The opinion
[Cite as Arndts v. State Teachers Retirement Sys. of Ohio, 2025-Ohio-3245.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
TENTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
Sha-Ann Arndts, :
Plaintiff-Appellant, :
No. 25AP-312
v. : (Ct. of Cl. No. 2024-00774JD)
State Teacher[s] Retirement [System] : (REGULAR CALENDAR)
of Ohio,
:
Defendant-Appellee.
:
D E C I S I O N
Rendered on September 9, 2025
On brief: Sha-Ann Arndts, pro se. Argued: Sha-Ann
Arndts.
On brief: Dave Yost, Attorney General, Timothy M. Miller,
and Camryn E. Hughes, for appellee. Argued: Timothy M.
Miller.
APPEAL from the Court of Claims of Ohio
DINGUS, J.
{¶ 1} Plaintiff-appellant, Sha-Ann Arndts, appeals from a judgment of the Court of
Claims of Ohio dismissing her complaint for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction pursuant to
Civ.R. 12(B)(1). For the following reasons, we affirm.
I. Facts and Procedural History
{¶ 2} On November 4, 2024, Arndts filed an action against defendant-appellant,
State Teachers Retirement System of Ohio (“STRS”), alleging her disability benefits were
wrongfully terminated in 2016 and not reinstated as required under Ohio law. On
December 3, 2024, STRS moved to dismiss the complaint for lack of subject-matter
No. 25AP-312 2
jurisdiction pursuant to Civ.R. 12(B)(1). Three days later, on December 6, 2024, Arndts
filed a duplicate copy of her complaint. On February 12, 2025, she moved for default
judgment. Then, on February 21, 2025, the Court of Claims granted STRS’s motion to
dismiss. The Court of Claims therefore dismissed the complaint for lack of subject-matter
jurisdiction and denied as moot Arndts’ default judgment motion.
{¶ 3} Arndts timely appeals.
II. Assignment of Error
{¶ 4} Arndts assigns the following sole assignment of error for our review:
The trial court erred in granting Appellee’s motion to Dismiss
and failing to grant Appellant’s Motion for Default Judgement,
thereby denying Appellant due process and a fair hearing.
(Sic passim.)
III. Discussion
{¶ 5} In her sole assignment of error, Arndts contends the Court of Claims erred in
granting STRS’s motion to dismiss and not granting her motion for default judgment. This
assignment of error is not well-taken.
{¶ 6} Civ.R. 12(B)(1) permits a responsive party to seek dismissal where the trial
court lacks jurisdiction over the subject matter of the litigation. Guillory v. Ohio Dept. of
Rehab. & Corr., 2008-Ohio-2299, ¶ 6 (10th Dist.). Subject-matter jurisdiction involves a
court’s power to hear and decide a case on the merits. Lowery v. Ohio Dept. of Rehab. &
Corr., 2015-Ohio-869, ¶ 6 (10th Dist.). A court must dismiss for lack of subject-matter
jurisdiction if the complaint fails to allege any cause of action cognizable in the forum.
Brown v. Levin, 2012-Ohio-5768, ¶ 14 (10th Dist.). A court’s subject-matter jurisdiction
cannot be waived and may be raised at any time. State v. Mbodji, 2011-Ohio-2880, ¶ 10.
And parties cannot confer subject-matter jurisdiction on a court; nor can it arise based on
estoppel. Ohio Vendors Representative Commt. v. Opportunities for Ohioans with
Disabilities/Bur. of Servs. for the Visually Impaired, 2022-Ohio-1252, ¶ 14 (10th Dist.).
When subject-matter jurisdiction is challenged, the party claiming jurisdiction bears the
burden of demonstrating that the court has jurisdiction over the subject matter. Pivonka
v. Corcoran, 2020-Ohio-3476, ¶ 34. An appellate court reviews a trial court’s decision on
a Civ.R. 12(B)(1) motion to dismiss for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction under a de novo
No. 25AP-312 3
standard of review. Pankey v. Ohio Dept. of Rehab. & Corr., 2014-Ohio-2907, ¶ 7 (10th
Dist.).
{¶ 7} We find the Court of Claims correctly determined it lacked subject-matter
jurisdiction over Arndts’ complaint. “Under the doctrine of sovereign immunity, ‘a state is
not subject to suit in its own courts unless it expressly consents to be sued.’ ” Smith v. Ohio
State Univ., 2024-Ohio-764, ¶ 12, quoting Proctor v. Kardassilaris, 2007-Ohio-4838, ¶ 7.
As amended in 1912, the Ohio Constitution permits “[s]uits [to] be brought against the
state, in such courts and in such manner, as may be provided by law.” Ohio Const., art. I,
§ 16. In 1975, the General Assembly enacted the Court of Claims Act, R.C. 2743.01 et seq.,
in which it waived sovereign immunity and consented to be sued and have its liability
determined in the Court of Claims.
{¶ 8} In relevant part, R.C. 2743.02(A)(1) states, “The state hereby waives its
immunity from liability . . . and consents to be sued, and have its liability determined, in
the [C]ourt of [C]laims created in this chapter in accordance with the same rules of law
applicable to suits between private parties.” For this purpose, the “[s]tate” is: “[T]he state
of Ohio, including, but not limited to, the general assembly, the supreme court, the offices
of all elected state officers, and all departments, boards, offices, commissions, agencies,
institutions, and other instrumentalities of the state.” R.C. 2743.01(A). The Court of Claims
“has exclusive, original jurisdiction of all civil actions against the state permitted by the
waiver of immunity” in R.C. 2743.02. R.C. 2743.03(A)(1). Consequently, the Court of
Claims’ jurisdiction is “tied to the scope of the state’s waiver of immunity and consent to be
sued in R.C. 2743.02.” Smith v. Ohio State Univ., 2024-Ohio-5887, ¶ 21 (10th Dist.).
{¶ 9} Here, Arndts sued STRS. In 1920, the General Assembly established STRS
“to pay retirement allowances and other benefits of Ohio public school teachers.” State ex
rel. Pipoly v. State Teachers Retirement Sys., 2002-Ohio-2219, ¶ 13, citing R.C. 3307.03,
and Buchter, Hastings, Sheeran & Stype, Ohio School Law, § T 11.1 at 264 (2001). See State
ex rel. Retirement Bd. of State Teachers’ Retirement Sys. v. Kurtz, 110 Ohio St. 332, 333-
334 (1924), citing 108 Ohio Laws, Part 1, 195 (“The Eighty-Third General Assembly of Ohio
passed an act ‘to provide a statewide retirement system for teachers in schools supported
wholly or in part by public funds.’ This act is to be found in the [former] General Code of
No. 25AP-312 4
Ohio as Section 7896-1 et seq.”). Although STRS is “ ‘an instrumentality of the state,’ ”1 the
Court of Claims Act does not apply “[t]o the extent that the state ha[d] previously consented
to be sued” in the courts of common pleas. R.C. 2743.02(A)(1). When enacted in 1920,
G.C. 7896-2, the predecessor to R.C. 3307.03, expressly stated the STRS board “shall have
the right to sue and be sued, plead and be impleaded, contract and be contracted with and
do all things necessary to carry out the provisions of this act.” See R.C. 3307.03 (STRS,
through its board, “may sue and be sued, plead and be impleaded, contract and be
contracted with, and do all things necessary to carry out such sections.”). Because this
consent to be sued predates the enactment of the Court of Claims Act, the Court of Claims
has no jurisdiction over claims against STRS. Therefore, the Court of Claims lacked subject-
matter jurisdiction over Arndts’ claims against STRS.
{¶ 10} Further, the Court of Claims lacked subject-matter jurisdiction for an
additional reason. Arndts asserts that her complaint filed on December 6, 2024 was an
amended complaint, and that she alleged fraud in that amended complaint. But the
December 6, 2024 filing was a duplicate of the previously filed complaint. The gravamen
of Arndts’ complaint against STRS (first filed on November 4, 2024, and then filed as a
duplicate again on December 6, 2024) is that she has been harmed because STRS abused
its discretion in terminating and not reinstating her disability benefits. See Guillory, 2008-
Ohio-2299, at ¶ 11 (10th Dist.) (“[I]n order to resolve the issue of whether a court has
subject-matter jurisdiction over a party’s claims, the court must look beyond the language
used in the complaint and examine the underlying nature of the claims.”). The Court of
Claims determined, and we agree, that Arndts did not present a fraud claim. As stated
above, her claim was that STRS wrongfully terminated her disability benefits and did not
reinstate them as required under Ohio law. Although Arndts seeks judicial review of these
administrative decisions, an STRS board decision concerning a member’s disability
benefits is not appealable to the courts. See R.C. 3307.62. And it is well-settled that
“[m]andamus is the appropriate remedy where there is no statutory right of appeal from a
decision of a public retirement system.” State ex rel. Cardiff v. State Teachers Retirement
Sys. Bd. of Ohio, 2011-Ohio-4757, ¶ 49 (10th Dist.); State ex rel. DeMatteo v. State Teachers
1 Alternatives Unlimited-Special, Inc. v. Ohio Dept. of Edn., 2006-Ohio-4779, ¶ 45 (10th Dist.), quoting Norris
v. State Teachers Retirement Sys., 1992 Ohio App. LEXIS 2564, *12 (8th Dist. May 12, 1992).
No. 25AP-312 5
Retirement Sys., 2018-Ohio-3635, ¶ 26 (10th Dist.). But the Court of Claims has no
jurisdiction over mandamus actions. See R.C. 2731.02 (authorizing the Supreme Court of
Ohio, the courts of appeals, or the courts of common pleas to issue writs of mandamus);
R.C. 2743.03 (governing the original jurisdiction and incidental powers of the Court of
Claims); Harris v. Ohio Dept. of Veterans Servs., 2018-Ohio-2165, ¶ 11 (10th Dist.), quoting
State ex rel. Hahoning Cty. Community Corr. Assn., Inc. v. Shoemaker, 12 Ohio App.3d 36
(10th Dist. 1983), paragraph two of the syllabus (“ ‘[T]he Court of Claims has no authority
to [issue] writs of mandamus [because] [t]hese are extraordinary writs, and are not
encompassed within the grant of “full equity powers” to the Court of Claims as found in
R.C. 2743.03(A).’ ”). Therefore, because Arndts’ claim against STRS is only cognizable in
mandamus, the Court of Claims lacked subject-matter jurisdiction over her complaint. For
this additional reason, the Court of Claims properly dismissed the complaint.
{¶ 11} Based on the foregoing, we overrule Arndts’ sole assignment of error.
IV. Disposition
{¶ 12} Having overruled Arndts’ sole assignment of error, we affirm the judgment
of the Court of Claims of Ohio.
Judgment affirmed.
JAMISON, P.J., and LELAND, J., concur.
_____________