“Even if supported by substantial evidence, however, a decision of the Commissioner will not be upheld where the SSA fails to follow its own regulations and where that error prejudices a claimant on the merits or deprives the claimant of a substantial right.”
How later courts described this case
- “Even if supported by substantial evidence, however, a decision of the Commissioner will not be upheld where the SSA fails to follow its own regulations and where that error prejudices a claimant on the merits or deprives the claimant of a substantial right.”
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
EASTERN DIVISION
JANIE M. VALENTIN, ) CASE NO. 4:25-CV-00021-DAP
)
Plaintiff, ) DAN AARON POLSTER
) UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
v. )
) MAGISTRATE JUDGE
COMMISSIONER OF ) JENNIFER DOWDELL
SOCIAL SECURITY, ARMSTRONG
)
)
Defendant. REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
)
I. INTRODUCTION
Plaintiff Janie M. Valentin (“Ms. Valentin”) seeks judicial review of the final decision of
the Commissioner of Social Security denying her application for disability insurance benefits
(“DIB”). This matter is before me pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g) and Local Rule 72.2(b). (See
ECF non-document entry dated January 7, 2025). For the reasons set forth below, I
RECOMMEND that the Court AFFIRM the Commissioner’s decision.
II. PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On May 19, 2021, Ms. Valentin filed her application for DIB, alleging an onset date of
January 23, 2020. (Tr. 286). Ms. Valentin’s application related to her right shoulder joint pain and
right shoulder impingement. (Tr. 317).
The Social Security Administration (“SSA”) denied Ms. Valentin’s application initially
and upon reconsideration. (Tr. 95-96). Ms. Valentin requested a hearing before an administrative
law judge (“ALJ”). (Tr. 157). The ALJ held a telephonic hearing on April 13, 2022, at which Ms.
vocational expert (“VE”). On May 3, 2022, the ALJ issued a written decision, finding that Ms.
Valentin was not disabled. (Tr. 106).
Ms. Valentin requested that the Appeals Council review the ALJ’s decision. (Tr. 227). On
April 20, 2023, the Appeals Council remanded the case to the ALJ for further proceedings,
determining that the ALJ failed to adequately evaluate the opinion of a state agency psychological
consultant when formulating Ms. Valentin’s residual functional capacity (“RFC”). (Tr. 126).
Following remand, the ALJ held another hearing on September 13, 2023, at which Ms.
Valentin and the VE testified. (Tr. 36). On November 22, 2023, the ALJ issued a written decision
again finding that Ms. Valentin was not disabled. (Tr. 14). The ALJ’s decision became final on
November 19, 2024, when the Appeals Council declined further review. (Tr. 1).
On January 7, 2025, Ms. Valentin filed her Complaint, challenging the Commissioner’s
final decision. (ECF No. 1). Ms. Valentin asserts a single assignment of error:
(1) The ALJ’s RFC was not supported by substantial evidence due to the failure to
consider the impact of Plaintiff’s bowel impairments on her work-related activities.
(ECF No. 9, PageID # 1142).
III. BACKGROUND1
A. Personal, Educational, and Vocational Experience
Ms. Valentin was born in 1972 and was 47 years old on the alleged onset date. (Tr. 286).
She has a high school diploma. (Tr. 318). Ms. Valentin is not married. (Tr. 43). She has three
children, two of whom are adults. Id. She has prior work experience as a machine operator, office
clerk, car assembler, circuit board assembler, and forklift operator. (Tr. 28).
1 The ALJ found that Ms. Valentin suffered from a number of physical and mental impairments. In this proceeding,
Ms. Valentin challenges only the ALJ’s treatment of her bowel impairment. Accordingly, I will limit my discussion
B. Relevant Hearing Testimony
1. Ms. Valentin’s Testimony
At the September 13, 2023 hearing, Ms. Valentin testified that she experiences chronic
diarrhea five to six times per day and that she needs to remain close to a bathroom as a result. (Tr.
46). She further testified that she has experienced accidents when not close to a bathroom, which
forced her to come home and change clothes. Id. Ms. Valentin testified that she has been
experiencing bowel issues for about two years. Id. She also testified that she has chronic stress
incontinence, which affects her daily. (Tr. 51-52). She further testified that doctors have informed
her that her stress incontinence is caused by her colitis. (Tr. 52).
2. Vocational Expert’s Testimony
At the September 13, 2023 hearing, the VE testified that a hypothetical individual with Ms.
Valentin’s age, education, job history, and RFC could perform work as a marker, garment sorter,
or classifier if limited to light work. (Tr. 54-55). The VE further testified that, if the hypothetical
individual were limited to sedentary work, the hypothetical individual could perform work as an
ink printer, patcher, or document preparer. (Tr. 55). However, the VE also testified that it would
be work preclusive if the hypothetical individual required four unscheduled 15-minute breaks per
workday or would be off-task 20 percent of the time and absent from work three times per month.
(Tr. 56).
C. Relevant Opinion Evidence
1. State Agency Medical Examiners
On July 25, 2021, Steve McKee, M.D., a state agency medical examiner, opined that Ms.
Valentin had a medically determinable impairment with respect to her right shoulder, but did not
opine that she had any medically determinable impairment or limitations related to her bowel
problems. (Tr. 90-92). On October 22, 2021, W. Scott Bolz, M.D., concurred with Dr. McKee’s
findings on reconsideration. (Tr. 102).
D. Relevant Medical Evidence
On July 23, 2021, Ms. Valentin was seen by Elizabeth Zinni, NP, complaining of weight
loss, dizziness, sweating, nausea, and abdominal pain. (Tr. 668). She reported that eating small
meals made her feel nauseous and full immediately. Id. She denied experiencing melena,
constipation, or diarrhea. Id. On examination, Ms. Valentin displayed abdominal pain in her right
upper quadrant. Id. Labs were drawn, and she was referred for a CT scan of her abdomen and
pelvis. Id.
On August 9, 2021, Ms. Valentin presented to Joey Annichine, NP, complaining of
abdominal pain, nausea, diarrhea, and fatigue. (Tr. 667). It was noted that Ms. Valentin’s blood
work following her July 23, 2021, visit was unremarkable. Id. Ms. Valentin reported that she had
not been able to keep food down and that she had pain in her right upper abdominal quadrant. Id.
On examination, Ms. Valentin had lost three pounds from the previous week. Id. Her abdomen
was soft with hyperactive bowel sounds. Id. Ms. Valentin also displayed a moderate amount of
pain with palpation of the right upper quadrant. Id. She was prescribed Zofran. Id. On August 13,
2021, Ms. Valentin had a CT scan of her abdomen and pelvis, which was unremarkable. (Tr. 666).
An ultrasound of her right upper quadrant on September 8, 2021 was likewise unremarkable. (Tr.
665).
On October 13, 2021, Ms. Valentin presented to the Liberty Gastroenterology Group for
evaluation of abdominal pain, abnormal liver enzymes, and weight loss. (Tr. 729). On
examination, she displayed positive bowel sounds and tenderness in the right upper quadrant
without visible herniations. Id. She was diagnosed with other specified noninfective gastroenteritis
and colitis. Id. It was also noted that Ms. Valentin had lost 60 pounds from a prior visit in
December 2017. Id.
On November 9, 2021, Ms. Valentin underwent an endoscopy, which revealed moderate
erosive gastritis. (Tr. 731). Biopsies were taken for H. pylori and celiac disease. Id. She was
instructed to begin taking Prilosec and was given diet recommendations for gastroesophageal
reflex disease (GERD). (Tr. 731-32). A hepatobiliary scan on November 22, 2021 was
unremarkable. (Tr. 748).
Ms. Valentin had a follow-up visit at Liberty Gastroenterology Group on January 12, 2022.
(Tr. 734). She reported that her symptoms were mildly improved. Id. On examination, her
abdomen was soft, nontender, and nondistended. Id.
On May 17, 2022, Ms. Valentin reported experiencing diarrhea for the previous three to
four weeks. (Tr. 1028). She denied rectal bleeding and melena. Id. She reported occasional nausea
but did not report vomiting. Id. On examination, her abdomen was soft, without masses,
tenderness, or swelling. Id. A stool culture was taken. Id. At a follow-up visit on October 4, 2022,
Ms. Valentin continued to report frequent loose bowel movements. (Tr. 1029).
On April 5, 2023, Ms. Valentin reported ongoing diarrhea but denied abdominal pain,
rectal bleeding, or melena. (Tr. 1027). She was diagnosed with ulcerative colitis, GERD, and
chronic diarrhea. Id.
IV. THE ALJ’S DECISION
The ALJ first determined that Ms. Valentin met the insured status requirements of the
Social Security Act through March 31, 2025. (Tr. 19). The ALJ next determined that Ms. Valentin
had not engaged in substantial gainful activity since January 23, 2020, the alleged onset date. Id.
The ALJ further determined that Ms. Valentin had the following severe impairments: obesity,
degenerative disc disease of the cervical spine with spondylosis and cervical headaches,
degenerative disc disease of the thoracic spine, right shoulder impingement syndrome and AC
joint osteoarthritis, degenerative joint disease of the right hand, bilateral carpal tunnel syndrome,
colitis, depressive disorder, adjustment disorder with mixed anxiety and depressed mood, and a
specific learning disorder of impaired reading. (Tr. 20). However, the ALJ also determined that
none of Ms. Valentin’s severe impairments, whether considered singly or in combination, met or
medically equaled the severity of one of the listed impairments in 20 CFR Part 404, Subpart P,
Appendix I. Id.
The ALJ next determined that Ms. Valentin had the residual functional capacity (“RFC”)
to:
perform light work as defined in 20 CFR 404.1567(b), but she cannot
climb ladders, ropes, or scaffolds, she must avoid exposure to
unprotected heights and hazardous machinery, she can do commercial
driving, and she can no more than occasionally climb ramps/stairs,
balance, stoop, and reach overhead. She can frequently reach in all other
directions, and she can frequently handle, finger, kneel, crouch, and
crawl. She can perform simple routine tasks, and make simple work-
related decisions, but not at a production rate pace, she is limited to
occasional interaction with supervisors, coworkers, and the general
public, and she can tolerate few changes in a routine work setting.
(Tr. 25).
The ALJ further determined that Ms. Valentin was unable to perform any past relevant
work. (Tr. 28). The ALJ determined, however, that jobs existed in significant numbers in the
national economy that Ms. Valentin could perform, including work as a merchandise marker,
garment sorter, and classifier. (Tr. 28-29). Accordingly, the ALJ found that Ms. Valentin was not
disabled. (Tr. 29).
V. LAW & ANALYSIS
A. Standard of Review
“After the Appeals Council reviews the ALJ’s decision, the determination of the council
becomes the final decision of the Secretary and is subject to review by this Court.” Olive v. Comm’r
of Soc. Sec., No. 3:06 CV 1597, 2007 WL 5403416, at *2 (N.D. Ohio Sept. 19, 2007) (citing Abbott
v. Sullivan, 905 F.2d 918, 922 (6th Cir. 1990); Mullen v. Bowen, 800 F.2d 535, 538 (6th Cir. 1986)
(en banc)). The Court’s review “is limited to determining whether the Commissioner’s decision is
supported by substantial evidence and was made pursuant to proper legal standards.” Winn v.
Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 615 Fed. Appx. 315, 320 (6th Cir. 2015) (quoting Cole v. Astrue, 661 F.3d
931, 937 (6th Cir. 2011)); see also 42 U.S.C. § 405(g).
“Under the substantial evidence standard, a court looks to an existing administrative record
and asks whether it contains sufficien[t] evidence to support the agency’s factual determinations.”
Biestek v. Berryhill, 139 S.Ct. 1148, 1154 (2019) (quotation omitted). The standard for “substantial
evidence” is “not high.” Id. While it requires “more than a mere scintilla,” “[i]t means—and means
only—such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a
conclusion.” Id. (quotation omitted).
In addition to considering whether substantial evidence supports the Commissioner’s
decision, the Court must determine whether the Commissioner applied proper legal standards.
Failure of the Commissioner to apply the correct legal standards as promulgated by the regulations
is grounds for reversal. See, e.g., White v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 572 F.3d 272, 281 (6th Cir.
2009); Bowen v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 478 F.3d 742, 746 (6th Cir. 2006) (“Even if supported by
substantial evidence, however, a decision of the Commissioner will not be upheld where the SSA
fails to follow its own regulations and where that error prejudices a claimant on the merits or
deprives the claimant of a substantial right.”).
Finally, a district court cannot uphold an ALJ’s decision, even if there “is enough evidence
in the record to support the decision, [where] the reasons given by the trier of fact do not build an
accurate and logical bridge between the evidence and the result.” Fleischer v. Astrue, 774 F. Supp.
2d 875, 877 (N.D. Ohio 2011) (quoting Sarchet v. Chater, 78 F.3d 305, 307 (7th Cir. 1996))
(alteration in original).
B. Standard for Disability
To establish entitlement to DIB under the Act, a claimant must be insured at the time of
disability and must prove an inability to engage “in substantial gainful activity by reason of any
medically determinable physical or mental impairment,” or combination of impairments, that can
be expected to “result in death or which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous
period of not less than 12 months.” 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.130, 404.315, 404.1505(a).
Consideration of disability claims follows a five-step review process. 20 C.F.R. §404.1520.
First, the claimant must demonstrate that she is not currently engaged in “substantial gainful
activity” at the time of the disability application. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(b). Second, the claimant
must show that she suffers from a “severe impairment” in order to warrant a finding of disability.
20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(c). A “severe impairment” is one that “significantly limits . . . physical or
mental ability to do basic work activities.” Abbott v. Sullivan, 905 F.2d 918, 923 (6th Cir. 1990).
Third, if the claimant is not performing substantial gainful activity, has a severe impairment
that is expected to last for at least twelve months, and the impairment, or combination of
impairments, meets or medically equals a required listing under 20 CFR Part 404, Subpart P,
Appendix 1, the claimant is presumed to be disabled regardless of age, education, or work
experience. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(d).
Before considering Step Four, the ALJ must determine the claimant’s residual functional
capacity, i.e., the claimant’s ability to do physical and mental work activities on a sustained basis
despite limitations from her impairments. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(e). At the fourth step, if the
claimant’s impairment or combination of impairments does not prevent her from doing her past
relevant work, the claimant is not disabled. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(e)-(f). For the fifth and final
step, even if the claimant’s impairment does prevent her from doing her past relevant work, the
claimant is not disabled if other work exists in the national economy that the claimant can perform.
20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(g) and 404.1560(c). See Abbott, 905 F.2d at 923.
C. Analysis
In her sole assignment of error, Ms. Valentin argues that the ALJ’s RFC was not supported
by substantial evidence because the ALJ failed to adequately account for the impact that her bowel
condition had on her ability to work. In particular, Ms. Valentin argues that the ALJ erred in failing
to include a limitation that Ms. Valentin would need to take frequent bathroom breaks which, she
asserts, would have been work-preclusive.
“A claimant's RFC is not a medical opinion, but an administrative determination reserved
to the Commissioner.” Golden v. Berryhill, No. 1:18CV00636, 2018 WL 7079506, at *17 (N.D.
Ohio Dec. 12, 2018), report and recommendation adopted sub nom, 2019 WL 415250 (N.D. Ohio
Feb. 1, 2019). The ALJ is “charged with the responsibility of determining the RFC based on [the
ALJ’s] evaluation of the medical and non-medical evidence.” Rudd v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 531
F. App’x 719, 728 (6th Cir. 2013). “[T]he ALJ must give some indication of the evidence upon
which he is relying, and he may not ignore evidence that does not support his decision, especially
when that evidence, if accepted, would change his analysis.” Golden, 2018 WL 7079506 at *17.
However, “[i]t is plaintiff’s burden to prove the severity of her impairments, and to provide
evidence establishing her RFC.” Lumpkin v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No. 1:20-CV-1849, 2021 WL
4987607, at *3 (N.D. Ohio Oct. 27, 2021).
Ms. Valentin argues that the ALJ failed to incorporate limitations relating to her bowel
condition without sufficient explanation. In support, Ms. Valentin points to the following
paragraph from the ALJ’s decision, which she argues does not adequately explain the ALJ’s
reasoning:
Similarly, although the claimant testified upon remand in September
2023 that her upper extremity pain and dysfunction have worsened, that
her colitis requires proximity to a bathroom due to the urgent [sic] to go
6 times per day on average, that she has a debilitating headache 3 times
per month, and that she has developed urinary stress incontinence that
limits her ability to engage in strenuous tasks, she acknowledged
improvement in her mental health, she said that she continued to crochet
blankets and hats, and she reported continuing to drive and to complete
ordinary self-, household-, and child-care tasks. While the claimant
reported doing so at her own pace, with frequent breaks, and with an
occasional daytime nap, the medical evidence of record shows resolution
of the claimant’s cervical radiculopathy, no worsening in her carpal
tunnel or spinal impairments, and unchanged right shoulder arthritis, with
some inflammation.
(Tr. 27).
It is true that the ALJ’s reasoning in this paragraph largely focuses on other impairments
and does not specifically explain why Ms. Valentin’s statements regarding her need to use the
bathroom are unpersuasive. However, a reviewing court reads the ALJ’s decision as a whole. See
Taylor v. Kijakazi, No. 1:20-cv-01121, 2021 WL 4477865, *8 (N.D. Ohio Sept. 30, 2021). Earlier
in the decision, the ALJ acknowledged Ms. Valentin’s testimony that she experienced diarrhea
four to five times per day. (Tr. 23). However, the ALJ found that “the record does not support the
frequency or severity of . . . colitis symptoms asserted by the claimant.” (Tr. 27). Elsewhere in the
decision, the ALJ noted that Ms. Valentin reported no colitis-related complaints during a
gastrointestinal consult in October 2021; that a November 2021 endoscopy showed only moderate
erosive gastritis; and that Ms. Valentin reported improvements in her symptoms during a 2022
follow-up visit. (Tr. 26-27). Earlier, at Step Two, the ALJ found that Ms. Valentin’s colitis did not
equal a listing because she had not required surgical invention and because the condition had not
caused marked limitations in her daily, social, or attentive functioning. (Tr. 20). The ALJ
concluded that Ms. Valentin’s colitis, combined with her other impairments, warranted precluding
her from exposure to extraordinary hazards and simple work performed at a non-production rate
pace, but that additional limitations were not warranted. (Tr. 27-28).
While the ALJ could perhaps have included a more fulsome discussion of Ms. Valentin’s
bowel condition, the ALJ addressed both Ms. Valentin’s testimony and the objective medical
evidence, including evidence that her condition was moderate in severity and that she reported
improvement at times. In light of those records, substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s conclusion
that Ms. Valentin’s bowel condition imposed certain limitations upon her but that a bathroom
requirement was not warranted. Notably, Ms. Valentin has not cited to any evidence, other than
her own testimony, establishing that she needs to use the bathroom five to six times per day. The
ALJ thus did not err in failing to include a bathroom requirement in the RFC. See Hess v. Comm’r
of Soc. Sec. Admin., No. 1:24-cv-679, 2024 WL 4710894, at *9 (N.D. Ohio Nov. 7, 2024) (holding
that ALJ did not err in failing to include specific bathroom limitations in RFC, stating, “[t]hat
[petitioner] disagrees with the ALJ's chosen limitations or believes additional limitations should
have been included does not mean that the ALJ erred or that her RFC determination lacks support
from substantial evidence”); Stuber v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No. 1:17 CV 1501, 2018 WL 4283047,
at *6 (N.D. Ohio Sept. 7, 2018) (holding that ALJ did not err in failing to include limitation relating
to bathroom breaks where evidence indicated bowel impairment was not extreme and claimant did
not provide any opinion evidence on the issue).
Ms. Valentin argues that the ALJ should have given more weight to medical records
showing that she had a history of bowel problems, experienced abdominal pain and diarrhea, and
was diagnosed with colitis and moderate gastritis. However, “the Commissioner's decision cannot
be overturned if substantial evidence, or even a preponderance of the evidence, supports the
claimant's position, so long as substantial evidence also supports the conclusion reached by the
ALJ.” Jones v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 336 F.3d 469, 477 (6th Cir. 2003); see also Anderson v.
Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No. 1:21-CV-1471, 2022 WL 4545188, at *2 (N.D. Ohio Sept. 29, 2022)
(“it is also well-established that as long as the ALJ cites substantial, legitimate evidence to support
the conclusion reached, the reviewing court may not second-guess that decision”). While the
evidence Ms. Valentin relies on could perhaps have supported a more-restrictive RFC, substantial
evidence also supports the ALJ’s conclusion.
Additionally, to the extent Ms. Valentin relies on her testimony regarding her need for
frequent bathroom breaks, a plaintiff does not demonstrate that the ALJ violated governing
regulations simply by pointing to her own testimony regarding her impairments, as “an ALJ is not
required to accept a claimant’s subjective complaints.” Jones, 336 F.3d at 476. Moreover, “[i]t is
for the administrative law judge, not the reviewing court, to judge the consistency of a claimant’s
statements.” Lipanye v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 802 F. App’x 165, 171 (6th Cir. 2020). Here, the
ALJ found that Ms. Valentin’s testimony regarding the intensity, persistence, and disabling effects
of her symptoms “lack[ed] objective and overall record support.” (Tr. 25).
Finally, Ms. Valentin argues that the ALJ erred in his questions to the VE, as the
hypotheticals the ALJ posed did not reference Ms. Valentin’s needs for bathroom breaks. But “an
ALJ is only required to include in his hypothetical individual to the VE the limitations that he finds
credible.” Perry v. Berryhill, No. 1:16CV2970, 2018 WL 1393275, at *8 (N.D. Ohio Mar. 20,
2018); see also Koukouvitakis v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No. 1:19-CV-02875-BYP, 2020 WL
9854962, at *10 n. 5 (N.D. Ohio Nov. 24, 2020), report and recommendation adopted, 2022 WL
202670 (N.D. Ohio Jan. 24, 2022) (“it is ‘well established that an ALJ . . . is required to incorporate
only those limitations accepted as credible by the finder of fact’ into the hypothetical question”)
(quoting Casey v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 987 F.2d 1230, 1235 (6th Cir. 1993)). Because
the ALJ found that a bathroom restriction was not warranted, the ALJ was not required to include
that limitation in his hypothetical questions to the VE. Ms. Valentin’s sole assignment of error is
therefore without merit.
VI. RECOMMENDATION
Based on the foregoing, I RECOMMEND that the Court AFFIRM the Commissioner’s
decision.
Dated: September 16, 2025 /s Jennifer Dowdell Armstrong
Jennifer Dowdell Armstrong
U.S. Magistrate Judge
VII. NOTICE TO PARTIES REGARDING OBJECTIONS
Local Rule 72.3(b) of this Court provides:
Any party may object to a Magistrate Judge’s proposed findings,
recommendations or report made pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)
within fourteen (14) days after being served with a copy thereof, and
failure to file timely objections within the fourteen (14) day period
shall constitute a waiver of subsequent review, absent a showing of
good cause for such failure. Such party shall file with the Clerk of
Court, and serve on the Magistrate Judge and all parties, written
objections which shall specifically identify the portions of the proposed
findings, recommendations, or report to which objection is made and the
basis for such objections. Any party may respond to another party’s
objections within fourteen (14) days after being served with a copy
thereof. The District Judge to whom the case was assigned shall make a
de novo determination of those portions of the report or specified
proposed findings or recommendations to which objection is made and
may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or
recommendations made by the Magistrate Judge. The District Judge need
conduct a new hearing only in such District Judge’s discretion or where
required by law, and may consider the record developed before the
Magistrate Judge, making a determination on the basis of the record. The
District Judge may also receive further evidence, recall witnesses or
recommit the matter to the Magistrate Judge with instructions
Id. (emphasis added).
Failure to file objections within the specified time may result in the forfeiture or waiver of
the right to raise the issue on appeal either to the district judge or in a subsequent appeal to the
United States Court of Appeals, depending on how or whether the party responds to the report and
recommendation. Berkshire v. Dahl, 928 F.3d 520, 530 (6th Cir. 2019). Objections must be
specific and not merely indicate a general objection to the entirety of the report and
Sec’y of Health and Hum. Servs., 932 F.2d 505, 509 (6th Cir. 1991).
Stated differently, objections should focus on specific concerns and not merely restate the
arguments in briefs submitted to the magistrate judge. “A reexamination of the exact same
argument that was presented to the Magistrate Judge without specific objections ‘wastes judicial
resources rather than saving them, and runs contrary to the purpose of the Magistrates
Act.’” Overholt v. Green, No. 1:17-CV-00186, 2018 WL 3018175, *2 (W.D. Ky. June 15, 2018)
(quoting Howard). The failure to assert specific objections may in rare cases be excused in the
interest of justice. See United States v. Wandahsega, 924 F.3d 868, 878-79 (6th Cir. 2019).