Baldwin v. Wright National Flood Insurance Company

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

OCALA DIVISION

GREGORY A BALDWIN, JR. and

KERTING L BALDWIN,

Plaintiffs,

v. Case No: 5:24-cv-487-MMH-PRL

WRIGHT NATIONAL FLOOD

INSURANCE COMPANY,

Defendant.

ORDER

This cause comes before the Court on Defendant Wright National Flood Insurance

Company’s Affidavit in Support of Attorney Fees and Costs, requesting to recover reasonable

expenses, including attorney’s fees, in the amount of $465.00 incurred in connection with its

Motion to Compel Discovery (“Motion to Compel”). (Doc. 33). Plaintiffs have failed to file

any objections or respond to Defendant’s counsel’s affidavit, and the time to do so has

expired. For the reasons explained below, the Court finds that Defendant is due to be awarded

$394.00 in attorney’s fees related to its routine Motion to Compel.

I. BACKGROUND

On July 31, 2025, Defendant filed a Motion to Compel, seeking an order compelling

Plaintiffs to answer Defendant’s first set of interrogatories and respond to Defendant’s

requests for production of documents, and requested an award of reasonable expenses,

including attorney’s fees. (Doc. 27). On August 7, 2025, the Court granted in part and denied

in part Defendant’s Motion to Compel, granting Defendant’s request to recover reasonable

expenses, including attorney’s fees, incurred in making the motion, and denied as moot

Defendant’s request for an order compelling Plaintiffs to provide discovery responses, since

Plaintiffs responded to Defendant’s outstanding discovery requests on August 1, 2025. (Doc.

30). In that Order, the Court directed the Defendant to file an affidavit supporting the request

for attorney’s fees and expenses incurred by counsel in preparing and filing the Motion to

Compel and permitted the Plaintiffs to file any objections seven days thereafter. (Id. at p. 6).

Pursuant to the Court’s Order, on August 21, 2025, Defendant filed an affidavit signed

by counsel Tara Kelly, seeking an award of attorney’s fees in the amount of $465.00, which

appears to consist of a total of 1.50 hours in preparing and filing the Motion to Compel by

three individuals—attorney Tara Kelly, attorney Ted Brenner (who is not counsel of record),

and Diane Wigley—at rates ranging from $160.00 to $390.00 per hour. (Doc. 33; Doc. 33-1).

Defendant’s request for attorney’s fees is broken down as follows: Ms. Kelly (0.80 hours of

time expended at an hourly rate of $355.00 per hour, totaling $284.00), Mr. Brenner (0.30

hours of time expended at an hourly rate of $390.00 per hour, totaling $117.00), and Ms.

Wigley (0.40 hours of time expended at an hourly rate of $160.00 per hour, totaling $64.00),

bringing the total fees to $465.00 based on 1.50 hours spent preparing and filing the Motion

to Compel. (See Doc. 33-1 at p. 3). Plaintiffs have not filed any objections or responded to

counsel’s affidavit.

II. DISCUSSION

While the Court has determined that the Defendant has a right to recover attorney’s

fees associated with its Motion to Compel, the Court has a corresponding duty to ensure that

such an award is reasonable. Because, however, Plaintiffs failed to file any objections or a

response in opposition to the affidavit, the Court lacks the benefit of the scrutiny and analysis

of the requested fees from the opposing party. See Godoy v. New River Pizza, Inc., 565 F. Supp.

2d 1345, 1347 (S.D. Fla. 2008) (noting that the adversarial process normally aids the court

in determining whether the amount of attorney’s fees requested is reasonable).

Nevertheless, in determining a reasonable award of attorney’s fees, the Court applies

the federal lodestar approach, which is calculated by multiplying the number of hours

reasonably expended on the litigation by the reasonable hourly rate for the services provided

by counsel for the prevailing party. See Loranger v. Stierheim, 10 F.3d 776, 781 (11th Cir. 1994)

(per curiam). “[T]he fee applicant bears the burden of establishing entitlement to an award

and documenting the appropriate hours expended and hourly rates.” Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461

U.S. 424, 437 (1983).

Once the Court has determined the lodestar, it may adjust the amount upward or

downward based upon a number of factors, including the results obtained. See Norman v. Hous.

Auth. of City of Montgomery, 836 F.2d 1292, 1302 (11th Cir. 1988). “Ultimately, the

computation of a fee award is necessarily an exercise of judgment, because ‘[t]here is no

precise rule or formula for making these determinations.’” Villano v. City of Boynton Beach, 254

F.3d 1302, 1305 (11th Cir. 2001) (quoting Hensley, 461 U.S. at 436). The Court is “an expert

on the question [of attorney’s fees] and may consider its own knowledge and experience

concerning reasonable and proper fees and may form an independent judgment either

with or without the aid of witnesses as to value.” See Norman, 836 F.2d at 1303 (quoting

Campbell v. Green, 112 F.2d 143, 144 (5th Cir. 1940)). Moreover, “[t]here is nothing

inherently unreasonable about a client relying on more than one lawyer or having an

attorney review and revise his or her colleague’s work; however, a fee applicant bears the

burden of establishing that billed time reflects distinct contributions by each lawyer.” See

People for Ethical Treatment of Animals, Inc. v. Dade City’s Wild Things, Inc., No. 8:16-cv-2899,

2018 WL 1605842, at *3 (M.D. Fla. Apr. 3, 2018) (citing ACLU of Ga. v. Barnes, 168 F.3d

423, 437 (11th Cir. 1999)).

A. Reasonableness of Hours Expended

First, the Court must determine the number of hours reasonably expended on the

litigation. “The attorney fee applicant should present records detailing the amount of work

performed[,]” and “[i]nadequate documentation may result in a reduction in the number of

hours claimed, as will a claim for hours that the court finds to be excessive or unnecessary.”

Fla. Patient's Comp. Fund v. Rowe, 472 So. 2d 1145, 1150 (Fla. 1985). Then, “[t]he fee

opponent . . . ‘has the burden of [pointing out] with specificity which hours should be

deducted.” See Rynd v. Nat’l Mut. Fire Ins. Co., No. 8:09-CV-1556-T-27TGW, 2012 WL

939387, at *3 (M.D. Fla. Jan. 25, 2012), report and recommendation adopted, No. 8:09-CV-1556-

T-27TGW, 2012 WL 939247 (M.D. Fla. Mar. 20, 2012) (quoting Centex-Rooney Const. Co. v.

Martin Cnty., 725 So. 2d 1255, 1259 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1999)). “[A]ttorneys ‘must exercise

their own billing judgment to exclude any hours that are excessive, redundant, or otherwise

unnecessary.’” Galdames v. N&D Inv. Corp., 432 F. App’x 801, 806 (11th Cir. 2011) (quoting

Resol. Tr. Corp. v. Hallmark Builders, Inc., 996 F.2d 1144, 1149 (11th Cir. 1993)) (internal

quotations omitted). A court may reduce excessive, redundant, or otherwise unnecessary

hours, or may engage in “an across-the-board cut,” as long as the court adequately explains

its reasons for doing so. See id.

Here, it appears that Defendant seeks compensation for a total of 1.50 hours of

attorney’s fees associated with the Motion to Compel. While this request is not specifically

stated in Ms. Kelly’s affidavit, it is reflected in the time sheet attached to the affidavit, which

details the time spent on the motion by three different individuals. (See Doc. 33-1). The time

sheet indicates that Ms. Kelly expended 0.80 hours, taking the lead in researching, drafting,

and revising the relatively uncomplicated motion; Mr. Brenner spent 0.30 hours, making

corrections and additions to the motion; and Ms. Wigley billed 0.40 hours, assisting in

preparing the motion’s exhibits and analyzing the motion for submission to the Court. (Id. at

pp. 2-3). Upon review of the billing records, and with no objection to the hours sought, the

Court finds the number of hours requested by Defendant to be reasonable under the

circumstances presented here and given the relatively unsophisticated nature of the discovery

dispute.

B. Reasonableness of Hourly Rate

Next, the Court must determine the reasonable hourly rate. “A reasonable hourly

rate is the prevailing market rate in the relevant legal community for similar services by

lawyers of reasonably comparable skills, experience, and reputation.” Norman, 836 F.2d at

1299 (citations omitted). “The applicant bears the burden of producing satisfactory evidence

that the requested rate is in line with prevailing market rates.” Id. (citation omitted). The

trial court itself is an expert on the question of the reasonableness of fees and may consider

its own knowledge and experience. See id. at 1303.

Here, it appears that Defendant requests that it be awarded attorney’s fees based, in

part, on an hourly rate of $355.00 for Ms. Kelly’s time and $390.00 for Mr. Brenner’s time

spent preparing and filing the Motion to Compel. (See Doc. 33-1). While Ms. Kelly merely

offers a timesheet to support the requested hourly rates, her affidavit does not provide any

further details in support of the reasonableness of the rates. Instead, Ms. Kelly’s affidavit

simply states that the timesheet attached to the affidavit “is a true and correct copy of an

invoice billed by counsel to Wright [National Flood Insurance Company] detailing the fees

incurred in making the Motion to Compel Discovery[,]” with “[t]he total amount of such

fees [of] $465.” (Doc. 33 at p. 2). Even though Plaintiffs made no objection to the hourly

rates claimed in the timesheet, Defendant does not offer any “direct evidence of rates

charged under similar circumstances” in the affidavit or otherwise. See Chemische Fabrik

Budenheim KG v. Bavaria Corp. Int’l, No. 6:08-cv-1182-ORL-22DAB, 2010 WL 98991, at *4

(M.D. Fla. Jan. 6, 2010) (citing Norman, 836 F.2d at 1299). Therefore, in the absence of

additional evidence, the Court may use its own discretion and expertise to determine a

reasonable hourly rate for an award of attorney’s fees. See Norman, 836 F.2d at 1303.

Given that Defendant failed to provide any detail, explanation, or evidentiary

support for the hourly rates it seeks, the Court is not persuaded that hourly rates of $355.00

and $390.00 are justified for a routine motion to compel. See, e.g., Pruco Life Ins. Co. v. Howen,

No. 2:23-cv-54-SPC-NPM, 2024 WL 1417406, at *1-2 (M.D. Fla. Apr. 2, 2024) (reducing

hourly rate to $300.00 where there was no detail or explanation for the requested rate on a

routine motion to compel); Roskovensky v. Sanibel Captiva Island Vacation Rentals, LLC, No.

2:22-cv-602-JLB-NPM, 2024 WL 474123, at *1-2 (M.D. Fla. Feb. 7, 2024) (reducing hourly

rate to $250.00 for a routine motion to compel); see also Singh v. Orlando Health, Inc., No.

6:22-CV-1365-RBD-EJK, 2023 WL 4052270, at *1 (M.D. Fla. June 16, 2023) (approving

an hourly rate of $300.00 on a motion to compel for a principal attorney with 15 years of

experience).

Further, based on the Court’s own experience and familiarity with rates in the Ocala

Division, the Court finds that such requested rates are well above the prevailing market

rates for similar cases. Having considered the extremely limited information provided by

Defendant’s counsel, the relative complexity of the case and issues presented, the Court’s

knowledge of market rates in the Ocala Division, and Plaintiffs’ lack of objection, the Court

finds that an hourly rate of $300.00 is reasonable for the attorneys’ work performed on the

routine Motion to Compel in this case. See Norman, 836 F.2d at 1303 (“The court, either

trial or appellate, is itself an expert on the question and may consider its own knowledge

and experience concerning reasonable and proper fees and may form an independent

judgment either with or without the aid of witnesses as to value.”) (citations omitted); Scelta

Delicatessen Support Servs., Inc., 203 F. Supp. 2d 1328, 1331 (M.D. Fla. 2002) (“[T]he court

may use its own expertise and judgment to make an appropriate independent assessment

of the value of an attorney’s services.”) (citing Norman, 836 F.2d at 1303).

In summary, Defendant has requested a total of $465.00 in attorney’s fees associated

with the Motion to Compel, consisting of 1.50 hours (including 1.10 hours of attorney time)

at the hourly rates of $355.00 for attorney Tara Kelly, $390.00 for attorney Ted Brenner,

and $160.00 for Diane Wigley. Plaintiffs have made no objection to Defendant’s request,

whether to the reasonableness of the hours, the rate, or otherwise. Despite this omission,

and for the reasons explained above, the Court finds that Defendant’s counsel reasonably

incurred 1.50 hours in preparing and filing the Motion to Compel, and that it is most

appropriate to adjust the attorneys’ hourly rates to $300.00, which is reasonable. Based on

the foregoing, Defendant is entitled to fees in the amount of $394.00.1

1 The total amount of attorney’s fees that will be awarded in this Order is $394.00. The math

is calculated as follows: (0.40 x $160.00) + (0.80 x $300.00) + (0.30 x $300.00) = $394.00.

Il. CONCLUSION

Accordingly, it is ORDERED that:

(1) Defendant Wright National Flood Insurance Company is AWARDED $394.00

in attorney’s fees incurred in making the Motion to Compel Discovery (Doc. 27).

(2) Plaintiffs Gregory Baldwin, Jr. and Kerting Baldwin shall remit to Defendant the

amount of $394.00, which represents the reasonable expenses, including

attorney’s fees, associated with Defendant’s Motion to Compel Discovery within

10 days from the date of this Order.

DONE and ORDERED in Ocala, Florida on September 9, 2025.

ZL ose

PHILIP R. LAMMENS

United States Magistrate Judge

Copies furnished to:

Counsel of Record

Unrepresented Parties

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