HARVEY v. United States

In the United States Court of Federal Claims

No. 25-742

Filed: September 11, 2025

MICHAEL JEROME HARVEY and

MICHELE NICOLE WEST-HARVEY,

Plaintiffs,

v.

THE UNITED STATES,

Defendant.

Michael Jerome Harvey and Michele Nicole West-Harvey, Minneapolis, M.N., Pro Se.

Michael T. Collins, Attorney of Record, Tax Division, with Jason Bergmann, Assistant Chief

Court of Federal Claims Section, U.S. Department of Justice, Washington, D.C., for Defendant.

ORDER GRANTING IN FORMA PAUPERIS PETITION;

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER DISMISSING; AND

ORDER IMPOSING RULE 11 SANCTIONS 1

TAPP, Judge.

Pro Se Plaintiffs, Michael Jerome Harvey and Michele Nicole West-Harvey, (“the

Harveys”), seek the “immediate release” of a purported $1,454,859.00 tax refund, along with

$250,000.00 in compensatory damages, $500,000.00 in punitive damages, and a statutory

interest award of “no less than” $116,388.72—collectively $2,321,247.72. 2 (Compl. at 23:23,

1

While the Harveys have not previously filed in this Court, Plaintiff Michael Harvey has filed

two complaints in the District of Minnesota: Case Nos. 24-1173 (dismissed for failure to state a

claim and perfect service) and 25-1073 (dismissed as frivolous).

2

The Harveys identify themselves as representatives of their “personal estate trusts,” namely

“The Michael Jerome Harvey Trust” and “The Michele Nicole Harvey Trust,” and affix

copyright and trademark symbols to their names. (See Compl., ECF No. 1). These practices are

commonly associated with the sovereign citizen movement. See Wood v. United States, 161 Fed.

Cl. 30, 34–35 (2022); Potter v. United States, 161 Fed. Cl. 24, 28–29 (2022).

24:1–13, ECF No. 1). 3 The Harveys also seek a declaratory judgment acknowledging that their

tax returns were properly filed through a “valid hybrid accounting method pursuant to [Internal

Revenue Service’s (“IRS”)] regulations,” and that the agency’s failure to process their refund

constitutes both a constructive denial and an uncompensated taking under the Fifth Amendment.

(Id. at 24:14–26, 25:1–17). In lieu of pre-paying a filing fee, the Harveys request to proceed in

forma pauperis (“IFP Application”), (ECF No. 2). That motion is GRANTED.

The United States moves to dismiss the Harveys’ Complaint under the Rules of the

United States Court of Federal Claims (“RCFC”) 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6). (Def.’s Mot., ECF No.

6). The United States argues that the Harveys failed to pay a remaining tax underpayment

balance of $447.00, that their unsigned Form 1040—submitted in support of their refund claim—

was not “duly filed” within the meaning of I.R.C. § 7422(a), and that the Harveys’ remaining

claims fall outside the scope of the Court’s jurisdiction. (Def.’s Mot. at 4–10). The Court

GRANTS the United States’ Motion. In addition, given the Harveys’ recent filing of a violent,

graphic, and improper document entitled as a “motion,” the Court, alternatively imposes a

SANCTION pursuant to RCFC 11.

I. Background 4

The Harveys’ claim stems from the joint Form 1040 Individual Income Tax Return the

Harveys filed for the 2023 tax year, which included a reported $141,616.00 in federal income tax

withheld from W-2 wages totaling $157,794.00, and an additional $1,329,868.00 in estimated tax

payments they attribute to their respective “trusts.” (Compl. at 5:8; Pls.’ Exhibits (“Exs.”) at 17–

18, ECF No. 1-3). 5 This purportedly led to tax payments totaling $1,471,484 by the Harveys.

(Id.). After subtracting their self-assessed tax liability of $16,625.00, the Harveys claimed a

refundable credit of $1,454,859.00. (Id. at 18).

The Harveys allege that, along with their jointly filed Form 1040, they submitted a hybrid

form of payment including “[Committee on Uniform Security Identification Procedures

3

Because the Harveys’ submissions are not clearly paginated, citations throughout the Opinion

refer to the page number assigned by CM/ECF and line numbers within the text, respectively.

4

In considering the pending Motion to Dismiss, the Court assumes the facts alleged in the

Complaint to be true. Jones v. United States, 846 F.3d 1343, 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2017). This

summary of the facts does not constitute findings of fact but is simply a recitation of the

allegations.

5

The Harveys’ Exhibits were filed as one document and were neither labeled nor paginated. (See

generally Pls. Exhibits (“Exs.”), ECF No. 1-3). Therefore, citations to their Exhibits throughout

the Opinion refer to the page number assigned by CM/ECF.

Additionally. the Harveys allege that they filed their Form 1040 on April 2, 2024. (See Compl.

5:9–13). The Court notes, the referenced Form 1040 lacks a signature or date. (See Exs. at 17–

18).

2

(“CUSIP”)]-verified promissory notes, 1099-OID reports, Forms 8300 and 8281, and verifiable

Bloomberg terminal documentation showing the value and trading eligibility of each submitted

asset.” (Compl. at 5:21–23). 6 According to the Harveys, the IRS received and accepted their

payment methods without objection. (Id. at 8:4–9:20). Subsequently, the Harveys assert they

claimed a refund for $1,571,248.00. 7 (Pls.’ Exs. at 15 (Form 843 (Claim for Refund and Request

for Abatement)).

The following year, the Harveys purport that the IRS issued a notice indicating an

overpayment and entitlement to a refund, (“the Notice”). (Compl. at 11:21–24). The Harveys

assert that, within the Notice, the IRS revised their 2023 Form 1040 to reflect a refund

entitlement of $133,062.51—an amount representing less than ten percent of the refund claimed

in their Complaint. (Pls.’ Exs. at 62). 8 Following receipt of the Notice, the Harveys allege that

they engaged in multiple phone conversations with IRS representatives who “recommended”

they file an amended return and that their refund remained under review. 9 (Compl. at 12:3-5;

12:9–20). The Harveys purport that the IRS eventually informed them that their return “had not

been denied,” but “was pending further internal processing,” and no letter of disallowance would

be sent. (Id. at 12:15–18).

The Harveys filed this action, contending that the IRS has neither reimbursed them nor

provided a formal letter of disallowance rejecting the hybrid form of payment used in their 2023

income tax return. (Compl. at 12:22–25). According to the Harveys, the IRS acknowledged their

overpayment for more than 520 days, thereby “exceeding the 45-day statutory deadline for

refund issuance under I.R.C. § 6611(e).” (Id. at 7:3). The Harveys further allege that the IRS’s

delay is “intentional and systematic.” (Id. at 7:5). The Harveys err.

II. Discussion

The United States moves to dismiss the Harveys’ claims for lack of subject matter

jurisdiction under RCFC 12(b)(1). (Def.’s Mot. 4–6). Specifically, the United States argues that

6

See IRS, About Form 1099-OID, https://www.irs.gov/forms-pubs/about-form-1099-oid (last

visited July 3, 2025) (explaining that a Form 1099-OID reports taxable original issue discount

income on debt instruments).

7

The Court notes the amount claimed does not match the Harveys’ Form 1040, and that

discrepancy is unexplained. (Compare Pls.’ Exs. at 17–18 (claiming an entitlement of

$1,454,859.00), with Pls.’ Exs. at 15 (claiming a refund in the amount of $1,571,248.00)).

8

Importantly, the second page of the Notice has a section titled “Payments credited to your

account for 2023[.]” (Pls.’ Exs. at 63). Underneath that section, the IRS included the following

statement: “Our Records show that you didn’t make estimated tax payments.” (Id.).

9

Despite reporting multiple alleged conversations with IRS agents, the Harveys failed to identify

any personnel they spoke with, nor do they provide any phone records to substantiate their

claims.

3

the Harveys failed to pay their full tax liability, thereby depriving this Court of jurisdiction. (Id.

at 4–6). The United States also argues that the Harveys failed to state a claim because they failed

to adhere to the prerequisites established in § 7422(a) for duly filing an administrative claim. (Id.

at 6–8). The United States maintain that the Harveys have pleaded “no other cognizable claim.”

(Id. at 8–10). The Court finds that the Harveys have not presented any claims over which it may

properly exercise jurisdiction.

A plaintiff “has the burden of establishing jurisdiction by a preponderance of the

evidence.” Fid. & Guar. Ins. Underwriters, Inc. v. United States, 805 F.3d 1082, 1087 (Fed. Cir.

2015). Pro se plaintiffs are held to “less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by

lawyers.” Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972). However, “[t]his latitude . . . does not

relieve a pro se plaintiff from meeting jurisdictional requirements.” Bernard v. United States, 59

Fed. Cl. 497, 499 (2004), aff’d, 98 F. App’x 860 (Fed. Cir. 2004). When deciding whether to

dismiss a complaint, “this court must assume that all undisputed facts alleged in the complaint

are true and must draw all reasonable inferences in the non-movant’s favor.” Wall v. United

States, 141 Fed. Cl. 585, 592 (2019) (citing Erickson, v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007)).

To establish subject matter jurisdiction under RCFC 12(b)(1), a plaintiff must identify

and plead a separate source of money-mandating law that creates a substantive right to monetary

relief. Starr Int'l Co. v. United States, 856 F.3d 953, 980 (Fed. Cir. 2017). The Tucker Act gives

this Court subject matter jurisdiction over tax refund suits so long as certain prerequisites are

met. See United States v. Clintwood Elkhorn Mining Co., 553 U.S. 1, 4 (2008). First, the plaintiff

must pay the principal tax deficiency in full. 26 U.S.C. § 6511(a) (imposing statute of limitations

from when tax was paid); see Diamond v. United States, 603 Fed. Appx. 947, 950 (Fed. Cir.

2015). “Second, the plaintiff must duly file a tax refund claim with the IRS.” Estate of Armitage

v. United States, 176 Fed. Cl. 199, 203 (2025) (citing 26 U.S.C. § 7422(a) (“No suit or

proceeding shall be maintained in any court for the recovery of any internal revenue tax alleged

to have been erroneously or illegally assessed or collected . . . until a claim for refund or credit

has been duly filed with the Secretary [of the Treasury.]”)); see also Shore v. United States, 9

F.3d 1524, 1526–27 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (discussing how the principal tax deficiency must be paid

in full or the claims will be dismissed). If the plaintiff fails to satisfy these requirements, this

Court lacks jurisdiction to hear their tax refund claims. See Estate of Armitage, 176 Fed. Cl. at

203 (citing Clintwood Elkhorn, 553 U.S. at 4). The Court will address each prong in turn.

First, the Harveys must pay the disputed tax in full for this Court to have jurisdiction over

a Tucker Act tax claim. See 26 U.S.C. § 6511(a); see Shore, 9 F.3d at 1526. The Harveys’

Complaint includes a Form 1040 showing $16,625 in self-assessed liability. (See Pls.’ Exs. at

18). Unfortunately, the Harveys failed to provide receipts, checks, bank withdrawals, or any

other evidence from which the Court could determine that the Harveys paid their self-assessed

tax obligation to the IRS. (See generally Pls.’ Exs.). The Harveys assert they utilized “financial

instruments” including “CUSIP-verified promissory notes, 1099-OID reports, Forms 8300 and

8281, and verifiable Bloomberg terminal documentation” to satisfy their tax obligations. (Compl.

at 8:4–14). The United States argues these payment methods are invalid. (Def’s. Mot. at 4–6).

4

On a motion to dismiss the Court “must accept as true the allegations in the complaint.”

Engage Learning, Inc. v. Salazar, 660 F.3d 1346, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2011). However, if the

government challenges a plaintiff's allegations of jurisdiction in a motion to dismiss under RCFC

12(b)(1), only those factual allegations that the government does not controvert are accepted as

true. Shoshone Indian Tribe of Wind River Rsrv. v. United States, 672 F.3d 1021, 1030 (Fed. Cir.

2012). “[T]he Court of Federal Claims “may consider relevant evidence in order to resolve the

factual dispute.’” Freeman v. United States, 875 F.3d 623, 627 (2017) (quoting Banks v. United

States, 741 F.3d 1268, 1277 (Fed. Cir. 2014)).

Generally, the Court agrees with the United States. 10 See Williams v. United States, 112

Fed. Cl. 67, 77 (2013) (“A Form 1099-OID cannot be used to establish tax payment, as that form

is used solely to report original issue discount income and related withholding.”); Montagne v.

United States, 90 Fed. Cl. 41, 48 (2009) (promissory notes not drawn from legitimate and

identifiable financial institutions not recognized as valid payment for tax obligations). However,

in support of their claims, the Harveys submitted the Notice as proof of the IRS’s confirmation

that the Harveys are entitlement to a refund of $133,062.51. (Pls.’ Exs. at 62). In opposition, the

United States attaches IRS Wage and Income Transcripts (“the Transcripts”) indicating that the

Harveys’ total federal withholdings for the 2023 tax year amounted to $16,178.00. (See Def.’s

Exs. 1, 2, ECF Nos. 6-1, 6-2). The United States also asserts that per the Harveys’ own

calculations, they were required to pay $16,625.00 in taxes, which would still leave a balance

due of $447.00. (Def.’s Mot. at 4; see also Pls.’ Exs. at 18).

While the Court agrees that the Harveys have a jurisdictional prerequisite to pay their full

tax liability, Ledford v. United States, 297 F.3d 1378, 1382 (Fed. Cir. 2002), neither Party has

explained the relationship between the Notice indicating a refund due of $133,062.51, and the

Transcripts provided by the United States. In fact, the United States does not even seem to

question the legitimacy of the Notice. Nonetheless, because there are alternative grounds on

which the Court may properly dismiss this case, as discussed below, engaging in this factual

examination is unnecessary.

The United States also argues that the Harveys failed to “duly file” an administrative

claim for refund with the IRS within the meaning of I.R.C. § 7422(a) because their Form 1040

was unsigned. (Def.’s Mot. at 6). The Court agrees.

Section 7422(a) states that “[n]o suit or proceeding shall be maintained . . . until a claim

for refund or credit has been duly filed with the Secretary, according to the provisions of law in

10

Form 8300 reports certain cash payments received by businesses, while Form 8281 reports

income from publicly offered original issue discount (OID) instruments. See Form 8300

Reference Guide, INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, https://www.irs.gov/businesses/small-

businesses-self-employed/irs-form-8300-reference-guide (last visited July 9, 2025); About Form

8281, INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, https://www.irs.gov/forms-pubs/about-form-8281 (last

visited July 9, 2025). Neither of which establish payment of taxes.

5

that regard, and the regulations of the Secretary established in pursuance thereof.” I.R.C. §

7422(a) (emphasis added). For a claim to be duly filed:

The claim must set forth in detail each ground upon which a credit or refund

is claimed and facts sufficient to apprise the Commissioner of the exact basis

thereof. The statement of the grounds and facts must be verified by a written

declaration that is made under the penalties of perjury. A claim which does

not comply with this paragraph will not be considered for any purpose as a

claim for refund or credit.

Treas. Reg. § 301.6402-2(b)(1) (emphasis added). The Federal Circuit noted that an exception to

the taxpayer signature requirement may be made only when “a legal representative certifies the

claim and attaches evidence of a valid power of attorney.” Brown v. United States, 22 F.4th

1008, 1012 (2022) (quoting Gregory v. United States, 149 Fed. Cl. 719, 723 (2020)). In making

this determination, the Circuit relied on language found in Title 26, §§ 6061(a) and 6065. Id.

Section 6061(a) states that “any return . . . or other document required to be made under

any provision of the internal revenue laws or regulations shall be signed in accordance with

forms or regulations prescribed by the Secretary.” Section 6065 of the U.S. Code, provides that

“[e]xcept as otherwise provided by the Secretary, any return . . . or other document required to be

made under any provision of the internal revenue laws or regulations shall contain or be verified

by a written declaration that it is made under the penalties of perjury.” These sections “impose a

default rule that individual taxpayers must personally sign and verify their income tax refund

claims[,]” and failure to meet these requirements renders the documents invalid and of no legal

effect. Dixon v. United States, 67 F.4th 1156, 1160 (2023) (quoting Brown, 22 F.4th at 1012). A

refund suit in which a taxpayer fails to duly file their claim, shall be dismissed “for failure to

state a claim upon which relief can be granted[.]” Brown, 22 F.4th at 1012 (citing RCFC

12(b)(6)).

Here, the Harveys provided the Court with copies of their Form 1040, alleging they were

filed with the IRS. (Pls.’ Exs. at 17–18). However, as the United States points out, this document

is devoid of the Harveys’ signatures. (See id.). Further still, the Harveys have neither alleged nor

provided evidence that their claim was signed by a representative operating under a valid power

of attorney, in accordance with the exception in Brown. (See Pls.’ Exs.; Brown, 22 F.4th at

1012). Thus, Plaintiffs have failed to duly file their claims pursuant to § 7422(a), and their tax

refund claim must be dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.

Brown, 22 F.4th at 1012–13 (finding dismissal pursuant to RCFC 12(b)(6) proper when the

signature and verification requirements were not met). 11

11

“Under United States v. Dalm, . . . [duly] filing is a jurisdictional requirement, while the

adequacy of that filing is a claims-processing requirement.” Duke v. United States, 173 Fed. Cl.

630, 633 (2024) (citing 494 U.S. 596, 609–10 (1990); Vensure HR, Inc. v. United States, 119

F.4th 7, 12–16 (Fed. Cir. 2024)). This Court and the Circuit routinely confirm that the signature

requirement is statutory and not a standard for assessing filing adequacy. Brown, 22 F.4th at

6

The Court notes that even if it were to find the lack of signatures to be of no

consequence, the Harveys’ claim would still fail for being filed prematurely with this Court.

“Under 26 U.S.C. § 6532 and § 7422(a), a suit may be brought in the [Court of Federal Claims]

after an administrative claim has been filed and either the taxpayer waited six months before

filing suit or the IRS took final action on the claim.” Brown, 22 F.4th at 1010) (emphasis added);

see also Dixon, 67 F.4th at 1156 (“Just as there are timing requirements for filing refund claims

with the IRS, there are both timing and other requirements for filing refund claims in court.”).

Section 6532(a) specifies that no suit shall begin “before the expiration of [six] months from the

date of filing the claim required under such section unless the Secretary renders a decision

thereon within that time.” 26 U.S.C. § 6532(a)(1).

The Harveys assert they filed their claim with the IRS utilizing Form 843. (Compl. at

3:18–20). Form 843 is signed and dated December 12, 2024, which is the earliest date that the

IRS could have received a validly executed claim from the Harveys. (Pls. Exs. at 5, 15). The

Harveys filed this suit on April 29, 2025, approximately four and a half months after filing their

claim with the IRS, in violation of the six-month waiting period established by statute. (See 26

U.S.C. §§ 6532, 7422(a)). Under these circumstances, the Harveys’ premature Complaint

deprives this Court of jurisdiction. See Lofton v. United States, No. 22-1335C, 2022 WL

17086753, at *2 (Fed. Cl. Nov. 18, 2022) (“The irony is not lost on the Court that this Order of

Dismissal is being issued on the precise date that [plaintiff]’s statutory six-month waiting period

expires.”), aff’d, No. 2023-1181, 2023 WL 3881362 (Fed. Cir. June 8, 2023); see also Thomas v.

United States, 56 Fed. Cl. 112, 120 (2003) (holding the court lacks jurisdiction where the

plaintiff filed its claim prematurely under 26 U.S.C. § 6532(a)).

In sum, even if jurisdiction existed, the Court must dismiss the Harveys’ claim for a tax

refund under RCFC 12(b)(6). The Harveys were required to properly file a tax return and then

seek a refund from the IRS before filing in this Court. Furthermore, they failed to observe the

required six-month waiting period between submitting their administrative claim and filing suit.

The Harveys have not stated a claim upon which relief can be granted.

The Harveys present several other theories upon which they believe they are entitled to

compensation, but these claims are not adequately stated and/or fall outside the Court’s

jurisdiction. (Compl. at 9:21–10:15). First, the Harveys claim that the IRS violated “APA §

555(e) by failing to issue a formal notice of disallowance or agency determination.” (Id. at 9:26–

28). However, “[t]he APA is not a money-mandating statute[,]” and therefore cannot serve as a

basis for jurisdiction under the Tucker Act. Harlem Globetrotters Int’l, Inc. v. United States, 168

Fed. Cl. 31, 42 (2023); see also Murphy v. United States, 993 F.2d 871, 874 (“[T]he Claims

Court has no authority to invoke the APA.”). Therefore, this claim must fail.

1012-13 (citing Diamond v. United States, 107 Fed. Cl. 702, 705 (2012); Selgas v.

Commissioner, 475 F.3d 697, 700–01 (5th Cir. 2007)).

7

The Harveys also invoke the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment, asserting that the

IRS’s refusal to release the refund allegedly owed to them constitutes an “unlawful deprivation

of private property without due process.” (Compl. at 10:1–2). Claims for tax refunds and related

damages based on alleged takings are rooted in the Federal Government’s power to impose

taxes, not in the unlawful seizure of private property governed by the Takings Clause. El v.

United States, 144 Fed. Cl. 741, 753 (2019). While the Federal Government’s taxing authority

can be viewed as a form of taking, it does not amount to a compensable “taking” under the Fifth

Amendment. U.S. Shoe Corp. v. United States, 296 F.3d 1378, 1383 (Fed. Cir. 2002), cert

denied, 538 U.S. 1056 (2003); see also Skillo v. United States, 68 Fed. Cl. 734, 743 (2005)

(holding that the collection of taxes does not amount to a prohibited Fifth Amendment taking).

Therefore, this argument is meritless.

Next, the Harveys raised claims of unjust enrichment, arguing that the IRS “has received

value” and “credited their account” by withholding funds for which they are entitled. (Compl. at

18:6–19). The theory of unjust enrichment “assumes the existence of a contract implied in law . .

. [and] this court [has] no jurisdiction over such a claim.” Glopak Corp. v. United States, 12 Cl.

Ct. 96, 104 n.6 (1987), aff'd, 851 F.2d 334 (Fed. Cir. 1988)) (alterations added); see also United

States v. Mitchell, 463 U.S. 206, 218 (1983) (“[W]e have held that the [Tucker] Act does not

reach claims based on contracts implied in law, as opposed to those implied in fact.”); Martinez

v. United States, 48 Fed. Cl. 851, 864 (2001) (“the claim of unjust enrichment or breach of an

implied-in-law contract, is a wholly-equitable action which is clearly outside of this court's

jurisdiction.”). The Harveys have not alleged the existence of a contract with the United States.

Therefore, the Harveys’ unjust enrichment claim fails.

The Harveys also seek compensatory damages for emotional and psychological distress,

financial hardship and deprivation of liquid assets, imminent loss of their residence, and harm to

their credit. (Compl. at 7:7–15, 19:22–20:3, 24:4–9). To the extent the Harveys seek to raise

claims based on torts, these also fall outside of this Court’s jurisdiction. Thompson v. United

States, 145 Fed. Cl. 641, 645 (2019) (dismissing litany of claims including intentional fraud,

theft, financial losses, misrepresentation, false imprisonment, emotional infliction of mental

distress, trespassing to land, trespass to chattel, conversion, and duress) (citing Haka v. United

States, 107 Fed. Cl. 111, 114 (2012)). The Tucker Act “excludes from the United States Court of

Federal Claims jurisdiction claims sounding in tort.” Rick's Mushroom Serv. v. United States,

521 F.3d 1338, 1343 (2008); see also Shearin v. United States, 992 F.2d 1195, 1197 (Fed. Cir.

1993) (“It is well settled that the United States Court of Federal Claims lacks jurisdiction to

entertain tort claims.”). Furthermore, the Harveys have not supplied any evidence demonstrating

that the Government caused their financial difficulties. Aboo v. United States, 86 Fed. Cl. 618,

632 (2009) (“[Plaintiff] has put forward no evidence to indicate his financial hardship was the

result of the government acting in a wrongful or improper manner.”). Because these claims all

sound in tort, they must fail.

The Harveys also request that the Court award $500,000 in punitive damages. (Compl. at

24:9–26). Yet again, these demands fall outside of the scope of the Court’s jurisdiction. See

Rogers v. United States, 66 F. App'x 195, 197 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (affirming dismissal for lack of

8

subject-matter jurisdiction where the plaintiff sought compensatory damages because the Tucker

Act precludes claims for “tort damages”); Woods v. United States, 122 F. App'x 989, 991 (Fed.

Cir. 2004) (“[E]ven if the trial court had jurisdiction over any of [plaintiff's] asserted claims, it

would not have had the power to grant punitive damages, as [plaintiff] requested.”).

Accordingly, for these substantive reasons, the Harveys’ Complaint must be dismissed.

One serious ancillary issue also requires attention. During the pendency of briefing on the

Motion to Dismiss, and unrelated to the merits of their claims, the Harveys submitted to the

Court on August 7, 2025, a filing bearing the title “Motion that Plaintiff Michele West Should

Kill Myself Pursuant to Rule 0000.” 12 The submission is saturated with profane and

reprehensible material, including racial slurs, graphic suggestions of sexual assault, and

photographic depictions of self-harm. Such content is not merely inappropriate; it is an affront to

the dignity of these proceedings and a blatant abuse of the judicial process. It is also a threat;

albeit not a threat directed at the Court, but a threat of violence, nonetheless. Receipt of this

scandalous filing necessitated a referral to law enforcement out of concern for the Harveys’

safety. There is no proper purpose for such a document, nor do the Harveys attempt to offer one;

its only conceivable purpose was to intimidate or coerce the Court towards favorable treatment.

The Court will not permit its docket to be weaponized in this matter. Accordingly, the Harveys

were ordered to show cause why sanctions should not be imposed. (Order to Show Cause, ECF

No. 16).

This Court has authority to sanction based on RCFC 11, which requires attorneys or

unrepresented parties to make certain certifications about any documents presented to the court,

based on “an inquiry reasonable under the circumstances.” 13 RCFC 11(b). In most federal

jurisdictions, it is well-settled that federal courts may impose sanctions pursuant to Rule 11 even

after dismissal of the merits of the case. See Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx Corp., 496 U.S. 384,

394–98 (1990); see also Bolivar v. Pocklington, 975 F.2d 28, 32–33 (1st Cir. 1992) (finding Rule

11 sanctions appropriate when there was “no objectively reasonable inquiry into whether the

complaint was warranted under existing law[.]”); DiPaolo v. Moran, 407 F.3d 140, 144 (3rd Cir.

2005) (“Rule 11 authorizes sanctions against the signer of any pleading, motion or other

paper.”); Bakker v. Grutman, 942 F.2d 236, 240 (4th Cir. 1991) (finding that Rule 11 sanctions

may be imposed for the filing of frivolous or legally unreasonable papers regardless if such

12

Given the graphic and disturbing nature of the Harveys’ filing, the Court initially directed that

the document not be filed and therefore available to the public. For purposes of appellate review,

and otherwise subject to the orders of the Court or a higher court, the Clerk is DIRECTED to

file UNDER SEAL the Harveys’ August 7, 2025 document, with its attached photographic

exhibits, contemporaneously with the entry of this Order.

13

The Rules of the United States Court of Federal Claims (RCFC) closely track the Federal

Rules of Civil Procedure (FRCP). See RCFC 2002 Rules Committee Note (“[I]nterpretation of

the court's rules will be guided by case law and the Advisory Committee Notes that accompany

the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.”). Because RCFC 11 is substantially identical to Rule 11 of

the FRCP, the court relies on precedent interpreting both provisions. Compare RCFC 11, with

FRCP 11.

9

documents were the result of inexperience, incompetence, or deliberate choice); American

Inmate Paralegal Assoc. v. Cline, 859 F.2d 59, 62 (8th Cir. 1990) (per curiam), (dismissal of

lawsuit pursuant to Rule 11 was appropriate even if the complaint had merit in light of

voluminous number of frivolous documents filed with the court), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 996

(1988). Warren v. Guelker, 29 F.3d 1386, 1390 (9th Cir. 1994) (“Rule 11’s express goal is

deterrence: IFP litigants, proceeding at the expense of taxpayers, need to be deterred from filing

frivolous lawsuits as much as litigants who can afford to pay their own fees and costs.”); Thomas

v. Evans, 880 F.2d 1235, 1239 (11th Cir. 1989) (a party may be sanctioned under Rule 11 for

filing a pleading that has no reasonable legal or factual basis or is filed for an improper

purpose.).

Aside from the Court’s Rule 11 authority to regulate the conduct of attorneys and parties

before it, courts “have the inherent power to control litigation by imposing sanctions appropriate

to rectify improper conduct by litigants.” PS Products Inc., v. Panther Trading Co., 122 F.4th

893, 898 (quoting Micron Tech., Inc. v. Rambus Inc., 645 F.3d1311, 1326 (Fed. Cir. 2011)

(internal citation and quotation marks omitted). While a preference exists for utilization of Rule

11 sanctions, when “there were no other mechanisms to sanction [a party’s] bad faith conduct

except the court's inherent power, the … court acted within its discretion by relying on its

inherent power to sanction conduct that would typically fall under Rule 11. PS Products, 122

F.4th at 900–01. For the reasons set forth below, the Court finds that no other mechanisms—

whether under Rule 11 or the Court’s inherent powers—are available to sanction the Harveys’

gross misconduct except dismissal.

In response to the Court’s order to show cause, the Harveys filed a fifteen-page document

that does little more than recite arguments made in their previous filings. (Pls.’ Resp. to Court’s

Order, ECF No. 17). Instead of offering any explanation for their disturbing filing, the Harveys

simply state that “[s]anctions or dismissal for noncompliance would be disproportionate given

Plaintiffs’ active cooperation and the substantial legal and factual merits of the claims

presented.” (Id. at 5). Not a single word is responsive to the Court’s directive to show cause. The

Harveys’ response does not demonstrate any awareness of their misconduct, nor indicate any

intent to forego the use of inappropriate tactics and scurrilous material in the future. Therefore,

pursuant to RCFC 11, or alternatively, the Court’s inherent authority, the Court finds that

dismissal of their Complaint, as an alternative to the substantive grounds for dismissal discussed

previously is warranted.

The Court notes the unusual nature of this sanction. In not quite 21 years of service on

three different courts, the Court cannot recall another instance in which it imposed Rule 11

sanctions, or dismissal using its inherent authority, on a pro se litigant. It is a drastic remedy, and

one which the Court does not resort to lightly.

In reaching this decision, the Court has also considered the availability of other remedies

including an admonition, contempt, therapeutic intervention, and monetary sanctions. None are

appropriate. First, the Harveys’ recent conduct in failing to meaningfully respond to the Court’s

directive to show cause indicates an admonition would be ineffectual. In the face of the Court’s

expressed concern, the Harveys’ silence speaks volumes: they simply are unconcerned with the

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impropriety of their own conduct. Second, the gravity of a contempt citation requires, in the

Court’s assessment, an in-person proceeding which would require either travel by the Harveys to

Washington D.C. or the Court to their locale. The Harveys are paupers. The cost of travel to the

National Courts Building is prohibitive for indigent litigants. Travel by the Court to Minneapolis

creates additional taxpayer burden, and at the conclusion of an in-person proceeding, the Court

would still be confronted with the same issue: fashioning an appropriate sanction. Third, a court-

ordered mental health assessment presents similar logistical issues. The Court is not well-

positioned to be aware of appropriate mental health resources in Minneapolis nor is it aware of

any resources readily available for compensation for those costs. Finally, the Court has

considered imposition of a monetary sanction. The futility of doing so is obvious: if the Harvey’s

are unable to pay the filing fee for their underlying action, a financial sanction is not only

counterintuitive, but it also creates additional future issues should the Harveys prove

intransigent.

The Court is unaware of other sanctions for the Harveys’ misconduct. Given their failure

to articulate even a sliver of remorse or appreciation of the wrongfulness of using such tactics in

an ineffectual attempt to influence the Court, some measure must be imposed to not only punish

their own conduct but to deter future analogous misconduct by others, even those proceeding pro

se. Whether dismissal under these unique circumstanced is couched as an exercise of authority

conveyed by RCFC 11 or one which the Court inherently possesses, is largely immaterial.

Conclusion

For the reasons stated above, the United States’ Motion to Dismiss, (ECF No. 6), is

GRANTED. For purposes of this case the Harveys’ Motion for Leave to Proceed in forma

pauperis, (IFP App., ECF No. 2), is also GRANTED. 14 Considering this decision, the Harvey’s

Motion for Summary Judgment, (ECF No. 8), is DENIED as MOOT. The Clerk SHALL enter

judgment accordingly.

As to the Harveys’ filing titled “Motion that Plaintiff Michele West Should Kill

Myself Pursuant to Rule 0000,” the Court believes that it should be docketed given its basis as

a sanction. However, this filing includes images and messaging inappropriate for this Court.

Therefore, the Clerk is DIRECTED to ACCEPT and SEAL this filing.

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The Harveys purport that they earn approximately $6,500.00 (gross pay/wages) a month,

collectively. (IFP App. at 2). They list monthly expenses which when subtracted from their pay

leaves them with $1,917.90 monthly, however some of the listed expenses are questionable. (See

id. (including vehicle repairs and education materials as monthly expenses)).

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The Clerk is directed to REJECT any future submissions in this case unless they comply

with this Court’s rules regarding post-dismissal submissions.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

David A. Tapp

DAVID A. TAPP, Judge

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