BROWN v. CARTER

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA

INDIANAPOLIS DIVISION

DARRELL BROWN, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

v. ) No. 1:23-cv-00782-TWP-MKK

)

JASON CARTER Individual Capacity, )

KELLY WILLIAMS Individual Capacity, )

SHELLY JACOBS Individual Capacity, )

CENTURION, )

)

Defendants. )

REPORT & RECOMMENDATION

This matter is before the Court on Plaintiff Darrell Brown's Motion for

Sanctions, Dkt. [92], and Defendants Carter, William and Centurion's response to

the Court's April 10, 2025 Show Cause Order, (Dkt. 102), ("Show Cause Order"). For

the reasons set forth below, the undersigned respectfully RECOMMENDS that the

District Judge GRANT Plaintiff's Motion for Sanctions to the extent that Attorney

Dillon and her law firm be ordered to pay a fine of $1,000.00 to Plaintiff.

Additionally, the Court ORDERS Attorney Dillon to file status reports as

further detailed below.

I. Background

As set forth in the screening order, this case involves Eighth Amendment

claims against Defendants Carter, Williams and Jacobs, based on Plaintiff's

"allegations that they were deliberately indifferent to his serious medical needs by

denying him treatment and/or pursuing a course of treatment known to be

ineffective." (Dkt. 73 at 3 (citing Dkt. 30 at 4)). Plaintiff is also pursuing Eighth

Amendment and state-law negligence claims against Centurion, (id.), the individual

Defendants' employer and the medical contractor for the prison at which Plaintiff

was housed, (Dkt. 30 at 4–5). All Defendants are represented by Attorney Carol

Dillon ("Attorney Dillon"). (Dkts. 33, 42).

On July 26, 2024, the Court issued a scheduling order setting forth various

case management deadlines, including a January 24, 2025, deadline for completing

discovery. (Dkt. 46 at 5). On October 21, 2024, Plaintiff filed a Notice of Filing

Interrogatories to Defendants and a Notice of Filing Request for Admissions to

Defendants, indicating he had sent his First Set of Interrogatories and First Set of

Requests for Admissions to Defendants on October 16, 2024. (Dkts. 59, 60).

On December 4, 2024, Plaintiff filed a Motion to Compel, asserting that

Defendants' objections to his discovery requests were "insufficient, boilerplate,

conclusory, and lack any substantive reason." (Dkt. 62 at 2). Defendants did not

respond to this Motion. On January 13, 2025, the Court granted in part and denied

in part Plaintiff's Motion to Compel. (Dkt. 70). The Court denied the Motion as to

the Requests for Admissions, since Plaintiff did not attach a copy of the requests or

Defendants' answers to his Motion. (Id. at 2). The Court also denied Plaintiff's

Motion as to the Interrogatories, due to Plaintiff's conflicting statements about

whether Defendants had responded to them. (Id.). The Court granted the Motion,

however, as to the Requests for Production, allowing Plaintiff to serve amended

Requests for Production no later than January 31, 2025. (Id. at 2–3).

On February 11, 2025, Plaintiff re-filed his Motion to Compel as to the

interrogatories and clarified that Defendants had yet to respond to them. (Dkt. 78).

Plaintiff also re-filed his Motion to Compel as to the Requests for Admissions,

attaching them to his filing along with Defendants' objections and responses. (Dkts.

80, 80-1). Defendants did not respond to either of the renewed Motions to Compel.

On March 7, 2025, the Court granted Plaintiff's February Motion to Compel

pertaining to the interrogatories and ordered Defendants to respond to the

interrogatories no later than March 14, 2025. (Dkt. 86 at 1). The Court also granted

in part Plaintiff's February Motion to Compel pertaining to the Requests for

Admissions and ordered Defendants to answer specific Requests for Admissions no

later than March 14, 2025. (Id. at 3–4). The Court further ordered Defendants to file

a notice no later than March 17, 2025, confirming service of their supplemental

responses to Plaintiff's Interrogatories and the selected Requests for Admissions.

(Id. at 1, 3–5).

On March 17, 2025, Attorney Dillon filed Defendants' Notice of Service of

Supplemental Responses to Plaintiff's Request for Admissions, indicating that

Defendants had served their responses to the Requests for Admissions. (Dkt. 87).

Attorney Dillon noted, however, that Defendants had not sent those responses until

that very day, three days after the Court-ordered deadline. (Id. at 1). Attorney

Dillon attributed this delay "to a failure to communicate by defense counsel to her

staff in her rush to leave the office and travel to Bloomington." (Id. at 2). The Notice

was silent as to whether Defendants had served their responses to Plaintiff's

interrogatories, (see id.), as the Court had ordered them to do, (Dkt. 86 at 1).

On March 26, 2025, Plaintiff filed a Notice to the Court, stating that he had

yet to receive Defendants' supplemental responses to his interrogatories. (Dkt. 90).

Shortly thereafter, on April 2, 2025, Plaintiff filed his Motion for Sanctions

pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 37(b), requesting that the Court

sanction Defendants and/or Attorney Dillon for failing to comply with the Court's

March 7th Order. Dkt. [92]. More specifically, Plaintiff requested the Court to

impose a variety sanctions, including establishing facts in his favor, barring the

disobedient party from submitting certain evidence, and entering a default

judgment against the disobedient party. (Id.). Defendants did not respond to the

Motion for Sanctions.

Plaintiff subsequently requested extensions of time for deadlines related to

summary judgment briefing, arguing that the interrogatory responses were

necessary for the summary judgment briefings. (Dkts. 96, 97). Plaintiff explained

that he had only received interrogatory responses from Defendant Jacobs, and those

responses were dated March 27, 2025. (Dkt. 96 at 2).

On April 10, 2025, the Court ordered Attorney Dillon to explain why

Defendants Carter, Williams, and Centurion disobeyed the Court's March 7th Order

by failing to provide responses to Plaintiff's Interrogatories by April 14, 2025. (Dkt.

102 at 1). Additionally, the Court ordered the three Defendants to serve their

responses to the interrogatories no later than April 18, 2025. (Id.).

On April 13, 2025, Attorney Dillon confirmed that the Defendants' responses

to interrogatories were sent after the deadline set by the Court's March 7th Order.

(Dkt. 103 at 2). Attorney Dillon indicated that the fault was her own, stating that

she had been overwhelmed by her workload. (Id.). She suggested that, in exchange

for the inconvenience, she would pay Plaintiff a total of $400. (Id.). Plaintiff

responded, arguing that the $400 offered by Attorney Dillon was not sufficient to

"fix such an extreme disrespect for both this Court and for the Plaintiff," and noted

that Defendants did not respond to the interrogatories until more than five months

after they were served. (Dkt. 106; see also Dkt. 107).

The Court now considers Plaintiff's Motion for Sanctions, Dkt. [92], as well as

Attorney Dillon's response to the Court's Show Cause Order, (Dkt. 103).

II. Applicable Law

The district court's authority to impose sanctions derives from both Federal

Rule of Civil Procedure 37 ("Rule 37") as well as its own inherent powers. Fed. R.

Civ. P. 37; Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 44–45 (1991) (court has inherent

power to protect integrity of judicial system and may impose sanctions for abusive

behavior); REP MCR Realty, L.L.C. v. Lynch, 363 F. Supp. 2d 984, 998 (N.D. Ill.

2005), aff'd, 200 F. App'x 592 (7th Cir. 2006) ("Precedent teaches that a district

court's authority to impose such sanctions comes from two sources: Federal Rule of

Civil Procedure 37 and the Court's own inherent powers.").

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 37 enables a court to impose sanctions on a

party who fails to comply with a court order "to provide or permit discovery." Fed. R.

Civ. P. 37(b)(2)(A); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 16(f)(1)(C) ("On motion or on its own, the

court may issue any just orders, including those authorized by Rule 37(b)(2)(A)(ii)-

(vii), if a party or its attorney . . . fails to obey a scheduling or other pretrial order.").

The sanctions the court can order include the following:

(i) directing that the matters embraced in the order or other

designated facts be taken as established for purposes of the

action, as the prevailing party claims;

(ii) prohibiting the disobedient party from supporting or opposing

designated claims or defenses, or from introducing designated

matters in evidence;

(iii) striking pleadings in whole or in part;

(iv) staying further proceedings until the order is obeyed;

(v) dismissing the action or proceeding in whole or in part;

(vi) rendering a default judgment against the disobedient party; or

(vii) treating as contempt of court the failure to obey any order except

an order to submit to a physical or mental examination.

Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(b)(2)(A)(i)–(vii). Additionally, Rule 37 provides that instead of or

in addition to any other sanction, the court "must order the disobedient party, the

attorney advising that party, or both to pay the reasonable expenses, including

attorney's fees, caused by the failure, unless the failure was substantially justified

or other circumstances make an award of expenses unjust." Fed. R. Civ. P.

37(b)(2)(C) (emphasis added); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 16(f)(2).

The purpose of Rule 37 sanctions is to "provide a district court with valuable

tools for preventing the parties to a lawsuit from unjustifiably resisting discovery."

Tamari v. Bache & Co. (Lebanon) S.A.L., 729 F.2d 469, 472 (7th Cir. 1984) (internal

quotations omitted). The court may impose Rule 37 sanctions not only to penalize

conduct, but also to deter conduct. Roadway Exp., Inc. v. Piper, 447 U.S. 752, 763–

64 (1980); see also Greviskes v. Univs. Rsch. Ass'n, Inc., 417 F.3d 752, 758–59 (7th

Cir. 2005) (affirming district court's decision to dismiss the case as a penalty and a

deterrence where plaintiff's "fraudulent conduct in the course of discovery and

attempts to hide such behavior behind a cloak of further fraud and deceit [was] an

affront to the legal process"). When exercising its broad discretion to decide whether

to impose Rule 37 sanctions, Tamari, 729 F.2d at 472, the court can "review a

sanction not in isolation but in light of the entire procedural history of the case,"

e360 Insight, Inc. v. Spamhaus Project, 658 F.3d 637, 643 (7th Cir. 2011) (internal

citations omitted).

In addition, "it is settled that federal courts [also] have inherent powers to

sanction litigants for bad-faith and fraudulent conduct related to federal cases."

REP MCR Realty, L.L.C, 363 F. Supp. 2d at 998; see also Chambers, 501 U.S. at 44–

45. A variety of sanctions are available to the Court under both Rule 37 and its

inherent authority, including ordering payment of reasonable expenses, an adverse

inference, or dismissal of the case, depending on the egregiousness of the

misconduct. Fuery v. City of Chicago, 900 F.3d 450, 468–69 (7th Cir. 2018); Ramirez

v. T&H Lemont, Inc., 845 F.3d 772, 775–776 (7th Cir. 2016). In every case, the

sanction should be proportional to the offense, Allen v. Chicago Transit Auth., 317

F.3d 696, 703 (7th Cir. 2003), and the court should consider “the egregiousness of

the conduct in question in relation to all aspects of the judicial process.” Dotson v.

Bravo, 321 F.3d 663, 667 (7th Cir. 2003) (internal quotation omitted).

III. Discussion

Plaintiff requests that this Court sanction Defendants and/or Attorney Dillon

for their failure to provide the interrogatory responses by the March 14, 2025

deadline. Dkt. [92]. Plaintiff argues that the Defendants and their counsel had more

than enough time to provide the responses. (Id.). Plaintiff maintains that the delay

is inexcusable considering he mailed the interrogatories on October 21, 2024, and

that every motion he filed on this topic should have served as a reminder to

Defendants of their discovery obligations. (Dkt. 106 at 1–2).

The undersigned agrees with Plaintiff that Defendants' discovery delays and

blatant failure to comply with the Court's March 7th Order warrant sanctions.

Defendants' inaction led Plaintiff to having to file multiple motions to compel

interrogatory responses, notices of failure to serve interrogatory responses, and

motions for extension of time due to lack of interrogatory responses. (See Dkts. 62,

78, 88, 90, 96, 97). After the Court ruled on said motions and issued concrete

deadlines, Defendants failed to timely respond to the interrogatories as ordered by

the Court. (Dkt. 102). Defendants have offered no meaningful excuse for these

discovery delays (and in fact chose to not even respond to Plaintiff's original motions

to compel), much less for their failure to comply with the Court-ordered deadline for

responding to the interrogatories.

Indeed, as Attorney Dillon admitted, "[t]here is no justifiable excuse for

failing to comply with this Court's Order Compelling the Interrogatory Answers by

a certain deadline." (Dkt. 103 at 2). A heavy workload does not excuse flagrant

disregard for discovery deadlines or Court orders. Sanctions therefore are

appropriate. See Spears v. City of Indianapolis, 74 F.3d 153, 157 (7th Cir. 1996) ("A

good judge sets deadlines, and the judge has a right to assume that deadlines will

be honored. The flow of cases through a busy district court is aided, not hindered, by

adherence to deadlines."); Smith v. Marion County Sheriff's Dep't, No. 1:22-cv-

01367-JRS-TAB, Dkt. 147 at 6 (S.D. Ind. Aug. 22, 2023) (ordering sanctions for

failure to comply with court order to make full and complete discovery responses by

a date certain).

The undersigned next turns to the question of what sanctions to recommend.

Before delving further into this consideration, the Court notes that Attorney Dillon

has accepted responsibility for the delay and non-compliance. (Dkt. 103 at 2). Thus,

there does not appear to be any reason to sanction Defendants.

The undersigned further notes, however, that this is not the first time that

Attorney Dillon has been sanctioned in this Court. Just last year, this Court ordered

sanctions against her for "failing to take the most basic steps to correct [] fillings

when their falsity became apparent," since her "error was significant, and because it

fits into a pattern of similar conduct by attorneys in her law firm." Taylor v.

Washington, No. 4:21-cv-00127-TWP-KMB, 2024 WL 1756180, at *14 (S.D. Ind.

Apr. 23, 2024). Like here, Attorney Dillon admitted she had no excuse for her

failures "except that she was busy preparing for trial in another matter." Id. at *8.

As this Court explained in Taylor, being preoccupied with other matters carries no

weight: "Practicing law requires lawyers to constantly prioritize and reprioritize the

countless entries on their to-do lists." Id. at *16. This conclusion is particularly

applicable in this case, where Attorney Dillon had more than five months to

complete proper discovery responses before the Court's involvement (i.e., October

16, 2024, to April 10, 2025).

In terms of the appropriate sanctions, the undersigned finds that the

potential sanctions provided by Rule 37(b)(2)(A)(i)–(vi) are not practical at this

stage of the case, as Plaintiff has now received Defendants' discovery responses and

the parties are engaged in summary judgment briefing. Additionally, these

potential sanctions would, in effect, penalize Defendants, which would not be

reasonable considering Attorney Dillon, not Defendants, is at fault for the delay and

non-compliance. Payment of "reasonable expenses, including attorney's fees,"

therefore, is the most obvious and appropriate sanction. Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(b)(2)(C).

As set forth above, the undersigned does not find Attorney Dillon's failure

"substantially justified;" nor would "other circumstances make an award of

expenses unjust." Id. Therefore, Rule 37 mandates the court to order payment of

reasonable expenses. Id.

Here, however, Plaintiff is pro se and therefore incurred no such expenses (or

attorney's fees) in pursuing discovery and engaging in motion practice (or at least,

no expenses that appear in the record). Faced with this scenario, the undersigned

declines to recommend letting the disobedient party off the hook. Instead, the

undersigned RECOMMENDS that the District Judge treat Attorney Dillon's

failure to comply with the Court's Order as contempt of court, see Fed. R. Civ. P.

37(b)(2)(A)(vii), and impose a fine of $1,000.00, payable to Plaintiff. Recognizing

that this is a significant sum, the undersigned nevertheless finds it appropriate,

given the fact that Defendants' conduct required Plaintiff to dedicate significant

resources to prepare the following filings:

Filing Docket Number

Motions to Compel 62, 63

Motions to Compel 77, 78, 79, 81

Notice 88

Notice 90

Sanctions Motion 92

Motion for Extension of Time 96

Motion for Reconsideration 97

Response to Show Cause

106

Order

Motion for Extension of Time 107

Affidavit 108

Moreover, as was the case in Taylor, the size of this fine is necessary to function as

an effective deterrent, considering Attorney Dillon's failure to comply with the

Court's Order and the pattern of such behavior in which she (and her firm) continue

to engage. See Taylor, 2024 WL 1756180, at *17–19; see also Smith v. Marion Cnty.

Sheriff's Dep't, No. 1:22-cv-01367-JRS-CSW, Dkt. 147, at *1 (S.D. Ind. Aug. 22,

2023) (sanctioning Attorney Dillon for "inexplicably delay[ing] and derail[ing] the

discovery process, wast[ing] everyone's time, and even ignore[ing] a Court order

along the way."); Littler v. Martinez, No. 2:16-cv-00472-JMS-DLP, 2019 WL

1043256, at *11–22 (S.D. Ind. Mar. 5, 2019) (sanctioning an attorney at Attorney

Dillon's law firm, and requiring all attorneys at the firm to submit a signed copy of

Rule 11 Compliance forms with summary judgment briefing in any case for one

year); Webster v. Ctr. for Diagnostic Imaging, Inc., No. 1:16-CV-02677-JMS-DML,

2018 WL 2136451, at *8 (S.D. Ind. May 9, 2018) (precluding Defendants from

presenting expert testimony for violation of Rule 26(a)).

IV. Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, the undersigned RECOMMENDS that Plaintiff's

Motion for Sanctions, Dkt. [92], be GRANTED to the extent that Attorney Dillon

and her law firm be ORDERED to pay a fine of $1,000.00 to Plaintiff.

Any objections to the Magistrate Judge’s Report and Recommendation must

be filed in accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b). Failure to

file objections within fourteen days after service will constitute a waiver of

subsequent review absent a showing of good cause for such failure.

V. Discovery Order

In addition to recommending the above sanction, the Court enters the

following order in an exercise of its authority to manage and control the discovery

process. See Dietz v. Bouldin., 579 U.S. 40, 47 (2016) ("[D]istrict courts have the

inherent authority to manage their dockets and courtrooms with a view toward the

efficient and expedient resolution of cases.").

The Court ORDERS Attorney Dillon to file a Status Report in the cases

listed below no later than August 20, 2025:

- 2:22-cv-00493-MPB-MKK

- 1:23-cv-00782-TWP-MKK

- 1:23-cv-02231-TWP-MKK

- 2:24-cv-00056-JMS-MKK

- 2:24-cv-00314-MPB-MKK

- 2:24-cv-00490-JPH-MKK

- 1:25-cv-00021-JMS-MKK

Said reports shall set forth: (a) a detailed description of all discovery

presently scheduled or pending; (b) a detailed description of all discovery (i) that

was completed within the preceding 28 days and (ii) that is planned to be completed

within the 28-day period following the report; (c) a brief description of any discovery

disputes presently pending; and, (d) any other issues that should be brought to the

attention of the Court.

If discovery remains ongoing in any of the above-listed cases after said status

report is filed, Attorney Dillon (or her co-counsel) shall file an updated status report

every 28 days until discovery concludes.

If discovery has concluded in the matter, the status report should indicate as

much and need only set forth: (a) a detailed description of all discovery completed to

date; (b) a brief description of any discovery disputes presently pending; and, (c) any

other issues that should be brought to the attention of the Court.

So ORDERED.

LL,

Date: 08/06/2025 Ap Lede

United States Magistrate Judge

Southern District of Indiana

13

Distribution:

DARRELL BROWN

214818

NEW CASTLE - CF

NEW CASTLE CORRECTIONAL FACILITY - Inmate Mail/Parcels

1000 Van Nuys Road

P.O. Box E

NEW CASTLE, IN 47362

Carol A. Dillon

BLEEKE DILLON CRANDALL, P.C.

carol@bleekedilloncrandall.com