Briggs v. Commissioner of Social Security

PEARSON, J.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO

EASTERN DIVISION

LARONDA JUNE BRIGGS, )

) CASE NO. 1:24-CV-00947

Plaintiff, )

)

v. ) JUDGE BENITA Y. PEARSON

)

COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY, )

) MEMORANDUM OF OPINION

Defendant. ) AND ORDER

) [Resolving ECF No. 14]

Before the Court is Plaintiff Laronda June Briggs’ Objections (ECF No. 14) to the

Magistrate Judge’s Report and Recommendations (“R&R”) (ECF No. 13). Under 28 U.S.C.

§ 636(b) and Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 72(b)(3), the Court has reviewed de novo those

portions of the R&R to which Plaintiff has objected. Because substantial evidence supports the

Administrative Law Judge’s (“ALJ”) findings and the magistrate judge did not err, Plaintiff’s

objections are overruled, the R&R is adopted, and the Commissioner’s decision against Plaintiff

is affirmed.

I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

The R&R accurately sets forth the factual and procedural background which is

incorporated herein by reference. ECF No. 13 at PageID ##: 881-904. Plaintiff does not object

to the factual record set by the magistrate judge. Plaintiff brings this action under 42 U.S.C. §

405(g) and 42 U.S.C. § 1383(c)(3) for review of a final decision of the Commissioner of Social

Security denying her applications for Period of Disability and Disability Insurance Benefits

(“DIB”).

On September 21, 2021, Plaintiff filed her DIB and Supplemental Security Income

(“SSI”) applications alleging a disability onset date of July 17, 2021, due to depression, anxiety,

insomnia, bipolar disorder with possible psychotic disorder, and a broken right foot. ECF No. 13

at PageID #: 881. The Social Security Administration denied Plaintiff’s initial claims and denied

again on reconsiderations. ECF No. 13 at PageID #: 881. Per Plaintiff’s request, a telephonic

hearing was held before an ALJ on March 8, 2023. ECF No. 13 at PageID #: 881. On May 31,

2023, the ALJ issued a decision finding Plaintiff was not disabled from July 17, 2021 through the

date of the decision. ECF No. 13 at PageID #: 882. The Appeals Council denied Plaintiff’s

request for review of the ALJ’s decision on April 2, 2023, rendering the ALJ’s findings the final

decision of the Commissioner. ECF No. 13 at PageID #: 882.

The ALJ determined Plaintiff was not disabled by applying the five-step sequential

analysis prescribed by the Secretary in 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(i)-(v). ECF No. 13 at PageID

##: 901-02. The ALJ made the following findings of fact and conclusions of law:

1. The claimant meets the insured status requirements of the Social

Security Act through March 31, 2023. (Tr. 18)

2. The claimant has not engaged in substantial gainful activity

since July 17, 2021, the alleged onset day. (Id.)

3. The claimant has the following severe impairments: obesity,

bipolar disorder, post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD), anxiety

disorder, and cannabis use disorder. (Id.)

4. The claimant does not have an impairment or combination of

impairments that meets or medically equals the severity of the

listed impairments in 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix

1. (Tr. 19-20.)

5. The claimant has the residual function capacity to perform

medium work as defined in 20 C.F.R. 404.1567(c), except that

she cannot: climb ladders, ropes, or scaffolds, work around

hazards, such as unprotected heights, work in proximity to

exposed, moving mechanical parts, or engage in occupational

driving; she can perform simple tasks without a production rate

pace with simple judgment, interact frequently with others on

matters limited to the straightforward exchange of information

without negotiation, persuasion, or conflict resolution, and adapt

to occasional changes. (Tr. 21-26.)

6. The clamant is unable to perform any past relevant work. (Tr.

26.)

7. The claimant was born in 1975, and was 45 years old, which is

defined as a younger individual age 18-49, on the alleged

disability onset date. (Id.)

8. The claimant has at least a high school education. (Id.)

9. Transferability of job skills is not material to the determination

of disability. (Id.)

10. Considering the claimant’s age, education, work experience, and

residual functional capacity, there are jobs that exist in

significant numbers in the national economy that the claimant

could perform, including lab equipment cleaner, laundry worker,

and industrial cleaner. (Tr. 26-27.)

ECF No. 13 at PageID #: 903. Plaintiff timely filed her complaint seeking review of the

Commissioner’s denial. Compl., ECF No. 1. In the Complaint, Plaintiff argues that the

“conclusions and findings of fact of the Defendant are not supported by substantial evidence and

are contrary to law and regulation.” ECF No. 1 at PageID #: 1, ⁋ 7.

Under Local Rule 72.2(b), the case was automatically referred to a magistrate judge for

the preparation of a R&R. The parties filed briefings on the merits. See ECF Nos. 9 and 11.

The magistrate judge filed her R&R, (1) finding that the ALJ’s findings were supported by

substantial evidence and applied the correct legal standard, and (2) recommending that the Court

affirm Commissioner’s final decision denying Plaintiff’s application for DIB. See, ECF No. 13.

Plaintiff timely filed objections to the R&R objecting to the magistrate judge’s analysis

relating to the ALJ’s evaluation of: (1) residual functional capacity (“RFC”) findings; (2) the

medical opinions and prior administrative medical findings; and (3) Plaintiff’s symptomology.

ECF No. 14 at PageID #: 926. The Commissioner responded that Plaintiff failed to show that the

magistrate judge erred because: the R&R reflects a thorough discussion of the record and

evidence considered by the ALJ, contains sound analysis of the applicable law, and that the

ALJ’s decision was supported by substantial evidence. ECF No. 16.

II. LEGAL STANDARD

A. Social Security Act

The Social Security Act allows claimants to seek DIB. The Social Security regulations

provide a five-step process that an ALJ must use to determine whether a claimant is entitled to

benefits. An ALJ must consider:

1. whether the claimant is engaged in substantial gainful activity;

2. if not, whether the claimant has a severe impairment or

combination of impairments;

3. if so, whether that impairment, or combination of impairments,

meets or equals any of the listings in 20 C.F.R. Part 404,

Subpart P, Appendix 1;

4. if not, whether the claimant can perform their past relevant

work in light of his residual function capacity; and

5. if not, whether, based on the claimant’s age, education, and

work experience, [claimant] can perform other work found in

the national economy.

20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(i)–(v); Combs v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 459 F.3d 640, 642–43 (6th

Cir. 2006) (en banc).

Ultimately, Plaintiff bears the burden of producing sufficient evidence to prove that she is

disabled and, therefore, entitled to benefits. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1512(a). Specifically, Plaintiff has

the burden of proof in steps one through four. Walters v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 127 F.3d 525, 529

(6th Cir. 1997). At the final step—step five—the burden shifts to the Commissioner to establish

whether the claimant has the residual function capacity to perform available work in the national

economy. Id.

B. Title 42 U.S.C. § 405(g)

The magistrate judge reviewed the order under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). Section 405(g)

provides, in relevant part:

The findings of the Commissioner of Social Security as to any fact,

if supported by substantial evidence, shall be conclusive, and where

a claim has been denied by the Commissioner of Social Security or

a decision is rendered . . . . the court shall review only the question

of conformity with such regulations and the validity of such

regulations.

42 U.S.C. § 405(g). For this reason, when reviewing the case under the Social Security Act, the

Court “must affirm the Commissioner’s decision if it ‘is supported by substantial evidence and

was made pursuant to proper legal standards.’” Rabbers v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 582 F.3d 647,

651 (6th Cir. 2009) (citation omitted). The Supreme Court determined that “[s]ubstantial

evidence . . . is more than a mere scintilla. It means—and means only—such relevant evidence

as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Biestek v. Berryhill, 587

U.S. 97, 103 (2019); accord Rogers v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 486 F.3d 234, 241 (6th Cir. 2007).

When deciding whether substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s decision, district courts do “not

try the case de novo, resolve conflicts in evidence, or decide questions of credibility.” Bass v.

McMahon, 499 F.3d 506, 509 (6th Cir. 2007); Rogers, 486 F.3d at 247 (“It is of course for the

ALJ, and not the reviewing court, to evaluate the credibility of witnesses, including that of the

claimant.”). “[I]f substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s decision,” the Court must “defer to

that finding ‘even if there is substantial evidence in the record that would have supported an

opposite conclusion.’” Blakley v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 581 F.3d 399, 406 (6th Cir. 2009)

(quoting Key v. Callahan, 109 F.3d 270, 273 (6th Cir. 1997)).

A district courts review is deferential but must also “take into account whatever in the

record fairly detracts from [the] weight” of the Commissioner’s decision. TNS, Inc. v. NLRB,

296 F.3d 384, 395 (6th Cir. 2002) (quoting Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474, 487

(1951)).

C. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 72

Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 72, a party may object to and seek review of a

magistrate judge’s R&R. See FED. R. CIV. P. 72(b)(2). When a petitioner makes an objection to a

magistrate judge’s R&R, the district court’s standard of review is de novo. FED. R. CIV. P.

72(b)(3). A district judge:

must determine de novo any part of the magistrate judge’s

disposition that has been properly objected to. The district judge

may accept, reject, or modify the recommended disposition; receive

further evidence; or return the matter to the magistrate judge with

instructions.

Id. Objections “must be specific in order to trigger the de novo review.” Bulls v. Potter, No.

5:16-CV-02095, 2020 WL 870931, at *1 (N.D. Ohio Feb. 21, 2020) (citing FED. R. CIV. P.

72(b)(2)). “An ‘objection’ that does nothing more than state a disagreement with a magistrate’s

suggested resolution, or simply summarizes what has been presented before, is not an ‘objection’

as that term is used in this context.” Spring v. Harris, No. 4:18-CV-2920, 2022 WL 854795, at

*4 (N.D. Ohio Mar. 23, 2022) (quoting Aldrich v. Bock, 327 F. Supp. 2d 743, 747 (N.D. Ohio

2022)). “A party disappointed with the magistrate judge’s recommendation has a ‘duty to

pinpoint those portions of the magistrate's report that the district court must specially consider.’”

Id. (quoting Enyart v. Coleman, 29 F. Supp. 3d 1059, 1068 (N.D. Ohio 2014)). “A general

objection to the entirety of [R&R]” or “an exact recitation of arguments previously raised” will

fail to “meet the specificity requirement for objections.” Potter, 2020 WL at *1.

III. DISCUSSION

Plaintiff raises four objections to the R&R: (1) the ALJ erred in her evaluation of the

opinion evidence of Hannah Finley, PMHNP-BC; (2) the ALJ erred in her evaluation of the

opinion evidence of Pamela Grassizk, APRN-CNP; (3) the ALJ failed to build an accurate and

logical bridge between the evidence and the RFC finding; and (4) the ALJ erred in her evaluation

of Plaintiff’s subjective complaints. ECF No. 14. For the following reasons, Plaintiff’s

objections are overruled.

A. Nurse Practitioner Finley’s Opinion

Plaintiff objects to the R&R’s finding that the ALJ complied with the revised regulations

in concluding that Nurse Practitioner Finley’s opinion was inconsistent with and unsupported by

the record. ECF No. 14 at PageID ##: 926-27. These objections are virtually identical to her

original arguments challenging the ALJ’s decision. ECF No. 14 at PageID ##: 928-31.

As in her initial challenge, Plaintiff claims the ALJ failed to provide how the mandatory

factors of consistency and supportability affected the persuasiveness of Nurse Practitioner

Finley’s opinion. Plaintiff claims that the ALJ improperly weighed Dr. Ahmad’s examination

findings as more persuasive than Nurse Practitioner Finley’s medical opinion. Although Dr.

Ahmad is a physician, Plaintiff claims that both practitioners were “on equal footing” given their

respective specialties. Plaintiff also argues that the ALJ failed to identify any inconsistencies

between Dr. Ahmad’s and Nurse Practitioner Finley’s findings and that Dr. Ahmad’s findings

were, in fact, consistent with Nurse Practitioner Finley’s. Finally, Plaintiff claims that and the

ALJ failed to explain its decision concerning supportability. ECF No. 14 at PageID ##: 928-34.

The magistrate judge rejected these arguments in the R&R, citing the following language

from the ALJ’s decision:

The claimant’s mental nurse practitioner completed a form at

Exhibit 8F, indicating marked limitations with frequent

absenteeism, among other things. However, she supports these

selections by indicating that her mood can fluctuate, which can

affect her ability to carry out a consistent work schedule, and that

her medications can cause drowsiness. As noted above, the claimant

frequently denies any medication[] side effects. While the record

does show some mood changes, and some fatigue associated with

insomnia, the source does not support the marked findings that

would be reasonably necessary to find that those mood changes

would prevent her from attending or focusing on work. The

collateral record, as noted, shows generally normal mental status

findings aside from “fair” insight, judgment, attention, and

concentration, and mood changes, at times. Despite her reported

fatigue, she does not present as drowsy, and is alert. A recent,

detailed neurological examination showed her to be awake and alert,

with normal attention, recall, logic, language fluency,

comprehension, object naming, and repetition (Exhibit 7F/53). As

this evaluation is much more detailed than the cognitive findings by

Nurse Finley and is by a physician, I find them to be significantly

inconsistent with her opinions and more persuasive. Therefore, as

her opinions are neither well supported on the form or in her own

mental status examinations, and are not consistent with the collateral

record, including neurological examinations and the State Agency

prior administrative medical findings, they are not persuasive.

ECF No. 13 at PageID #: 907 (citing Tr. at 25-26, ECF No. 7 at PageID ##: 81-82).

First, the magistrate judge determined that Plaintiff failed to demonstrate that the ALJ’s

decision inadequately explained the inconsistencies between Nurse Practitioner Finley’s medical

opinion and other medical and nonmedical evidence in the record. The magistrate judge also

explained that the ALJ appropriately considered the educational differences between Dr. Ahmad

and Nurse Practitioner Finley when weighing the persuasiveness of their respective medical

findings. ECF No. 13 at PageID #: 908. Moreover, the magistrate judge concluded that Plaintiff

failed to demonstrate how omitting Dr. Ahmad’s Montreal Cognitive Assessment (“MoCA”)

score rendered the ALJ’s decision unsupported by substantial evidence, particularly because the

ALJ is not required to include a full recitation of Dr. Ahmad’s examination findings. ECF No.

13 at PageID ##: 908-09 (citing Boseley v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 397 F. App’x 195, 199

(6th Cir. 2010)). The magistrate judge noted that Dr. Ahmad conclusions that Plaintiff “is

probably cognitively normal” and that “[m]ood may be a contributing factor,” ECF No. 13 at

PageID #: 909 (citing Tr. at 565, ECF No. 7 at PageID #: 621), were not consistent with Nurse

Practitioner Finley’s opinion that Plaintiff had “moderate difficulties in interacting with others

and in adapting or managing oneself; and marked difficulties in understanding, remembering,

and applying information and maintaining concentration, persistence, or pace.” ECF No. 13 at

PageID ##: 897-98 (citing Tr. at 624-25, ECF No. 7 at PageID ##: 680-81). The magistrate

judge determined that the ALJ’s conclusion that the record was inconsistent with Nurse

Practitioner Finley’s opinion was supported by substantial evidence and, as such, the Court

cannot overturn the ALJ’s decision. ECF No. 13 at PageID #: 910.

Second, regarding the ALJ’s decision concerning supportability, the magistrate judge

concluded that Plaintiff’s mental health records and other collateral evidence did not support her

reported level of limitation. The magistrate judge pointed to the ALJ’s decision in which she

summarized Plaintiff’s mental health treatment records, including Nurse Practitioner Finley’s

assessments:

Mentally, the records document an acute psychiatric exacerbation

leading to a brief hospitalization; however, the claimant admitted to

not sleeping for five days and to not taking her psychiatric

medication since moving back to Ohio from West Virginia []. By

the time of discharge, she improved, reported no adverse medication

side effects, and she was attending groups and attending to her

activities of daily living. In follow up she noted feeling better after

being on medication for over a month []. Generally, she exhibited

mildly abnormal to normal mental status examinations, with

decreasing to no paranoid thoughts []. She repeatedly exhibited

intact attention, memory, and concentration. She was generally

noted to have fair insight and judgment. She also reported coping

skills such as baking, music, and crafting []. Her own statements are

not entirely consistent. . . . She reported paranoid ideation (the belief

that others were talking about her) but interacted appropriately with

treatment providers. She reported memory issues but was able to

provide histories and manage decisions related to her medical and

psychiatric care. Regarding course of treatment, . . . [o]n the mental

health side, she has engaged in medication management and had the

one hospitalization, which she attributed at hearing to being given

high doses of prednisone for bronchitis, but with the inpatient record

indicating failure to comply with treatment after moving. She

admitted at hearing that she had not experienced psychosis since

July 2021 and no seizure like activity since that time either. Also,

her treatment has been largely successful. While her symptoms of

anxiety and depression were not fully resolved, they have waxed and

waned to a mild to moderate degree. She does not report consistent

precipitating or aggravating factors, other than her belief that in a

work setting she would think others were talking about her and low

motivation to leave home. She does not report significant or

consistent medication side effects since the alleged onset date.

In summary, except for one acute exacerbation complicated by lack

of sleep and noncompliance with prescribed medication, the

claimant’s mental status examinations have been relatively benign,

showing some variability in mood, with both anxiety and depression

noted at times, worse at times due to insurance issues affecting her

ability to obtain medication [] and relationship stressors [], and, at

times difficulty with transportation []. She also reported some

fatigue and low motivation at times []. She consistently was

indicated to have “fair” insight, judgment, attention, and

concentration with variability in terms of memory.

ECF No. 13 at PageID #: 911 (citing Tr. at 23-24, ECF No. 7 at PageID ##: 79-80). The

magistrate judge noted that “[a]n ALJ may rely on information articulated earlier in a decision to

support her findings and need not rearticulate information in her later analysis.” ECF No. 13 at

PageID #: 910 (citing Crum v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 660 F. App’x 449, 457 (6th Cir.

2016)). Taking the ALJ’s decision as a whole, the magistrate judge determined that Plaintiff

“failed to demonstrate that the ALJ did not adequately explain how Plaintiff’s mental status

findings—which were abnormal in only limited ways—contradicted NP Finley’s opinion that

[Plaintiff] had marked limitations in various areas of mental functioning.” ECF No. 13 at

PageID #: 911.

Finally, the magistrate judge rejected Plaintiff’s claims that Dr. Ahmad’s examination

findings were, in fact, consistent with Nurse Practitioner Finley’s medical opinion. ECF No. 13

at PageID #: 912. The magistrate judge concluded that it is not the place of the Court to weigh

the evidence de novo. Rather, the Court must determine whether the ALJ’s decision is supported

by substantial evidence. ECF No. 13 at PageID #: 912.

As indicated above, Plaintiff’s objections to the R&R’s treatment of Nurse Practitioner

Finley’s opinion, does little more than renew her initial challenge to the ALJ’s decision. ECF

No. 14 at PageID ##: 928-34. “This challenge is not a proper objection to the Report and

Recommendation, as required by FED. R. CIV. P. 72(b), because it merely rehashes [Plaintiff]’s

arguments.” Bentley v. Colvin, No. 16-11314, 2017 WL 3768941, at *2 (E.D. Mich. Aug. 31,

2017) (overruling plaintiff’s second objection, because it was already addressed and rejected in

the proposed recommendation of the magistrate judge); Mary H. v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., No.

3:24-CV-045-RGJ-CHL, 2025 WL 903837, at *4 (W.D. Ky. Mar. 25, 2025) (overruling

plaintiff’s second objection that the “associated recommendation that ‘the ALJ adequately

explained how the factors of supportability and consistency lead one to find Dr. Corpus’s

opinion is unpersuasive[,]’” because it rehashed the same arguments raised before the magistrate

judge).

Even if the Court addressed the merits of Plaintiff’s objection, Plaintiff’s argument is

unpersuasive. An ALJ must provide sufficient explanation for the Plaintiff and any reviewing

court to be able to “trace the path of his reasoning.” Stacy v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 451 F. App'x

517, 519 (6th Cir. 2011) (internal citations omitted). As explained in the R&R and above, the

ALJ did just that. The ALJ adequately identified substantial evidence supporting her decision

that Nurse Practitioner Finley’s opinion was inconsistent with the record. For instance, the ALJ

noted that Plaintiff: (1) admitted that she felt better after being on medication and did not report

any medication side effects; (2) “exhibited intact attention, memory, and concentration”; (3)

reported coping skills such as baking, music, and crafting; (4) was able to interact appropriately

with treatment providers; (5) was able to provide histories and manage decisions relating to her

medical and psychiatric care; and (6) had not experienced psychosis since July 2021. ECF No.

13 at PageID #: 911 (citing Tr. at 23-24, ECF No. 7 at PageID ##: 79-80).

Similarly, Plaintiff’s argument that the ALJ did not explain her decision regarding the

supportability of Nurse Practitioner Finley’s opinion is not well taken. As the magistrate judge

noted, an ALJ is not required to reiterate facts established earlier in the decision. ECF No. 13 at

PageID #: 910 (citing Crum, 660 F. App’x at 457). In explaining that Nurse Practitioner Finley’s

opinion was not supported by her own examination reports or the evidence, the ALJ referred to

earlier recitations of Plaintiff’s medical treatment history, which included analysis of Nurse

Practitioner Finley’s assessments and findings. ECF No. 13 at PageID #: 910 (citing Tr. at 26,

ECF No. 7 at PageID #: 82). That the ALJ did not reiterate Plaintiff’s medical treatment history

when discussing supportability does not render the analysis insufficient under the legal standards

in 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520c.

The Court finds that, taken as a whole, the ALJ thoroughly explained the basis for her

RFC determination, and the ALJ’s explanation enjoys substantial support in the record.

Plaintiff’s objection is overruled.

B. Nurse Practitioner Gassizk’s Medical Opinion Evidence

Plaintiff objects to the magistrate judge’s conclusion that the ALJ’s step-two finding

regarding the severity of Plaintiff’s rheumatoid arthritis offsets the ALJ’s finding that there is a

lack of objective evidence supporting Nurse Practitioner Gassizk’s opinion. ECF No. 14 at

PageID #: 934. Plaintiff argues that even if her rheumatoid arthritis were not severe, the ALJ

was still required to consider the combined effects of impairment. ECR No. 14 at PageID #: 934

(citing 20 C.F.R. § 404.1523(c)). Plaintiff urges that because the ALJ did not consider the

combined effects of impairment, the case should be remanded. ECF No. 14 at PageID #: 935.

Plaintiff’s objection is not well taken. Under the step-two process, the ALJ must

determine whether, first, the individual has a medically determinable impairment, and second,

the intensity and persistence of the individual’s symptoms. SSR 16-3p, 2017 WL 5180304 at *3-

4 (Oct. 25, 2017). The magistrate judge concluded that Plaintiff failed to meet her initial burden

at step two because she failed to “properly establish[]” that “pain” and “rheumatoid arthritis”

were “medically determinable impairments.” ECF No. 13 at PageID #: 914. Specifically, the

ALJ stated that “there were no objective signs of findings to support [Plaintiff’s rheumatoid

arthritis diagnosis] (no abnormal laboratory markers, no synovitis on examination, etc.) and the

diagnosis . . . appears to be based only on her reported history.” ECF No. 13 at PageID #: 914

(citing Tr. at 19, ECF No. 7 at PageID #: 75). Moreover, the magistrate judge found Plaintiff

waived this argument because she failed to present any developed arguments challenging the

ALJ’s step-two analysis or findings. ECF No. 13 at PageID #: 914, n.15 (citing McPherson v.

Kelsey, 125 F.3d 989, 995-96 (6th Cir. 1997) (finding “issues adverted to in a perfunctory

manner, unaccompanied by some effort at developed argumentation, are deemed waived.”)).

Even if Plaintiff’s argument were not waived, she has not demonstrated that the ALJ

erred regarding her alleged rheumatoid arthritis diagnosis. The record contains no diagnostic

tests or results confirming such a diagnosis and, instead, relies entirely on Plaintiff’s subjective

reports and complaints. ECF No. 13 at PageID #: 914 (citing Tr. at 19, ECF No. 7 at PageID #:

75). The step-two process requires Plaintiff to present some medical source evidence

establishing the existence of a medically determinable impairment before the ALJ moves on to

assessing the severity of such impairment in isolation or in combination with other impairments.

SSR 16-3p, 2017 WL 5180304 at *3 (Oct. 25, 2017). See R&R, Brown v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec.,

No. 5:24-CV-578, 2024 WL 4706709, at *5 (N.D. Ohio Nov. 7, 2024) adopted by 2024 WL

4881673 (N.D. Ohio Nov. 25, 2024) (holding a plaintiff’s statements regarding their symptoms,

alone, do not permit an ALJ to find a medically determinable impairment and, in addition, an

ALJ need not consider such statements in their step-two analysis). Because she has not

demonstrated a medically determinable physical impairment, the ALJ need not have considered

her symptoms in combination with her mental impairments. Plaintiff’s objection is overruled.

C. The RFC Finding’s Evidentiary Support

In her third objection, Plaintiff challenges the R&R’s finding that the ALJ adequately

explained how the evidence supports the abilities contained in the RFC finding. ECF No. 14 at

PageID #: 935. As in her initial challenge to the ALJ’s decision, Plaintiff argues that many of

the medical opinions concerning her physical and mental abilities differed from the ALJ’s

ultimate decision and that the ALJ did not “build an accurate and logical bridge between the

evidence and the abilities and limitations.” ECF No. 14 at PageID #: 935.

The magistrate judge rejected this argument, pointing to specific explanations provided

by the ALJ in support of the ALJ’s RFC decisions regarding limitation. For instance, the ALJ

explained that she “restricted the claimant to simple tasks, rather than one to three step tasks,

given that nearly any task can be further divided into sub-steps, rending this an unhelpful way to

describe complexity.” ECF No. 13 at PageID #: 920 (citing Tr. at 25, ECF No. 7 at PageID #:

81). The ALJ also explained that she “limited the nature of interaction to preclude more stressful

and difficult interactions . . . given some mood lability.” ECF No. 13 at PageID #: 921 (citing

Tr. at 25, ECF No. 7 at PageID #: 81). The magistrate judge concluded that the ALJ complied

with Social Security Ruling 96-8p because she adequately explained her reasons for adopting a

“simple tasks” limitation and for limiting the type of Plaintiff’s interactions. ECF No. 13 at

PageID ##: 920-21.

Plaintiff retorts that the ALJ’s explanation regarding her “simple tasks” limitation

amounts to a hypothetical that should have presented to a vocational expert and that the ALJ’s

reasons for rejecting Plaintiff’s limitations were not valid or supported by substantial evidence.

ECF No. 14 at PageID #: 936.

Plaintiff’s objection essentially restates her initial disagreement with the ALJ’s decision

to change the “1-3 step” task limitation to “simple tasks.” As stated above, such regurgitation is

not a proper challenge because it merely rehashes Plaintiff’s prior arguments. See Bentley, 2017

WL 3768941, at *2. Regardless, Plaintiff’s arguments are unpersuasive. As noted in the R&R,

the ALJ explained her consideration of the State Agency’s RFC determination, her decision to

alter the RFC limitation to better reflect complexity in work tasks, and reasons for limiting the

nature of Plaintiff’s interactions, given her “typically normal mental status with some mood

lability and ‘fair’ insight, judgment, attention, and concentration.” ECF No. 13 at PageID #: 920

(citing Tr. 25, ECF No. 7 at PageID #: 81). This is consistent with Social Security Rule 96-8p,

which requires the ALJ to consider all medical opinions in the RFC assessment and explain why

a medical opinion was not adopted. SSR 96-8p, 1996 WL 374184 at *7 (July 2, 1997). Plaintiff

does not cite any legal authority indicting the ALJ’s explanation as invalid or unsupported by the

substantial evidence. Accordingly, Plaintiff’s objection is overruled.

D. Plaintiff’s Subjective Complaints

In her final objection, Plaintiff challenges the R&R regarding the ALJ’s evaluation of

Plaintiff’s subjective complaints. Plaintiff claims that the magistrate judge mischaracterized her

argument regarding the ALJ’s findings highlighting Plaintiff’s noncompliance with medications.

ECF No. 14 at PageID #: 937. Plaintiff argues that the ALJ’s summarization of the records of

when Plaintiff did not have or receive adequate care does not mean the ALJ considered why

Plaintiff was not receiving care. Plaintiff argues that because the ALJ did not consider these

reasons, remand is required. ECF No. 14 at PageID #: 937.

Plaintiff’s objection is without merit. The R&R correctly sets forth the two-step analysis

for assessing the limiting effects of Plaintiff’s symptoms by: (1) establishing a medically

determinable impairment; and (2) evaluating the intensity and persistence of the symptoms. ECF

No. 13 at PageID ##: 922-23 (citing SSR 16-3p, 2017 WL 5180304 at *3); Rogers v. Comm’r of

Soc. Sec., 486 F.3d 234, 247 (6th Cir. 2007) (citing 20 C.F.R. § 416.929(a)). The magistrate

judge identified the relevant factors for considering the intensity and persistence of symptoms

which include: daily activities, types and effectiveness of medication, treatment received to

address symptoms, and other factors concerning the alleged limitations and restrictions due to

pain or other symptoms. ECF No. 13 at PageID #: 923.

As set forth in the R&R, the ALJ properly assessed these factors in relation to Plaintiff’s

medication compliance. ECF No. 13 at PageID ##: 923-24. The ALJ accurately described

Plaintiff’s two instances of medication noncompliance (the first due to her relocation to Ohio, the

second due to insurance issues) and concluded that Plaintiff’s claimed impairments were not

supported by the record. ECF No. 13 at PageID ##: 924-25. In particular, the ALJ explained

that the record supported Plaintiff’s “normal mental status findings even after the insurance issue

interfered with her medications, and the overall waxing and waning of her symptoms only ‘to a

mild or moderate degree.’” ECF No. 13 at PageID #: 925 (citing Tr. 22-24, ECF No. 7 at

PageID #: 78-80). The ALJ also noted that Plaintiff failed to pursue follow-up treatment for her

physical symptoms.” ECF No. 13 at PageID #: 925. Because the record demonstrates that the

ALJ adequately considered and evaluated the reasons and effects of Plaintiff’s lack of (or delay

in seeking) care, Plaintiff’s objection is overruled.

IV. CONCLUSION

For the above reasons, the Court overrules Plaintiff’s objections (ECF No. 14), adopts the

magistrate judge’s Report and Recommendation (ECF No. 13), and affirms the Commissioner’s

decision denying Plaintiff’s applications for Disability Insurance Benefits and Supplemental

Security Income.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

September 18, 2025 /s/ Benita Y. Pearson

Date Benita Y. Pearson

United States District Judge