Locure v. Bisignano (CONSENT)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

NORTHERN DIVISION

AKAELIA L., )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

v. ) CASE NO. 2:24-cv-608-JTA

) (WO)

FRANK BISIGNANO,1 Commissioner )

of Social Security, )

)

Defendant. )

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), Akaelia L. brings this action to review a final

decision by the Commissioner of Social Security (“Commissioner”). (Doc. No. 1.)2 The

Commissioner denied Plaintiff’s application for Supplemental Security Income (“SSI”)

and claim for a period of disability and Disability Insurance Benefits (“DIB”). The Court

construes Plaintiff’s memorandum in support of her Complaint (Doc. No. 10) as a motion

for summary judgment and the Commissioner’s memorandum in support of the

Commissioner’s decision as a motion for summary judgment (Doc. No. 16). The parties

have consented to the exercise of dispositive jurisdiction by a magistrate judge pursuant to

28 U.S.C. § 636(c). (Docs. No. 8, 9.)

1 Frank Bisignano became the Commissioner of Social Security on May 6, 2025, and under Federal

Rule of Civil Procedure 25(d) is automatically substituted as the defendant. See Fed. R. Civ. P.

25(d).

2 Document numbers as they appear on the docket sheet are designated as “Doc. No.”

After scrutiny of the record and the parties’ motions, the Court finds Plaintiff’s

motion for summary judgment is due to be DENIED, the Commissioner’s motion for

summary judgment is due to be GRANTED, and the Commissioner’s decision is due to be

AFFIRMED.

I. PROCEDURAL HISTORY AND FACTS

Plaintiff is an adult woman3 with a high school education and no past relevant work.

(R. 20, 220, 258.)4 She alleged a disability onset date of August 10, 2021, due to major

depressive disorder (“MDD”) with psychotic features, schizoaffective disorder,

schizophrenia, and anxiety disorder. (R. 16, 31.) On November 15, 2021, Plaintiff filed a

Title II application (42 U.S.C. §§ 401, et seq.) for a period of disability and DIB and a Title

XVI application (42 U.S.C. §§ 1381, et seq.) for SSI. (R. 13, 203, 234.) The applications

were denied initially and upon reconsideration. (R. 13, 65–88.) Plaintiff requested an

administrative hearing on October 12, 2022. (R. 113.)

The Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) held an administrative hearing on July 5,

2023.5 (R. 27.) At the hearing, Plaintiff’s attorney agreed the record was complete and did

not request a mental consultative examination. (R. 30.)

3 Plaintiff was 22 years old at the alleged disability onset date. (R. 65.)

4 Citations to the administrative record (“R.”) are consistent with the transcript of administrative

proceedings filed in this case. (See Doc. No. 7.)

5 Plaintiff was absent at the beginning of the administrative hearing, although her attorney expected

her to be present and had spoken with her in preparation for the hearing. (R. 29.) It was determined

the Commissioner had not updated her address in the record despite the filing of a notice of change

of address. (R. 30.) Without waiving Plaintiff’s right to testify, her attorney presented her case and

answered the ALJ’s questions regarding her symptoms and other relevant matters. (R. 29-30.)

Then, with her attorney’s agreement, the ALJ proceeded to question the vocational expert (“VE”).

Following the administrative hearing, the ALJ denied Plaintiff’s request for benefits

in a decision dated December 26, 2023. (R. 13–22.)

Plaintiff requested review by the Appeals Council, and it denied review on July 25,

2024. (R. 1–5.) Consequently, the hearing decision became the final decision of the

Commissioner. See 42 U.S.C. § 405(g); Doughty v. Apfel, 245 F.3d 1274, 1278 (11th Cir.

2001) (citation omitted) (“When as in this case, the ALJ denies benefits and the [Appeals

Council] denies review, [the court] review[s] the ALJ’s decision as the Commissioner’s

final decision.”).

On September 27, 2024, Plaintiff filed this action seeking review of the

Commissioner’s final decision. (Doc. No. 1.) The parties have briefed their respective

positions. (Docs. No. 10, 16.)

This matter is ripe for review.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Judicial review of disability claims is limited to whether the Commissioner’s

decision is supported by substantial evidence and whether the correct legal standards were

applied. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g); Dyer v. Barnhart, 395 F.3d 1206, 1210 (11th Cir. 2005). The

court “must scrutinize the record as a whole to determine if the decision reached is

reasonable and supported by substantial evidence.” Schink v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 935

(R. 32.) Plaintiff arrived at the hearing during the VE’s testimony. (R. 35.) After the VE completed

his testimony, the ALJ took testimony from Plaintiff, then offered her attorney an opportunity to

further question the VE. (R. 34–35; R. 36–53.) Her attorney declined to further question the VE,

stating: “[J]udge, I feel like you’ve covered the basics of what would be in any follow up, thank

you.” (R. 52–53.)

F.3d 1245, 1257 (11th Cir. 2019) (citations omitted). “Substantial evidence” is more than

a mere scintilla and is “such relevant evidence as a reasonable person would accept as

adequate to support a conclusion.” Crawford v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 363 F.3d 1155, 1158

(11th Cir. 2004) (quoting Lewis v. Callahan, 125 F.3d 1346, 1349 (11th Cir. 1997)). Even

if the Commissioner’s decision is not supported by a preponderance of the evidence, the

findings must be affirmed if they are supported by substantial evidence. Id. at 1158-59; see

also Martin v. Sullivan, 894 F.2d 1520, 1529 (11th Cir. 1990). The court may not find new

facts, reweigh evidence, or substitute its own judgment for that of the Commissioner.

Bailey v. Soc. Sec. Admin., Comm’r, 791 F. App’x 136, 139 (11th Cir. 2019); Phillips v.

Barnhart, 357 F.3d 1232, 1240 n.8 (11th Cir. 2004); Dyer, 395 F.3d at 1210. However, the

Commissioner’s conclusions of law are not entitled to the same deference as findings of

fact and are reviewed de novo. Ingram v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 496 F.3d 1253, 1260

(11th Cir. 2007).

Sentence four of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) authorizes the district court to “enter, upon the

pleadings and transcript of the record, a judgment affirming, modifying, or reversing the

decision of the Commissioner of Social Security, with or without remanding the cause for

a rehearing.” 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). The district court may remand a case to the Commissioner

for a rehearing if the court finds “either . . . the decision is not supported by substantial

evidence, or . . . the Commissioner or the ALJ incorrectly applied the law relevant to the

disability claim.” Jackson v. Chater, 99 F.3d 1086, 1092 (11th Cir. 1996).

III. STANDARD FOR DETERMINING DISABILITY

An individual who files an application for DIB6 must prove that she is

disabled. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1505. The Act defines “disability” as the “inability to do any

substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental

impairment which can be expected to result in death or which has lasted or can be expected

to last for a continuous period of not less than 12 months.” 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A); 20

C.F.R. § 405.1505(a).

Disability under the Act is determined under a five-step sequential evaluation

process. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520. The evaluation is made at the hearing conducted by the

ALJ. See Washington v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 906 F.3d 1353, 1359 (11th Cir. 2018). First,

the ALJ must determine whether the claimant is currently engaged in substantial gainful

activity. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(b). “Substantial gainful activity” is work activity that

involves significant physical or mental activities. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1572(a). If the ALJ finds

that the claimant is engaged in substantial gainful activity, the claimant cannot claim

disability. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(b). Second, the ALJ must determine whether the claimant

has a medically determinable impairment or a combination of impairments that

significantly limit the claimant’s ability to perform basic work activities. 20 C.F.R. §

404.1520(c). Absent such impairment, the claimant may not claim disability. Id. Third, the

ALJ must determine whether the claimant meets or medically equals the criteria of an

6 Although DIB and SSI are separate programs, the standards for determining disability are

identical. See Patterson v. Bowen, 799 F.2d 1455, 1456 n.1 (11th Cir. 1986); Miles v. Soc. Sec.

Admin., Comm’r, 469 F. App’x 743, 744 (11th Cir. 2012).

impairment listed in 20 C.F.R. § 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1 (20 C.F.R. §§

404.1520(d), 404.1525, and 404.1526). If such criteria are met, then the claimant is

declared disabled. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(d).

If the claimant has failed to establish that she is disabled at the third step, the ALJ

may still find disability under the next two steps of the analysis. At the fourth step, the ALJ

must determine the claimant’s residual functional capacity (“RFC”), which refers to the

claimant’s ability to work despite her impairments. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(e). The ALJ must

determine whether the claimant has the RFC to perform past relevant work. 20 C.F.R. §

404.1520(f). If it is determined that the claimant is capable of performing past relevant

work, then the claimant is not disabled. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1560(b)(3). If the ALJ finds that

the claimant is unable to perform past relevant work, then the analysis proceeds to the fifth

and final step. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(g)(1).

In this final analytical step, the ALJ must decide whether the claimant is able to

perform any other relevant work corresponding with her RFC, age, education, and work

experience. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1560(c). Here, the burden of proof shifts from the claimant to

the ALJ in proving the existence of a significant number of jobs in the national economy

that the claimant can perform given her RFC, age, education, and work experience. 20

C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(g), 404.1560(c). See Hale v. Bowen, 831 F.2d 1007, 1011 (11th Cir.

1987) (“The burden then shifts to the Secretary to show the existence of other jobs in the

national economy which, given the claimant’s impairments, the claimant can perform.”).

To determine the existence of other jobs which the claimant can perform, the ALJ may rely

on the testimony of a VE. Winschel v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 631 F.3d 1176, 1180 (11th Cir.

2011).

IV. ADMINISTRATIVE DECISION

Within the structure of the sequential evaluation process, the ALJ found Plaintiff

had not engaged in substantial gainful activity since the alleged onset date. (R. 15.) The

ALJ determined Plaintiff suffers from the following severe impairments that significantly

limit her ability to perform basic work activities: MDD with psychotic features,

schizoaffective disorder, schizophrenia, and anxiety disorder. (R. 16.) Nevertheless, the

ALJ concluded Plaintiff does not have an impairment or combination of impairments that

meets or medically equals the severity of one of the listed impairments in 20 C.F.R. § 404,

Subpart P, Appendix 1. (Id.)

After consideration of the record, the ALJ determined Plaintiff has the RFC to

perform a full range of work at all exertional levels, but with the following nonexertional

limitations:

[Plaintiff] is limited to unskilled work activity defined as simple routine tasks

involving no more than simple short instructions making simple work-related

decisions with few workplace changes and routine supervision. She is limited

to no more than occasional interaction with coworkers and the general public.

Plaintiff cannot engage in teamwork and no work at a fixed production rate

pace but rather goal-oriented work.

(R. 18.) In determining Plaintiff’s RFC, the ALJ discussed Plaintiff’s medical records at

length. (R. 18–20.) The ALJ found the medical records consistently demonstrated Plaintiff

was “treated with a regimen of prescription medications resultant in good symptom

management and control with medication compliance,” but her symptoms worsened when

she stopped complying with her prescribed treatment. (Id.) Accordingly, the ALJ found

Plaintiff’s “statements concerning the intensity, persistence, and limiting effects of [her]

symptoms [were] not entirely consistent with the medical evidence and other evidence in

the record.” (R. 19.)

Because Plaintiff had no past relevant work, the ALJ did not address whether she is

able to perform any past relevant work. (R. 20.) Nonetheless, the ALJ determined a

significant number of jobs exist in the national economy Plaintiff can perform given her

age, education, work experience, and RFC. (R. 21.) The ALJ further concluded Plaintiff

had not been under a disability from November 15, 2021, to December 26, 2023, the date

of the ALJ’s decision. (R. 31.) The ALJ found Plaintiff “is not disabled under section

1614(a)(3)(A) of the Social Security Act.” (Id.)

V. DISCUSSION

Plaintiff presents one argument: the ALJ erred by not ordering a mental consultative

examination. (Doc. No. 10 at 2.) The Commissioner responds no mental consultative

examination was necessary and, therefore, the ALJ did not err. (Doc. No. 16 at 1.)

“Because a hearing before an ALJ is not an adversary proceeding, the ALJ has a

basic obligation to develop a full and fair record.” Graham v. Apfel, 129 F.3d 1420, 1422

(11th Cir. 1997) (citation omitted). “But ‘[t]he social security hearing examiner . . . does

not act as counsel. He acts as an examiner charged with developing the facts.’” Smith v.

Schweiker, 677 F.2d 826, 829 (11th Cir. 1982) (quoting McConnell v. Schweiker, 655 F.2d

604, 606 (5th Cir. 1981)).7 “[T]he ALJ’s obligation to develop the record does not relieve

the claimant of the burden of proving she is disabled.” Walker v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 404

F. App’x 362, 366 (11th Cir. 2010) (citing Ellison v. Barnhart, 355 F.3d 1272, 1276 (11th

Cir. 2003)); see also 20 C.F.R. § 404.1512(a) (“In general, you have to prove to us that you

are . . . disabled.”); 20 C.F.R. § 416.912(a) (same).

In conjunction with the ALJ’s duty to develop the record, the ALJ has the discretion

to order a consultative examination. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1512(b)(2); 20 C.F.R. § 416.917; 20

C.F.R. § 416.919. The ALJ “may purchase a consultative examination to try to resolve an

inconsistency in the evidence or when the evidence as a whole is insufficient to support a

determination or decision on [the] claim.” 20 C.F.R. § 416.919a(b); see also 20 C.F.R. §

404.1519a (same). Still, “the ALJ . . . need not order a consultative examination as long as

the record contains sufficient evidence for [the ALJ] to make an informed decision.” Banks

for Hunter v. Comm’r, Soc. Sec. Admin., 686 F. App’x 706, 713 (11th Cir. 2017) (citing

Ingram, 496 F.3d at 1269).

Here, after thorough consideration of the medical record, the ALJ concluded

Plaintiff’s “statements about the intensity, persistence, and limiting effects of her symptoms

were “inconsistent with the medical evidence of record” because treatment records showed

“good symptom management and control” when she complied with her prescription

medication regimen. (R. 19.) See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1530(a)–(b) (“[T]o get benefits, you must

7 See Bonner v. City of Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206 (11th Cir. 1981) (en banc) (adopting as binding

precedent all of the decisions of the former Fifth Circuit handed down prior to the close of business

on September 30, 1981).

follow treatment prescribed by your medical source(s) if this treatment is expected to

restore your ability to work . . . . If you do not follow the prescribed treatment without a

good reason,[8] we will not find you disabled or, if you are already receiving benefits, we

will stop paying you benefits.”); 20 C.F.R. § 416.930(a)–(b) (same).

As Plaintiff points out, the ALJ did not order a mental consultative examination to

obtain a physician’s assessment of her mental functional capacity. However, the absence of

a physician’s assessment of her mental functional abilities does not inherently render the

record incomplete, ambiguous, or insufficient for the ALJ to make a determination.

Although “the ALJ must consider the claimant’s medical condition as a whole and must

provide a sufficient rationale to link the evidence to his RFC determination,” the claimant’s

RFC and ability to work are “issue[s] reserved for the Commissioner.” Getman v. Kijakazi,

No. 3:22-CV-38-SMD, 2023 WL 5803701, at *3 (M.D. Ala. Sept. 7, 2023) (citing 20 C.F.R.

§§ 404.1545(a)(3); 416.945(a)(3); Pate v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 678 F. App’x 833, 834 (11th

Cir. 2017) (citing in turn 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d)(2)); Russ v. Barnhart, 363 F. Supp. 2d

1345, 1347 (M.D. Fla. 2005) (citing in turn Keeton v. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 21

F.3d 1064, 1066 (11th Cir. 1994)); see also Robinson v. Astrue, 365 F. App’x 993, 999 (11th

8 The ALJ noted that, at the hearing, Plaintiff contended she stopped taking her medication in part

because she found out she was pregnant. (R. 19, 45.) On appeal, Plaintiff does not argue her

pregnancy or any other factor warranted “good cause” not to take her medication. Nor does she

demonstrate that pausing her prescription medication due to pregnancy would cause her alleged

mental functional limitations to prevent her from working for a continuous period of at least one

year. See 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A) (defining “disability” as the “inability to do any substantial

gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment which can

be expected to result in death or which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period

of not less than 12 months”); 20 C.F.R. §§ 405.1505(a), 416.905(a).

Cir. 2010) (“[T]he task of determining a claimant’s residual functional capacity and ability

to work is within the province of the ALJ, not of doctors.”).

In addition, “there must be a showing of prejudice before [the court] will find that

the claimant’s right to due process has been violated to such a degree that the case must be

remanded to the [ALJ] for further development of the record.” Brown v. Shalala, 44 F.3d

931, 935 (11th Cir. 1995). In assessing the necessity for a remand, the court is “guided by

whether the record reveals evidentiary gaps which result in unfairness or clear prejudice.”

Id; see also Smith v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 501 F. App’x 875, 878–79 (11th Cir. 2012)

(finding the ALJ’s failure to order a consultative psychological evaluation was not error

because the record does not reveal an evidentiary gap that prejudiced the plaintiff). To

establish an evidentiary gap in the record, the claimant must identify “what facts could

have been submitted . . . that would have changed the outcome.” Edwards v. Sullivan, 937

F.2d 580, 586 (11th Cir. 1991); see also Henderson v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 353 F. App’x

303, 305 (11th Cir. 2009) (holding the claimant failed to show prejudice because she “d[id]

not explain how the absence of a mental RFC assessment from the record precluded the

ALJ from making an informed disability determination. Nor does she explain how such an

assessment would have affected the ALJ’s overall disability determination.”).

Here, the Court concludes the record contained sufficient evidence to reach an

informed decision, and the record as a whole was sufficient for the ALJ to conclude that

Plaintiff was not disabled. See 20 C.F.R. § 416.919(b); Ingram, 496 F.3d at 1269. The

relevant medical evidence consisted of records spanning over two and one-half years,9

including records from Plaintiff’s four medical providers and two state agency medical

consultants.10 (R. 376, 761.) From the ALJ’s summary of the medical evidence in the

hearing decision, it appears the ALJ considered all the medical records that existed from

Plaintiff’s alleged onset date through the date of the hearing decision. (R. 16-20.) Nothing

before the Court shows that Plaintiff challenged the accuracy or sufficiency of those

medical records.

Besides, Plaintiff has failed to show that any unfairness or clear prejudice resulted

due to the lack of a mental consultative examination. She has not identified any

inconsistencies in the record that would necessitate a mental consultative examination or

identified any evidentiary gaps. Nor does she show her condition worsened at some

9 The latest of these records came from a mental health provider who, three weeks before the

hearing, noted Plaintiff “was calm and seemed to be in a natural mood” and “said that she has been

eating and sleeping well and taking her medication as prescribed.” (R. 756.) At that time, Plaintiff

“denied having any hallucinations, paranoid thoughts, or feelings of depression.” (Id.) She stated

she “ha[d] started working, so her feelings and emotions ha[d] been low,” and “[s]he said the

medication helps a lot.” (Id.) According to the medical record, “[c]ounselor and client discussed

her treatment plan goals. She said that everything was pretty good with her. She just wants to

remain stable.” (Id.) One of Plaintiff’s treatment goals was “to get back on her medication” and

she had shown “[g]ood [i]mprovement” in fulfilling her stated objective of “tak[ing] medication 7

of 7 days a week.” (R. 752.) The ALJ noted this record in his opinion. (R. 20.)

10 The ALJ discounted the findings of the state agency medical consultants, who had determined

the claim to be insufficient. (R. 20.) He stated:

The State agency psychological consultants who reviewed the evidence at the initial

and reconsideration stages of adjudication determined the claim was insufficient

(1A, 4A, 6A-7A). These opinions are not persuasive. The undersigned finds that

the record supports a more limiting residual functional capacity of nonexertional

work and simple tasks due to psychological symptoms. However, these symptoms

are not disabling as alleged by the claimant. It should be further noted that no

physician has placed greater restrictions on the claimant than those adopted herein.

pertinent juncture or that she developed new limitations which necessitated a mental

consultative examination. Nor does she identify what facts would have been discovered in

a mental consultative examination that would have supported her disability claim.

Speculation does not suffice. See McCabe v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 661 F. App’x 596, 599

(11th Cir. 2016) (stating “[a] claimant cannot show prejudice by speculating that she would

have benefitted from a more comprehensive hearing”). Notably, the record shows that

during the administrative hearing Plaintiff did not contend the medical evidence before the

ALJ was inadequate or that further medical evidence was needed to evaluate her mental

condition.11 See Osborn v. Barnhart, 194 F. App’x 654, 668–69 (11th Cir. 2006) (rejecting

the plaintiff’s contention that more medical evidence was necessary because, among other

reasons, Plaintiff “had the burden of producing evidence in support of his claim and was

represented by counsel, who neither requested a clarification nor objected that the medical

records were inadequate”). Nor is there any evidence in the record showing Plaintiff

requested the ALJ to order a mental consultative examination or argued the same to the

Appeals Council. (R. 1–2, 32, 225–26.). Hence, prior to seeking judicial review, Plaintiff

apparently did not believe a mental consultative examination was necessary and she has

failed to persuade the Court that one is necessary now.

11 At the hearing, the ALJ asked, “[I]s the record complete?” (R. 30.) Plaintiff’s attorney

responded: “It is to the best of my knowledge.” (Id.)

Further, Plaintiff’s sparse arguments12 are unsupported and undeveloped. Citing

merely the lack of a mental consultative examination, she argues the record was insufficient

to support the ALJ’s decision. (Doc. No. 10 at 9–10.) She fails to offer any explanation for

how the absence of a mental consultative examination resulted in reversible error. Though

she cites one section of the United States Code and four cases, none the cited authorities

stand for the proposition that an ALJ’s determination is inherently flawed whenever the

record lacks a mental consultative examination, regardless of whether such an examination

is necessary to resolve a fatal insufficiency or incongruency in the record. In fact, the

authorities Plaintiff cited state the contrary. Banks, 686 F. App’x at 713 (“Ordering a

consultative examination is a discretionary matter for the ALJ and would be sought ‘to try

to resolve an inconsistency in the evidence or when the evidence as a whole is insufficient

to support a determination or decision’ on the claim.” (quoting 20 C.F.R. § 416.919a(b));

Ingram, 496 F.3d at 1269 (“The administrative law judge has a duty to develop the record

where appropriate but is not required to order a consultative examination as long as the

record contains sufficient evidence for the administrative law judge to make an informed

decision.”); Reeves v. Heckler, 734 F.2d 519, 522 n.1 (11th Cir. 1984) (“The regulations

provide that the ALJ may order a consultative examination when warranted. It is reversible

error for an ALJ not to order a consultative examination when such an evaluation is

necessary for him to make an informed decision.” (citations omitted)); Prunty v. Colvin,

No. 1:13-CV-00254-MP-GRJ, 2015 WL 1409664, at *7 & n. 25 (N.D. Fla. Mar. 26, 2015)

12 Counting generously, Plaintiff’s argument consumes slightly more than one page of her brief.

(Doc. No. 10 at 8–9.)

(noting that “the ALJ may order a physical or mental examination of a claimant at the

government’s expense[,] but the ALJ is not required to order an examination if it is not

necessary to enable the ALJ to make a disability determination” (citations and internal

quotation marks omitted)), aff’d sub nom. Prunty v. Acting Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin.,

635 F. App’x 757 (11th Cir. 2015).

In sum, Plaintiff “fails to cite any part of the Social Security Act, the regulations, or

any authority which supports [her] argument.” Fleeton v. O’Malley, No. 2:23-CV-62-JTA,

2024 WL 235216, at *6 (M.D. Ala. Jan. 22, 2024). She “makes no arguments on the merits

of the issue and cites no specific authority or evidence which supports [her] conclusion.”

Id. She offers “nothing more than conclusory and unsupported arguments which the Court

deems are waived.” Id.; see Davis v. Soc. Sec. Admin., Comm’r, No 4:20-CV-346-LSC,

2021 WL 3887467, at *6 (N.D. Ala. Aug. 31, 2021) (holding a claimant waived his

challenge to the ALJ’s RFC determination because he failed to present arguments as to why

the ALJ’s RFC assessment was conclusory) (citing Outlaw v. Barnhard, 197 F. App’x 825,

828 n.3 (11th Cir. 2006)); Lewis v. Berryhill, No. 1:17-CV-62-MW-GRJ, 2018 WL

1463725, at *5 (N.D. Fla. Mar. 1, 2018) (“[C]onclusory and unsupported arguments may

be deemed waived.”) (citing N.L.R.B. v. McClain of Georgia, Inc., 138 F.3d 1418, 1422

(11th Cir. 1998)). Accordingly, the Court finds no reversible error.

VI. CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated, the Court finds the decision of the Commissioner is supported

by substantial evidence and is in accordance with applicable law. Therefore, it is

ORDERED as follows:

1. Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment (Doc. No. 10) is DENIED.

2. The Commissioner’s motion for summary judgment (Doc. No. 16) is

GRANTED.

3. The decision of the Commissioner is AFFIRMED.

A separate judgment will issue.

DONE this 15th day of September, 2025.

JERAJSHA T. ADAMS

U ED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

16