Bradley v. Eichhorn

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO

EASTERN DIVISION

CALVIN BRADLEY,

Plaintiff,

v. Civil Action 2:25-cv-959

Chief Judge Sarah D. Morrison

Magistrate Judge Chelsey M. Vascura

MATTHEW EICHHORN, et al.,

Defendants.

ORDER and REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

Plaintiff, Calvin Bradley, an Ohio resident proceeding without the assistance of counsel,

sues the Washington County Sheriff’s Department,1 two of its officers, and the City of Belpre,

Ohio, under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for violation of his Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights.

Plaintiff has submitted a request to proceed in forma pauperis. (ECF No. 1.) The Court

GRANTS Plaintiff’s request to proceed in forma pauperis. All judicial officers who render

services in this action shall do so as if the costs had been prepaid. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a).

This matter is also before the Court for the initial screen of Plaintiff’s Complaint (ECF

No. 1-2) as required by 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) to identify cognizable claims and to recommend

dismissal of Plaintiff’s Complaint, or any portion of it, which is frivolous, malicious, fails to

state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is

1 Plaintiff’s Complaint alleges that Defendants were “Washington County Police” officers, but

Washington County has a Sheriff’s Department, not a police department. See

https://www.washingtoncountysheriff.org/, last visited September 9, 2025.

immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). Having performed the initial screen, Plaintiff

MAY PROCEED on Counts I, II, III, and V of his Complaint against Defendants Eichhorn and

Peters for damages in their individual capacities, but for the reasons below, the undersigned

RECOMMENDS that the Court DISMISS Plaintiff’s remaining claims under § 1915(e)(2)(B)

for failure to state a claim on which relief can be granted.

I. BACKGROUND

Plaintiff alleges that on August 5, 2024, he was a passenger in a ride share vehicle that

was pulled over by officers of the Washington County Sheriff’s Department, Defendants

Matthew Eichhorn and Justin Peters, for speeding. Despite Plaintiff’s assertion that he did not, as

a mere passenger, wish to participate in the traffic stop, Eichhorn and Peters conducted a K-9

search of the vehicle, and the dog was allegedly manipulated to hit on the window nearest

Plaintiff. Plaintiff asserts that the dog was a marijuana-trained K-9 whose use is no longer

permitted after the passage of Ohio Issue 2 in November 2023, which legalized possession of

recreational marijuana.

The officers then ordered the driver and Plaintiff to exit the vehicle. Plaintiff was

subjected to a soft pat down, after which one of the officers attempted a second, more invasive

pat down, to which Plaintiff objected. Plaintiff then attempted to exit the scene. The officers gave

chase and apprehended Plaintiff, punching him multiple times in the process. Upon a subsequent

search of Plaintiff’s person, the officers found “an illegal substance” in Plaintiff’s possession.

According to the docket for State of Ohio v. Bradley, 24 CR 000567, currently pending in the

Court of Common Pleas for Washington County, Ohio, charges of trafficking and possession of

cocaine and fentanyl, as well as failure to comply with an order or signal of police, remain

pending against Plaintiff.2

Plaintiff’s Complaint advances seven counts under 42 U.S.C. § 1983: (I) unlawful seizure

and detention, (II) unlawful search without consent, (III) false imprisonment, (IV) racial

discrimination and profiling, (V) unlawful arrest without probable cause, (VI) municipal liability

against the City of Belpre, Ohio, and the Washington County Sheriff’s Department, and

(VII) unlawful search and seizure via the improper use of a marijuana-trained K-9. Plaintiff

seeks compensatory and punitive damages, attorney’s fees and costs, and declaratory and

injunctive relief. (Compl., ECF No. 1-2.)

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Congress enacted 28 U.S.C. § 1915, the federal in forma pauperis statute, seeking to

“lower judicial access barriers to the indigent.” Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 31 (1992). In

doing so, however, “Congress recognized that ‘a litigant whose filing fees and court costs are

assumed by the public, unlike a paying litigant, lacks an economic incentive to refrain from

filing frivolous, malicious, or repetitive lawsuits.’” Id. at 31 (quoting Neitzke v. Williams, 490

U.S. 319, 324 (1989)). To address this concern, Congress included subsection (e) as part of the

statute, which provides:

(2) Notwithstanding any filing fee, or any portion thereof, that may have been paid,

the court shall dismiss the case at any time if the court determines that—

* * *

2 This Court properly takes judicial notice of the state-court dockets relating to Plaintiff’s state-

court criminal proceedings pursuant to Federal Rule of Evidence 201(b). Cf. Buck v. Thomas M.

Cooley Law Sch., 597 F.3d 812, 816 (6th Cir. 2010) (“Although typically courts are limited to

the pleadings when faced with a motion [to dismiss], a court may take judicial notice of other

court proceedings without converting the motion into one for summary judgment.”).

(B) the action or appeal—

(i) is frivolous or malicious; [or]

(ii) fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted . . . .

28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i) & (ii); Denton, 504 U.S. at 31. Thus, § 1915(e) requires sua sponte

dismissal of an action upon the Court’s determination that the action is frivolous or malicious, or

upon determination that the action fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.

To properly state a claim upon which relief may be granted, a plaintiff must satisfy the

basic federal pleading requirements set forth in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a). See also

Hill v. Lappin, 630 F.3d 468, 470–71 (6th Cir. 2010) (applying Federal Rule of Civil Procedure

12(b)(6) standards to review under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915A and 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii)). Under Rule

8(a)(2), a complaint must contain a “short and plain statement of the claim showing that the

pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Thus, Rule 8(a) “imposes legal and factual

demands on the authors of complaints.” 16630 Southfield Ltd., P’Ship v. Flagstar Bank, F.S.B.,

727 F.3d 502, 503 (6th Cir. 2013).

Although this pleading standard does not require “detailed factual allegations, a pleading

that offers labels and conclusions or a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action”

is insufficient. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (cleaned up). A complaint will not

“suffice if it tenders naked assertion devoid of further factual enhancement.” Id. (cleaned up).

Instead, to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, “a complaint must contain sufficient

factual matter to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Id. (cleaned up). Facial

plausibility is established “when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw

the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. “The

plausibility of an inference depends on a host of considerations, including common sense and the

strength of competing explanations for the defendant’s conduct.” Flagstar Bank, 727 F.3d at 504

(citations omitted). Further, the Court holds pro se complaints “to less stringent standards than

formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Garrett v. Belmont Cty. Sheriff’s Dep’t, 374 F. App’x 612,

614 (6th Cir. 2010) (quoting Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972)). This lenient

treatment, however, has limits; “courts should not have to guess at the nature of the claim

asserted.” Frengler v. Gen. Motors, 482 F. App’x 975, 976–77 (6th Cir. 2012) (quoting Wells v.

Brown, 891 F.2d 591, 594 (6th Cir. 1989)).

III. ANALYSIS

Having conducted the initial screen of Plaintiff’s Complaint, Plaintiff may proceed on

Counts I, II, III, and V of his Complaint against Defendants Eichhorn and Peters for damages in

their individual capacities. The undersigned recommends that the remaining claims be dismissed.

First, Plaintiff’s claims for declaratory and injunctive relief (against all Defendants) must

be dismissed. “When seeking declaratory and injunctive relief, a plaintiff must show actual

present harm or a significant possibility of future harm in order to demonstrate the need for

preenforcement review.” Nat’l Rifle Ass’n of Am. v. Magaw, 132 F.3d 272, 279 (6th Cir. 1997).

In other words, “[p]ast harm allows a plaintiff to seek damages, but it does not entitle a plaintiff

to seek injunctive or declaratory relief.” Kanuszewski v. Michigan Dep’t of Health & Hum.

Servs., 927 F.3d 396, 406 (6th Cir. 2019). Plaintiff does not allege any ongoing or likely future

violations of his constitutional rights. His claims for declaratory judgment and injunctive relief

must therefore be dismissed.

Further, as Plaintiff is proceeding without the assistance of counsel, his claims for

attorney’s fees are not viable. See Wright v. Crowell, 674 F.2d 521, 522 (6th Cir. 1982) (“a pro

se litigant is not entitled to an award of attorney fees under 42 U.S.C. § 1988.”).

Moreover, Plaintiff has not stated a claim against the City of Belpre, Ohio. Although

Plaintiff alleges that the incident underlying his claims occurred in Belpre, Ohio, the officers

involved were officers of the Washington County Sheriff’s Department. Plaintiff’s Complaint

does not make any allegations against the City of Belpre, its agents, or its employees. Any claims

against the City of Belpre, Ohio, must therefore be dismissed.

Plaintiff also has not stated a claim for municipal liability against the Washington County

Sheriff’s Department. To begin, the Washington County Sheriff’s Office is not an appropriate

Defendant because, as a county department, it is not sui juris—that is, it lacks the capacity to be

sued. See, e.g., Carmichael v. City of Cleveland, 571 F. App’x 426, 435 (6th Cir. 2014)

(affirming district court’s holding that sheriff’s department, as arm of the county, is not sui juris).

Plaintiff’s claims against the Washington County Sheriff’s Office must therefore be dismissed.

But even if the Court were to liberally construe Plaintiff’s Complaint to advance claims

against Washington County through its Board of Commissioners, see Ohio Revised Code

§ 305.12, those claims could not survive. “[A] local government may not be sued under § 1983

for an injury inflicted solely by its employees or agents. Instead, it is when execution of a

government’s policy or custom . . . inflicts the injury that the government as an entity is

responsible under § 1983.” Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978); Nichols v.

Wayne Cty. Mich., 822 F. App’x 445, 448 (6th Cir. 2020) (“To state a municipal-liability claim

under § 1983, the plaintiff must allege the deprivation (1) of a right secured by the Constitution

or laws of the United States, (2) that was directly caused by a municipal policy or custom.”)

(citing Hardrick v. City of Detroit, 876 F.3d 238, 243 (6th Cir. 2017)). A plaintiff may prove an

unconstitutional “policy” or “custom” by demonstrating “(1) the existence of an illegal official

policy or legislative enactment; (2) that an official with final decision making authority ratified

illegal actions; (3) the existence of a policy of inadequate training or supervision; or (4) the

existence of a custom of tolerance or acquiescence of federal rights violations.” Burgess v.

Fischer, 735 F.3d 462, 478 (6th Cir. 2013) (citing Thomas v. City of Chattanooga, 398 F.3d 426,

429 (6th Cir. 2005)). Here, Plaintiff alleges that the Washington County Sheriff’s Department is

liable for its officers’ conduct, but states only that the Washington County Sheriff’s Department

is responsible for a pattern or custom of racial profiling and illegal searches, a failure to train

officers on passengers’ Fourth Amendment rights, and allowing misconduct to go unchecked.

(Compl., ECF No. 1-2, PAGEID #9–10.) But these allegations do not contain any facts on which

this Court could rely to plausibly infer that Eichhorn’s and Peters’s allegedly unlawful conduct

was the result of a county custom or policy. That is, “[h]e offers only . . . bare legal conclusions

which the Court properly disregards.” Freeman v. Spoljaric, 667 F. Supp. 3d 636, 651 (S.D.

Ohio 2023) (dismissing a claim for Monell liability due to conclusory allegations); see also Assi

v. Hanshaw, 625 F. Supp. 3d 722, 750 (S.D. Ohio 2022) (dismissing a claim for Monell liability

because it was “simply too conclusory to survive”). Accordingly, any claims against Washington

County must be dismissed.

Further, to the extent that Plaintiff sues Eichhorn or Peters in their official capacities,

those claims also fail. A suit against a government official in his or her official capacity is “not a

suit against the official but rather is a suit against the official’s office.” Will v. Mich. Dep’t of

State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989). Thus, “an official-capacity suit is, in all respects other than

name, to be treated as a suit against the entity.” Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 166 (1985).

But, as just discussed, Plaintiff has not stated a claim against the relevant entities (Washington

County or the Washington County Sheriff’s Office). Plaintiff’s official-capacity claims against

Eichhorn and Peters must therefore be dismissed.

All that remain are Plaintiff’s individual-capacity claims for damages against Officers

Eichhorn and Peters. As noted above, Plaintiff may proceed on these claims under Counts I, II,

III, and V. However, the allegations underlying Plaintiff’s Count IV, for racial discrimination

and profiling, are too conclusory to state a claim. Plaintiff alleges only that Defendants’ conduct

“constituted unlawful racial profiling” and that Plaintiff, “[a]s a Black man,” was “singled out

and targeted by Detectives Eichhorn and Peter for invasive, non-consensual searches that would

not have occurred but for his race.” (Compl., ECF No. 1-2, PAGEID #8.) Plaintiff does not

identify the race of his ride share driver or the officers involved. Indeed, the Complaint contains

no facts related to possible racial profiling other than that Plaintiff is Black. These are precisely

the kind of “naked assertion[s] devoid of further factual enhancement” that do not suffice

under Iqbal. See 556 U.S. at 678. Plaintiff’s Count V for racial discrimination and racial

profiling must therefore be dismissed.

Finally, Plaintiff’s Count VII, for unlawful search and seizure by means of improper use

of a marijuana-trained K-9, must also be dismissed. The Court could locate no support for the

inability of law enforcement officers to rely on marijuana-trained canines, even after marijuana

legalization. Cf. State v. Bowen, 2023 WL 4266350, *7 (Ohio Ct. App. June 29, 2023) (rejecting

a criminal defendant’s argument that “because some forms and amounts of marijuana are now

legal in Ohio, the sniff by Andor, a canine trained to alert to the presence of marijuana, among

other substances, did not give officers probable cause to search the vehicle”).

Plaintiff’s assertions to the contrary lack merit. Plaintiff contends that “recently, Ohio

appellate courts have clarified that after legalization [of recreational marijuana in Ohio via state

ballot initiative in November 2023], a K-9 alert alone cannot provide probable cause where the

dog was trained to detect marijuana.” (Compl., ECF No. 1-2, PAGEID #7.) Plaintiff cites two

purported Ohio appellate court decisions for this proposition: “State v. Parker, 2018-Ohio-4210,

2d Dist.; State v. Gonzales, 2016-Ohio-8319, 6th Dist.” But neither of these citations lead to

apposite cases, or indeed, the cases indicated by Plaintiff. 2018-Ohio-4210 is a citation to State v.

Coleman, an Eighth District criminal appeal that has nothing to do with drug-sniffing dogs or

marijuana. 2016-Ohio-8319 does lead to a case titled State v. Gonzalez, but it is an Ohio

Supreme Court decision, not a Sixth District decision, and again, has nothing to do with dogs or

the legalization of marijuana.3 And, perhaps more importantly, these 2016 and 2018 cases can

have nothing to say about the effect of a change in the law in 2023. As the use of marijuana-

trained canines does not appear to be a legitimate basis for invalidating a Fourth Amendment

search, Plaintiff’s Count VII must be dismissed.

IV. DISPOSITION

Plaintiff’s motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis (ECF No. 1) is GRANTED.

Plaintiff MAY PROCEED on Counts I, II, III, and V of his Complaint against Defendants

Eichhorn and Peters for damages in their individual capacities, but for the reasons above, the

undersigned RECOMMENDS that the Court DISMISS Plaintiff’s remaining claims under

§ 1915(e)(2)(B) for failure to state a claim on which relief can be granted.

Plaintiff has submitted completed summons forms (Form AO-440) and a service of

process by U.S. Marshal form (Form USM-285) for each of Defendants Eichhorn and Peters.

(ECF Nos. 1-3, 1-4.) If Plaintiff wishes to have the United States Marshal effect service of the

summons and Complaint on Defendants, Plaintiff is DIRECTED to submit a service copy of the

Complaint for each of Defendant Eichhorn and Peters to the Clerk of Court. If Plaintiff does so,

3 The Court has recently seen an influx of pro se filings relying on generative artificial

intelligence (“AI”) technology. “Generative AI, at least in its current iterations, will sometimes

simply make stuff up or hallucinate quotations and/or case law.” Muhammad v. Gap Inc., No.

2:24-CV-3676, 2025 WL 1836657, at *14 (S.D. Ohio July 3, 2025) (cleaned up). The Court

suspects that Plaintiff’s inaccurate case citations may be the result of generative AI and

CAUTIONS Plaintiff that future submissions relying on inaccurate or non-existent authorities

may be grounds for sanctions.

the Clerk is DIRECTED to issue the summons and the United States Marshal is DIRECTED to

serve by certified mail upon Defendants Eichhorn and Peters the issued summons, a copy of the

Complaint, and a copy of this Order and Report and Recommendation.

PROCEDURE ON OBJECTIONS

If any party objects to this Report and Recommendation, that party may, within fourteen

(14) days of the date of this Report, file and serve on all parties written objections to those

specific proposed findings or recommendations to which objection is made, together with

supporting authority for the objection(s). A District Judge of this Court shall make a de novo

determination of those portions of the Report or specified proposed findings or recommendations

to which objection is made. Upon proper objections, a District Judge of this Court may accept,

reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or recommendations made herein, may receive

further evidence or may recommit this matter to the Magistrate Judge with instructions. 28

U.S.C. § 636(b)(1).

The parties are specifically advised that failure to object to the Report and

Recommendation will result in a waiver of the right to have the District Judge review the Report

and Recommendation de novo, and also operates as a waiver of the right to appeal the decision of

the District Court adopting the Report and Recommendation. See Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140

(1985); United States v. Walters, 638 F.2d 947 (6th Cir. 1981).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

/s/ Chelsey M. Vascura

CHELSEY M. VASCURA

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE