SAUNDERS v. RT & RT MANORS LLC, LANDLORD

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

DONNA SAUNDERS, :

Plaintiff, :

:

v. : CIVIL ACTION NO. 25-CV-5099

:

RT & RT MANORS LLC, :

LANDLORD, et al., :

Defendants. :

MEMORANDUM

PEREZ, J. SEPTEMBER 17, 2025

Plaintiff Donna Saunders brings this civil action against a realtor, Robert Foster, and

three property companies—RT & RT Manors LLC, BHHS Fox & Roach Bear, and Pocono

Properties—claiming breach of contract in connection with a real estate transaction. She seeks

leave to proceed in forma pauperis. For the following reasons, the Court will grant Saunders

leave to proceed in forma pauperis and dismiss her Complaint for lack of subject matter

jurisdiction.

I. FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS

Saunders’s Complaint is sparse. She identifies RT & RT Manors LLC as her landlord

and notes that she initially began “doing business” with Foster, an employee of RT & RT

Manors LLC, as a “renter.” (Compl. at 2, 4.)1 She subsequently entered into an agreement with

Foster whereby he would sell her unspecified properties. (Id.) Saunders alleges that Foster and

the other three Defendants, with whom Foster allegedly had arrangements, “defraud[ed]” her to

give her “a smaller amount than agreed upon.” (Id.) Saunders alleges that her constitutional

1 The Court adopts the pagination supplied to the Complaint (ECF No. 2) by the Court’s

CM/ECF docketing system.

right to due process was violated as a result of this conduct and also claims breach of contract.

(Id. at 3.) She seeks millions of dollars in damages. (Id. at 5.)

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

The Court will grant Saunders leave to proceed in forma pauperis because it appears that

she is incapable of paying the fees to commence this civil action. Accordingly, 28 U.S.C. §

1915(e)(2)(B) requires the Court to screen the Complaint and dismiss it if it is frivolous,

malicious, fails to state a claim for relief, or seeks damages from an immune defendant.

Furthermore, the Court must dismiss the Complaint if it lacks subject matter jurisdiction. Fed. R.

Civ. P. 12(h)(3) (“If the court determines at any time that it lacks subject-matter jurisdiction, the

court must dismiss the action.”); Grp. Against Smog and Pollution, Inc. v. Shenango, Inc., 810

F.3d 116, 122 n.6 (3d Cir. 2016) (explaining that “an objection to subject matter jurisdiction may

be raised at any time [and] a court may raise jurisdictional issues sua sponte”). A plaintiff

commencing an action in federal court bears the burden of establishing federal jurisdiction. See

Lincoln Ben. Life Co. v. AEI Life, LLC, 800 F.3d 99, 105 (3d Cir. 2015) (“The burden of

establishing federal jurisdiction rests with the party asserting its existence.”). “Jurisdictional

[issues] . . . may be raised at any time and courts have a duty to consider them sua sponte.”

Wilkins v. United States, 598 U.S. 152, 157 (2023) (internal quotations omitted). As Saunders is

proceeding pro se, the Court construes her allegations liberally. Vogt v. Wetzel, 8 F.4th 182, 185

(3d Cir. 2021) (citing Mala v. Crown Bay Marina, Inc., 704 F.3d 239, 244-45 (3d Cir. 2013)).

III. DISCUSSION

A. Federal Claims

Saunders attempts to invoke this Court’s federal question jurisdiction, 28 U.S.C. § 1331,

by using the Court’s form complaint for a plaintiff alleging a civil rights violation and asserting

due process claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. However, “wholly insubstantial” claims are

insufficient to invoke federal question jurisdiction, even if they purport to be predicated on a

federal statute. Shapiro v. McManus, 577 U.S. 39, 45 (2015) (“We have long distinguished

between failing to raise a substantial federal question for jurisdictional purposes . . . and failing

to state a claim for relief on the merits; only ‘wholly insubstantial and frivolous’ claims implicate

the former.”); Kehr Packages, Inc. v. Fidelcor, Inc., 926 F.2d 1406, 1408-09 (3d Cir. 1991)

(dismissal of claims for lack of jurisdiction is proper “when the claim clearly appears to be

immaterial and made solely for the purpose of obtaining jurisdiction or is wholly insubstantial

and frivolous” (cleaned up)). The factual scenario described in the Complaint as the basis for

Saunders’s claims, i.e., a private transaction with private parties who are not subject to liability

under § 1983, see, e.g., Hussein v. New Jersey, 403 F. App’x 712, 716 (3d Cir. 2010) (per

curiam) (landlords were not state actors); Green-Jordan v. Taylor, No. 22-00170, 2023 WL

4291849, at *5 (C.D. Cal. May 3, 2023) (private realtors were not state actors), does not raise a

substantial federal question for jurisdictional purposes, see, e.g., Rose v. Husenaj, 708 F. App’x

57, 60 (3d Cir. 2017) (per curiam) (concluding that civil rights claims were insufficiently

substantial to invoke federal question jurisdiction because “Rose’s conclusory reference to ‘civil

rights’ does not convert his tort claims against non-state actors into constitutional claims”);

Yoder v. Morrow, 671 F. App’x 27, 29 (3d Cir. 2016) (per curiam) (affirming dismissal for lack

of subject matter jursidction because “[a]lthough Yoder’s complaint purported to rely on 42

U.S.C. § 1983, her allegations do not actually implicate that federal statute”). Accordingly, the

Court may not exercise jurisdiction under § 1331.

B. State Claims

Saunders’s Complaint is best construed as raising contract (and possibly tort) claims

under Pennsylvania law. See Holley v. Dep’t of Veteran Affairs, 165 F.3d 244, 248 (3d Cir.

1999) (“We apply the applicable law, irrespective of whether a pro se litigant has mentioned it

by name.”). District courts may exercise jurisdiction over cases raising claims exclusively under

state law if “the matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value of $75,000, exclusive of interest

and costs, and is between . . . citizens of different States.” 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a). “Complete

diversity requires that, in cases with multiple plaintiffs or multiple defendants, no plaintiff be a

citizen of the same state as any defendant.” Zambelli Fireworks Mfg. Co. v. Wood, 592 F.3d

412, 419 (3d Cir. 2010). For diversity purposes, an individual is a citizen of the state where he is

domiciled, meaning the state where he is physically present and intends to remain. See

Washington v. Hovensa LLC, 652 F.3d 340, 344 (3d Cir. 2011). Several factors may be relevant

in determining an individual’s domicile, including “declarations, exercise of political rights,

payment of personal taxes, house of residence, and place of business”, as well as “location of

brokerage and bank accounts, location of spouse and family, membership in unions and other

organizations, and driver’s license and vehicle registration.” McCann v. Newman Irrevocable

Tr., 458 F.3d 281, 286 (3d Cir. 2006) (internal quotations omitted).

For diversity purposes, a corporation is a citizen of the state in which it is incorporated

and the state in which it has its principal place of business. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(c). In contrast,

“the citizenship of an LLC [or other unincorporated entity] is determined by the citizenship of its

members.” Zambelli, 592 F.3d at 420. “[W]here an LLC has, as one of its members, another

LLC, the citizenship of unincorporated associations must be traced through however many layers

of partners or members there may be to determine the citizenship of the LLC.” Id. (internal

quotations omitted). At the pleading stage, a plaintiff need not affirmatively allege the

citizenship of a LLC if she alleges, after a reasonable investigation, that the members of the LLC

are not citizens of her state of citizenship. See Lincoln Benefit Life Co., 800 F.3d at 102.

Saunders provides a Pennsylvania address for herself, which suggests she may be a

Pennsylvania citizen, although she does not specifically allege her citizenship. (Compl. at 2.)

Similarly, she provides a Delaware address for Foster without alleging his citizenship. (Id. at 3.)

However, residency alone is generally insufficient to adequately allege citizenship. See McNair

v. Synapse Grp. Inc., 672 F.3d 213, 219 n.4 (3d Cir. 2012) (noting that use of the term

“resident,” rather than “domiciliary” or “citizen,” is an improper means of pleading citizenship

for purposes of diversity jurisdiction). Nor does she allege the citizenship of the entity

Defendants—RT & RT Manors LLC, BHHS Fox & Roach Bear, and Pocono Properties—which

are either corporations whose citizenship are governed by their principal place of business and

state of citizenship, or LLCs whose citizenship is governed by the citizenship of their members.

(See Compl. at 2-3.) In sum, absent sufficient allegations pertaining to the parties’ citizenship,

the Court cannot exercise diversity jurisdiction under § 1332. See, e.g., Johnson v. Wal-Mart

Stores E., LP, No. 20-02450, 2020 WL 3264066, at *3 (D.N.J. June 17, 2020) (“When a party to

the action is an unincorporated association, an allegation of diversity of citizenship must include

the citizenship of each of the association’s members.”).

IV. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Court will dismiss this case for lack of subject matter

jurisdiction. The dismissal will be without prejudice to Saunders filing an amended complaint in

the event she can allege a basis for subject matter jurisdiction over her state claims or,

alternatively, filing a complaint in the proper state court so she may proceed on her claims in that

venue.” An appropriate Order follows, which provides further instructions.

BY THE COURT:

HON. MIA R. PEREZ

? The Court expresses no opinion at this time on the merits of Saunders’s state claims. The Court

notes, however, that if Saunders returns with an amended complaint in this Court, she must

allege sufficient facts to both justify this Court’s exercise of jurisdiction and to state a plausible

claim against each named defendant. This means Saunders must allege specific facts explaining

what each defendant did or did not do that caused her harm. See generally Bell Atl. Corp. v.

Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007) (“Because the plaintiffs here have not nudged their claims

across the line from conceivable to plausible, their complaint must be dismissed.”).