Jean Guillaume v. USA

USCA11 Case: 24-13584 Document: 31-1 Date Filed: 09/10/2025 Page: 1 of 10

NOT FOR PUBLICATION

In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Eleventh Circuit

____________________

No. 24-13584

Non-Argument Calendar

____________________

JEAN FRANTZ GUILLAUME,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

versus

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

DEPARTMENT OF VETERAN AFFAIRS,

OFFICE OF HEARINGS AND APPEALS - SMALL BUSINESS

ADMINISTRATION,

THOMAS MCGRATH,

in his individual and official capacity,

BENJAMIN WARD,

in his individual and official capacity, et al.,

Defendants-Appellees.

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2 Opinion of the Court 24-13584

____________________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of Florida

D.C. Docket No. 1:23-cv-23287-MD

____________________

Before ROSENBAUM, NEWSOM, and ABUDU, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:

Jean Guillaume, proceeding pro se, appeals the district

court’s dismissal of his amended complaint against the U.S. Depart-

ment of Veterans Affairs, U.S. Small Business Administration, and

various officials in both agencies for removing his application as a

service-disabled veteran-owned small business under 38 U.S.C.

§ 8127, with prejudice. First, he argues that his claims are not

barred by sovereign immunity and that the complaint plausibly

states claims on which relief could be granted. Second, he disputes

that various claims in his amended complaint constitute shotgun

pleadings. Finally, he asserts that the district court erred in failing

to review his amended complaint under the liberal pleading stand-

ard afforded to pro se litigants. For the reasons below, we reject

these contentions and affirm the district court’s dismissal of his

amended complaint with prejudice. 1

1 We also conclude that Guillaume abandoned Counts V and VIII and the issue

of whether the district court erred by identifying “Jean Frantz Guillaume” as

the party in interest instead of “Jean Frantz Guillaume DBA Negro American.”

Counts V and VIII are abandoned because Guillaume failed to address the dis-

trict court’s dismissal of those counts on appeal. See Access Now, Inc. v. Sw.

Airlines Co., 385 F.3d 1324, 1330 (11th Cir. 2004). Whether the district court

erred by identifying “Jean Frantz Guillaume” as the party in interest is also

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24-13584 Opinion of the Court 3

The facts are known to the parties; we repeat them here only

as necessary to decide the case.

I

We first consider Guillaume’s argument that Counts I and

XII—that the federal government violated his First Amendment

rights and res judicata, and that Guillaume is entitled to a declara-

tory judgment against the federal government—are not barred by

sovereign immunity. “Sovereign immunity is jurisdictional in na-

ture,” FDIC v. Meyer, 510 U.S. 471, 475 (1994), and we review a dis-

trict court’s grant of a motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter

jurisdiction de novo. McElmurray v. Consol. Gov’t of Augusta-Rich-

mond Cnty., 501 F.3d 1244, 1250 (11th Cir. 2007). A dismissal for

lack of subject matter jurisdiction is entered “without prejudice.”

Stalley ex rel. U.S. v. Orlando Reg’l Healthcare Sys., Inc., 524 F.3d 1229,

1232 (11th Cir. 2008). We agree with Guillaume that the district

court erred in dismissing Counts I and XII with prejudice, but, for

reasons we will explain below, we nevertheless affirm the dismissal

because they fail to state a plausible claim.

We may affirm for “any reason supported by the record,

even if the district court did not rely on that reason.” Wright v. City

of St. Petersburg, Fla., 833 F.3d 1291, 1294 (11th Cir. 2016) (citation

modified). “Specifically, where we determine that a district court

has erroneously dismissed a complaint on a particular ground, but

abandoned because he raises the issue for the first time on appeal. See Sapuppo

v. Allstate Floridian Ins. Co., 739 F.3d 678, 683 (11th Cir. 2014).

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4 Opinion of the Court 24-13584

has done so without reaching the merits . . . the dismissal of

the complaint must nevertheless be affirmed if the complaint fails

to state a claim.” Silberman v. Miami Dade Transit, 927 F.3d 1123,

1137 (11th Cir. 2019) (citation modified). Because we conclude that

Counts I and XII fail to state a claim, we affirm the district court’s

dismissal of Counts I and XII.

We “review de novo [a] district court’s grant of a motion to

dismiss for failure to state a claim under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6),

accepting the allegations in the complaint as true and construing

them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.” Timson v.

Sampson, 518 F.3d 870, 872 (11th Cir. 2008).

Counts I and XII fail to state a plausible claim on which relief

can be granted. In Count I, Guillaume alleges that the United

States violated his First Amendment right of redress and disre-

garded the principles of res judicata. His First Amendment claim

amounts to a conclusory allegation regarding “a violation of his

First Amendment right of redress against the Defendant, the

United States” that fails to provide enough facts to state a claim to

relief that is facially plausible. First Am. Compl. ¶ 24. Under res

judicata, a claim is barred by a prior suit if: “(1) there is a final judg-

ment on the merits; (2) the decision was rendered by a court of

competent jurisdiction; (3) the parties, or those in privity with

them, are identical in both suits; and (4) the same cause of action is

involved in both cases.” Griswold v. Cnty. of Hillsborough, 598 F.3d

1289, 1292 (11th Cir. 2010). Guillaume’s case does not qualify for

res judicata treatment because his introduction of facts pertaining

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to his prior suits involving “Afily8 Government Solutions” indicates

that the parties in this lawsuit are not identical to those in his prior

suits, and he fails to explain how the cause of action is identical

between the current and prior suits. First Am. Compl. ¶¶ 22–27.

Count XII fails to state a plausible claim for relief under the

Declaratory Judgment Act. The Declaratory Judgment Act allows

federal courts to issue declaratory judgments “upon the filing of an

appropriate pleading.” 28 U.S.C. § 2201. Because none of his other

claims entitle him to relief, as we will explain below, Guillaume

does not state a claim under the Declaratory Judgment Act.

II

We next consider whether Counts II–III, VI–VII, and IX–X

state a claim on which relief can be granted. Counts II and III allege

violations of Guillaume’s rights under the Whistleblower Protec-

tion Act; Counts VI and IX allege Bivens violations; Count VII al-

leges a conspiracy under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1985, 1986, and the FCA; and

Count X alleges that the removal of documents from his applica-

tion violated double jeopardy.

Counts II and III do not state a claim on which relief can be

granted because Guillaume is not a federal employee. Both are as-

serted under the Whistleblower Protection Act, which protects fed-

eral employees against agency reprisal for whistleblowing activi-

ties, 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8), but Guillaume does not allege sufficient

facts showing that he is a federal employee. Though he argues that

his status as a third-party beneficiary provides him with standing to

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6 Opinion of the Court 24-13584

sue the United States for breach of contract, he has not alleged suf-

ficient facts to establish standing.

Counts VI and IX fail to provide sufficient facts to plausibly

state Bivens violations. In Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed.

Bureau of Narcotics, the Supreme Court recognized an implied pri-

vate action for damages against federal officers alleged to have vio-

lated a citizen’s constitutional rights. 403 U.S. 388, 397 (1971).

Count VI fails to state a plausible Bivens violation under the First

Amendment because the Supreme Court has been cautious about

expanding Bivens to new contexts and has consistently rejected the

application of Bivens to the First Amendment. See, e.g., Bush v. Lu-

cas, 462 U.S. 367, 390 (1983); Reichle v. Howards, 566 U.S. 658, 663 n.4

(2012) (“We have never held that Bivens extends to First Amend-

ment claims.”).

Count IX alleges a Bivens violation against McGrath, Perkins,

and Ward for “unreasonably seiz[ing]” four documents to review

his eligibility for a government contracting program, First Am.

Compl. ¶¶ 104–18, but Bivens actions cannot be brought against

federal officers in their official capacities. See Corr. Servs. Corp. v.

Malesko, 534 U.S. 61, 69–71 (2001).

Count VII fails to state a claim on which relief could be

granted under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1985, 1986, or the False Claims Act.

Section 1985 provides plaintiffs with a remedy against conspiracies

to interfere with their civil rights. 42 U.S.C. § 1985. Section 1986

is a derivative claim under § 1985 and, where there is no underlying

conspiracy to support a § 1985 claim, the derivative § 1986 claim

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24-13584 Opinion of the Court 7

must also fail. Park v. City of Atlanta, 120 F.3d 1157, 1159–60 (11th

Cir. 1997); 42 U.S.C. § 1986. Guillaume alleges a repetitive and con-

fusing list of actions by McGrath, Ward, Titus, and Perkins; he fails

to state a claim under § 1985 or § 1986 because his list comprises

conclusory statements that assume the defendants had conspired

with each other without providing facts that plausibly state such a

claim.

Count VII also fails to state a claim under the False Claims

Act because Guillaume’s allegations do not assert any specific

fraudulent claim with particularity. A claim under the FCA “must

state with particularity the circumstances constituting fraud or mis-

take.” Hopper v. Solvay Pharms., Inc., 588 F.3d 1318, 1324 (11th Cir.

2009). A claim has sufficient particularity if it “sets forth facts as to

time, place, and substance of the defendant’s alleged fraud, specifi-

cally the details of the defendants’ allegedly fraudulent acts, when

they occurred, and who engaged in them.” Id. (citation modified).

Count X fails state a claim under the Double Jeopardy

Clause. The Double Jeopardy Clause applies only to criminal pun-

ishments, and it provides that no “person [shall] be subject for the

same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb.” U.S.

Const. amend. V; Hudson v. United States, 522 U.S. 93, 98–99 (1997).

A civil penalty can qualify as a criminal punishment only if it is “so

punitive either in purpose or effect” that it is transformed into a

“criminal penalty.” Cole v. Dep’t of Agric., 133 F.3d 803, 806 (11th

Cir. 1998). Guillaume’s allegation that documents he had submit-

ted for his application to the Veterans First Contracting Program

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8 Opinion of the Court 24-13584

were removed is not a criminal punishment—or sufficiently puni-

tive to transform into a criminal penalty—and is therefore unre-

lated to the Double Jeopardy Clause.

III

We next consider the district court’s determination that

Counts IV and XI constitute shotgun pleadings. “We review a dis-

missal on Rule 8 shotgun pleading grounds for an abuse of discre-

tion.” Vibe Micro, Inc. v. Shabanets, 878 F.3d 1291, 1294 (11th Cir.

2018). The abuse-of-discretion standard requires us to “affirm un-

less we find that the district court has made a clear error of judg-

ment, or has applied the wrong legal standard.” United States v. Fra-

zier, 387 F.3d 1244, 1259 (11th Cir. 2004).

A shotgun pleading is a complaint that fails “to give the de-

fendants adequate notice of the claims against them and the

grounds upon which each claim rests.” Weiland v. Palm Beach Cnty.

Sheriff’s Off., 792 F.3d 1313, 1323 (11th Cir. 2015) (citation modi-

fied). Shotgun pleadings “waste scarce judicial resources, inexora-

bly broaden the scope of discovery, wreak havoc on appellate court

dockets, and undermine the public’s respect for the courts.” Vibe

Micro, Inc., 878 F.3d at 1295 (citation modified). One category of

shotgun pleading “assert[s] multiple claims against multiple de-

fendants without specifying which of the defendants are responsi-

ble for which acts or omissions, or which of the defendants the

claim is brought against.” Weiland, 792 F.3d at 1323. But a com-

plaint is not a shotgun pleading if it “can be fairly read to aver that

all defendants are responsible for the alleged conduct.” Kyle K. v.

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Chapman, 208 F.3d 940, 944 (11th Cir. 2000). If a court identifies

that a complaint is a shotgun complaint, it generally must give the

litigant one chance to replead, with instructions on the deficiencies.

Vibe Micro, Inc., 878 F.3d at 1296–97.

The district court didn’t abuse its discretion in dismissing

Counts IV and XI as shotgun pleadings. Count IV is a shotgun

pleading because it failed to specify which defendants were liable

for the alleged wrongdoing, which in turn fails to give the defend-

ants adequate notice of the claims against them. Weiland, 792 F.3d

at 1323. Count XI is a shotgun pleading because, even though Guil-

laume identified particular defendants, he failed to identify which

defendants are responsible for which claims, and his allegations in

this claim alternately target “Defendant” and “Defendants,” creat-

ing confusion as to whom he intended to sue for each claim.

Weiland, 792 F.3d at 1323. Furthermore, the district court had pro-

vided Guillaume with instructions on the deficiencies of his initial

complaint, but he failed to cure the deficiencies when given the op-

portunity to amend.

IV

We next consider whether the district court failed to con-

strue Guillaume’s complaint liberally under the liberal pleading

standards afforded to pro se litigants. When “a more carefully

drafted complaint might state a claim, a [pro se] plaintiff must be

given at least one chance to amend the complaint before the district

court dismisses the action with prejudice.” Woldeab v. Dekalb Cnty.

Bd. of Educ., 885 F.3d 1289, 1291 (11th Cir. 2018) (citation modified).

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But a court needn’t grant leave to amend when doing so would be

futile. Marrache v. Bacardi U.S.A., Inc., 17 F.4th 1084, 1091 (11th Cir.

2021).

We conclude that the district court construed Guillaume’s

complaint liberally, as it referenced the liberal pleading standards

for pro se plaintiffs four times in its dismissal order. Because Guil-

laume has already had two bites at the apple, further opportunities

to amend are unlikely to uncover plausible claims upon which re-

lief can be granted. Thus, granting him another chance to amend

his complaint would be futile, and dismissal with prejudice is ap-

propriate.

* * *

Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s dismissal of Guil-

laume’s first amended complaint with prejudice.

AFFIRMED.