Hart v. Suffolk County

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

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WILLIE HART,

Plaintiff,

MEMORANDUM

v. AND ORDER

25-CV-0301-SJB-AYS

SUFFOLK COUNTY,

Defendant.

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BULSARA, United States District Judge:

Plaintiff Willie Hart (“Hart”), currently incarcerated at the Suffolk County

Correctional Facility (“SCCF”) in Riverhead, New York, filed this pro se action alleging

violations of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (“Section 1983”) by Suffolk County and Michael J. Brown

(“Brown”), Hart’s criminal defense attorney in a pending, underlying state court

prosecution.1 (Compl. dated Dec. 22, 2024 (“Compl.”), Dkt. No. 1 at 2; Am. Compl.

dated Mar. 3, 2025 (“Am. Compl.”), Dkt. No. 12 at 1–3).2 Hart also filed: (1) a motion for

leave to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”), (Mot. for Leave to Proceed in forma pauperis

dated Dec. 22, 2024 (“IFP Mot.”), Dkt. No. 4 at 2); (2) two motions for the appointment

of pro bono counsel to represent him in this case, (Mots. to Appoint Counsel dated

Feb. 7, 2025 and Mar. 1, 2025 (“PBC Mots.”), Dkt. Nos. 11, 14); and (3) two motions by

order to show cause seeking to enjoin the state court prosection and to secure the return

1 The Court dismissed the claims against Brown in light of the Stipulation of

Dismissal and Discontinuance filed by the parties on March 24, 2025. (Order dated

Mar. 25, 2025). Thus, Suffolk County is the sole Defendant.

2 All page numbers are in reference to the pages of the PDF.

of his retainer payment to Brown. (Orders to Show Cause filed Jan. 8, 2025 and Mar. 10,

2025 (“OSC”), Dkt. Nos. 2–3, 13).3 Hart’s application to proceed IFP is granted. But for

the reasons discussed below, Hart’s Complaint is dismissed because the Court is

required to abstain in the face of his pending criminal case pursuant to Younger v.

Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971).

FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Hart commenced this action on January 15, 2025 and filed an Amended

Complaint on March 10, 2025. The Amended Complaint alleges several due process

violations during Hart’s underlying state court criminal proceeding. Hart alleges that

the Suffolk County District Attorney was required to but failed to give him five days

judicial notice before the grand jury proceeding and that Suffolk County denied him a

pen and paper while in custody so that he could serve a notice to appear before the

grand jury. (Am. Compl. at 7). He further alleges that on October 16, 2023, he was

arraigned on a murder indictment, informed that the counsel he had retained was no

longer his attorney, and assigned counsel that he claims was ineffective for failure to file

a timely N.Y. Crim. Proc. L. § 190.50(5)(c) motion to dismiss the indictment. (Id.).

Hart requests relief in the form of a “preliminary injunction and temporary

restraining order” to halt his criminal case. (Id. at 6; see also OSC, Dkt. No. 13 at 1–2).

Hart also moved for the appointment of pro bono counsel on February 20, 2025 and

March 10, 2025. (PBC Mots., Dkt. Nos. 11, 14). Suffolk County filed a premotion

3 The OSC filed on January 15, 2025 is identical to the OSC filed on March 10,

2025 with the exception that the March filing has the handwritten notation “Amended

Complaint” at the top of the first page. (See OSC, Dkt. No. 13 at 1).

conference request seeking to dismiss the case on March 21, 2025, to which Hart did not

respond. (Def.’s Mot. for Premotion Conference dated Mar. 21, 2025, Dkt. No. 17 at 1).

For the reasons explained below, the Court must dismiss the claim.

DISCUSSION

A complaint must plead “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible

on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). “Threadbare recitals of

the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not

suffice.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). A complaint must contain more than

“naked assertion[s] devoid of further factual enhancement.” Id. (quotations

omitted). In other words, a plausible claim contains “factual content that allows the

court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct

alleged.” Id.; Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). “Factual allegations must be enough to raise a right

to relief above the speculative level, on the assumption that all the allegations in the

complaint are true (even if doubtful in fact).” Twombly, 550 U.S. 554, 555 (2007) (internal

citations omitted). The determination of whether a party has alleged a plausible claim

is “a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial

experience and common sense.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679; see also Escamilla v. Young Shing

Trading Co., No. 17-CV-652, 2018 WL 1521858, at *2 (E.D.N.Y. Jan. 8, 2018), report and

recommendation adopted, 2018 WL 1033249, at *3 (Feb. 23, 2018).

A pro se plaintiff’s pleadings are held “to less stringent standards than formal

pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (per curiam)

(quoting Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976)); see also Harris v. Mills, 572 F.3d 66, 72

(2d Cir. 2009) (noting that even after Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007),

courts “remain obligated to construe a pro se complaint liberally”). Nonetheless, under

28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B), a district court must dismiss an in forma pauperis action where

it is satisfied that the action “(i) is frivolous or malicious; (ii) fails to state a claim on

which relief may be granted; or (iii) seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is

immune from such relief.”

Hart seeks to enjoin an ongoing state criminal proceeding. Hart’s claim for

injunctive relief—for a “preliminary injunction and temporary restraining order” to

stop Suffolk County from “prosecuting [his case],” (Am. Compl. at 6)—is precluded by

Younger abstention, which “provides that ‘federal courts should generally refrain from

enjoining or otherwise interfering in ongoing state proceedings.’” Weiss v. New York,

No. 22-2326, 2024 WL 2837623, at *2 (2d Cir. June 5, 2024) (quoting Spargo v. N.Y.

Comm’n on Jud. Conduct, 351 F.3d 65, 74 (2d Cir. 2003)). “Younger exemplifies one class

of cases in which federal-court abstention is required: When there is a parallel, pending

state criminal proceeding, federal courts must refrain from enjoining the state

prosecution.” Sprint Commc’ns, Inc. v. Jacobs, 571 U.S. 69, 72 (2013). Enjoining Hart’s

state criminal prosecution is precisely the kind of interference that Younger precludes,

and the Court is required to abstain and dismiss such a request. E.g., Weinstein v. Vill. of

Briarcliff Manor, No. 21-CV-1996, 2021 WL 1063763, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 17, 2021)

(refusing to intervene in plaintiff’s “ongoing criminal proceedings” in state court

because of Younger).

Still, “[d]espite the strong policy in favor of abstention, a federal court may

nevertheless intervene in a state proceeding upon a showing of ‘bad faith, harassment

or any other unusual circumstance that would call for equitable relief.’” Diamond “D”

Const. Corp. v. McGowan, 282 F.3d 191, 198 (2d Cir. 2002) (quoting Younger, 401 U.S. at

54). “To invoke this exception, the federal plaintiff must show that the state proceeding

was initiated with and is animated by a retaliatory, harassing, or other illegitimate

motive.” Id. at 199. However, “[a] state proceeding that is legitimate in its purposes,

but unconstitutional in its execution . . . will not warrant the application of the bad faith

exception.” Id. Hart has not alleged any improper motive that could constitute bad

faith or some other extraordinary circumstance. Liberally construed, Hart’s Amended

Complaint alleges due process violations in the form of lack of notice, denial of access to

writing materials to pursue arguments in his case, and ineffective assistance of counsel

in his ongoing state criminal proceeding. (Am. Compl. at 5, 7). These allegations reflect

the sort of procedural defects that do not permit federal court intervention as an

exception to Younger abstension. See Diamond, 282 F.3d at 199; e.g., Barker v. Suffolk

Cnty., No. 24-CV-07941, 2024 WL 4827739, at *3 (E.D.N.Y. Nov. 18, 2024) (finding the

“bad faith” exception did not apply to allegations of constitutional rights violations in

the form of failure to follow criminal procedure laws and ineffective assistance of

counsel). Hart is free to raise his claims and arguments in his ongoing state case and/or

appeal. See Weiss, 2024 WL 2837623, at *2 (noting that there was no reason why the

plaintiff could not raise her constitutional claims and arguments in her state appeal).

And though Hart requests relief because he claims he has “no expectation of a fair or

favorable outcome,” (Am. Comp. at 6), such a conclusory recitation of the standard for

bad faith is insufficient. See Diamond, 282 F.3d at 199 (“[F]or a federal plaintiff to invoke

the bad faith exception, ‘the party bringing the state action must have no reasonable

expectation of obtaining a favorable outcome.’”) (quoting Cullen v. Fliegner, 18 F.3d 96,

103 (2d Cir. 1994)); e.g., Weinstein, 2021 WL 1063763, at *3 (“Beyond her conclusory

assertions of retaliation and conspiracy, Plaintiff has alleged no specific facts showing

bad faith, harassment, or irreparable injury with respect to her pending state-court

criminal proceeding.”).

Where a plaintiff “seeks exclusively injunctive relief relating to his on-going state

court criminal prosecution” and the Court “must abstain under the Younger abstention

doctrine,” the plaintiff fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted, and the

claim must be dismissed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). Hudson v. Camacho,

No. 15-CV-7313, 2016 WL 1248816, at *3 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 23, 2016).

Leave to Amend

“The Second Circuit has held that ‘[d]istrict courts should generally not dismiss a

pro se complaint without permitting at least one opportunity to amend, but granting

leave to amend is not necessary when it would be futile.’” Gross v. Intratek Comput. Inc.,

No. 22-CV-7440, 2023 WL 144129, at *3 (E.D.N.Y. Jan. 10, 2023) (quoting Lamb v. Cuomo,

698 F. App’x 1, 2 (2d Cir. 2017)). Here, Hart has already amended his complaint once,

and, given the application of Younger abstention to Hart’s claim for injunctive relief, the

Court concludes that any amendment would ultimately prove futile. See Haziz-

Ramadhan v. Specialized Loan Servicing, LLC, No. 23-CV-02671, 2023 WL 8003339, at *4

(E.D.N.Y. Nov. 17, 2023) (denying plaintiff leave to amend claims barred by, inter alia,

Younger abstention).

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Amended Complaint, filed in forma pauperis, is

dismissed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). Given the dismissal of the Amended

Complaint, Hart’s motions for the appointment of pro bono counsel are denied as moot.

The Court certifies pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3) that any appeal would not

be taken in good faith and, therefore, in forma pauperis status is denied for purpose of an

appeal. See Coppedge v. United States, 369 U.S. 438, 444–45 (1962).

The Clerk of Court is directed to close this case. The Clerk is also directed to mail

a copy of this Memorandum and Order and the Judgment to Hart at his address of

record with the notation “Legal Mail” on the envelope and record such mailing on the

docket.

SO ORDERED.

/s/ Sanket J. Bulsara

SANKET J. BULSARA

United States District Judge

Date: September 12, 2025

Central Islip, New York