Rajabian v. Mercedes-Benz USA, LLC

FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

ZAKIA JACKLINE RAJABIAN; No. 24-3000

DULCERIA LA BONITA

D.C. No.

WHOLESALE LLC, an Arizona

2:23-cv-00168-

corporation,

MTL

Plaintiffs - Appellants,

OPINION

v.

MERCEDES-BENZ USA, LLC;

PHOENIX MOTOR COMPANY

INCORPORATED, an Arizona

Corporation doing business as

Mercedes-Benz of Scottsdale; VERN

FOUTZ;JEFF NOWAK; GUS

GONZALES; JANE DOES, Spouses;

Foutz, Nowak, Gonzales;

LIONHEART SECURITY

INTERNATIONAL CONSULTING

LLC, an Arizona limited liability

company; GERALD SCHEIBLY,

Defendants - Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Arizona

Michael T. Liburdi, District Judge, Presiding

2 RAJABIAN V. MERCEDES-BENZ USA

Argued and Submitted March 25, 2025

Phoenix, Arizona

Filed September 17, 2025

Before: Susan P. Graber and Mark J. Bennett, Circuit

Judges, and John R. Tunheim, District Judge.*

Opinion by Judge Graber;

Concurrence by Judge Tunheim

SUMMARY**

Stay of Proceedings / Appellate Jurisdiction

The panel (1) affirmed the district court’s order denying

a motion to lift a Colorado River stay of a federal case

pending state court litigation; and (2) dismissed as untimely

plaintiffs’ appeal to the extent that it challenged the initial

stay.

As to appellate jurisdiction, the panel held that an order

staying a federal case under the Colorado River doctrine is

an appealable final order under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. Under

Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(1)(A), a notice of appeal in a civil case

must be filed with the district clerk within 30 days after entry

*

The Honorable John R. Tunheim, United States District Judge for the

District of Minnesota, sitting by designation.

**

This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It has

been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.

RAJABIAN V. MERCEDES-BENZ USA 3

of the judgment or order appealed from. Fed. R. Civ. P.

58(c) provides that a judgment is entered:

(1) if a separate document is not required,

when the judgment is entered in the civil

docket under Rule 79(a); or

(2) if a separate document is required, when

the judgment is entered in the civil docket

under Rule 79(a) and the earlier of these

events occurs:

(A) it is set out in a separate document; or

(B) 150 days have run from the entry in

the civil docket.

The panel held that the judgment at issue required a

separate document. The district court granted the stay on

November 22, 2023, and later formally imposed the stay in

a text-only minute order on December 19, 2023. The panel

held that the minute order qualified as a separate document

because it clearly signaled, in unadorned fashion, that the

matter was fully closed. The minute order therefore started

the 30-day appeal clock, and so plaintiffs’ notice of appeal,

filed on May 6, 2024, was untimely as to the initial stay.

The panel affirmed the district court’s denial of

plaintiffs’ motion to lift the stay. Joining other circuits, the

panel held that the denial of a motion to lift a stay is reviewed

for an abuse of discretion. The panel concluded that the

district court did not abuse its discretion because, in

imposing the stay, the court engaged in a thorough analysis

under the Colorado River doctrine, stating the proper legal

standard and following it carefully, and there were not any

later material changes of law or fact that could have

4 RAJABIAN V. MERCEDES-BENZ USA

undermined the continued propriety of the court’s initial

analysis.

Concurring, District Judge Tunheim wrote separately to

emphasize the ambiguity in Fed. R. Civ. P. 58 in the age of

exclusive digital filing and communication.

COUNSEL

Rob Somers (argued), Aaron M. Finter, and Michael A.

Schern, Schern Richardson Finter PLC, Mesa, Arizona, for

Plaintiffs-Appellants.

Carl J. Mudd (argued) and Matthew D. Kleifield, Lewis

Brisbois Bisgaard & Smith LLP, Phoenix, Arizona; Larry J.

Cohen (argued), Cohen Law Firm, Phoenix, Arizona;

Brendan A. Murphy, Hendricks Murphy PLLC, Phoenix,

Arizona; Jill Ormond, Gordon Rees Scully Mansukhani

LLP, Phoenix, Arizona; Steven D. Crocchi, Clyde & Co

LLP, Phoenix, Arizona; for Defendants-Appellees.

RAJABIAN V. MERCEDES-BENZ USA 5

OPINION

GRABER, Circuit Judge:

Several parties dispute ownership of a particular

Mercedes-Benz car. A lawsuit was brought in a state court,

and then—almost a year later—another action was brought

in a federal district court. Both proceedings sought to

answer the same question: who was the car’s rightful owner?

The district court stayed the federal case under the doctrine

described in Colorado River Water Conservation District v.

United States, 424 U.S. 800 (1976). Plaintiffs did not appeal

that stay. But they filed a motion to lift the stay months later.

The district court denied Plaintiffs’ motion, and Plaintiffs

appeal. We affirm the district court’s denial of the motion

to lift the stay and dismiss as untimely the appeal to the

extent that it challenges the initial stay.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

A. Purchase and Possession of the Vehicle

Phoenix Motor Company (“PMC”) is a car dealership

that does business as Mercedes-Benz of Scottsdale. In

October 2021, PMC paid Wholesale Exotics, an automobile

wholesaler, $274,800 for a 2021 Mercedes-Benz G63.

Wholesale Exotics deposited PMC’s check and sent the

funds to Fredrick Aljundi, who agreed to pick up the car and

deliver it to PMC on behalf of Wholesale Exotics. Aljundi,

along with two of his colleagues, used those funds to

purchase the vehicle from Mercedes-Benz Chandler.

Then things went awry. Instead of delivering the car to

PMC, Aljundi traded it in to another dealership, Mercedes-

Benz of North Scottsdale. When PMC inquired into the

car’s location, one of Aljundi’s associates explained that

6 RAJABIAN V. MERCEDES-BENZ USA

Aljundi planned to “refund [PMC’s] money and profits”

rather than deliver the car.

In February 2022, Zakia J. Rajabian and Dulceria La

Bonita Wholesale (collectively, “Dulceria”) bought the car

from Mercedes-Benz of North Scottsdale, receiving title to

it later that month. After gaining possession of the car,

Dulceria locked it away in a storage locker, keeping the car’s

door open to disengage the built-in Mercedes-Benz tracking

system. Nevertheless, PMC, with the help of Mercedes-

Benz USA, allegedly used the “Mercedes Me Connect”

technology to locate the car in Dulceria’s storage locker on

March 15, 2022.

B. State Court Litigation

Perhaps unsurprisingly, a flurry of litigation followed.

On March 18, 2022, PMC filed a complaint in Maricopa

County Superior Court, alleging claims for breach of

contract, breach of the implied covenant of good faith and

fair dealing, and conversion against Dulceria, Wholesale

Exotics, Aljundi, his company, and various other employees

and agents. PMC also took possession of the car after

requesting and receiving a preliminary order from the state

court requiring delivery of the car. 1 Dulceria answered

PMC’s complaint and brought counterclaims for abuse of

process, invasion of privacy, and intentional interference

with contractual relations.2

Litigation in the state court continued with motions for

dismissal and summary judgment, in which both PMC and

1

The Supreme Court of Arizona later dissolved the preliminary order.

2

Dulceria later amended its answer to add a counterclaim that Mercedes-

Benz USA and PMC violated Arizona Revised Statutes section 13-2316,

which prohibits various forms of computer tampering.

RAJABIAN V. MERCEDES-BENZ USA 7

Dulceria argued over who had superior title to the car. On

January 30, 2023, the state trial court found PMC to be the

rightful owner of the car.

C. Federal Court Litigation

Only five days before the state court found PMC to be

the rightful owner of the car—and nearly a year after the

state-court litigation began—Dulceria filed this action in

federal district court against PMC, Mercedes-Benz USA,

and several of their employees. The operative complaint

lists several causes of action including, among others, claims

for invasion of privacy, breach of implied contract, a

violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2511, and a violation of Arizona

Revised Statutes section 13-2316.

PMC filed a motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter

jurisdiction, seeking either a dismissal or a stay pursuant to

the Colorado River doctrine. The court granted PMC’s

request for a stay, explaining in an order dated November

22, 2023, that the relevant factors weighed strongly in favor

of a Colorado River stay. On December 19, 2023, the district

court held a hearing and formally ordered the stay in the form

of a text-entry minute order. The relevant portion of that

minute order provides:

Document Number: 79 (No document

attached)

....

MINUTE ENTRY for proceedings held

before Judge Michael T. Liburdi: Status

Conference held on 12/19/2023. . . . IT IS

ORDERED staying [sic] the case on all

8 RAJABIAN V. MERCEDES-BENZ USA

claims pending the outcome of the state court

litigation. . . .

. . . This is a TEXT ENTRY ONLY.

There is no PDF document associated with

this entry. (LMR)

2:23-cv-00168-MTL Notice has been

electronically mailed to: [the attorneys of

record].

(Underlined emphasis added.)3

D. Post-Stay Developments

After the district court stayed the case, Dulceria sought

leave from the state court to add four counterclaims against

PMC—violation of Arizona’s consumer fraud act,

negligence, violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2511, and violation of

18 U.S.C. § 2701—and to add new parties and claims

included in the federal case but not yet included in the state

case. The state court allowed Dulceria to add new claims

against PMC, but denied Dulceria’s request to bring in new

claims against new parties. The court reasoned that Dulceria

“knew about these parties and [its] allegations against them”

and that Dulceria “made a conscious, informed decision not

to sue these individuals/entities in this action.”

On March 20, 2024, Dulceria filed a motion in the

district court seeking to lift the stay. The district court

denied the motion on April 30, 2024. Dulceria appealed the

3

The minute order included some additional text but, during oral

argument, Dulceria affirmatively waived any argument that the

additional text has any bearing on the outcome of this appeal. We

therefore treat the minute order as if it included only the text block-

quoted above.

RAJABIAN V. MERCEDES-BENZ USA 9

district court’s denial of its motion to lift the stay on May 6,

2024, within 30 days of its issuance. But Dulceria did not

file a notice of appeal regarding the district court’s initial

stay order. On June 11, 2024, the state court dismissed

several of Dulceria’s claims, including the federal

wiretapping claim (18 U.S.C. § 2511).

STANDARD OF REVIEW

We review de novo questions of jurisdiction, Hooper v.

Brnovich, 56 F.4th 619, 624 (9th Cir. 2022) (per curiam),

including whether the facts of a case satisfy the requirements

of the Colorado River doctrine, Seneca Ins. Co. v. Strange

Land, Inc., 862 F.3d 835, 840 (9th Cir. 2017). When those

requirements are satisfied, we review for abuse of discretion

a district court’s decision to impose such a stay. Id.

Application of the Colorado River doctrine is the exception,

not the rule, and there is a strong presumption against its

application. Id. at 841.

Although we have not yet said so in a published opinion,

only in an unpublished memorandum disposition, Johnson v.

Inos, 619 F. App’x 651 (9th Cir. 2015), we review for abuse

of discretion a district court’s denial of a motion to lift a stay.

Id. at 651. A motion to lift a stay resembles a motion for

reconsideration of the court’s grant of a stay. Marti v.

Iberostar Hoteles y Apartamentos S.L., 54 F.4th 641, 646

(11th Cir. 2022). And we review for abuse of discretion a

district court’s denial of a motion to reconsider. Do Sung

Uhm v. Humana, Inc., 620 F.3d 1134, 1140 (9th Cir. 2010).

We thus join the other circuits that review the denial of a

motion to lift a stay for abuse of discretion. See, e.g., United

States v. Acorn Tech. Fund, L.P., 429 F.3d 438, 444–45 (3d

Cir. 2005); SEC v. Vescor Cap. Corp., 599 F.3d 1189, 1196

10 RAJABIAN V. MERCEDES-BENZ USA

(10th Cir. 2010); Marti, 54 F.4th at 646; Murata Mach. USA

v. Daifuku Co., 830 F.3d 1357, 1361 (Fed. Cir. 2016).

DISCUSSION

Dulceria challenges both (A) the merits of the district

court’s initial order imposing the stay and (B) the court’s

denial of the motion to lift the stay. We address each issue

in turn.

A. We Lack Jurisdiction to Review the District Court’s

Initial Stay Because Dulceria Did Not Appeal in

Time.

The parties dispute, on timeliness grounds, whether we

have jurisdiction to consider the merits of the initial stay. An

order staying a federal case under the Colorado River

doctrine constitutes an appealable final order under 28

U.S.C. § 1291. Nakash v. Marciano, 882 F.2d 1411, 1413

(9th Cir. 1989); see Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(a) (“‘Judgment’ as

used in these rules includes a decree and any order from

which an appeal lies.”).4 “In a civil case . . . the notice of

appeal . . . must be filed with the district clerk within 30 days

after entry of the judgment or order appealed from.” Fed. R.

App. P. 4(a)(1)(A). The question here, then, is when the

district court entered the order staying the case.

4

Our recent opinion in McNeil v. Gittere, No. 23-3080 (9th Cir. Sep. 2,

2025), is distinguishable. There, the defendants appealed from a

collateral order—the district court’s denial of qualified immunity—

whereas Plaintiffs here appeal a stay under the Colorado River doctrine,

which our court treats as a final order. Nakash, 882 F.2d at 1413; see

Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 10

(1983) (“[A stay under the Colorado River doctrine] amounts to a

dismissal of the suit.”).

RAJABIAN V. MERCEDES-BENZ USA 11

That question is less straightforward than one might

think. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 58(c) provides that a

“judgment is entered”:

(1) if a separate document is not required,

when the judgment is entered in the civil

docket under Rule 79(a); or

(2) if a separate document is required, when

the judgment is entered in the civil docket

under Rule 79(a) and the earlier of these

events occurs:

(A) it is set out in a separate

document; or

(B) 150 days have run from the entry

in the civil docket.

Fed. R. Civ. P. 58(c).5 The judgment at issue here requires

a “separate document.” See Fed. R. Civ. P. 58(a) (providing

that all judgments, with some exceptions not relevant here,

require a separate document). The timeliness of Dulceria’s

appeal, then, hinges on whether the December 19, 2023,

minute order satisfies the requirements of a “separate

document.” If so, Dulceria’s 30-day “appeal” clock began

ticking on December 19, 2023. Otherwise, Dulceria’s 30-

day window did not begin until 150 days after that date.

The rule itself is ambiguous as to what qualifies as a

“separate document,” including whether a minute order can

5

This rule was amended in 2002, in part to fix a wrinkle that existed in

the pre-2002 version of Rule 58. Harmston v. City & County of San

Francisco, 627 F.3d 1273, 1279–80 (9th Cir. 2010). By changing the

rules and adding the 150-day provision, Congress chose “to avoid giving

parties ‘forever to appeal.’” Id. at 1280.

12 RAJABIAN V. MERCEDES-BENZ USA

constitute a “separate document” for purposes of Rule 58.

But we have already held that minute orders can do exactly

that. See Brown v. Wilshire Credit Corp. (In re Brown), 484

F.3d 1116, 1121–22 (9th Cir. 2007) (holding, after the 2002

amendment to the rules, that minute orders can constitute a

“separate document” that starts the appeal clock); Ingram v.

ACandS, Inc., 977 F.2d 1332, 1339 (9th Cir. 1992) (holding

that, under the pre-2002 rules, two separate minute orders

denying post-trial motions each started the appeal clock).

To determine whether a particular minute order has that

effect, we ask whether there has been a “clear and

unequivocal manifestation by the trial court of its belief that

the decision made, so far as it is concerned, is the end of the

case.” In re Brown, 484 F.3d at 1122 (citation and internal

quotation marks omitted). Otherwise, parties might “be

misled about when their time to appeal begins to run.” Id.

As we and other courts have explained, that clear signal is

lacking when the district court’s minute order signals that the

case is not fully closed or when the order contains significant

reasoning and, therefore, is not “separate.” Id. at 1122–23;

see also In re Cedant Corp. Secs. Litig., 454 F.3d 235, 241

(3d Cir. 2006) (“[A]n order will be treated as a separate

document if it meets three criteria: first, the order must be

self-contained and separate from the opinion; second, the

order must note the relief granted; and third, the order must

omit (or at least substantially omit) the District Court’s

reasons for disposing of the parties’ claims.”).

Here, the district court’s November 22, 2023, order set

forth its reasoning in full for implementing the stay. Then,

the court separately entered a minute order on December 19,

2023, which clearly signaled, in unadorned fashion, that the

matter was fully closed. Indeed, the court’s order stated

without elaboration: “IT IS ORDERED staying the case on

RAJABIAN V. MERCEDES-BENZ USA 13

all claims pending the outcome of the state court litigation.”

The district court’s entry of that order into the docket

automatically generated a “Notice of Electronic Filing,”

which the court mailed electronically to the parties with the

entire text of the minute order. The electronic docket also

automatically designated the order as “Document Number:

79.”

We have, in the past, considered whether an order had

been mailed to the parties. See Ingram, 977 F.2d at 1338.

When the parties accept electronic notices from the court, we

see no relevant difference between mailing through the post

office and electronic mailing. Nor does any party argue

otherwise. Additionally, actual receipt of the document in

either physical or electronic form is sufficient. All parties

here actually received copies of the electronic filing.

In the circumstances, the December 19, 2023, minute

order constituted a “separate document” for purposes of Rule

58(c) and, therefore, started the 30-day appeal clock.

The conduct of the parties confirms the finality of the

minute order. See In re Brown, 484 F.3d at 1120

(considering the parties’ conduct). The first motion filed in

federal court after the court imposed the stay on December

19, 2023, was Dulceria’s March 20, 2024, motion to lift the

stay. By contrast, during the preceding months, active

litigation continued in the state court. That conduct is

entirely consistent with the parties’ understanding that the

minute order fully stayed the case.

Dulceria argues that the minute order did not start the

appeal clock because it was a “text entry only” and there was

“no document attached,” that is, “no PDF document

associated” with the docket entry. Notably, Dulceria takes

no issue with the content of the minute order as it relates to

14 RAJABIAN V. MERCEDES-BENZ USA

finality. Indeed, Dulceria’s lawyer stated during oral

argument that the appeal clock would have started had the

exact text of the minute order appeared in PDF format. In

other words, Dulceria asks us to elevate form above function

by requiring a particular document type. We are not aware

of any case law, either from our court or from any other

circuits, supporting the adoption of such a rigid rule.

Dulceria also contends that our decisions in Comedy

Club, Inc. v. Improv West Associates, 553 F.3d 1277 (9th

Cir. 2009), and Harmston, 627 F.3d 1273, compel us to hold

that its appeal was timely. But those cases did not involve,

as here, an unadorned minute order that clearly and

unequivocally took the case out of federal court in a

document separate from the court’s reasoning.

In sum, Dulceria had 30 days after December 19, 2023,

to appeal the initial stay. Dulceria’s appeal came too late,

and we therefore lack jurisdiction to review the initial stay.

B. The District Court Did Not Err in Refusing to Lift the

Stay.

Although Dulceria did not timely appeal the district

court’s stay, it did timely appeal the district court’s denial of

its motion to lift the stay. Accordingly, we have jurisdiction

to review that order. But we conclude that the district court

did not abuse its discretion in declining to lift the stay.

A stay under the Colorado River doctrine is a “narrow

exception to ‘the virtually unflagging obligation of the

federal courts to exercise the jurisdiction given them.’”

Holder v. Holder, 305 F.3d 854, 867 (9th Cir. 2002) (quoting

Colorado River, 424 U.S. at 817). Such a stay is not

appropriate where there is substantial doubt that the

resolution of the state proceedings will resolve the federal

RAJABIAN V. MERCEDES-BENZ USA 15

case. Id. at 868. The state and federal cases must be parallel,

but the doctrine does not require exact parallelism so long as

“the two proceedings are substantially similar.” Nakash, 882

F.2d at 1416 (internal quotation marks omitted); see id.

(holding that two proceedings were substantially similar

where both disputes concerned the parties’ actions after one

party purchased interest in a company).

The district court must consider whether eight factors

point in favor of a stay. R.R. St. & Co. v. Transp. Ins. Co.,

656 F.3d 966, 978–79 (9th Cir. 2011). Those factors are:

(1) which court first assumed jurisdiction

over any property at stake; (2) the

inconvenience of the federal forum; (3) the

desire to avoid piecemeal litigation; (4) the

order in which the forums obtained

jurisdiction; (5) whether federal law or state

law provides the rule of decision on the

merits; (6) whether the state court

proceedings can adequately protect the rights

of the federal litigants; (7) the desire to avoid

forum shopping; and (8) whether the state

court proceedings will resolve all issues

before the federal court.

Id.

Dulceria did not identify, nor do we discern, any material

legal or factual error committed by the district court in its

Colorado River analysis, which could have warranted lifting

the stay. In its initial decision, which the district court

implicitly adopted in declining to lift the stay, the district

court engaged in a thorough analysis under the Colorado

River doctrine. The district court stated the proper legal

16 RAJABIAN V. MERCEDES-BENZ USA

standard and followed it carefully. The district court’s eight-

factor analysis considered the reluctance to stay the exercise

of federal jurisdiction required by the Colorado River

doctrine and permissibly decided to impose a stay. Having

applied the proper test, the district court ultimately found

that six of the eight factors favored a stay. Of those six

factors, one—the risk of piecemeal litigation—“strongly”

favored a stay. Of the two factors that did not favor a stay,

one factor—whether state or federal law is at issue—was

neutral, and only a single factor—whether the federal forum

was convenient—weighed against a stay.

Nor were there any material changes of law or fact after

the district court granted the stay, which could undermine

the continued propriety of its initial analysis. Dulceria points

to only one changed circumstance: The state court denied

Dulceria’s attempt to add parties that are in the federal

proceeding but not in the state proceeding. But those parties

were not a part of the state proceeding when the district court

granted the stay, and they are not parties to the state

proceeding now. Thus, Dulceria’s alleged change in

circumstance is not a change at all. Moreover, a stay

pursuant to the Colorado River doctrine, by definition,

contemplates continued litigation in state court. Even

granting Dulceria’s premise that the state court’s denial of

its request to add parties constituted a change in

circumstances, we see no abuse of discretion in the district

court’s conclusion that this minor change did not warrant

lifting the stay.

AFFIRMED IN PART and DISMISSED IN PART.

RAJABIAN V. MERCEDES-BENZ USA 17

Tunheim, District Judge, concurring:

I concur in the opinion but write separately to emphasize

the ambiguity in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 58. The

aim of Rule 58 is clarity, but the term “separate document”

is anything but clear. In the age of exclusive digital filing

and communication, Rule 58 is ripe for an amendment to

resolve the current disputes about what constitutes a

“separate document.”