The opinion
Case: 24-20361 Document: 67-1 Page: 1 Date Filed: 09/09/2025
United States Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit
____________ United States Court of Appeals
Fifth Circuit
FILED
No. 24-20361 September 9, 2025
____________
Lyle W. Cayce
Jane Doe, on behalf of M.F., Clerk
Plaintiff—Appellant,
versus
Sylvia Trevino, Harris County Precinct Six Constable; Brandin
Glispy,
Defendants—Appellees.
______________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Texas
USDC No. 4:19-CV-1297
______________________________
Before Haynes, Ho, and Oldham, Circuit Judges.
Per Curiam: *
Jane Doe alleges that Constable Sylvia Trevino failed to supervise a
deputy constable in her precinct, leading to Doe’s sexual assault. The district
court found that Doe was unable to support her arguments with admissible
evidence and granted summary judgment for Trevino. We affirm.
_____________________
*
This opinion is not designated for publication. See 5th Cir. R. 47.5.
Case: 24-20361 Document: 67-1 Page: 2 Date Filed: 09/09/2025
No. 24-20361
I.
Constable Deputy Brandin Glispy sexually assaulted Jane Doe during
a routine traffic stop. Doe reported the assault to law enforcement the same
night it occurred. Glispy was suspended immediately and fired from the
precinct three days later.
In this civil rights action, Doe seeks damages from Constable Sylvia
Trevino for her supervision of Glispy. Specifically, Doe alleges that Glispy
assaulted another woman four months earlier and that Trevino failed to
supervise Glispy after learning of this allegation, thereby enabling him to
assault Doe.
Trevino moved for summary judgment, asserting qualified immunity.
She argued that no constitutional violation occurred because she was
unaware of Glispy’s previous alleged sexual misconduct until after his assault
on Doe.
In response, Doe argued that Trevino knew of the allegations before
Glispy assaulted Doe. To support her arguments opposing summary
judgment, Doe offered eight summary judgment exhibits.
Trevino replied. And in a separate filing, she raised objections to
Doe’s summary judgment evidence. Specifically, Trevino objected to
exhibits 1, 2, 4, 5, 8, and the deposition testimony presented as exhibits 6 and
7.
Doe never responded to Trevino’s objections, rebutted any argument
presented in them, or otherwise acted in court regarding the objections.
The district court sustained Trevino’s objections and granted
summary judgment for Trevino. Doe appealed.
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II.
Doe raises four issues on appeal, but she only meaningfully briefs
two—whether sustaining Trevino’s objections to her summary judgment
evidence was an abuse of discretion and whether Trevino was entitled to
summary judgment on her supervisory liability claims. 1
A.
We review a district court’s decision to strike summary judgment
evidence for abuse of discretion. Richardson v. Oldham, 12 F.3d 1373, 1376
(5th Cir. 1994). “A trial court abuses its discretion when its ruling is based
on an erroneous view of the law or a clearly erroneous assessment of the
evidence.” United States v. Ebron, 683 F.3d 105, 133 (5th Cir. 2012).
Here, the district court sustained Trevino’s objections “for the
reasons stated in her brief and due to Doe’s failure to respond and oppose.”
Doe has not carried her burden on appeal of showing this decision was an
error of law or fact.
To start, Doe’s opening brief makes no argument that sustaining the
objections for the reasons stated in Trevino’s brief was erroneous. So these
arguments are forfeited. See Rollins v. Home Depot USA, 8 F.4th 393, 397 (5th
Cir. 2021).
Her primary argument is that the court improperly sustained
Trevino’s objections due to Doe’s lack of opposition (and without giving
notice that failure to respond would result in sustained objections). Doe cites
only one out-of-circuit case—Sandoval v. County of San Diego—for the
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1
The fourth issue in Doe’s brief states that the district court abused its discretion
by denying her motions for reconsideration. But she offers no argument in her opening brief
as to how these decisions were erroneous, so this issue is forfeited. See Rollins v. Home
Depot USA, 8 F.4th 393, 397 (5th Cir. 2021).
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proposition that a district court abuses its discretion by “summarily
sustaining the defendants’ meritless—indeed frivolous—evidentiary
objections” when a plaintiff does not respond. 985 F.3d 657, 667 (9th Cir.
2021).
But Sandoval is distinguishable. Trevino’s objections are thorough
and detailed—citing Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Federal Rules of
Evidence, and circuit precedent. They are far from the “boilerplate one-
word objections” that were sustained in error in Sandoval. 985 F.3d at 665.
And Doe hasn’t identified any other reason why Trevino’s objections might
have been “meritless” or “frivolous.” Id. We therefore see no abuse of
discretion.
Doe also claims that she was denied due process because she was not
informed that a failure to rebut the objections would lead to their acceptance.
But she cites only Southern District of Texas Local Rule 7.4—which states
that “failure to respond to a motion will be taken as a representation of no
opposition” and offers instruction on responding and replying to motions—
to support that claim. And there’s no indication that the district court relied
on that rule. Doe allowed more than eight months to pass after Trevino filed
her objections—never once attempting to respond or seek clarification from
the court about responding. On that score, we decline to find reversible error.
Lastly, Doe argues that Trevino never objected to exhibits 6 and 7 and
that this evidence is thus part of the competent summary judgment record.
But she is mistaken. Trevino objected that “[t]he unofficial
transcripts of the Depositions contained in Exhibits 6 and 7 are inadmissible
under Fed. R. Evid. 802.” And the court sustained all of Trevino’s
objections. So these exhibits are likewise excluded.
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All told, Doe failed to show that the court abused its discretion by
sustaining Trevino’s objections to Doe’s summary judgment evidence.
Exhibits 1, 2, 4, 5, 6, 7, and 8 remain excluded.
B.
We review a district court’s decision to grant summary judgment de
novo. Richardson, 12 F.3d at 1376. A court should grant summary judgment
where there is no genuine dispute of material fact, and the movant is entitled
to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).
Typically, the moving party bears the burden of demonstrating an
absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Nola Spice Designs, LLC v. Haydel
Enters., Inc., 783 F.3d 527, 543 (5th Cir. 2015). But “where the non-movant
bears the burden of proof at trial, the movant may merely point to the absence
of evidence and thereby shift to the non-movant the burden of demonstrating
by competent summary judgment proof that there is an issue of material fact
warranting trial.” Id. (cleaned up). Here, Trevino properly raised qualified
immunity, which shifts the burden of proof at trial to Doe to demonstrate the
defense does not apply. See Batyukova v. Doege, 994 F.3d 717, 724 (5th Cir.
2021).
More specifically, Doe must show that there is a material dispute of
fact as to whether Trevino’s conduct violated her clearly established
constitutional rights. Brown v. Callahan, 623 F.3d 249, 253 (5th Cir. 2010).
She hasn’t done so. Doe argues that Trevino violated her
constitutional rights by failing to discipline or supervise Glispy after learning
of his prior sexual assault allegation. But as the district court observed, “this
argument depends entirely on whether Trevino learned of the sexual assault
that Glispy allegedly committed [prior to Doe] before she learned of the
assault he committed against Doe.”
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Trevino testified that she was unaware of any sexual assault prior to
Doe. Doe never then proffered any admissible evidence that contradicts this
testimony.
Now on appeal, Doe makes no argument that her remaining,
admissible evidence creates a genuine dispute of fact. She again relies
exclusively on excluded evidence. So Doe failed to carry her burden of
“demonstrating by competent summary judgment proof that there is an issue
of material fact warranting trial.” Nola Spice Designs, 783 F.3d at 543. 2
We affirm.
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2
Doe argues that she is entitled to punitive damages against Trevino. Because we
affirm the grant of summary judgment, we need not address this argument.
6