Vigue v. Jautausch, Jr.

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO

EASTERN DIVISION

DAWN LIBERTY VIGUE,

Plaintiff, Case No. 2:25-cv-00987

v. Judge Michael H. Watson

Magistrate Judge Kimberly A. Jolson

WILLIAM J. JAUTAUSCH,

JR., et al.,

Defendants.

ORDER AND REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

This matter is before the Undersigned for consideration of several Motions (Docs. 1, 2, 3),

and the initial screen of Plaintiff’s Complaint (Doc. 1-1) under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). Plaintiff’s

Motion to Proceed in forma pauperis (Doc. 1) is GRANTED. All judicial officers who render

services in this action shall do so as if the costs had been prepaid. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a). After

conducting the required initial screen, the Undersigned RECOMMENDS that Plaintiff’s

Complaint (Doc. 1-1) be DISMISSED.

I. STANDARD

Because Plaintiff is proceeding in forma pauperis, the Court must dismiss the Complaint,

or any portion of it, that is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief can be

granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915(e)(2). Complaints by pro se litigants are to be construed liberally and held to less stringent

standards than those prepared by attorneys. Martin v. Overton, 391 F.3d 710, 712 (6th Cir. 2004).

But this leniency is not boundless, and “it is not within the purview of the district court to conjure

up claims never presented.” Frengler v. Gen. Motors, 482 F. App’x 975, 977 (6th Cir. 2012). Nor

is it the Court’s role to “ferret out the strongest cause of action on behalf of pro se litigants” or

advise “litigants as to what legal theories they should pursue.” Young Bok Song v. Gipson, 423 F.

App’x 506, 510 (6th Cir. 2011) (considering the sua sponte dismissal of an amended complaint

under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)). At bottom, “basic pleading essentials” are still required, regardless

of whether an individual proceeds pro se. Wells v. Brown, 891 F.2d 591, 594 (6th Cir. 1989).

These essentials are not onerous or overly burdensome. A complaint must contain “a short

and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief,” see Fed. R. Civ. P.

8(a)(2), and provide the defendant with “fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon

which it rests,” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (internal quotation omitted).

In reviewing Plaintiff’s Complaint at this stage, the Court must construe it in her favor, accept all

well-pleaded factual allegations as true, and evaluate whether it contains “enough facts to state a

claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Id. at 570. “A claim has facial plausibility when the

plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the

defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing

Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). Although this standard does not require “detailed factual

allegations, . . . [a] pleading that offers labels and conclusions” is insufficient. Id. at 678 (internal

quotation and quotation marks removed). In the end, the Court must dismiss the Complaint “if it

tenders naked assertions devoid of further factual enhancement.” Id. (internal quotation and

quotation marks omitted).

Courts also “understand § 1915(e)(2) to include screening for lack of subject matter

jurisdiction.” Howard v. Good Samaritan Hospital, No. 1:21-cv-160, 2022 WL 92462, at *2 (S.D.

Ohio Jan. 10, 2022). Indeed, courts are obligated to consider whether they have subject matter

jurisdiction and may raise jurisdictional issues sua sponte. Klepsky v. United Parcel Serv., Inc.,

489 F.3d 264, 268 (6th Cir. 2007). If a court finds that that it lacks subject matter jurisdiction, it

must dismiss the case. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3).

II. DISCUSSION

Plaintiff’s Complaint is not a model of clarity. As best the Undersigned can tell, Plaintiff

sues several Defendants for actions related to her housing. (Doc. 1-1 at 2). Specifically, Plaintiff

alleges that Defendant Doug Richmond “falsified” unknown documents potentially related to

Plaintiff’s “complaint[s]” about mold. (Id. at 3). She further states that Defendant Chip Robert

defamed her when he said she has “mental problems.” (Id.). Additionally, Plaintiff claims that

Defendant Bill Jantausch, her landlord, did not accept rent payments made on her behalf by two

charitable organizations. (Id. at 4). Plaintiff also alleges that “Jeff . . . the maintenance man,” and

tenants Robert Nibet and Shelly Chapman harassed her. (Id.). As relief, Plaintiff seems to seek

an order for these individuals to comply with landlord-tenant laws; damages; “a new living

arrangement”; and an order clearing her “record.” (Id. at 5). However, even construing Plaintiff’s

allegations generously, the Court does not have jurisdiction to hear this case.

Under 28 U.S.C. § 1331, a federal district court has original jurisdiction of all civil actions

arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States. Up front, the Undersigned

observes that Plaintiff does not identify the specific claims she brings against any Defendant. (See

generally Doc. 1-1). Potential claims include defamation, harassment, and violation of Ohio

landlord-tenant laws. See Ohio Rev. Code § 5321.02. None of these claims, on their face, arise

under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States. And while Plaintiff indicates this

case is brought against Defendants acting under the color of state law who deprived her a right

secured by federal law or the Constitution (Doc. 1-1 at 2), her sparse allegations do not allow the

Undersigned the conclude as much. Therefore, the Court does not have federal question

jurisdiction.

Alternatively, under 28 U.S.C. § 1132(a), a federal district court has original jurisdiction

of a civil action where the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000 and the case is between citizens

of different states. Here, Plaintiff identifies herself and all the Defendants as citizens of Ohio.

(Doc. 1-1 at 1–2). Therefore, the Court does not have diversity jurisdiction either.

Because the Court does not have jurisdiction to hear this case, the Undersigned

RECOMMENDS this matter be DISMISSED. Still the Undersigned briefly addresses Plaintiff’s

other Motions.

First, Plaintiff filed a Motion to Appoint Counsel. (Doc. 2). Although the Court has the

statutory authority under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e) to appoint counsel in a civil case, appointment of

counsel is not a constitutional right. Lavado v. Keohane, 992 F.2d 601, 605–06 (6th Cir. 1993)

(internal quotation omitted). Rather, “it is a privilege that is justified only by exceptional

circumstances.” Id. at 606. After considering the circumstances here, the Court finds that the

appointment of counsel is not warranted. Generally, a motion to appoint counsel is appropriate

after a complaint survives motions to dismiss and motions for summary judgment. The Court also

makes every effort to appoint counsel in cases that proceed to trial. Even if this case were to

proceed beyond the initial screen, Plaintiff’s request is premature. Consequently, Plaintiff’s

Motion is DENIED without prejudice.

Second, Plaintiff filed a Motion to Stay. (Doc. 3). The Court is unsure what Plaintiff seeks

to stay. In the narrative section of her Motion, she seems to reiterate the relief sought in her

Complaint. (Id.). That is, she lists various laws she wants followed and types of damages she

seeks. (Id.). Because this Motion does not appear to ask the Court to stay anything, the Motion is

DENIED.

III. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Undersigned GRANTS Plaintiff’s Motion for Leave to

Proceed in forma pauperis (Doc. 1), DENIES without prejudice her Motion to Appoint Counsel

(Doc. 2), and DENIES her Motion to Stay (Doc. 3). After conducting an initial screen of the

Complaint under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2), the Undersigned RECOMMENDS that it be

DISMISSED.

Date: September 5, 2025 /s/Kimberly A. Jolson

KIMBERLY A. JOLSON

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

Procedure on Objections

If any party objects to this Report and Recommendation, that party may, within fourteen

(14) days of the date of this Report, file and serve on all parties written objections to those specific

proposed findings or recommendations to which objection is made, together with supporting

authority for the objection(s). A Judge of this Court shall make a de novo determination of those

portions of the Report or specified proposed findings or recommendations to which objection is

made. Upon proper objections, a Judge of this Court may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in

part, the findings or recommendations made herein, may receive further evidence, or may

recommit this matter to the Magistrate Judge with instructions. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1).

The parties are specifically advised that failure to object to the Report and

Recommendation will result in a waiver of the right to have the District Judge review the Report

and Recommendation de novo and operates as a waiver of the right to appeal the decision of the

District Court adopting the Report and Recommendation. See Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985);

United States v. Walters, 638 F.2d 947 (6th Cir. 1981).