M.L. v. Board of Education of Bourbon County

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF KENTUCKY

CENTRAL DIVISION

(at Lexington)

M.L., by and through her next friends, )

her parents D.L. and M.L., )

)

Plaintiff, ) Civil Action No. 5: 25-279-DCR

)

V. )

)

BOARD OF EDUCATION OF ) MEMORANDUM OPINION

BOURBON COUNTY, et al., ) AND ORDER

)

Defendants. )

*** *** *** ***

Plaintiff M.L., by and through her next friends and parents, has moved for a preliminary

injunction to compel the Defendants Board of Education of Bourbon County (“Board”) and

Larry Begley, in his individual and official capacity as Superintendent of Bourbon County

Schools, to re-enroll M.L. in the Bourbon County School District (“District”) and, thereafter,

provide special education services to her under the Individuals with Disabilities Educational

Improvements Act (“IDEA”) as well as other federal and state laws. [Record No. 3] However,

the plaintiff’s motion will be denied because the factors do not weigh in favor of granting the

extraordinary relief sought.

I. Background

M.L. is a fifth grader who resides with her parents in the Nicholas County School

District; however, she has attended Bourbon County Schools since 2020.1 [See Record Nos.

7 at 2; 7-2 at 1–3; 8 at 2.] M.L. was able to attend in that district, in part, because her mother

1 But see infra note 2 discussing the conflicting dates and facts provided by the plaintiff.

is employed by the Bourbon County School District. [Record Nos. 1 at 4; 7 at 2; 7-2 at 1] The

Board’s non-resident pupil policy provides that “[n]onresident pupils will only be enrolled

when they can be assigned to classes where the enrollment is below the allowable maximum

or programs currently exist to meet educational needs.” [Record No. 7-3 at 2] It further

provides that, “[w]hen the number of nonresident students must be limited due to enrollment

capacity. . . ., [s]udents of district employees will have priority over new applicants.” Id.

M.L. was determined previously to be a child with a disability and “eligible for

specially designed instruction under the categorical disability of attention deficit hyperactivity

disorder, anxiety mood disorder, unspecified and fetal alcohol syndrome.” [Record No. 1 at

4] Her disability frequently presents as “aberrant in-school behavior.” Id. M.L.’s mother

provided an affidavit which explained that M.L. had an Individualized Education

Plan/Program (“IEP”) while attending Nicholas County Schools during the 2019–2020

academic year. [Record No. 8] But once she was enrolled in the Bourbon County School

District, her mother was informed that she no longer qualified for an IEP. Id. During M.L.’s

second grade year, and while attending Bourbon County Schools, her behavior prompted the

creation of an individual § 504 plan to address her support needs. Id.

Despite the § 504 plan, M.L. claims that she was “isolate[ed] her from her non-disabled

peers while in the school setting” due to her unmanaged behaviors. [Record No. 1 at 4] The

Board ultimately changed her school “placement from in-school to virtual home school.” Id.

M.L.’s parents responded by filing a due process complaint under 34 CFR § 300.507 on

November 14, 2024. Id. But the parties settled their dispute rather than proceed with a due

process hearing and potential appeal. Id. They agreed that M.L. would be permitted to “return

to school but not spend the whole day in an isolated setting.” Id. She was placed in a hybrid

educational environment when she returned, but roughly one week later she was again

allegedly in a segregated placement. Id.

The parties created an IEP for M.L. on March 20, 2025.2 [Record No. 7 at 7] The IEP

provided for special education services in a highly structured special education classroom for

420 minutes daily. [Record No. 7-4 at 1] But M.L. was again removed from the in-school

setting and placed in virtual home school about two months later. [Record No. 1 at 5] The

following day (May 8, 2025), M.L.’s parents withdrew her from the Bourbon County School

District to begin homeschooling. [Record Nos. 1 at 5 and 7-1]

In the past, M.L.’s mother was sent a form each year indicating her intent to have M.L.

attend in the District for the upcoming school year. [Record No. 8 at 4] However, because

M.L. had withdrawn, in early July 2025, her mother submitted an enrollment form attempting

to have M.L. returned to the District for the 2025–2026 school year. [Record Nos. 1 at 5 and

7-2 at 1–2] Rather than keep M.L. at her previous school, her mother sought placement at a

different elementary school in the District. [See Record No. 7-2 at 1–2.] Bourbon County

Superintendent Begley denied re-enrollment, allegedly stating “it was his decision” and that

she was being denied due to academic behavior and attendance. [Record Nos. 1 at 5 and 8 at

2] This lawsuit followed.

M.L. alleges that Begley denied her re-enrollment due to her disability and in retaliation

for her 2024 due process complaint. [Record No. 1 at 5] She brings claims against the

2 M.L.’s mother provides in her affidavit that M.L. had an IEP in Nicholas County

Schools in 2019–2020. However, when she enrolled in Bourbon County Schools, she was told

that she did not qualify for an IEP. [Record No. 8] The dates are conflicting because other

pleadings (and even the affidavit) state that M.L. has been in Bourbon County Schools since

2019.

defendants for purportedly violating 29 U.S.C. § 794 (i.e., § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act)

(Count I); the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”) (Count II); the Individuals with

Disabilities Act (“IDEA”) (Count III); KRS 344.130 (Count IV); KRS 159.010 and Article II

of the Kentucky Constitution (Count V); and the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States

Constitution through 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Count VII).3 [Record No. 1] She seeks both injunctive

relief as well as money damages for her asserted injuries.

Oral argument was held on M.L.’s motion for injunctive relief on August 25, 2025.

[Record Nos. 3 and 5] She seeks an order compelling the defendants to re-enroll her in the

Bourbon County School District for the 2025–2026 school year which has already

commenced. [Record No. 5] Prior to the hearing, Defendant Begley moved to dismiss all

claims against him in his official capacity, arguing that the plaintiff’s claims may only be

brought against the Board. [Record No. 6] And with respect to the claims asserted against

him in his individual capacity, he contends they are redundant to those made against the Board.

Id. In any event, he contends that the claims are barred by governmental and qualified

immunity. Id. The defendants also oppose the request for injunctive relief and move to dismiss

the Complaint under Rule 12(b)(1)4 and 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

3 Her Complaint does not include a Count VI.

4 But see Zdrowski v. Rieck, 119 F. Supp. 3d 643, 661–62 (E.D. Mich. 2015) (making

the case that the IDEA exhaustion requirement is not jurisdictional despite Metropolitan Board

of Public Education v. Guest, 193 F.3d 457, 463 (6th Cir. 1999), because of the subsequent

Supreme Court’s decision in Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199 (2007)); see also L.G. by & through

G.G. v. Bd. of Educ. of Fayette Cnty., 775 F. App’x 227, 231 n.3 (6th Cir. 2019) (holding that

“[t]his circuit has not determined whether exhaustion under the IDEA is a jurisdictional

requirement”).

[Record No. 7] Following the hearing, M.L tendered a reply to address the defendants’

arguments. [Record No. 12]

II. Legal Standard

A preliminary injunction is an extraordinary remedy that should only be granted if the

movants carry their burden of proving that the circumstances clearly demand it. Overstreet v.

Lexington-Fayette Urban Cnty. Gov’t, 305 F.3d 566, 573 (6th Cir. 2002) (citing Leary v.

Daeschner, 228 F.3d 729, 739 (6th Cir. 2000)). And “‘[w]henever the extraordinary writ of

injunction is granted, it should be tailored to restrain no more than what is reasonably required

to accomplish its ends.’” Stenberg v. Cheker Oil Co., 573 F.2d 921, 924 (6th Cir. 1978)

(quoting Consolidation Coal Co. v. Disabled Miners of Southern West Virginia, 442 F.2d

1261, 1267 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 911 (1971)).

The fundamental purpose of a preliminary injunction is “to preserve the status quo

during litigation to avoid an irreparable injury.” BE the Bush Recovery Ministries v. Coffee

Cnty., Tenn., 2023 WL 110775, at *2 (6th Cir. Jan. 5, 2023) (citing Resurrection Sch. v. Hertel,

35 F.4th 524, 531 (6th Cir. 2022)). However, it can also be used to return the parties to the

“‘last, uncontested status preceding commencement of the controversy.’” Blaylock v. Cheker

Oil Co., 547 F.2d 962, 965 (6th Cir. 1976) (quoting Washington Capitols Basketball Club, Inc.

v. Barry, 419 F.2d 472 (9th Cir. 1969)).

Plaintiffs seeking a preliminary injunction must show that “they are likely to succeed

on the merits, that they are likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary relief,

that the balance of equities tips in their favor, and that an injunction would be in the public

interest.” Mahmoud v. Taylor, 145 S. Ct. 2332, 2350 (2025) (citing Winter v. Natural

Resources Defense Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 20 (2008)); see also EOG Res., Inc. v. Lucky

Land Mgmt., LLC, 134 F.4th 868, 874 (6th Cir. 2025). And while all these factors must be

considered by the Court, the existence of irreparable harm (that is certain and immediate, not

speculative or theoretical) is “mandatory.” EOG Res., Inc, 134 F.4th at 874 (citing D.T. v.

Sumner Cnty. Schs., 942 F.3d 324, 326–27 (6th Cir. 2019)). Without irreparable harm, there

is no reason for the court to act at such an early juncture (rather than allow the case to proceed

in the ordinary course). Id. at 885. Therefore, a “district court is ‘well within its province’

when it denies a preliminary injunction based solely on the lack of an irreparable injury.” D.T.,

942 F.3d at 327 (quoting S. Milk Sales, Inc. v. Martin, 924 F.2d 98, 103 (6th Cir. 1991)).

Rule 65(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that “[t]he court may issue

a preliminary injunction or a temporary restraining order only if the movant gives security in

an amount that the court considers proper to pay the costs and damages sustained by any party

found to have been wrongfully enjoined or restrained.” And a court has discretion to determine

the appropriate amount of the bond, or to waive it under certain circumstances. USACO Coal

Co. v. Carbomin Energy, Inc., 689 F.2d 94, 100 (6th Cir. 1982).

III. Analysis

A. Likelihood of Success on the Merits

M.L. argues that she has a strong likelihood of success on the merits for the following

reasons: Begley’s decision not to re-enroll her was “arbitrary and based solely on her

disability”; IDEA’s “stay put” requirement supports the issuance of an injunction; and because

she is a child with a disability, being denied access to the public school systems in Bourbon

County because of her disability violates several relevant statutes. [Record No. 3-1 at 3–5]

Conversely, the defendants contend that M.L. has no likely or probable success on the

merits because “the Complaint is barred under IDEA” and she “has no legal right to enrollment

in the Board’s District.” [Record No. 7 at 9] Specifically, she failed to exhaust administrative

procedures which include an “impartial administrative due process hearing and an opportunity

to appeal.” Id. at 3. They insist that her exclusive remedies are with the Kentucky Department

of Education under the IDEA. Id. at 6. The defendants further assert that M.L. has no legal

right to enrollment in the Bourbon County School District because once she withdrew to home

school, Nicholas County School District became the responsible entity for implementing her

IEP and otherwise providing for her educational needs. Id. at 8. Regarding the allegation that

she was denied re-enrollment because of her disability and in retaliation of her due process

complaint, the defendants reference district policy and insist that they could not re-enroll her

because they do not have the staffing, classroom space, or programs to meet her educational

needs due to increased enrollment. Id. at 11.

The IDEA requires recipients of federal funds to provide a free appropriate public

education (“FAPE”) to children with disabilities. See 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(1) (2012). And this

guarantee is protected with certain procedural safeguards. Id. at § 1415. Parties may present

a due process complaint alleging a FAPE violation and may be entitled to a “due process

hearing” before an impartial hearing officer. Id. at § 1415(a)(6), (f). A party aggrieved by the

result of an IDEA due process hearing may appeal the result to the state educational agency.

Id. at § 1415(g). The outcome of the administrative review hearing may then be challenged in

district court. Id. at § 1415(i)(2).

These exhaustion requirements also apply to claims brought under other federal laws

such as the ADA and § 504 when plaintiffs seek “relief that is also available under [the IDEA].”

20 U.S.C. § 1415(l). The United States Supreme Court has provided that such claims must

comply with the IDEA’s exhaustion requirements when, at bottom, they seek relief for the

denial of a free appropriate public education. Fry v. Napoleon Cmty. Schs., 580 U.S. 154, 168

(2017) (citing 20 U.S.C. § 1415(l)).

In determining whether a lawsuit seeks relief for the denial of a FAPE, a court “should

look to the substance, or gravamen, of the plaintiff’s complaint.” Id. at 165. If the plaintiff

alleges the denial of a FAPE, “the plaintiff cannot escape § 1415(l) merely by bringing her suit

under a statute other than the IDEA.” Id. at 168. “But if, in a suit brought under a different

statute, the remedy sought is not for the denial of a FAPE, then exhaustion of the IDEA’s

procedures is not required.” Id. To assess the gravamen of the complaint, “a court should

attend to the diverse means and ends of the statutes covering persons with disabilities—the

IDEA on the one hand, the ADA and Rehabilitation Act (most notably) on the other.” Id. at

170. “[T]he IDEA guarantees individually tailored educational services, while Title II and §

504 promise nondiscriminatory access to public institutions.” Id. at 170–71.

A court considers two hypothetical questions to aid in this determination: (1) “could

the plaintiff have brought essentially the same claim if the alleged conduct had occurred at a

public facility that was not a school,” and (2) “could an adult at the school have pressed

essentially the same grievance?” Id. at 171 (emphasis in original). For example, a

discrimination suit against a school for failing to provide wheelchair access ramps would not

be subject to the IDEA’s exhaustion requirements, because it could be brought against any

public facility that lacked access ramps, and could be brought against the school by an adult.

See id. at 171–72. Whereas a claim against a school for failing to provide remedial

mathematics tutoring to a student with a disability could not be brought against another public

facility, nor could it be brought by an adult at the school, rendering it subject to exhaustion.

See id. at 172–73.

The United States Supreme Court has further clarified that when a plaintiff’s lawsuit’s

gravamen is the denial of a FAPE, but the relief sought is not available under the IDEA, then

exhaustion of the administrative remedies is not required. Perez v. Sturgis Pub. Schs., 598

U.S. 142, 146–47 (2023) (holding that the IDEA’s exhaustion requirement did not preclude an

Americans with Disabilities Act lawsuit because the plaintiff sought compensatory damages

that the Act did not provide). Other exceptions to the exhaustion requirements include when:

“‘(1) exhaustion would be futile or inadequate; (2) the issue presented is purely a legal

question; (3) the administrative agency cannot grant relief; and (4) exhaustion would cause

severe or irreparable harm.’” J.A. by & through S.A. v. Williamson Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 731 F.

Supp. 3d 938, 951 (M.D. Tenn. 2024) (quoting M.M. v. Paterson Bd. of Educ., 736 F. App'x

317, 319–20 (3d Cir. 2018) (internal citation omitted) (and citing Donoho ex rel. Kemp v. Smith

Cty. Bd. of Educ., 21 F. App’x 293, 297 (6th Cir. 2001)). Otherwise, exhaustion is required,

and parents may not circumvent it by unilaterally removing their child from public school. See

Doe By & Through Doe v. Smith, 879 F.2d 1340, 1343 (6th Cir. 1989).

Here, M.L. claims that she is being denied access to Bourbon County Schools, for

which the IDEA provides no remedy. [Record No. 12 at 6] She argues that her denial is

analogous to a wheelchair-bound child being denied access to a school because it lacks

wheelchair ramps as hypothesized in Fry. Id. at 3 (citing Fry, 580 U.S. at 171). And because

she contends that she is being denied her right to access the school, not challenging the

adequacy of her special education services, the gravamen of her complaint falls under the

ADA/Section 504, not IDEA. Id. at 3–4. Therefore, exhaustion is not required.

But the plaintiff’s analogy misses a crucial point: the student must have a right to access

the school in the first place before there can be some determination regarding whether he or

she is being denied access because of his or her disability. To clarify, the Court’s hypothetical

questions in Fry directed courts to ask, “could the plaintiff have brought essentially the same

claim if the alleged conduct had occurred at a public facility that was not a school,” and (2)

“could an adult at the school have pressed essentially the same grievance?” Fry, 580 U.S. at

171. The first question (and the second by extension) in that hypothetical assumes the

individual has a right to access the “public facility” like any other member of the public. The

plaintiff attempts to shoehorn her situation into this hypothetical by beginning with the

assumption that she has a right to enter the Bourbon County Schools. But as the plaintiff

conceded during the hearing, she has no statutory right to enroll in the District, rather she relies

on a policy under which she may be enrolled.

Consider an individual who has no right of access to a public school, perhaps because

he or she has no student enrolled or other legitimate reason to gain entry. Assume that person

visits the secured school while it is in session, rings the doorbell, and after explaining that he

or she would like to listen to students play in gym class, is denied entry. Now assume that

person is blind and insists he or she is being denied access because of that disability. That

person would not fall under the hypotheticals in Fry because he or she would have no right to

access the school in the same way he or she would in a place of public accommodation. To

clarify, if that person were a student enrolled in that school or a parent who was needing to

pick their child up from school for a doctor’s appointment, M.L.’s analogy would work.

Try another way: the plaintiff’s allegation that she is being denied the ability to enroll

in Bourbon County School because of her disability is a claim alleging a denial of a FAPE.

The plaintiff’s Complaint alleges that the defendants failed to comply with the agreement the

parties reached after M.L.’s parents filed a due process complaint. M.L. contends that they

agreed that she would be allowed to return to school but not spend the whole day isolated. The

defendants provided M.L.’s IEP that was created in March 2025 which appears to support the

plaintiff’s contention. But M.L. insists that she was placed in a segregated setting about two

months later and that is why her parents withdrew her from school to homeschool.

At bottom, the seminal disagreement triggering the above events was a change in

M.L.’s placement (hybrid to segregated learning environment). Therefore, a denial of FAPE

is the gravamen of her Complaint. Additionally, had her parents filed a due process complaint

over the allegedly unilateral and unwarranted placement change, they could have triggered

stay put rights which would have required that M.L. remain in the hybrid learning environment

as provided for in her IEP. But instead, they withdrew her entirely.

The stay put provision in the IDEA is one of the procedural safeguards available to a

student and her parents. J.L. through S.L. v. Williamson Cnty., Tennessee, Bd. of Educ., No.

23-5704, 2024 WL 3634456, at *2 (6th Cir. Aug. 2, 2024). For a stay put injunction to take

effect, the plaintiff must show “(1) a proceeding conducted pursuant to 20 U.S.C. § 1415 is

pending, and (2) the child has a then-current educational placement in which he must remain.”

Id. at *5 (citation modified). When triggered, it maintains a child’s placement and services

until the dispute between the public school and parent is resolved, either by a due process

complaint and potential appeal or an agreement between the parties. Id. at *2 (citing 20 U.S.C.

§ 1415(j)).

Here, the stay put provision does not apply because there is no 20 U.S.C. § 1415 (due

process complaint) proceeding pending. And M.L. is not free to circumvent her procedural

safeguards by withdrawing from public school and then seeking a court injunction rather than

following the administrative process which allows for a statutory injunction.

Fry supports this conclusion. M.L.’s disagreement regarding the defendants’ placement

decision is a claim that could not be brought outside of the school setting and no adult could

raise this grievance against the school. See Fry, 580 U.S. at 168, 171. Therefore, M.L. put the

cart before the horse in seeking an injunction because she does not appear to have exhausted

her administrative remedies. Further, there is no indication that she appealed Begley’s decision

to the Board (whose decision would be final per policy) or that she initiated a due process

complaint regarding his denial. While it is possible that a future due process complaint would

be rejected or denied based on her voluntary withdrawal from the District and homeschooling

designation, M.L. has not made an adequate showing that exhaustion would be futile or that

the relief she seeks cannot be granted by the administrative agency. [See Record Nos. 3-1 and

12.]; J.A. by & through S.A., 731 F. Supp. 3d at 951. At this juncture and on the limited record

before the Court, it clearly appears that exhaustion is required. See Perez, 598 U.S. at 146–

47.

B. Irreparable Harm/Injury

“To establish that they will face irreparable harm in the absence of injunctive relief,

Plaintiffs must show that they are at risk of suffering some harm that ‘is not fully compensable

by monetary damages.’” Int’l Union of Painters & Allied Trades Dist. Council No. 6 v. Smith,

_ F.4th _, No. 24-3282, 2025 WL 2170424, at *4 (6th Cir. July 31, 2025) (quoting Overstreet,

305 F.3d at 578)). During the hearing, M.L.’s counsel asserted that M.L. is being denied access

to Bourbon County Schools because of her disability and, therefore, the injury to her

constitutional rights is an irreparable harm for which there is no other remedy. M.L. further

argues that she would lose “programs offered to her due to her disability.” [Record No. 3-1 at

5] She also claims that if she is denied admission to Bourbon County Schools, her mother

would have to leave her job to stay home because there is no after school program available in

her districted school. Id. And although she claimed that she would lose her school friends,

during the hearing, her counsel conceded that she would have lost her friends either way

because her mother sought placement at a different elementary school for the current school

year. [Compare Record No. 7-2 at 1 (showing her last school attended was Bourbon Central

Elementary) with Record No. 7-2 at 2 (selecting Cane Ridge Elementary as the school M.L.

will attend).]

While a denial of a constitutional right can constitute irreparable harm, M.L. asks this

Court to make the inference that she was denied the ability to enroll in Bourbon County

Schools because of her disability, rather than pursuant to the District’s policy of admitting

nonresident students as the defendants contend. See Mahmoud, 145 S. Ct. at 2364. It is true

that FAPE requires a child’s resident school district to enroll that child, but that right does not

extend to other schools to which the child may apply to attend out of district. See 34 C.F.R. §

300.201; 707 KAR 1:290 § 1. The defendants insist that Nicholas County Schools would be

obligated to provide M.L. the programs and services outlined in her IEP as her districted

school. Therefore, she cannot show an irreparable harm in losing any programs. [Record No.

7-6] And the plaintiff does not deny that Nicholas County would be obligated to provide her

services provided for in her IEP. In short, while M.L. has a right to access a FAPE, she does

not have an unfettered right to attend whatever public school she wishes.

The defendants argue that Bourbon County no longer has the space, staff or programs

to support M.L.’s needs because of increased enrollment, and the District policy appears to

allow such a denial under such circumstances. Had M.L. remained enrolled, she could have

made a stronger showing that she was denied access to Bourbon County Schools because of

her disability. But, as here, where M.L. was voluntarily and unilaterally withdrawn by her

parents (requiring her mother to file an application to enroll her for the current school year

rather than the simple form she had filled out in years’ past), she has not made a sufficient

showing that she was denied access due to her disability to support the extraordinary relief she

requests.

Next, regarding M.l.’s contention that her mother would have to quit her employment

causing M.L. harm, it is too speculative and relies solely on indirect harm. M.L.’s mother

withdrew her from school on May 8, 2025, to homeschool her and apparently was using Family

and Medical Leave Act (“FMLA”) to aid in this endeavor. [Record No. 8] But in making

similar preparations for the upcoming school year, she claims she was told by her principal

that she could only receive a half day off at a time (rather than less than a half day off as she

hoped). And she contends this is why she can no longer homeschool M.L. or otherwise provide

her necessary care if she attends school in Nicholas County. Id.

But the plaintiff does not show why she can no longer be cared for by someone else

(such as her father or other relative) after school or otherwise. Nor does she show why a

private individual’s childcare services cannot be sought. And if these other options are

attainable, why this harm could be remedied later by compensatory damages should M.L.

prevail.

Here, M.L. attempts to rely on (anticipated) collateral harm to her mother’s

employment as a basis for granting M.L. injunctive relief. While it is arguable that her mother

quitting her job could result in some indirect harm to M.L. through financial means (for which

an injunction would not be appropriate), it is more difficult to say that it would cause M.L.

direct harm. It is possible that her mother leaving her job would help and not harm M.L. in

the remaining intangible ways, especially considering her persistent behavior challenges in the

public-school setting.

C. Balancing the Equities

Under this factor, courts “ask where the greatest harm will fall” by “balanc[ing] the

competing claims of injury” and “consider[ing] the effect on each party of the granting or

withholding of the requested relief.” EOG Res., Inc., 134 F.4th at 886 (citing Winter, 555 U.S.

at 24) (citation modified). M.L. argues that granting the injunction will not harm the

defendants when balanced against the harm she faces if the Court were not to grant the

injunction. [Record No. 7 at 6] She emphasizes that Begley’s decision to deny re-enrolment

was arbitrary and that she was not provided a way to contest it.5 Id. And she argues that her

family would face hardship if she is not allowed to re-enroll because her mother would need

to quit her job. During the hearing, the defendants claimed that they would be harmed by an

injunction because they do not have the staffing, classroom space, or programs to enroll M.L.

due to increased enrollment in the 2025–2026 school year. M.L. insisted that the defendants’

stated reasons were inconsistent with Begley’s statement that the decision to deny enrollment

was due to academic behavior and attendance.

Because M.L.’s mother waited until July 5, 2025, to apply for enrollment (after she

figured out that she could not use FMLA in the way she hoped) and the school year has already

commenced, granting the injunction would pose a significant harm to the defendants. [Record

No. 8] They would need to scramble to find a place outside of the general classroom and staff

5 The Bourbon County School District policy on nonresident enrollment allows a party

aggrieved to appeal the Superintendent’s denial to the Bourbon County Board of Education

and that decision would be final. [Record No. 7-3 at 2] There is no indication that an appeal

to the Board occurred.

to provide M.L. with her daily 420 minutes of time in the resource room as required by her

IEP. [Record No. 7-4 at 1] M.L.’s family would also face hardship in needing to obtain after

school care and other logistics involved with her mother working in a different county from

where M.L. is districted to attend school. [Record No. 12 at 7]

Here, on the limited record, it appears that the defendants would face a greater harm if

the Court were to grant the injunction than the one M.L. would face if the Court did not.

D. Public Interest

M.L. contends that the “denial of equal access to a public entity due to a protected class

is and has been an interest of the public since Brown v Board of Education.” [Record No. 3-1

at 6] She asserts that the public interest favors her inclusion in Bourbon County Schools. The

defendants offer that the purpose of requiring exhaustion is to allow “agencies to exercise

discretion and apply their expertise, to allow the complete development of the record before

judicial review, to prevent parties from circumventing the procedures established by Congress,

and to avoid unnecessary judicial decisions by giving the agency an opportunity to correct

errors.” [Record No. 7 at 4 (citing Urb. by Urb. v. Jefferson Cnty. Sch. Dist. R-1, 89 F.3d 720,

724 (10th Cir. 1996))]

This factor weighs against granting the injunction. The public interest is not advanced

by out-of-district students picking and choosing which school to attend at the final hour. Nor

is the public interest served by federal courts compelling school districts to enroll students who

have not exhausted the administrative processes available to them.

IV. Conclusion

Having considered the matter, it is hereby ORDERED that the plaintiff’s motion for a

preliminary injunction [Record No. 3] is DENIED.

Dated: September 4, 2025.

: al 4 Danny C. Reeves, District Judge

oS I) United States District Court

□ Eastern District of Kentucky

-17-