The opinion
[Cite as State v. Jones, 2025-Ohio-4317.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
JACKSON COUNTY
STATE OF OHIO, :
:
Plaintiff-Appellee, : Case No. 23CA19
:
v. :
: DECISION AND JUDGMENT
DAKOTA S. JONES, : ENTRY
:
Defendant-Appellant. :
_____________________________________________________________
APPEARANCES:
Elizabeth Miller Ohio State Public Defender, Renee Severyn, Assistant
Public Defender, Columbus, Ohio, for Appellant.
Randy Dupree, Jackson County Prosecuting Attorney, Jackson, Ohio, for
Appellee.
_____________________________________________________________
Smith, P.J.
{¶1} Dakota Jones, “Jones,” appeals the November 16, 2023 Uniform
Sentencing Entry of the Jackson County Court of Common Pleas. Jones was
found guilty by a jury of one count of Failure to Comply with an Order or
Signal of Police Officer, in violation of R.C. 2921.331(B), a felony of the
third degree. Jones raises three assignments of error challenging the
handling of voir dire; the effectiveness of his legal representation; and his
maximum sentence. Based on our review of the record, we find no merit to
Jackson App. No. 23CA19 2
the arguments raised within Jones’ assignments of error. Accordingly, we
overrule all assignments of error and affirm the judgment of the trial court.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
{¶2} After leading officers of the Wellston Police Department (WPD)
on a high-speed chase through the city of Wellston, Jones and three
passengers crashed a white Impala off the right side of State Route 327 near
Jack Vaughn Road. As a result, Jones was indicted on one count of Failure
to Comply with Order or Signal of Police Officer. The following facts are
gleaned from the testimony of witnesses at Jones’ one-day jury trial.
{¶3} Officer Terry Fletcher of the WPD began by identifying Jones in
the courtroom. Officer Fletcher testified that on March 23, 2023, he was on
duty in his uniform and in a marked cruiser, aware that the Jackson County
Sheriff’s Office was looking for a white Impala. Officer Fletcher observed a
white Impala at a Speedway gas station. Jones checked the license plate,
which did not report as a white Impala but rather as a 1991 black two-door
Acura. Nevertheless, Fletcher made no further attempt to investigate the
white car.
{¶4} Later, around 2:30 a.m., Officer Fletcher again observed a white
Impala, this time being driven at a high rate of speed. Officer Fletcher
maneuvered behind the white car on Wisconsin Avenue in Wellston. Using
Jackson App. No. 23CA19 3
radar, Fletcher gauged the speed of the white car at 47 mph in a 25-mph
zone. The road conditions at the time were very slick due to light rain.
Officer Fletcher activated his lights and siren and began to pursue the white
car.
{¶5} The driver of the white Impala did not slow or stop but, instead,
accelerated beyond 47 mph. A chase ensued as Officer Fletcher continued
to follow the white car through Wellston. During the pursuit, the driver of
the white car failed to stop at four stop signs. When the white car entered a
35-mph zone, Officer Fletcher testified that he traveled 70 mph in order to
keep pace.
{¶6} The white Impala eventually entered State Route 327, a two-lane
road where the speed limit increased to 55 mph. Officer Fletcher observed
the white car being operated left of center at times. Despite traveling at
unsafe speeds, the driver hit the brakes. Fletcher opined the braking was
likely an effort to delay him or damage his cruiser.
{¶7} Thereafter, Officer Brant Derrow joined in the chase. The chase
ended when the driver of the white car failed to negotiate a turn, rolled over
an embankment and down a hill, and overturned on the right side of the
road. The white car came to rest on its top.
Jackson App. No. 23CA19 4
{¶8} Officer Fletcher estimated the chase lasted about five minutes
and covered about five miles. Fletcher testified that after the crash it took
him 5 to 10 seconds to approach and check the passengers in the white
vehicle. Fletcher testified he observed four people in the car: Jones, Ashley
Brown, James Friend, and a three-year-old child. Fletcher testified half of
Jones’ body was in the driver’s seat. Ashley Brown was in the passenger
front seat. James Friend and the young child were in the back seat. All
occupants of the white vehicle were transported to the hospital.
{¶9} After the crash Officer Fletcher again checked the license plate
of the white car. This time the white car was reported as owned by Ashley
Brown. Fletcher also learned that Jones had active warrants. Officer
Fletcher identified photographs of the white Impala.
{¶10} Upon cross-examination, Officer Fletcher acknowledged that
when he initially saw the white car at Speedway he could not see who was
driving it. When the white car passed him later, at 2:30 a.m. in the darkness,
Fletcher admitted he did not get a good look at the driver. Fletcher admitted
his body camera did not fully capture the chase and did not capture footage
of the driver inside the car. Fletcher was not able to see inside the driver’s
side of the car during the pursuit. Defense counsel played a portion of
Fletcher’s body camera footage. Fletcher admitted it showed Jones’ body
Jackson App. No. 23CA19 5
hanging out of the passenger side of the vehicle. However, on redirect,
Officer Fletcher clarified that the lower half of Jones’ body was in the
driver’s seat.
{¶11} Officer Brant Derrow of the WPD testified that he joined in the
high-speed chase and observed the driver of the white Impala committing
multiple traffic violations. Derrow also observed the rollover crash. Officer
Derrow testified he reached the vehicle about 20-30 seconds after the crash.
Derrow saw a child hanging upside down in the back seat by her seatbelt.
James Friend was also located in the back seat. Similarly, Derrow testified
Jones’ legs were under the steering wheel, but he was lying across the front
passenger seat. Officer Derrow also identified photographs of the white
Impala and identified Jones in the courtroom as the driver.
{¶12} On cross-examination, Officer Derrow admitted that he was not
able to positively identify the driver of the white Impala while the vehicle
was in motion. Jones was transported from the scene before Derrow had a
chance to speak with him. Derrow admitted that several minutes of body
camera footage were missing from the time he spoke to Ashley Brown at the
scene.
{¶13} Ashley Brown testified that at the time of the accident she was
in a relationship with Jones. She did not want to be at the trial. During the
Jackson App. No. 23CA19 6
high-speed chase, Brown’s daughter and James Friend were in the back seat.
Jones was driving and she was a passenger in the front seat. She could not
recall lights and sirens. Brown testified she did not recall telling Officer
Derrow at the scene that Jones was the driver. Brown also did not recall
telling another officer, Sergeant Shong, in a recorded phone conversation,
that Jones was the driver.
{¶14} On cross-examination, Brown testified that she drove the white
car away from Speedway. Brown also admitted that she was in active
addiction at the time the accident happened, and that her memory may have
been affected. During redirect, the jurors were excused and the prosecutor
refreshed Brown’s memory by playing the recorded phone conversation with
Sergeant Shong. When the jurors returned, she recalled her conversation
with Shong and that she told him Jones was the driver. On recross, Brown
was forced to admit that she was investigated by Child Protective Services
(CPS) as a result of the accident. She also testified she spent six months in
treatment after the accident.
{¶15} At the close of the State’s case, defense counsel moved for
dismissal under Crim.R. 29, arguing that there was scant evidence to suggest
beyond a reasonable doubt that Jones was the driver. Counsel also asserted
that serious physical harm had not been proven. The motion was overruled.
Jackson App. No. 23CA19 7
{¶16} Following deliberations, the jury returned a guilty verdict. On
November 16, 2023, Jones was sentenced. The trial court imposed a
maximum sentence of 36 months in prison.
{¶17} This timely appeal followed. Additional facts are set forth
below where pertinent.
ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR
I. THE TRIAL COURT’S FAILURE TO INFORM
POTENTIAL JURORS OF THE PENDING
CHARGE BEFORE OR DURING VOIR DIRE
DEPRIVED BOTH JONES AND THE COURT OF
THEIR ABILITY TO MAKE INFORMED
STRIKES, VIOLATING JONES’ RIGHT TO A
FAIR TRIAL.
II. DEFENSE COUNSEL’S MISTAKES AND
INACTION, WHEN CONSIDERED TOGETHER,
DEPRIVED JONES OF THE EFFECTIVE
ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL.
III. THE COURT FAILED TO CONSIDER THE
STATUTORY SENTENCING FACTORS
REQUIRED BY R.C. 2921.331(C)(5)(b).
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR ONE - VOIR DIRE
A. Legal Principles
{¶18} The Sixth Amendment guarantees the right to trial “by an
impartial jury” in federal criminal prosecutions. “Because ‘trial by jury in
criminal cases is fundamental to the American scheme of justice,’ the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment guarantees the same right in
Jackson App. No. 23CA19 8
state criminal prosecutions.” Nebraska Press Assn. v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539,
551 (1976), quoting Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 149 (1968). The
Ohio Constitution provides that “[t]he right of trial by jury shall be
inviolate,” Ohio Const., Art. I, § 5, and guarantees the accused “an
impartial jury.” Ohio Const., Art. I, § 10. See State v. Dennison, 2025-
Ohio-139, ¶ 35 (4th Dist.).
{¶19} “To safeguard this constitutional right, the General Assembly
has provided for peremptory challenges and challenges for cause.” State v.
Anderson, 30 Ohio St.2d 66, 71 (1972), citing R.C. 2945.21, R.C. 2945.22
(now repealed), and R.C. 2945.25. R.C. 2313.17(B) sets forth
circumstances which constitute “good causes for challenge to any person
called as a juror,” and R.C. 2945.25 and Crim.R. 24(C) each set forth
additional lists of causes that constitute grounds to challenge a person called
as a juror in a criminal case. See Dennison at ¶ 36. The scope of voir dire
varies with the circumstances of a particular case. State v. Lundgren, 73
Ohio St.3d 474, 481 (1995), citing State v. Bedford, 39 Ohio St.3d 122, 129
(1988).
{¶20} “Generally, trial courts ‘have wide discretion to design and
direct voir dire procedures in their courts.’ ” Dennison at ¶ 37, quoting
Crumley v. McCloud, 2020-Ohio-2737, ¶ 9 (10th Dist.). Trial courts also
Jackson App. No. 23CA19 9
have discretion in resolving challenges for cause as they involve a judgment
on credibility, and the court sees and hears the jurors. See State v. Knuff,
2024-Ohio-902, ¶ 75, citing State v. Madison, 2020-Ohio-3735, ¶ 42.
Appellate courts are bound by a narrow standard in reviewing claimed voir
dire errors. See State v. Burns, 2024-Ohio-1669, ¶ 13. (Citation omitted.)
{¶21} Here, because Jones’ trial counsel did not object and call
attention to this alleged omission, we review the issue now for plain error.
State v. Ford, 2019-Ohio-4539, ¶ 126. Pursuant to Crim.R. 52(B), we may
notice plain errors or defects affecting substantial rights. “ ‘Inherent in the
rule are three limits placed on reviewing courts for correcting plain error.’ ”
State v. Black, 2013-Ohio-2105, ¶ 21 (4th Dist.), quoting State v. Payne,
2007-Ohio-4642, ¶ 15. “ ‘First, there must be an error, i.e., a deviation
from the legal rule. * * * Second, the error must be plain. To be ‘plain’
within the meaning of Crim.R. 52(B), an error must be an ‘obvious’ defect
in the trial proceedings. * * * Third, the error must have affected
‘substantial rights.’ We have interpreted this aspect of the rule to mean that
the trial court's error must have affected the outcome of the trial.’ ” Id. at ¶
16, 873 N.E.2d 306, quoting State v. Barnes, 94 Ohio St.3d 21, 27 (2002).
We will notice plain error “only to prevent a manifest miscarriage of
justice.” State v. Long, 53 Ohio St.2d 91(1978), paragraph three of the
Jackson App. No. 23CA19 10
syllabus. “Reversal is warranted only if the outcome of the trial clearly
would have been different absent the error.” State v. Hill, 92 Ohio St.3d
191, 203 (2001).
B. Analysis
{¶22} Under the first assignment of error, Jones contends that he was
deprived of a constitutionally adequate jury selection process because the
prospective jurors were not specifically informed that he was being tried for
the offense of Failure to Comply with an Order or Signal of Police Officer.
Jones asserts that without this basic but specific information, prospective
jurors were unable to provide informed answers regarding their potential
biases and prior knowledge of the underlying facts. Jones argues that this
omission deprived the trial court of the ability to make knowledgeable
rulings and Jones of the ability to make intelligent for-cause and
peremptory challenges. For instance, Jones’ counsel was unable to flesh
out any preconceived notions the jurors may have had regarding people
who lead high-speed chases, obstruct or evade law enforcement, or place
children at risk.
{¶23} Voir dire examination is an essential process which allows
litigants to determine whether a venireman is prejudiced or biased against
either litigant. See Vega v. Evans, 128 Ohio St. 535 (1934), paragraph one
Jackson App. No. 23CA19 11
of the syllabus; Krupp v. Poor, 24 Ohio St.2d 123, 125 (1970); Lloyd v.
Willis, 2004-Ohio-427, ¶ 11 (4th Dist.). In State v. Madison, 2020-Ohio-
3735, the Supreme Court of Ohio more recently explained that the purpose
of voir dire is to discover whether any juror has a bias that would prevent
him or her from individually weighing the facts of the case. Id. at ¶ 24.
During voir dire, a trial court should allow reasonable inquiry on any
relevant matter which is determinative of the issues of the case. See State v.
Gaines, 2009-Ohio-622, ¶ 71 (8th Dist.); State v. Atalla, 2004-Ohio-3414, ¶
13 (9th Dist.); Dayton v. Meyer, 1991 WL 47533, *3 (2d Dist.).
{¶24} Our review of the record reveals that Jones is correct in his
assertion that the prospective jurors were never informed of the name of the
offense for which he was being tried. During voir dire, the trial court made
the following comments:
1. “There may be something in this particular case that could disqualify
you.”
2. The questions from the court and counsel are “not designed to pry into
your personal affairs but to discover if you have any knowledge of the
case” or to discover “if you have any prior experience that might
cause you to identify yourself with either party.
3. “Is there any reason that you feel that you couldn’t be a fair and
impartial juror for us in this case?”
Furthermore, the prospective jurors were not provided with a context for the
offense, such as briefly advising them that the facts would involve Jones
Jackson App. No. 23CA19 12
allegedly driving at unsafe speeds or that there would be testimony that
Jones failed to slow or stop when Officer Fletcher activated his cruiser lights
and siren.
{¶25} Our research has yielded no Ohio cases directly on point. Jones
has directed us to the Ohio Jury Instructions (OJI), which provides a guide
for trial judges. “The standard instructions are crafted by the Ohio Judicial
Conference and sanctioned by the Ohio Supreme Court to assist trial judges
and lawyers in correctly and efficiently charging the jury on the law
applicable to a particular case.” State v. Morgan, 2024-Ohio-5843, ¶ 62.
OJI CR 203.01 governs introductory remarks and directs that after
introducing the attorneys the trial court should provide “a brief synopsis of
the charges.” Id. “The particular instruction to be given in a jury trial is fact
specific and based upon the indictment, testimony, evidence, and defenses
available to the defendant.” Id.
{¶26} The State is quick to point out that “the standard instructions in
Ohio Jury Instructions…are not mandatory. Rather they are recommended
instructions based primarily upon case law and statutes.” Morgan, supra,
quoting State v. Jeffers, 2008-Ohio-1894, (11th Dist.). The State is correct.
The trial court was not required to provide the additional information Jones
now argues was lacking during voir dire.
Jackson App. No. 23CA19 13
{¶27} We cannot find that the trial court committed any error, let
alone plain error. Based on the foregoing, Jones’ first assignment of error is
without merit. Accordingly, it is hereby overruled.
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR TWO - INEFFECTIVE
ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL
A. Legal Principles
{¶28} To prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of
counsel, a criminal defendant must establish (1) deficient performance by
counsel, i.e., performance falling below an objective standard of reasonable
representation, and (2) prejudice, i.e., a reasonable probability that, but for
counsel's errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. See
State v. Allah, 2015-Ohio-5060, ¶ 14 (4th Dist.); State v. Short, 2011-Ohio-
3641, ¶ 113; Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687. The defendant
has the burden of proof because in Ohio, a properly licensed attorney is
presumed competent. State v. Gondor, 2006-Ohio-6679, ¶ 62. Failure to
satisfy either part of the test is fatal to the claim. Strickland at 697; State v.
Bradley, 42 Ohio St.3d 136, 143 (1989).
{¶29} In reviewing the claim of ineffective assistance of counsel we
must indulge in “a strong presumption that counsel's conduct falls within the
wide range of reasonable professional assistance; that is, the defendant must
Jackson App. No. 23CA19 14
overcome the presumption that, under the circumstances, the challenged
action ‘might be considered sound trial strategy.’ ” Strickland at 689.
B. Analysis
1. Voir Dire
{¶30} Jones cites his attorney’s failure to request the trial court
provide the prospective jurors with the name of the offense as deficient
performance. Jones also argues his counsel should have, himself, provided
the name or basic context of the offense in order to determine if there were
any reasons the prospective jurors might not be able to show fairness and
impartiality. As such, Jones concludes that his counsel’s omission deprived
him of a fair trial. Ordinarily, “ ‘[c]ounsel's actions during voir dire are
presumed to be matters of trial strategy.’ ” Allah, at ¶ 16, quoting State v.
Perez, 2009-Ohio-6179, ¶ 206-208.
{¶31} As discussed above, however, the trial court was not required to
provide the prospective jurors with the name of the offense charged or the
basic context for the charge. Said request from defense counsel may have
well been futile. Thus, counsel’s performance cannot be found deficient
because “ ‘the failure to perform a futile act does not support a claim of
ineffective assistance of counsel.’ ” State v. Walton, 2024-Ohio-607, ¶ 21
(4th Dist.), quoting State v. Stevens, 2023-Ohio-3280, ¶ 120 (4th Dist.).
Jackson App. No. 23CA19 15
{¶32} Jones also claims that his counsel failed to ask additional
questions to determine if the jurors knew anyone “involved with the trial.”
Jones asserts this omission was not the result of a strategic decision, but
rather oversight. Arguably, defense counsel should have asked the
prospective jurors if they knew Ashley Brown, James Friend, or the WPD
officers who would be testifying. However, inquiring about persons
“involved with the trial” is a rather broad argument on appeal.
{¶33} We note that the prosecutor asked if anyone knew Dakota
Jones. Defense counsel further inquired as to whether anyone had spoken to
Jones in the hallway.1 Assuming that defense counsel somehow committed
error by not expanding upon this line of inquiry, we nonetheless cannot find
the outcome of Jones’ trial would have changed. Once again, we cannot
engage in speculation. Both of Jones’ arguments are without merit.
2. Key Witness
{¶34} Jones next argues that his attorney had the duty to
secure the presence of James Friend by subpoenaing him for his trial. The
Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides that “[i]n all
criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right ... to be confronted
1
This ultimately led to a sidebar conference with the trial court, the attorneys, and Juror 13 who was
ultimately excused from service.
Jackson App. No. 23CA19 16
with the witnesses against him.” State v. McKenzie, 2025-Ohio-415, ¶20
(4th Dist.). The Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment is made
applicable to the states by the Fourteenth Amendment. State v. Issa, 93
Ohio St.3d 49, fn. 4 (2001). “Consequently, this constitutional right applies
to both federal and state prosecutions, but the right of confrontation in
Article I, Section 10 of the Ohio Constitution provides no greater right of
confrontation than the Sixth Amendment.” State v. Smith, 2021-Ohio-2866,
¶ 67 (4th Dist.), citing State v. Arnold, 2010-Ohio-2742, ¶ 12.
{¶35} “The ‘primary object’ of this provision is to prevent
unchallenged testimony from being used to convict an accused—a safeguard
that applies to both federal and state prosecutions.” State v. Carter, 2024-
Ohio-1247, ¶ 27, citing Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237, 242 (1895).
Additionally, “[t]he provision encompasses the rights to have a witness
physically appear in the courtroom, to require the witness to testify under
oath, and to force the witness to be subject to cross-examination.” Id.
{¶36} Absent a showing of prejudice, the mere failure to subpoena
witnesses does not render trial counsel's assistance ineffective. State v.
Kessinger, 2014-Ohio-2496, ¶ 42 (4th Dist.); State v. Dotson, 2001-Ohio-
2507, *9 (4th Dist.); State v. Coulter, 75 Ohio App.3d 219, 230 (12th
Dist.1992). To demonstrate prejudice, the defendant must establish that the
Jackson App. No. 23CA19 17
witness's testimony would have significantly assisted the defense, and that
the testimony would have affected the outcome of the case. See, e.g.,
Coulter, supra; State v. Reese, 8 Ohio App.3d 202, 203 (1st. Dist.1982).
{¶37} During cross-examination, defense counsel attempted to elicit
testimony from Officer Derrow that James Friend had initially confessed to
driving the white Impala during the chase. The prosecutor objected. The
jury was dismissed as the parties discussed the issue. The trial court
ultimately ruled that any evidence of a confession could not come into
evidence because Friend was not unavailable under Evid. R. 804(A)(5).
During the discussion, defense counsel admitted that he did not subpoena
Friend on his own but instead relied on the State’s subpoena attempt to
ensure Friend’s availability.
{¶38} In support of his ineffectiveness claim, Jones points out that the
jury asked three questions during deliberations, one of which included:
“Can we know why the third adult victim was not part of the evidence?”
Jones asserts that Friend’s testimony, or lack thereof, could have directly
impacted deliberations. For the reasons which follow, we disagree.
{¶39} We are mindful that while the decision not to call a witness
may be debatable, it does not constitute ineffective assistance of counsel.
State v. Martin, 2005-Ohio-1369, ¶ 19 (2d Dist.). However, defense counsel
Jackson App. No. 23CA19 18
admitted that he relied upon the State’s subpoena for Friend. While
counsel’s decision may have been erroneous, Jones is still unable to provide
any evidence as to what Friend’s testimony may have been. Once again, we
are asked to engage in speculation, which we may not do. Once again, Jones
cannot demonstrate that the outcome of the trial might have been different
had his defense counsel subpoenaed Friend.
{¶40} Additionally, we may take judicial notice of the pleadings in
this matter which indicate that the State subpoenaed James Friend via the
Vinton County Sheriff’s Office, with an address at: 37274 S.R. 324,
Hamden, Ohio on September 18, 2023.2 During sidebar, the prosecutor
indicated he “called back” the subpoena, but he may have been mistaken.
By contrast, the pleadings docket indicates that the subpoena for James
Friend was returned from Vinton County for failure of service on October
16, 2023 for the following reason: “Not living at this address.”
{¶41} Both the State’s and the defense’s responses to discovery
provide this Vinton County address as the only one for James Friend.
Arguably any attempts to locate and subpoena Friend may have been futile.
2
“ ‘A judicially noticed fact must be one not subject to reasonable dispute in that it is either (1) generally
known within the territorial jurisdiction of the trial court or (2) capable of accurate and ready determination
by resort to sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned.’ ” Gold v. Bertram, 2023-Ohio-
4567, ¶ 17 (4th Dist.), (citation omitted), quoting Evid.R. 201(B). “ ‘Both trial courts and appellate courts
can take judicial notice of filings readily accessible from a court's website.’ ” Gold, supra, ¶ 18, quoting
Teays Valley Local School District Board of Education v. Struckman, 2023-Ohio-244, ¶ 76 (4th Dist.)
(Internal citations omitted.)
Jackson App. No. 23CA19 19
For the above reasons, we find no merit to Jones’ claim regarding the failure
to subpoena James Friend.
3. Exhibit
{¶42} Jones also argues that his counsel should have moved to admit
Officer Fletcher’s body camera video as an exhibit, concluding that this
omission constitutes ineffective assistance. Defense counsel played the
body camera video of Fletcher approaching the vehicle but did not move to
admit it into evidence. During deliberations, the first question the jury
submitted was “Can we please see the video again?” The trial court
declined, noting that the video was not introduced as an exhibit. For the
following reasons, we find that counsel’s omission in proffering the body
camera as an exhibit is not error.
{¶43} During cross-examination, Officer Fletcher testified that his
body camera was not on at the beginning of the chase. Officer Fletcher
testified repeatedly that he was unable to visualize the driver during the
chase. Specifically, Fletcher testified as follows:
Q: Now, did your body camera at any point happen to
get a clean look at the driver during the chase?
A: No, sir.
Q: Inside the car at all?
A: No.
Jackson App. No. 23CA19 20
{¶44} Then, while defense counsel played the body camera, Officer
Fletcher narrated. Fletcher explained to the jury that it showed him
approaching the passenger side. The transcript indicates that the body
camera showed a “set of hands sticking out of the passenger side window.”
Officer Fletcher confirmed that Jones could be seen hanging out of the
passenger side of the vehicle.
{¶45} In light of Officer Fletcher’s testimony, we suspect that the
body camera evidence, even if it had been admitted as an exhibit, would not
have greatly aided the jury in its deliberations. Defense counsel successfully
emphasized some testimony that suggested Jones’ body was not completely
in the driver’s seat. The body camera evidence, along with Fletcher’s
testimony, would likely have been cumulative. Moreover, even if the body
camera evidence had been admitted as an exhibit and the jury had replayed
it, based on the substantial evidence of Jones’ guilt, we cannot say the
outcome of the trial would have been different. We find Jones’ argument
regarding the exhibit is also without merit.
4. Cross-examination
{¶46} During Ashley Brown’s cross-examination, Jones’ trial counsel
attempted to demonstrate that Brown may have had a motive to lie about
who drove the white Impala in order to avoid potential problems with CPS.
Jackson App. No. 23CA19 21
Defense counsel inquired: “And if you were convicted of a felony then that
involved a car crash with your child in the back seat, that would mean CPS
may take away your children?” The prosecutor objected and the trial court
excluded the question as calling for a legal conclusion. Jones asserts that his
trial counsel did not, but should have, corrected the “flawed questioning.”
{¶47} We are unpersuaded that defense counsel performed deficiently
by not continuing to pursue this line of questioning with Ashley Brown. Our
review demonstrates that counsel successfully elicited testimony that Brown
was under the influence of illicit substances on the night of the accident; that
she had obviously allowed her child to be in the car during the high-speed
chase; and that CPS contacted her after the chase and crash. Defense
counsel’s cross-examination was able to cast aspersions on Brown’s
credibility. We cannot find counsel’s performance on cross-examination to
be deficient.
5. Cumulative Error
{¶48} Jones cites the above alleged errors as constituting
cumulative error warranting reversal of his conviction and a new trial.
Under the cumulative-error doctrine, “ ‘a conviction will be reversed where
the cumulative effect of errors in a trial deprives a defendant of the
constitutional right to a fair trial even though each of numerous instances of
Jackson App. No. 23CA19 22
trial court error does not individually constitute cause for reversal.’ ” State
v. Fannon, 2018-Ohio-5242, ¶124 (4th Dist.), quoting State v. Garner, 74
Ohio St.3d 49, 64(1995), citing State v. DeMarco, 31 Ohio St.3d 191(1987),
paragraph two of the syllabus. “Before we consider whether ‘cumulative
errors’ are present, we must first find that the trial court committed multiple
errors.” State v. Smith, 2016-Ohio-5062, ¶ 106 (4th Dist.), citing State v.
Harrington, 2006-Ohio-4388, ¶ 57 (4th Dist.).
{¶49} The cumulative error doctrine does not apply where the
defendant “cannot point to ‘multiple instances of harmless error.’ ” Fannon,
supra, ¶ 124, quoting State v. Mammone, 2014-Ohio-1942, ¶ 148. We have
found no errors and we cannot indulge in speculation simply because we are
“peering through the cumulative error lens.” See State v. Baber, 2021-Ohio-
1506, ¶ 39 (1st Dist.). For the foregoing reasons, Jones’ second assignment
of error alleging ineffective assistance of counsel is without merit and is
hereby overruled.
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR THREE - MAXIMUM
SENTENCE
A. Legal Principles
{¶50} Jones challenges his maximum sentence of 36 months for
Failure to Comply with Order of Police Officer, R.C. 2921.331. We review
felony sentences under the standard set forth in R.C. 2953.08(G)(2):
Jackson App. No. 23CA19 23
The appellate court may increase, reduce, or otherwise
modify a sentence that is appealed under this section or
may vacate the sentence and remand the matter to the
sentencing court for resentencing. The appellate court's
standard for review is not whether the sentencing court
abused its discretion. The appellate court may take any
action authorized by this division if it clearly and
convincingly finds either of the following:
(a) That the record does not support the sentencing court's
findings under division (B) or (D) of section 2929.13,
division (B)(2)(e) or (C)(4) of section 2929.14, or
division (I) of section 2929.20 of the Revised Code,
whichever, if any, is relevant;
(b) That the sentence is otherwise contrary to law.
See State v. Hughes, 2021-Ohio-3127, at ¶ 37 (4th Dist.).
{¶51} Jones contends that the trial court did not consider the required
factors for sentencing under R.C. 2921.331(C)(5)(b) and, consequently, his
sentence is disproportionate to other sentences for the same offense. Under
R.C. 2921.331(B), “[n]o person shall operate a motor vehicle so as willfully
to elude or flee a police officer after receiving a visible or audible signal
from a police officer to bring the person's motor vehicle to a stop.” A
violation of R.C. 2921.331(B) rises to the level of a third-degree felony if a
jury or judge finds proof beyond a reasonable doubt that either:
(i) The operation of the motor vehicle by the offender
was a proximate cause of serious physical harm to
persons or property.
Jackson App. No. 23CA19 24
(ii) The operation of the motor vehicle by the offender
caused a substantial risk of serious physical harm to
persons or property.
R.C. 2921.331(C)(5)(a)(i)-(ii).
{¶52} R.C. 2921.331(C)(5)(b) sets forth additional factors a trial court
must consider when sentencing an offender for failure to comply if R.C.
2921.331(C)(5)(a) applies. Under this provision, trial courts must not only
consider the factors set forth in sections 2929.11 and 2929.12 of the Revised
Code when determining the seriousness of an offender's conduct in
committing failure to comply, they must also consider additional factors set
forth in R.C. 2921.331(C)(5)(b) to determine the seriousness of the
offender's conduct. Pursuant to R.C. 2921.331(C)(5)(b), the trial court was
required to consider the following factors when determining what sentence
to impose for Jones’ offense:
(i) The duration of the pursuit;
(ii) The distance of the pursuit;
(iii) The rate of speed at which the offender operated the
motor vehicle during the pursuit;
(iv) Whether the offender failed to stop for traffic lights or
stop signs during the pursuit;
(v) The number of traffic lights or stop signs for which the
offender failed to stop during the pursuit;
(vi) Whether the offender operated the motor vehicle
during the pursuit without lighted lights during a time
when lighted lights are required;
(vii) Whether the offender committed a moving violation
during the pursuit;
Jackson App. No. 23CA19 25
(viii) The number of moving violations the offender
committed during the pursuit;
(ix) Any other relevant factors indicating that the
offender's conduct is more serious than conduct normally
constituting the offense.
R.C. 2921.331(C)(5)(b)(i)-(ix).
B. Analysis
{¶53} Jones asserts that there is no indication that the trial court
actually considered the R.C. 2921.331(C)(5)(b) sentencing factors because
they were never discussed at the sentencing hearing. Jones is correct that the
factors were not discussed. At the hearing, the prosecutor requested a
maximum sentence, noting Jones’ extensive criminal history and lack of
taking responsibility for his actions. The underlying facts of the offense
were not revisited.
{¶54} Jones points to the language of the Uniform Sentencing Entry
which states only that the trial court considered the “principles and purposes
of sentencing in R.C. 2911, the seriousness and recidivism factors in R.C.
2929.12, and all other relevant sentencing statutes…” Jones concedes that
the trial court’s reasons for its findings need not be specified in the
sentencing entry “as long as they are discernable from the record as a
whole.” State v. Sheets, 2022-Ohio-6243, ¶ 24. However, Jones directs our
Jackson App. No. 23CA19 26
attention to several cases from other districts to demonstrate that Jones’
sentence is disproportionately high for the conduct alleged.
{¶55} We have reviewed these cases. We are not persuaded that the
trial court failed to consider the required sentencing factors for Failure to
Obey Signal or Order of Police Officer. Nor are we persuaded that Jones’
sentence is disproportionate. Our first observation is that in a majority of the
other cases, the defendants acknowledged their criminal conduct and pled
guilty to the offense. That alone differentiates Jones’ sentence.
{¶56} In State v. Webster, 2023-Ohio-2637, the 9th District noted,
beginning at ¶ 21:
Regarding the sentencing factors a court is required to
consider under Section 2929.11 and 2929.12, this Court
presumes that a trial court has properly considered the
statutes even if it does not put its consideration of them on
the record. State v. Fernandez, 2014-Ohio-3651, ¶ 8 (9th
Dist.). We have held that, “[u]nless the record shows that
the court failed to consider the factors, or that the sentence
is ‘strikingly inconsistent’ with the factors, the court is
presumed to have considered the statutory factors if the
sentence is within the statutory range.” Id., quoting State
v. Boysel, 2014-Ohio-1272, ¶ 13 (2d Dist.). We conclude
that the same presumption should apply to the sentencing
factors under Section 2921.331(C)(5)(b). State v.
Yarbrough, 2015-Ohio-1672, ¶ 17 (2d Dist.).
Other courts have reached the same analysis as the 2d and 9th Districts. See
State v. Wingate, 2020-Ohio-6796, ¶ 23 (3d Dist.); State v. Fiske, 2024-
Jackson App. No. 23CA19 27
Ohio-5467, ¶ 24 (5th Dist.); State v. Rochester, 2024-Ohio-5306, ¶ 45 (6th
Dist.); State v. Reed, 2008-Ohio-6082, (10th Dist.); and State v. Peoples,
2025-Ohio-1015, ¶ 15 (11th Dist.).
{¶57} Based on our review, we find no merit to Jones’ argument that
the trial court failed to consider the required sentencing factors and as such,
his sentence is disproportionate. At Jones’ sentencing, the prosecutor
reminded the court that Jones had not accepted responsibility for his actions.
Prior to imposition of his sentence, the trial court stated: “The Court would
note the presentence investigation report…Mr. Jones is continuing to deny
that he was driving the vehicle.”
{¶58} In the report, Jones was asked to provide an “Offender’s
Version” of the offense. Interestingly, despite being self-described as “high
myself on meth” at the time of the police pursuit, Jones’ description of the
twists and turns taken throughout Wellston and onto State Route 327 closely
mirrors Officer Fletcher’s testimony of the same. While the trial court did
not explicitly make reference to the R.C. 2921.331(C)(5)(b) factors, the trial
judge sat through the jury trial and the testimony of the officers who
described the distance and duration of their pursuit of Jones; the driving
infractions they observed; and the weather conditions at the time. Jones’
sentence is within the statutory range. In the absence of any indication in
Jackson App. No. 23CA19 28
this record that the court failed to consider the factors, we have no reason to
presume that the trial court did anything other than know the law and
properly apply the required R.C. 2921.331(C)(5)(b) factors. See State v.
Kimble, 2025-Ohio-310, ¶ 36 (6th Dist.); State v. Stevers, 2023-Ohio-3050, ¶
21 (4th Dist.), citing State v. Combs,18 Ohio St.3d 123, 125 (1985).
Accordingly, Jones’ third assignment of error is without merit and is hereby
overruled.
{¶59} Having found no merit to any of Jones’ assignments of error,
the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
JUDGMENT AFFIRMED.
Jackson App. No. 23CA19 29
JUDGMENT ENTRY
It is ordered that the JUDGMENT BE AFFIRMED and costs be
assessed to appellant.
The Court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.
It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this Court directing
the Jackson County Common Pleas Court to carry this judgment into
execution.
IF A STAY OF EXECUTION OF SENTENCE AND RELEASE
UPON BAIL HAS BEEN PREVIOUSLY GRANTED BY THE TRIAL
COURT OR THIS COURT, it is temporarily continued for a period not to
exceed 60 days upon the bail previously posted. The purpose of a continued
stay is to allow appellant to file with the Supreme Court of Ohio an
application for a stay during the pendency of proceedings in that court. If a
stay is continued by this entry, it will terminate at the earlier of the
expiration of the 60-day period, or the failure of the appellant to file a notice
of appeal with the Supreme Court of Ohio in the 45-day appeal period
pursuant to Rule II, Sec. 2 of the Rules of Practice of the Supreme Court of
Ohio. Additionally, if the Supreme Court of Ohio dismisses the appeal prior
to expiration of 60 days, the stay will terminate as of the date of such
dismissal.
A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to
Rule 27 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure.
Abele, J. and Hess, J. concur in Judgment and Opinion.
For the Court,
________________________
Jason P. Smith
Presiding Judge
NOTICE TO COUNSEL
Pursuant to Local Rule No. 14, this document constitutes a final
judgment entry and the time period for further appeal commences from
the date of filing with the clerk.