Tidwell v. State of Tennessee

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

WESTERN DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE

EASTERN DIVISION

THIAKIA TIDWELL,

Plaintiff,

v. No. 1:24-cv-01118-SHM-tmp

TENNESSEE DEPARTMENT OF

CORRECTION, CORECIVIC, HARDEMAN

COUNTY CORRECTIONAL FACILITIES

CORPORATION, and JERRY WARDLOW,

Defendants.

ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO DISMISS

Plaintiff Thiakia Tidwell brings this action under 42 U.S.C.

§ 1983 and Tennessee law, asserting civil rights violations and

wrongful death claims arising from the death of her son, Roddarous

Marcus Bond (“Bond”). (ECF Nos. 1, 32). Before the Court is

Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure

12(b)(6) (“the Motion”), filed on February 4, 2025. (ECF No. 33).

For the reasons set forth below, the Motion is GRANTED.

I. BACKGROUND

A. Factual Background

The following facts are taken from Plaintiff’s original and

amended complaints. (ECF Nos. 1, 32). For purposes of deciding

the Motion, the Court accepts all well-pleaded factual allegations

as true and views them in the light most favorable to Plaintiff.

See Mertik v. Blalock, 983 F.2d 1535, 1356 (6th Cir. 1993); see

also Miller v. Currie, 50 F.3d 373, 377 (6th Cir. 1995).

Plaintiff was the mother of Roddarous Marcus Bond, an inmate

who died while incarcerated at the Hardeman County Correctional

Facility (“HCCF”) in Whiteville, Tennessee. (ECF No. 32, ¶¶ 1-

3). HCCF is owned by Hardeman County Correctional Facilities

Corporation (“HCCFC”) and operated by CoreCivic, a private prison

management company, under a contract with the Tennessee Department

of Correction (“TDOC”). (Id. at ¶¶ 2-3). Defendant Jerry Wardlow

was the warden at HCCF when Bond was incarcerated there. (Id. at

¶ 5).

Throughout his incarceration, Bond allegedly told Plaintiff

about the “poor living conditions and dangerous environment within

the facility.” (Id. at ¶ 7). Bond described “broken cell doors,”

“poor sanitation,” and “lack of access to basic necessities.” (Id.

at ¶ 8). There were “frequent lockdowns” during which “proper

procedures were not followed,” and “administrative roadblocks”

that prevented his participation in rehabilitation programs. (Id.

at ¶¶ 11, 16). The facility was also “chronic[ally]

understaff[ed],” leading to “lapse[s] in security” and “inadequate

supervision” that exposed inmates to harm. (Id. at ¶ 17). At an

unspecified time, Bond witnessed correctional officers “bringing

drugs into the facility,” “forcing inmates” to ingest those drugs,

and “extort[ing] inmates for financial gain.” (Id. at ¶ 10).

On June 6, 2023, Plaintiff was notified by HCCF that Bond had

died while in custody. (ECF No 1, Ex. 5). The autopsy report

lists the cause of death as an overdose of Fentanyl and Xylazine.

(Id.) After Bond’s death, Plaintiff exchanged multiple emails

with HCCF staff requesting an investigation into the circumstances

surrounding the death and the return of Bond’s personal property.

(Id., Ex. 4). Plaintiff alleges that no investigation has been

conducted. (Id.)

B. Procedural Background

On June 5, 2024, Plaintiff filed a pro se complaint against

Bolivar General Hospital, CoreCivic, and Jerry Wardlow, asserting

wrongful death and § 1983 claims. (ECF No. 1). Each Defendant

filed a motion to dismiss. (ECF Nos. 12, 16, 22). Plaintiff

subsequently retained counsel and moved for leave to amend her

complaint. (ECF No. 30). The Court granted leave on December

19, 2024. (ECF No. 31). On January 21, 2025, Plaintiff filed an

amended complaint, dropping Bolivar General Hospital and naming

the Tennessee Department of Correction and Hardeman County

Correctional Facilities Corporation as new defendants. (ECF No.

32). The Court denied the prior motions to dismiss as moot. (ECF

No. 34).

In the amended complaint, Plaintiff alleges Defendants

violated Bond’s rights under § 1983 by failing to maintain a safe

environment and to protect inmates from the risk of drug overdose.

(ECF No. 32). Specifically, Plaintiff alleges that, due to

“chronic understaffing,” correctional officers failed to conduct

required cell checks every 30 minutes, leaving Bond unattended at

the time of his fatal overdose. (Id. at ¶¶ 24, 28). Plaintiff

alleges that “Defendants’ negligence” in allowing officers to

bring lethal drugs into the facility and their “failure to uphold

security protocols” directly caused Bond’s death and amounted to

a deprivation of his constitutional rights. (Id. at ¶¶ 18, 29).

On February 4, 2025, Defendants moved to dismiss, arguing

that (1) the amended complaint fails to allege a specific

constitutional violation by any person acting under color of state

law for which Defendants are liable; (2) Plaintiff fails to plead

facts showing that any municipal policy or custom was the “moving

force behind the alleged constitutional deprivation,” as required

by Monell v. New York City Dept. of Social Serv., 436 U.S. 658,

691 (1978); and (3) the § 1983 claim against Wardlow is redundant.

(ECF No. 33)

On February 19, 2025, Plaintiff filed a response clarifying

that the predicate constitutional violation underlying her § 1983

claim is the Eighth Amendment prohibition against cruel and unusual

punishment. (ECF No. 34) Plaintiff argues that her Monell claim

is viable because Defendants’ alleged pattern of “understaffing,

failure to conduct proper cell checks, and allowing officers to

bring drugs into the facility” constitutes a municipal policy or

custom. (Id.) Plaintiff specifies that her claim against Wardlow

is brought in his official capacity as warden of HCCF. (Id.) The

matter is now fully briefed and ripe for adjudication.

II. JURISDICTION

The Court has federal question jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C.

§ 1331 because Plaintiff asserts claims arising under § 1983. The

Court exercises supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s state

law claims under 28 U.S.C. § 1367, because those claims arise from

a “common nucleus of operative facts” with the § 1983 claims.

Packard v. Farmers Ins. Co. of Columbus Inc., 423 Fed. Appx. 580,

583 (6th Cir. 2011); see also Royal Canin U.S.A., Inc. v.

Wullschleger, 604 U.S. 22, 27 (2025).

III. LEGAL STANDARD

A. Rule 12(b)(6) Standard

When evaluating a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6),

courts must “construe the complaint in the light most favorable to

the plaintiff [and] accept all factual allegations as true.” Payne

v. Secretary of Treasury, 73 Fed. Appx. 836, 837 (6th Cir. 2003);

see also League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Bredesen, 500 F.3d

523, 527 (6th Cir. 2007). However, courts “need not accept as

true legal conclusions or unwarranted factual inferences.”

Commercial Money Ctr., Inc. v. Illinois Union Ins. Co., 508 F.3d

327, 336 (6th Cir. 2007); see also JP Morgan Chase Bank, N.A. v.

Winget, 510 F.3d 557, 582 (6th Cir. 2007). Courts may consider

“matters of public record, orders, items appearing in the record,

and exhibits attached to the complaint,” as well as “documents

that a defendant attaches to a motion to dismiss … if referred to

in the complaint and are central [to the] claim.” Amini v. Oberlin

College, 259 F.3d 493, 502 (6th Cir. 2001).

To survive a motion to dismiss, the complaint must contain

sufficient facts to “state a claim that is plausible on its face.”

Albrecht v. Treon, 617 F.3d 890, 893 (6th Cir. 2010) (citing

Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 679 (2009)). A claim is plausible

when the alleged facts “allow the court to draw the reasonable

inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.”

Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. Although the complaint need not include

“detailed factual allegations,” Bell Atlantic Corp v. Twombly, 550

U.S. 544, 555 (2007), it must assert “more than an unadorned, the-

defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at

678. A complaint fails to meet this standard when it “pleads facts

‘merely consistent with a defendant's liability’ or if the alleged

facts do not ‘permit the court to infer more than the mere

possibility of misconduct.’” Albrecht, 617 F.3d at 893.1

B. Section 1983 Claim

Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, any “person who, under color of any

statute, ordinance, regulation, custom or usage, of any State”

subjects another to “the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or

immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable

1 Plaintiff’s counsel relies on the wrong legal standard.

Plaintiff’s response cites the pleading standard in Tennessee

Rules of Civil Procedure 8.01 and 12.02(6), rather than the

applicable Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. (ECF No. 34). The

Tennessee Rules do not apply. Because Plaintiff brings claims

under § 1983, the Court exercises federal question jurisdiction

under 28 U.S.C. § 1331, and the Federal Rules control. Even if

jurisdiction were based on diversity of citizenship under 28 U.S.C.

§ 1332, the Federal Rules would govern. See Jones v. Correctional

Medical Services, Inc., 845 F.Supp.2d 824, 852 (W.D. Mich. 2012)

(citing Shady Grove Orthopedic Assoc., P.A. v. Allstate Ins. Co.,

130 S. Ct. 1431, 1449 (2010)) (“[A] state law that conflicts with

a valid federal rule simply does not apply in federal court.”);

see also Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 469-70 (1965) (holding

that federal courts sitting in diversity apply the Federal Rules

of Civil Procedure instead of conflicting state law).

to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other

proper proceeding for redress[.]” 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege two

elements:

(1) the deprivation of a right secured by the “Constitution

and laws of the United States,” and

(2) that the deprivation was committed by a person “acting

under the color of state law.”

Crowder v. Boyce, No. 2:14-cv-2962-JDT-tmp, 2015 WL 4546512, at *3

(W.D. Tenn. Jul. 28, 2015) (citing Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co.,

398 U.S. 144, 150 (1970)). “Like a tort plaintiff, a § 1983

plaintiff must establish “both causation in fact and proximate

causation.” Marvaso v. Sanchez, 971 F.3d 599, 606 (6th Cir. 2020)

(citing Lamont v. New Jersey, 637 F.3d 177, 185 (3d Cir. 2011)).

Section 1983 “is to be read in harmony with general principles of

tort immunities and defenses rather than in derogation of them.”

Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 418 (1976).

C. Monell Liability

When performing “the traditional state function of operating

a prison,” private entities act under “the color of state law for

purposes of § 1983.” Thomas v. Coble, 55 Fed. Appx. 748, 748 (6th

Cir. 2003) (citing Street v. Corrs. Corp. of Am., 102 F.3d 810,

814 (6th Cir. 1996)). The standard for municipal liability under

Monell applies to state agencies like TDOC and to private prison

operators like CoreCivic and HCCFC. See Williams v. CoreCivic of

Tenn., LLC, No. 1:24-cv-01074-JDB-jay, 2025 WL 952241, at *5 (W.D.

Tenn. Mar. 28, 2025) (citing Street, 102 F.3d at 817-18).

Under Monell, entities acting under color of state law cannot

be held vicariously liable under § 1983 for the actions of their

employees. See Braswell v. Corrs. Corp. of Am., 419 Fed. Appx.

622, 627 (6th Cir. 2011) (citing Monell, 436 U.S. at 691-92). To

impose liability under § 1983, a plaintiff “must show that a policy

or well-settled custom of the [entity] was the ‘moving force’

behind the alleged deprivation” of constitutional rights. Id.

(citing Miller v. Sanilac, 606 F.3d 240, 254-55 (6th Cir. 2010)).

As the Supreme Court has explained:

Locating a “policy” ensures that a municipality is held

liable only for those deprivations resulting from the

decisions of its duly constituted legislative body or of

those officials whose acts may fairly be said to be those

of the municipality. Similarly, an act performed

pursuant to a “custom” that has not been approved by an

appropriate decisionmaker may fairly subject a

municipality to liability on the theory that the

relevant practice is so widespread as to have the force

of law.

Bd. of the Cnty. Comm’rs v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 403-04 (1997)

(internal citations omitted). A “custom” may arise from

affirmative conduct or deliberate inaction, and it “need not be

formally approved by the entity” to trigger § 1983 liability.

Schenk ex rel. Ev M v. Thomas, No. 1:22-cv-01268-STA-jay, 2023 WL

5108594, at *3 (W.D. Tenn. Aug. 9, 2023) (quoting City of Canton

v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 404 (1989)). However, there must be a

“causal connection” between the policy or custom and the alleged

constitutional violation. Id. (quoting Oklahoma City v. Tuttle,

471 U.S. 808, 823-24 (1985)).

To establish liability under § 1983, a plaintiff must: (1)

“identify the policy [or custom]”; (2) “connect the policy [or

custom] to the [entity] itself”; and (3) “show that the particular

injury was incurred because of the execution of that policy [or

custom].” Id. (quoting Garner v. Memphis Police Dept., 8 F.3d

358, 364 (6th Cir. 1993)) (internal citations omitted).

IV. ANALYSIS

A. Section 1983 Claims Against CoreCivic, HCCFC, and TDOC

Although § 1983 provides a procedural mechanism to bring

constitutional claims, it does not itself confer any substantive

rights. See Humes v. Gilless, 154 F.Supp.2d 1353, 1357 (W.D. Tenn.

2001). Rather, it creates a “species of tort liability” for the

violation of rights secured by the Constitution. Manuel v. City

of Joliet, Illinois, 580 U.S. 357, 362 (2017). The first step in

any § 1983 analysis is to “identify the specific constitutional

right at issue.” Johnson v. CoreCivic, Inc., No. 18-1051-STA-egb,

2018 WL 5798534, at *4 (W.D. Tenn. Nov. 5, 2018) (quoting Albright

v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 271 (1994)).

Here, Plaintiff grounds her § 1983 claim in the Eighth

Amendment, which prohibits the infliction of “cruel and unusual

punishments.” U.S. Const. amend. VIII. That protection imposes

on prison officials a duty to “provide humane conditions of

confinement,” to “ensure that inmates receive adequate food,

clothing, shelter, and medical care, and [to] take reasonable

measures to guarantee the safety of the inmates.” Farmer v.

Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 833 (1994); see also Bishop v. Hackel, 636

F.3d 757, 766 (6th Cir. 2011).

To establish a failure-to-protect claim under the Eighth

Amendment, a plaintiff must allege:

(1) an objectively “serious risk to inmate health or

safety”; and

(2) a subjectively “culpable state of mind” on part of the

prison officials – namely, “deliberate indifference to

the health or safety of the inmate.”

Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 298 (1991); see also Estelle v.

Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976).

1. The Objective Prong

“The objective prong of a failure-to-protect claim requires

an analysis of the risk to the [inmate] before the alleged injury

occurred.” Zakora v. Chrisman, 44 F.4th 452, 469 (6th Cir. 2022)

(citing Reedy v. West, 988 F.3d 907, 909, 912-14 (6th Cir. 2021)).

That analysis considers “the likelihood of harm” in light of the

“circumstances that led to the injury.” Id. (citing Schack v.

City of Taylor, 177 Fed. Appx. 469, 472 (6th Cir. 2006)).

When there are drug-related injuries, a fatal overdose “does

not independently establish the objective prong.” Williams, 2025

WL 952241, at *5 (quoting Schack, 177 Fed. Appx. at 470). As the

Sixth Circuit clarified in Caraway, “[t]he relevant constitutional

injury is the exposure to an objectively excessive risk, not any

physical harm that befalls the inmate because of that risk.”

Caraway v. CoreCivic of Tenn., LLC, 98 F.4th 679, 685 (6th Cir.

2024). “Serious physical harm – even death – does not ipso facto

satisfy a failure-to-protect claim’s objective component.” Id.

Plaintiff alleges that Bond’s fatal overdose was a direct

consequence of correctional officers smuggling drugs into the

facility. (ECF No. 32, ¶ 10). According to Plaintiff’s amended

complaint and response, the presence of illicit drugs alone created

an “objectively excessive risk to Bond’s health and safety.” (ECF

Nos. 32, 34). Although Plaintiff correctly asserts that drugs

like fentanyl pose serious risks, she fails to establish that the

risk rose to the level of “objectively excessive.” See Zakora, 44

F.4th at 470 (“Fentanyl unquestionably poses a severe danger to

anyone who comes in contact with it.”); see also United States v.

Colon, 246 Fed. Appx. 153, 156 (3d Cir. 2007) (“The inherent danger

of drugs is magnified when introduced to a controlled environment

like a prison.”).

To demonstrate an objectively excessive risk, Plaintiff must

show that inmates had “unfettered access to deadly drugs inside a

prison,” and that the presence of those drugs was “widespread.”

Caraway, 98 F.4th at 684. A “simple exposure to drugs, without

more, does not violate contemporary standards of decency and thus

does not satisfy the objective prong” of an Eighth Amendment

violation. Williams, 2025 WL 952241, at *5 (quoting Zakora, 44

F.4th at 472).

Although Plaintiff alleges that Bond observed correctional

officers bringing drugs into the facility, she fails to plead

specific facts about the methods by which officers allegedly

smuggled drugs into HCCF, the circumstances under which inmates

had access to those drugs, or any prior incidents of inmate

overdoses. Her allegations are insufficient when compared to the

level of detail in cases where courts have found an objectively

excessive risk of inmate drug overdose. See Caraway, 98 F.4th at

684 (finding an objectively excessive risk where the complaint

included “detailed allegations” that “two other inmates had also

overdosed” and that “prison officials failed to investigate those

overdoses”); see also Zakora, 44 F.4th at 461 (describing drugs

smuggled through basketballs tossed over fences and identifying a

prison-wide “drug-smuggling ring.”).

Because Plaintiff’s amended complaint lacks factual

allegations describing with specificity the extent and frequency

of drug use at HCCF and the access to drugs, she fails to establish

the “objectively excessive risk of harm” necessary to satisfy the

first prong of an Eighth Amendment failure-to-protect claim.

2. The Subjective Prong

Addressing the subjective prong of her Eighth Amendment

claim, Plaintiff alleges that Defendants acted with “deliberate

indifference” to the risk of inmate drug overdose by

“negligent[ly], reckless[ly], and intentional[ly]” understaffing

the facility. (ECF No. 32, ¶ 29). She alleges that, because of

understaffing, correctional officers failed to conduct the

required 30-minute cell checks, which in turn prevented staff from

discovering Bond in time to intervene during his fatal overdose.

(Id. at ¶¶ 17-19).

However, “the failure to adequately staff a prison – even a

deliberate failure – is not itself a constitutional violation.”

Caraway, 98 F.4th at 684 (citing Agramonte v. Shartle, 491 Fed.

Appx. 557, 560 (6th Cir. 2012)); see also Burwell v. City of

Lansing, 7 F.4th 456, 471 (6th Cir. 2021) (holding that a failure

to conduct cell checks in compliance with internal policies “does

not constitute deliberate indifference.”). “[G]eneralized

allegations that … understaffing ‘led to’ rampant drug use” are

insufficient to meet the subjective prong. Caraway, 98 F.4th at

686. To satisfy that prong, a § 1983 plaintiff must plead facts

that support a “reasonable inference that the defendants (1) had

notice of the risks that inmates would overdose based on their

unfettered access to drugs and (2) failed to reasonably respond to

that risk.” Id. (citing Zakora, 44 F.4th at 472; Farmer, 511 U.S.

at 844).

Plaintiff fails to plausibly allege that Defendants had

general knowledge of a drug problem at HCCF. Although Plaintiff

broadly asserts in her response that Defendants “were aware” of

drug smuggling within the facility (ECF No. 34), she provides no

factual support for that assertion – such as “how [D]efendants

obtained that knowledge, when they obtained it, or what that

knowledge entailed.” See Caraway, 98 F.4th at 686; see also

Zakora, 44 F.4th at 472 (“The [prison] official must both be aware

of facts from which the inference could be drawn and that a

substantial risk of serious harm exists, and he must also draw the

inference.”); see also Taylor v. Mich. Dept. of Corr., 69 F.3d 76,

81 (6th Cir. 1995) (“[The prison official] must ha[ve] knowledge

about the substantial risk of serious harm to a particular class

of persons[.]”).

Plaintiff also fails to allege that any correctional officer

had specific knowledge of an overdose risk stemming from inmates’

unfettered access to drugs, or that any officer failed to respond

once the officer became aware of that risk. Although Plaintiff

alleges that Bond’s “cellmates reportedly called for help” at the

time of his overdose, the amended complaint includes no details

about how or when Defendants responded, or whether any delay

resulted from deliberate indifference. (ECF No. 32, at ¶ 18).

Absent more details, Plaintiff’s allegations merely restate the

elements of the subjective prong of her failure-to-protect claim.

Plaintiff has not adequately pled her § 1983 claim of failure-to-

protect under the Eighth Amendment.

B. Monell Claim Against CoreCivic, HCCFC, and TDOC

Because the Court has not found an underlying constitutional

violation, it need not address whether § 1983 liability may be

imposed on CoreCivic, HCCFC, and TDOC under Monell. See Caraway,

98 F.4th at 683 (citing Baynes v. Cleland, 799 F.3d 600, 622 (6th

Cir. 2015) (“The estate [of the decedent] seeks to impose Monell

liability on the corporate defendants. But because the complaint

doesn’t allege an underlying constitutional violation, those

claims fail.”); see also Wilson v. Morgan, 477 F.3d 326, 340 (6th

Cir. 2007) (“There can be no Monell municipal liability under §

1983 unless there is an underlying unconstitutional act.”).

Even assuming the existence of an underlying constitutional

violation, Plaintiff fails to identify any specific municipal

“policy or custom” with the factual specificity required under

Monell. Plaintiff broadly asserts in her response that Defendants

maintained a “custom” of “understaffing, failure to conduct proper

cell checks, and allowing officers to bring drugs into the

facility” as well as “a persistent pattern of unconstitutional

conduct[.]” (ECF No. 34). Those conclusory assertions,

unsupported by concrete facts, would be insufficient to establish

municipal liability even if alleged in the amended complaint. See

City of St. Louis v. Praprotnik, 485 U.S. 112, 127 (1988)

(explaining that a municipal custom must be “so permanent and well

settled as to constitute a custom or usage with the force of

law.”); see also Doe v. Claiborne County, Tenn., 103 F.3d 495,

507-08 (6th Cir. 1996) (“the notion of ‘law’ must include ‘deeply

embedded traditional ways of carrying out state policy.’”)

(internal citations omitted); id. at 508 (citing Feliciano v. City

of Cleveland, 988 F.2d 649, 655 (6th Cir. 1993) (“In short, a

‘custom’ is a ‘legal institution’ not memorialized by written

law.”).

Plaintiff’s § 1983 claims against CoreCivic, HCCFC, and TDOC

fail as a matter of law.

C. Section 1983 Claim Against Wardlow

Plaintiff brings § 1983 claims against Jerry Wardlow in his

official capacity as the warden of HCCF and an employee of

CoreCivic. (ECF Nos. 32, 34). A suit against an officer in his

official capacity is “only another way of pleading an action

against an entity of which an officer is an agent.” Hafer v. Melo,

502 U.S. 21, 25 (1991). Such a suit is not brought “against the

[officer] personally, for the real party in interest is the

entity.” Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 166 (1985). Unlike

personal-capacity suits, which seek to “impose personal liability

upon a government official for the actions he takes under the color

of state law,” an official-capacity suit is, “in all respects other

than name, to be treated as a suit against the entity.” Id. at

165 (citing Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 237-238 (1985), and

Brandon v. Holt, 469 U.S. 464, 471-72 (1985)).

Plaintiff asserts that her claims against Wardlow are “based

on his specific actions and omissions as warden” and are distinct

from those against CoreCivic. (ECF No. 34). However, she fails

to identify any specific conduct attributable only to Wardlow.

Instead, the allegations against him are identical to those

asserted against CoreCivic and the other Defendants. Thus, the

official-capacity claim against Wardlow is redundant.

Because Plaintiff fails to plausibly state a § 1983 claim

against CoreCivic based on an underlying Eighth Amendment

violation, her official-capacity claim against Wardlow necessarily

fails as well.

D. Wrongful Death Claims Under State Law

Because dismissal of Plaintiff’s § 1983 claims is warranted,

the Court must determine whether to exercise supplemental

jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s remaining wrongful death claims,

which arise solely under Tennessee law and do not involve parties

of diverse citizenship. See Cole v. Robertson County Sheriff’s

Dept., No. 3:18-cv-00497, 2020 WL 738362, at *5 (M.D. Tenn. Jan.

28, 2020) (declining to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over

wrongful death claims after dismissing § 1983 claims); see also

Lipman v. Budish, 383 F.Supp.3d 764, 778-79 (N.D. Ohio 2019)

(same). Under 28 U.S.C. § 1367, a federal court may decline to

exercise supplemental jurisdiction when it “has dismissed all

claims over which it has original jurisdiction[.]” 28 U.S.C. §

1367(c)(3). In exercising that discretion, courts “consider and

weigh several factors, including the ‘values of judicial economy,

convenience, fairness, and comity.’” Gamel v. City of Cincinnati,

625 F.3d 949, 951-52 (6th Cir. 2010) (quoting Carnegie-Mellon Univ.

v. Cohill, 484 U.S. 343, 350 (1988)). When all federal claims are

dismissed at the Rule 12(b)(6) stage, those factors generally weigh

in favor of dismissing the remaining state-law claims. See Cole,

2020 WL 738362, at *5 (“When all federal claims have been dismissed

before trial, these factors usually weigh in favor of dismissing

the state-law claims so that they can be pursued in state court.”);

see also Musson Theatrical, Inc. v. Fed. Express Corp., 89 F.3d

1244, 1254-55 (6th Cir. 1996). The Sixth Circuit has “long

recognized a general rule disfavoring a district court’s exercise

of pendent jurisdiction when federal issues are dismissed before

trial.” Lipman, 383 F.Supp.3d at 778 (quoting Wellman v. Wheeling

& Lake Erie Ry. Co., 134 F.3d 373 (6th Cir. 1998).

Potential state law claims arising out of the events Plaintiff

alleges are not elaborated in her amended complaint or response to

the Motion to Dismiss. Having dismissed all federal claims, the

Court has heard no arguments and sees no reason for the remaining

state law claims to be heard here. Comity strongly supports that

conclusion. The Court, therefore, follows the Sixth Circuit’s

general rule and declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction

over the remaining state law claims.

V. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 33)

is GRANTED.

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Plaintiff’s § 1983 claims against

Defendants CoreCivic, HCCFC, TDOC, and Wardlow are DISMISSED WITH

PREJUDICE. The Court declines to exercise supplemental

jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s wrongful death claims. Those claims

are DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE so that Plaintiff may, if she

chooses, pursue them in state court.

SO ORDERED this 18th day of September, 2025.

/s/ Samuel H. Mays, Jr.

SAMUEL H. MAYS, JR.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE