R-E-R-M- & J-D-R-M

Cite as 29 I&N Dec. 202 (A.G. 2025) Interim Decision #4121

Matter of R-E-R-M- & J-D-R-M-, Respondents

Decided by Attorney General September 2, 2025

U.S. Department of Justice

Office of the Attorney General

Matter of L-E-A-, 28 I&N Dec. 304 (A.G. 2021), is overruled, and immigration judges

and the Board should adhere to the holding of Matter of L-E-A-, 27 I&N Dec. 581

(A.G. 2019), in all pending and future claims.

BEFORE THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

Pursuant to 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(h)(1)(i), I direct the Board of Immigration

Appeals (“Board”) to refer this case to me for my review. With the case thus

referred, I hereby remand to the Board for further consideration consistent

with this opinion. Furthermore, I conclude that the holding of Matter of

L-E-A-, 27 I&N Dec. 581, 581 (A.G. 2019) (“L-E-A- II”) should be

considered precedential for pending and future claims of asylum and overrule

the Attorney General’s decision in Matter of L-E-A-, 28 I&N Dec. 304 (A.G.

2021) (“L-E-A- III”) to the contrary.

The Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”) authorizes the Attorney

General to grant asylum to individuals who meet several statutory

requirements, including an inability to return to their home country because

of “persecution or a well-founded fear of persecution on account of race,

religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political

opinion.” INA § 101(a)(42)(A), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A); see

INA § 208(b)(1)(A), (B)(i), 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(A), (B)(i). This case

centers on the meaning of “membership in a particular social group,” a term

that has been subject to repeated and sometimes conflicting interpretation by

the Board, the Attorney General, and the U.S. Courts of Appeals. See 27 I&N

Dec. at 581, 587–92. In 2019, Attorney General Barr issued a decision

explaining why under the text of the statute and Board precedent, an

individual’s “family-based group” qualifies as a “‘particular social group’

under the INA” only if the family group is “defined with sufficient

particularity” and is “socially distinct in his society.” Id. at 586.

Subsequently, in L-E-A- III, Attorney General Garland vacated the decision

“so as to return the immigration system to the preexisting state of affairs

pending . . . the issuance of a final rule addressing the definition of ‘particular

social group.’” 28 I&N Dec. at 305; see Exec. Order No. 14010, § 4(c)(ii),

86 Fed. Reg. 8267, 8271 (Feb. 2, 2021). No rulemaking was ever completed

and the Board has not materially developed the standard since, leaving

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immigration officials without the benefit of a clear standard for interpreting

when clans or other kinship groups constitute “particular social groups.”

The lead respondent and her minor son, natives and citizens of

El Salvador, have applied for asylum and withholding of removal. The

respondent claims that she faces the prospect of future harm if returned to

El Salvador based on her “family/kinship ties” as well as her membership in

the social group of “individuals who oppose gang membership and gang

authority.” Matter of R-E-R-M- & J-D-R-M-, at 1–2 (BIA Aug. 4, 2023)

(unpublished decision). She testified that while in El Salvador, gang

members demanded an extortion fee from her and threatened to kill her

brother if she failed to pay. Id. at 2. The respondent fled to Guatemala in

2015, where she continued to receive threats. Id. She entered the United

States in September 2015. Id.

The immigration judge (“IJ”) denied the respondent’s claim for asylum

and withholding of removal, finding that she had not shown that she was a

member of the group of individuals who oppose gang membership and gang

authority, and that the social group of respondent’s family or kinship ties was

not cognizable. Id. The Board affirmed the IJ’s finding that the respondent’s

family was not a discrete class of persons with definable boundaries. 1 Id.

The respondent appealed. Without conceding error, the Government asked

the court to remand the case to the Board to reconsider whether the

respondent’s claimed social group of “family/kinship ties” was cognizable

as a “particular social group” in light of L-E-A- III. Respondent’s Motion for

Remand, R-E-R-M- & J-D-R-M- v. Garland, No. 23-2094 (9th Cir. Feb. 6,

2024).

Having reconsidered the case following remand from the Ninth Circuit, I

conclude that L-E-A- II correctly interpreted the text and structure of the INA,

as well as longstanding Board practice, to find that kinship ties may form the

basis for a “particular social group” only where they are “‘defined with

particularity’” and “‘socially distinct within the society in question.’”

27 I&N Dec. at 588 (quoting Matter of M-E-V-G-, 26 I&N Dec. 227, 237

(BIA 2014)). 2 To be sufficiently particular, a group must have “discernible

1

The respondent did not challenge on appeal the IJ’s finding as to her membership in the

group “individuals who oppose gang membership and gang authority,” and the Board thus

deemed the issue waived. Id.

2

The Board also requires that a particular social group be “composed of members who

share a common immutable characteristic,” but as the Attorney General observed in

L-E-A- II, “many family relationships will be immutable,” and the analysis will often focus

on the particularity and social distinction requirements. 27 I&N Dec. at 588, 592–93.

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boundaries” and cannot be “too vague or amorphous.” Id. at 593. To be

socially distinct, “‘society in general,’” rather than just the actual or potential

persecutors, must “‘perceive[], consider[], or recognize[] persons sharing the

particular characteristic to be a group.’” Id. at 594 (quoting Matter of

W-G-R-, 26 I&N Dec. 208, 217 (BIA 2014)).

Importantly, L-E-A- III did not conclude otherwise. It noted only that the

decision in L-E-A- II was “inconsistent with the decisions of several courts

of appeals that have recognized families as particular social groups.” 28 I&N

Dec. at 305. But to the extent these differing circuit court decisions

“adopt[ed] a categorical rule that any nuclear family could constitute a

cognizable ‘particular social group,’” any such result would be “inconsistent

with both the asylum laws and the long-standing precedents of the Board.”

27 I&N Dec. at 591. Moreover, in issuing those decisions, “courts may have

been willing . . . to accept, or assume with little analysis, the existence of a

particular social group because the court went on to deny asylum on other

grounds.” Id. at 589. While L-E-A- II did opine that “the term ‘particular

social group’ is ambiguous,” and invoked the principles of deference

established in Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resource Defense Council,

Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 844 (1984)—now overruled, see Loper Bright Enters. v.

Raimondo, 603 U.S. 369 (2024)—L-E-A- II ultimately concluded that its

interpretation was the one “most faithful to the text, purpose, and policies

underlying the asylum statute.” 27 I&N Dec. at 591–92. It observed that a

contrary rule would “render virtually every alien a member of a particular

social group,” a result at odds with the text and structure of the INA.

Id. at 593. Because I agree that the analysis in L-E-A- II presents the “best

reading” of the law, Loper Bright, 603 U.S. at 400, I adopt its analysis as

controlling here, even though the decision also invoked the now-defunct

Chevron framework as additional justification for its bottom-line conclusion.

L-E-A- III was also wrong to suggest that the issues addressed in L-E-A- II

are best left to rulemaking. As an initial matter, the anticipated rulemaking

that motivated the Attorney General’s vacatur in L-E-A- III never occurred.

Nor is rulemaking necessarily the preferable administrative process for

determining whether and when families may constitute “particular social

group[s]” under the INA. The meaning and scope of the statutory

prerequisites to asylum are questions of law that are appropriately resolved

through adjudication under the Attorney General’s authority to issue

“controlling” decisions “with respect to all questions of law” “relating to the

immigration and naturalization of aliens.” 8 U.S.C. § 1103(a)(1). The rule

of law put forth in L-E-A- II and reaffirmed here only reinforces the

importance of a “fact-based inquiry to determine whether” a respondent’s

family group is “defined with sufficient particularity and is socially distinct

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in his society.” 27 I&N Dec. at 586. Adjudication presents the best method

of ensuring that the facts and analysis particular to each case are carefully

and fully considered. That such an inquiry is better resolved through

case-by-case adjudication than broad-based rulemaking is confirmed by the

failure of the previous administration to issue any rule addressing the

meaning of “particular social group” over almost three years—despite a (now

rescinded) Executive Order requiring that the Secretary of Homeland

Security and Attorney General do so “within 270 days.” Exec. Order

No. 14010, § 4(c)(ii), 86 Fed. Reg. at 8271; see Exec. Order No. 14148,

§ 2(u), 90 Fed. Reg. 8237, 8238 (Jan. 20, 2025) (rescinding Executive Order

14010).

Accordingly, I overrule L-E-A- III and instruct that immigration judges

and the Board should adhere to the holding of L-E-A- II in all pending and

future cases. I therefore remand this case to the Board for further proceedings

consistent with this opinion.

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