The opinion
NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the
internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
APPELLATE DIVISION
DOCKET NO. A-0496-24
MARY CATHERINE BARAN,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
GEORGE L. BARAN,
Defendant-Respondent.
___________________________
Submitted September 9, 2025 – Decided September 16, 2025
Before Judges Susswein and Chase.
On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey,
Chancery Division, Family Part, Burlington County,
Docket No. FM-03-1255-22.
Richard Obuch, attorney for appellant.
Respondent has not filed a brief.
PER CURIAM
In this post-judgment matrimonial appeal, plaintiff, Mary Baran,
challenges the Family Part's September 13, 2024 order, denying her request to
unfreeze defendant George Baran's Fidelity retirement account and granting his
cross-motion to execute a Qualified Domestic Relations Order ("QDRO"). This
dispute arises from the parties' efforts to effectuate their settlement and, more
acutely, in the parties' divergent interpretations as to the division of retirement
assets. We conclude that a plenary hearing is required and accordingly vacate
and remand.
I.
Plaintiff and defendant were married in 1995. They were divorced in June
2023 by way of a Final Judgment of Divorce which incorporated a Property
Settlement Agreement ("PSA").
Pertinent to this appeal, Article Eight, paragraph C of the PSA provides
that modifications to any provision of the Agreement "shall be effective only if
made in writing and executed with the same formality as this Agreement."
Article Five, paragraph A(5) details that retirement accounts were to be divided
by a QDRO, prepared by a mutually selected expert, based on the marital
coverture from date of marriage to date of complaint. Costs were to be shared
equally. The PSA further noted that division of an annuity was resolved by a
lump sum payment tied to the equity in the marital home.
Attempts to formalize the QDRO were stymied by several rejections from
Fidelity, the retirement account custodian. After negotiation, the parties agreed
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on language acceptable to Fidelity, resulting in a proposed QDRO filed by
defendant in March 2024 ("March QDRO"). Paragraph ten stated that plaintiff
is entitled to earnings on her share, from the valuation date until segregation. It
is not clear from the record if this QDRO was ever signed by the court.
In June, defendant, without plaintiff's consent, submitted a proposed
amended QDRO ("June 5 QDRO") eliminating paragraph ten. Plaintiff objected
in writing and negotiations ensued. Ultimately, the parties and their respective
counsel prepared, signed, and submitted to the court a new QDRO ("June 26
QDRO") which restored and clarified paragraph ten by delineating each party's
entitlement to gains, losses, dividends, and interests in their respective shares.
Following Fidelity's implementation of the signed June 26 QDRO,
defendant contacted Fidelity questioning its interpretation of paragraph ten.
Fidelity responded by freezing the account. As a result, plaintiff moved to
unfreeze the funds and defendant cross-moved to adopt the objected-to June 5
QDRO.
After oral argument, the Family Part denied plaintiff's motion and granted
defendant's cross motion, reasoning the June 26 QDRO lacked the formality
required by the PSA and defendant entered into it by mistake.
This appeal follows.
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II.
We begin our analysis by setting forth basic principles that guide us in our
review. We typically "accord deference to a trial court's fact findings,
particularly in family court matters where the court brings to bear its special
expertise." Moynihan v. Lynch, 250 N.J. 60, 90 (2022) (citing Cesare v. Cesare,
154 N.J. 394, 413 (1998)). "Under that deferential standard of review, we are
bound to uphold a finding that is supported by sufficient credible evidence in
the record." Ibid.
Furthermore, we review decisions on post-judgment motions for abuse of
discretion. D.M.C. v. K.H.G., 471 N.J. Super. 10, 27 (App. Div. 2022). An
abuse of discretion occurs "when a decision is 'made without a rational
explanation, inexplicably departed from established policies, or rested on an
impermissible basis.'" Ibid. (quoting U.S. Bank Nat'l Ass'n v. Guillaume, 209
N.J. 449, 467 (2012)). "However, we owe no deference to a trial court's
interpretation of the law, and review issues of law de novo." Cumberland Farms,
Inc. v. N.J. Dep't of Env't Prot., 447 N.J. Super. 423, 438 (App. Div. 2016).
III.
On appeal, plaintiff argues the court erred in determining that the signed
June 26 QDRO was not an amendment to the PSA. Moreover, plaintiff contends
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the court should have ordered a plenary hearing to determine the parties' intent
before deciding that defendant entered the June 26 QDRO by mistake.
"An agreement to settle a lawsuit is a contract which, like all contracts,
may be freely entered into and which a court, absent a demonstration of 'fraud
or other compelling circumstances,' should honor and enforce as it does other
contracts." Pascarella v. Bruck, 190 N.J. Super. 118, 124-25 (App. Div. 1983)
(quoting Honeywell v. Bubb, 130 N.J. Super. 130, 136 (App. Div. 1974)), certif.
denied, 94 N.J. 600 (1983). "Settlement agreements in matrimonial matters,
being 'essentially consensual and voluntary in character, . . . [are] entitled to
considerable weight with respect to their validity and enforceability' in equity
provided they are fair and just." Dolce v. Dolce, 383 N.J. Super. 11, 20 (App.
Div. 2006) (quoting Petersen v. Peterson, 85 N.J. 638, 642 (1981)); see also
Lepis v. Lepis, 83 N.J. 139, 153 (1980); Berkowitz v. Berkowitz, 55 N.J. 564,
569 (1970); Schlemm v. Schlemm, 31 N.J. 557, 581-82 (1960). We note that
"[s]ettlement of litigation ranks high in the pantheon of public policy." N.H. v.
H.H., 418 N.J. Super. 262, 279 (App. Div. 2011). Thus, "'fair and definitive
arrangements arrived at by mutual consent should not be unnecessarily or lightly
disturbed.'" Konzelman v. Konzelman, 158 N.J. 185, 193-94 (1999) (quoting
Smith v. Smith, 72 N.J. 350, 358 (1977)).
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Nonetheless, "'the law grants particular leniency to agreements made in
the domestic arena,' thus allowing 'judges greater discretion when interpreting
such agreements.'" Pacifico v. Pacifico, 190 N.J. 258, 266 (2007) (quoting
Guglielmo v. Guglielmo, 253 N.J. Super. 531, 542 (App. Div. 1992)).
Furthermore, in addition to a Family Part judge's duty to assure the equitable
enforcement of agreements, the law imposes a duty of fairness upon the parties.
Fattore v. Fattore, 458 N.J. Super. 75, 88 (App. Div. 2019).
Importantly, "in the Family Part, a plenary hearing is only required if there
is a genuine, material and legitimate factual dispute." Segal v. Lynch, 211 N.J.
230, 264-65 (2012); see R. 5:8-6. "[A] party must clearly demonstrate the
existence of a genuine issue as to a material fact before a hearing is necessary."
Lepis, 83 N.J. at 159; accord Hand v. Hand, 391 N.J. Super. 102, 105 (App. Div.
2007). Material factual disputes "bear directly on the legal conclusions required
to be made and [such] disputes can only be resolved through a plenary hearing."
Spangenberg v. Kolakowski, 442 N.J. Super. 529, 540 (App. Div. 2015).
For example, in Harrington v. Harrington, we required a hearing when the
parties' certifications demonstrated a genuine factual dispute as to the
modification of a material term of a PSA. 281 N.J. Super. 39, 47 (App. Div
1995). Similarly, we required a hearing when the parties filed contradictory
certifications disputing whether the parties had reached final agreement.
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Whitfield v. Whitfield, 315 N.J. Super. 1, 11-12 (App. Div. 1998). A plenary
hearing may also be required when the record demonstrates that equity may
mandate modification or reformation of a PSA. Conforti v. Guliadis, 128 N.J.
318, 322 (1992).
The contested question is whether the June 26 QDRO, executed by both
parties and counsel, reflects mutual intent to modify or supplement the
components of the PSA. While we agree with the court that the parties' intent
is the linchpin, we part company with its determination that the parties did not
intend to amend the PSA. The Family Part's conclusion, that such modification
required more explicit formality or specific phrasing, does not comport with the
core doctrine that mutual settlement terms carry significant weight. The parties
and their counsel signed the June 26 QDRO and submitted it to the court. This
evidenced their intent to settle their dispute and amend the PSA.
However, our analysis does not end there as the record reveals bona fide
disputes regarding the intent and operation of paragraph ten of the June 26
QDRO and whether defendant entered into it by mistake. These disputes are
material and the equities at stake are significant. Fidelity's factual application
of the parties' agreement further magnifies the need for clarity. Such clarity can
only be achieved by plenary hearing, where the parties may testify and
credibility can be assessed.
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Vacated and remanded for proceedings consistent with this opinion. We
do not retain jurisdiction.
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