCRA petition and

remand for the PCRA court to consider in the first instance the

claims present counsel has raised pursuant to Bradley. We leave

to the PCRA court’s discretion the extent and manner of the

additional evidence to be developed concerning the new claims.

Thereafter, the PCRA court shall enter a new final order disposing

of all claims Appellant has raised in connection with the instant

PCRA petition, after which any aggrieved party may seek appellate

review.

Lawrence, 309 A.3d at 156-57.

The previous panel was specifically concerned with Appellant’s Bradley

issues, which included “trial counsel’s failure to investigate and litigate an alibi

defense or to object to the trial court’s identification jury instruction, as well

as prior PCRA counsel’s posturing of the claim concerning Ms. Jones’s

impeachment.” Id. at 154.

The PCRA court concluded that “[s]ince the Superior Court did not

require a hearing on Appellant’s Bradley claims, and this court did not need

additional testimony to address those issues, this court did not err in failing

to hold an additional evidentiary hearing.” PCRA Ct. Op. at 8. We discern no

abuse of discretion as each of the issues identified by the prior panel of this

Court were addressed in the PCRA court’s Rule 1925(a) opinion. See

Maddrey, 205 A.3d at 328. Further, we have concluded that each of those

claims is without merit based upon the PCRA court’s analysis. Accordingly, no

relief is due.

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Order affirmed. Jurisdiction relinquished.

9/19/2025

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