Dalicier v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A.

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

WILBERSON SEVERE DALICIER, : Civil No. 1:25-CV-672

:

Plaintiff, :

:

v. :

:

JPMORGAN CHASE BANK, N.A., : (Magistrate Judge Carlson)

:

Defendant. :

MEMORANDUM OPINION1

I. Factual Background

Wilberson Dalicier is a prodigious, but prodigiously unsuccessful, pro se

litigants who has filed some three dozen lawsuits in recent years. Dalicier’s forays

in federal court have been many and varied but are often marked by a familiar

theme—Dalicier’s claims that various businesses and lenders have violated his rights

by declining to extend millions of dollars in credit to the plaintiff. What makes

Dalicier’s frequent demands that he has some legal right to received millions in

goods and products on credit particularly ironic is the fact that Wilberson Dalicier

is, by his own admission, a pauper who has consistently sought leave to proceed in

forma pauperis as he has pursued these frivolous claims that the refusal to extend

credit to this destitute litigant violates his legal rights.

1 The parties consented to magistrate judge jurisdiction on September 9, 2025.(Doc.

32).

Given this extensive history of feckless, frivolous, in forma pauperis litigation

in December of 2024, Chief Magistrate Judge Bloom recommended that a credit

discrimination case brought by Dalicier be dismissed and: “in addition to dismissing

the complaint, . . . recommend[ed] that this court enter a show cause order as to why

a prefiling injunction should not issue against the plaintiff, prohibiting him from

filing litigation based on the denial of his credit applications without paying the

filing fee.” Dalicer v. Members 1st FCU, No. 1:24-CV-1737, 2024 WL 5374925, at

*4 (M.D. Pa. Dec. 23, 2024), report and recommendation adopted sub nom. Dalicier

v. Members 1st FCU, No. 1:24-CV-01737, 2025 WL 365637 (M.D. Pa. Jan. 31,

2025).

The district court adopted this recommendation, and in order to prevent

further abuse of the in forma pauperis process by Dalicier entered an order on May

30, 2025 that provided as follows:

1)Plaintiff Wilberson Severe Dalicier is ENJOINED pursuant to the All

Writs Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1651(a), from proceeding in forma pauperis in

any new civil case in this District in which he asserts that he was

wrongfully denied credit.

2) This injunction shall not apply to any criminal cases and shall not

prohibit Plaintiff from filing an appeal of this injunction.

3) If Plaintiff files a new civil case in which he asserts that he was

wrongfully denied credit, the Clerk of Court shall docket this order to

that case. If the reviewing Judge determines the new case was initiated

in violation of the injunctive sanction, the case may be dismissed

without any consideration of its merits.

Dalicier v. Members 1st Credit Union, Civil No. 1:24-cv-1737 (Doc. 13). Thus, as a

result of his past litigation misconduct involving multiple lawsuits containing legal

demands for millions of dollars in credit by an impecunious plaintiff, Dalicier is now

enjoined from further frivolous in forma pauperis filings of this nature.

It is against this backdrop that we consider Dalicier’s current complaint, and

the motion to dismiss that complaint. Dalicier initially filed the instant case against

JPMorgan Chase Bank, along with a motion to proceed in forma pauperis, on April

15, 2025. (Docs. 1 and 2). Both Dalicier’s initial complaint and his motion to proceed

in forma pauperis were deemed facially insufficient by Judge Arbuckle and Dalicier

was admonished to file amended pleadings. (Docs. 4 and 7).

Dalicier responded to these orders in an enigmatic and elliptical fashion, filing

amended pleadings which were rife with new riddles, inconsistencies and

inadequacies. For example, nine days after he filed his first, flawed, motion for leave

to proceed in forma pauperis, (Doc. 2), on May 5, 2025 Dalicier filed a second

motion requesting leave of court to proceed without paying the filing fee required

by law. (Doc. 5).

While Judge Arbuckle preliminarily granted Dalicier leave to proceed in

forma pauperis, (Doc. 6), upon reflection the amended motion—like many of

Dalicier’s pleadings—leaves us with more questions than answers. For example, in

his initial in forma pauperis motion, Dalicier declined to identify any sources of

income but claimed that his monthly expenses totaled $2,250. (Doc. 2). In the second

motion which he filed nine days later, (Doc. 5), Dalicier repeated that his monthly

expenses totaled $2,250 and stated that he received $300 per month in food stamps

and public assistance. However, mysteriously, for the first time Dalicier also claimed

to receive dividend and interest income of $1,800 per month. The mystery

surrounding this new, previously undisclosed income was heightened when—

oddly—Dalicier denied owning anything of value which would generate such

income for him. (Id.)

As for Dalicier’s amended complaint it alleged a violation of the Equal Credit

Opportunity Act, (ECOA) 15 U.S.C. §1691, et seq. (Doc. 8). According to Dalicier

in March of 2025 he applied for a Chase Sapphire Visa Signature credit card. (Id., at

¶ 5). Dalicier avers that, at the time of his application he had a FICO score of 750.

(Id., at ¶6). Dalicier claims that on March 11, 2025 he received a written notice from

Chase stating that his application was denied based upon a “low FCO score.” (Id., at

¶7). Dalicier contends that this expressly stated reason for declining him credit was

false and pretextual since he possessed a high FICO score and avers without any

further specific well-pleaded facts that the true reason for the credit denial his race,

national origin and age. (Id.)

Thus, the factual lynchpin in Dalicier’s amended complaint is his allegation

that Chase falsely and pretextually told him in its March 11, 2025 notice that he was

denied credit due to a “low FICO score.” It is this crucial premise which JPMorgan

Chase attacks in its motion to dismiss. (Doc. 20). Attaching the actual March 11,

2025 notice that Dalicier purports to quote in his amended complaint, JPMorgan

Chase points out that the alleged reference in this notice to a “low FICO score” which

serves as the factual crux of Dalicier’s claim simply does not exist. Instead, the

notice explains that Dalicier’s application was denied for other independent reasons:

namely, too few accounts with recent payment information; the number of inquiries

on his credit report; his past or present delinquent credit obligations; and his history

of poor credit performance. (Doc. 21-1).

Thus, the uncontested, authentic record which serves as the factual pivot for

Dalicier’s claim that he was denied credit for a false and pretextual reason—a “low

FICO score”—proves that Dalicier’s factual averment concerning the content of this

notice is false. Because Dalicier may not maintain a legal claim based upon what is

clearly a factual falsehood the motion to dismiss will be granted. Moreover, in light

of this latest instance of litigation misconduct indulged in by the plaintiff while

enjoying in form pauperis privileges, and given the material inconsistencies in his

second application for leave to proceed in forma pauperis which claims that he

receives $1,800 a month in dividends and interest even though he possesses no things

of value, Dalicier’s leave to proceed in forma pauperis will be revoked and he will

be subject to the pre-filing injunction previously entered by this Court.

II. Discussion

A. Motion to Dismiss – Standard of Review

A motion to dismiss tests the legal sufficiency of a complaint. It is proper for

the court to dismiss a complaint in accordance with Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal

Rules of Civil Procedure only if the complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief

can be granted. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). With respect to this benchmark standard for

the legal sufficiency of a complaint, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third

Circuit has aptly noted the evolving standards governing pleading practice in federal

court, stating that:

Standards of pleading have been in the forefront of jurisprudence in

recent years. Beginning with the Supreme Court’s opinion in Bell

Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007), continuing with our

opinion in Phillips [v. County of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 230 (3d Cir.

2008)], and culminating recently with the Supreme Court’s decision in

Ashcroft v. Iqbal, BU.S.B, 129 S. Ct. 1937 (2009), pleading standards

have seemingly shifted from simple notice pleading to a more

heightened form of pleading, requiring a plaintiff to plead more than

the possibility of relief to survive a motion to dismiss.

Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 209-10 (3d Cir. 2009).

In considering whether a complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief

may be granted, the court must accept as true all allegations in the complaint and all

reasonable inferences that can be drawn therefrom are to be construed in the light

most favorable to the plaintiff. Jordan v. Fox, Rothschild, O’Brien & Frankel, Inc.,

20 F.3d 1250, 1261 (3d Cir. 1994). However, a court “need not credit a complaint’s

bald assertions or legal conclusions when deciding a motion to dismiss.” Morse v.

Lower Merion Sch. Dist., 132 F.3d 902, 906 (3d Cir. 1997). Additionally, a court

need not “assume that a . . . plaintiff can prove facts that the . . . plaintiff has not

alleged.” Associated Gen. Contractors of Cal. v. California State Council of

Carpenters, 459 U.S. 519, 526 (1983). As the Supreme Court held in Bell Atlantic

Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007), in order to state a valid cause of action, a

plaintiff must provide some factual grounds for relief which “requires more than

labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of

actions will not do.” Id., at 555. “Factual allegations must be enough to raise a right

to relief above the speculative level.” Id.

In keeping with the principles of Twombly, the Supreme Court has

underscored that a trial court must assess whether a complaint states facts upon

which relief can be granted when ruling on a motion to dismiss. In Ashcroft v. Iqbal,

556 U.S. 662 (2009), the Supreme Court held that, when considering a motion to

dismiss, a court should “begin by identifying pleadings that, because they are no

more than conclusions, are not entitled to the assumption of truth.” Id., at 679.

According to the Supreme Court, “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of

action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Id., at 678. Rather,

in conducting a review of the adequacy of a complaint, the Supreme Court has

advised trial courts that they must:

[B]egin by identifying pleadings that because they are no more than

conclusions are not entitled to the assumption of truth. While legal

conclusions can provide the framework of a complaint, they must be

supported by factual allegations. When there are well-pleaded factual

allegations, a court should assume their veracity and then determine

whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief.

Id., at 679.

Thus, following Twombly and Iqbal, a well-pleaded complaint must contain

more than mere legal labels and conclusions; it must recite factual allegations

sufficient to raise the plaintiff’s claimed right to relief beyond the level of mere

speculation. As the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has stated:

[A]fter Iqbal, when presented with a motion to dismiss for failure to

state a claim, district courts should conduct a two-part analysis. First,

the factual and legal elements of a claim should be separated. The

District Court must accept all of the complaint’s well-pleaded facts as

true, but may disregard any legal conclusions. Second, a District Court

must then determine whether the facts alleged in the complaint are

sufficient to show that the plaintiff has a “plausible claim for relief.” In

other words, a complaint must do more than allege the plaintiff’s

entitlement to relief. A complaint has to “show” such an entitlement

with its facts.

Fowler, 578 F.3d at 210-11.

As the court of appeals has observed:

The Supreme Court in Twombly set forth the “plausibility” standard for

overcoming a motion to dismiss and refined this approach in Iqbal. The

plausibility standard requires the complaint to allege “enough facts to

state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Twombly, 550 U.S.

at 570, 127 S. Ct. 1955. A complaint satisfies the plausibility standard

when the factual pleadings “allow[ ] the court to draw the reasonable

inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal,

129 S. Ct. at 1949 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556, 127 S. Ct. 1955).

This standard requires showing “more than a sheer possibility that a

defendant has acted unlawfully.” Id. A complaint which pleads facts

“merely consistent with” a defendant’s liability, [ ] “stops short of the

line between possibility and plausibility of ‘entitlement of relief.’ ”

Burtch v. Milberg Factors, Inc., 662 F.3d 212, 220-21 (3d Cir. 2011), cert. denied,

132 S. Ct. 1861 (2012).

In practice, consideration of the legal sufficiency of a complaint entails a

three-step analysis:

First, the court must “tak[e] note of the elements a plaintiff must plead

to state a claim.” Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1947. Second, the court should

identify allegations that, “because they are no more than conclusions,

are not entitled to the assumption of truth.” Id., at 1950. Finally, “where

there are well-pleaded factual allegations, a court should assume their

veracity and then determine whether they plausibly give rise to an

entitlement for relief.”

Santiago v. Warminster Twp., 629 F.3d 121, 130 (3d Cir. 2010) (quoting

Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1950).

In considering a motion to dismiss, the court generally relies on the complaint,

attached exhibits, and matters of public record. Sands v. McCormick, 502 F.3d 263,

268 (3d Cir. 2007). The court may also consider “undisputedly authentic

document[s] that a defendant attached as an exhibit to a motion to dismiss if the

plaintiff’s claims are based on the [attached] documents.” Pension Benefit Guar.

Corp. v. White Consol. Indus., 998 F.2d 1192, 1196 (3d Cir. 1993). Moreover,

“documents whose contents are alleged in the complaint and whose authenticity no

party questions, but which are not physically attached to the pleading, may be

considered.” Pryor v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 288 F.3d 548, 560 (3d Cir.

2002); see also U.S. Express Lines, Ltd. v. Higgins, 281 F.3d 382, 388 (3d Cir. 2002)

(holding that “[a]lthough a district court may not consider matters extraneous to the

pleadings, a document integral to or explicitly relied upon in the complaint may be

considered without converting the motion to dismiss in one for summary

judgment”).

B. Dalicier’s Amended Complaint Will Be Dismissed and His Leave

to Proceed In Forma Pauperis Revoked

Considerations of law, legal ethics, public policy and basic honesty all require

complaints to rest upon well pleaded facts rather that demonstrable falsehoods. False

pleadings are an anathema in our system of justice, which relies upon candor to

determine the truth. Given the pivotal role of truthfulness in litigation, it is well-

settled that: “A lack of good faith or malice also can be inferred from a complaint

containing untrue material allegations of fact or false statements made with intent to

deceive the court.” Herrejon v. Ocwen Loan Servicing, LLC, 980 F. Supp. 2d 1186,

1208 (E.D. Cal. 2013) citing Horsey v. Asher, 741 F.2d 209, 212 (8th Cir.1984).

In the instant case, Dalicier’s amended complaint runs afoul of this bedrock

principle since it asserts as a fact something that is obviously fictional. As we have

noted, in this amended complaint Dalicier alleges that in March of 2025 he applied

for a Chase Sapphire Visa Signature credit card. (Doc. 8, ¶ 5). Dalicier avers that at

the time of his application he had a FICO score of 750. (Id., at ¶6). Dalicier then

avers that on March 11, 2025 he received a written notice from Chase stating that

his application was denied based upon a “low FCO score.” (Id., at ¶7). We find that

Dalicier’s use of quotation marks in his pleading is done by design and plainly is

intended to indicate that he is quoting directly from JPMorgan Chase’s denial notice.

This specific factual averment then becomes the lynchpin of Dalicier’s amended

complaint, since Dalicier insists that this expressly stated reason for declining him

credit was false and pretextual given that he claims he possessed a high FICO score.

From these “facts” Dalicier then invites us to infer that the true reason for the credit

denial were his race, national origin and age. (Id.)

We now know that this averment—the factual crux of the amended

complaint—is not true. The denial letter, whose authenticity is uncontested, does not

say what Dalicier claims. Instead, the notice explains that Dalicier’s application was

denied because: he had too few accounts with recent payment information; the

number of inquiries on his credit report was excessive; he had past or present

delinquent credit obligations; and he possessed a history of poor credit performance.

(Doc. 21-1).

The court is not required to indulge in Dalicier’s creative fictions when

assessing the sufficiency of his amended complaint. Since this pleading clearly rests

on a material misstatement of facts, we may infer a lack of good faith on Dalicier’s

part, which fully justifies dismissal of this case. See Flores v. EMC Mortg. Co., 997

F. Supp. 2d 1088, 1128 (E.D. Cal. 2014).

Moreover, once Dalicier’s false statements are redacted from this amended

complaint, and we rely upon the actual justification for this decision to deny credit

to this confessed pauper, it is apparent that Dalicier’s claims fail on their merits. The

legal lynchpin of Dalicier’s complaint is the federal Equal Credit Opportunity Act,

(ECOA), 15 U.S.C. § 1691, which provides in part that:

It shall be unlawful for any creditor to discriminate against any

applicant, with respect to any aspect of a credit transaction—

(1) on the basis of race, color, religion, national origin, sex or marital

status, or age (provided the applicant has the capacity to contract);

(2) because all or part of the applicant's income derives from any public

assistance program; or

(3) because the applicant has in good faith exercised any right under

this chapter.

15 U.S.C. § 1691 (a). Dalicier v. McLaren Newport Beach, No. 1:24-CV-599, 2024

WL 4315229, at *5 (M.D. Pa. Aug. 22, 2024), report and recommendation adopted

sub nom. Dalicer v. McLaren Newport Beach, No. 1:24-CV-00599, 2024 WL

5184305 (M.D. Pa. Oct. 2, 2024). In order “to establish a prima facie case under the

ECOA, a plaintiff must show that (1) []he was a member of a protected class; (2)

[]he applied for credit from the defendant; (3) []he was qualified for the credit; and

(4) despite qualifying, []he was denied credit.” Stefanowicz v. SunTrust Mortg., 765

F. App'x 766, 772 (3d Cir. 2019) citing Anderson v. Wachovia Mortgage Corp., 621

F.3d 261, 268 n.5 (3d Cir. 2010).

In this case, once Dalicier’s falsehoods are stripped from his amended

complaint, and we are provided with the actual basis for JPMorgan Chase’s decision,

all that remains is a credit denial based upon a host of legitimate underwriting

factors. This is not invidious discrimination; rather it is economically rational

behavior and nothing that remains in Dalicier’s amended complaint establishes a

well-pleaded factual basis for inferring discrimination from what are otherwise

legitimate business decisions.

In fact, when Dalicier’s amended complaint is assessed in conjunction with

his application for leave to proceed in forma pauperis which indicates that he has no

assets and a negative monthly cash flow, the intellectual bankruptcy of his claims

becomes clear. As we have previously observed in a related case:

The docket affirmatively reveals that the denial of credit to Dalicier

does not appear to be some act of invidious discrimination or the breach

of some commercially reasonable contract. Rather, given Dalicier's

own admissions [in his motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis],

this was an economically rational decision.

Dalicier v. McLaren Newport Beach, 2024 WL 4315229, at *6.

Therefore, Dalicier’s amended complaint will be dismissed due to its lack of

merit and the plaintiff’s lack of candor.

Additionally, Dalicier’s permission to proceed in forma pauperis will be

revoked since his amended motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis, like his

amended complaint, displays a fatal lack of candor. This motion for leave to proceed

in forma pauperis contains a crucial factual inconsistency. In his motion Dalicier

first the first time claims to receive dividend and interest income of $1,800 per

month, but denies having any savings, bank accounts, or possessing anything of

value which would generate such a monthly income. (Doc. 5). Thus, presently

Dalicier seems to claim that he receives a steady income stream from assets that he

denies exist.

Moreover, Dalicer made these expedient and in some instances false

statements in his amended complaint and amended motion for leave to proceed in

forma pauperis in April and May of this year, at a time when filing sanctions

proceedings were pending against him in Dalicier v. Members 1st Credit Union, Civil

No. 1:24-cv-1737. These proceedings plainly put Dalicier on notice of the necessity

of complete candor with the court. However, it is now apparent that the plaintiff

chose a more expedient, and less truthful path. On these facts, Dalicier should face

the consequences of his conduct. Dalicier’s leave to proceed in forma pauperis will

be revoked and he will be subject to the pre-filing injunction previously entered by

this Court.

III. Conclusion

Accordingly, for the foregoing reasons, the defendant’s motion to dismiss

(Doc. 20), is GRANTED and this case is DISMISSED with prejudice. IT IS

FURTHER ORDERED that Dalicier’s leave to proceed in forma pauperis is revoked

and he is now subject to the pre-filing injunction previously entered by this Court.2

An appropriate order follows.

S/ Martin C. Carlson

Martin C. Carlson

United States Magistrate Judge

DATED: September 9, 2025

2 We note one final irony in this case. Despite the fact that Dalicier’s complaint

rests upon a material misstatement of fact, he has moved for summary judgment in

his favor. (Doc. 25). This motion apparently invites us to exult his factual

misstatements and treat those misstatements as undisputed facts. This we cannot do

since on summary judgment we must “consider all evidence in the light most

favorable to the party opposing the motion.” A.W. v. Jersey City Pub. Schs., 486

F.3d 791, 794 (3d Cir. 2007). Accordingly, this motion—which is frivolous and

which Dalicier has not attempted to support with a brief—will also be denied. In

particular, the plaintiff’s failure to file a brief is a significant shortcoming since Local

Rule 7.5 requires that any party who files a motion shall be required to file a brief in

support of that motion and provides that: “If a supporting brief is not filed within the

time provided in this rule the motion shall be deemed to be withdrawn.” Since the

plaintiff has not filed a brief in support of this motion, we will deem the motion to

be withdrawn. See, e.g., Salkeld v. Tennis, 248 F. App'x 341 (3d Cir.2007)

(affirming dismissal of motion under Local Rule 7.5). Finally, in light of these

rulings, JPMorgan Chase’s motion to strike the plaintiff’s summary judgment

motion (Doc. 30), is dismissed as moot.