State ex rel. Garrison v. Hawkins

[Cite as State ex rel. Garrison v. Hawkins, 2025-Ohio-3160.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO

TENTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

State ex rel. Carlos Q. Garrison, :

Relator, :

No. 24AP-764

v. :

(REGULAR CALENDAR)

Judge Daniel Hawkins et al., :

Respondents. :

DECISION

Rendered on September 4, 2025

Carlos Q. Garrison, pro se.

[Shayla D. Favor], Prosecuting Attorney, and Patrick A.

Stevens, for respondents.

IN PROHIBITION

ON RESPONDENTS’ MOTION TO DISMISS

BEATTY BLUNT, J.

{¶ 1} Petitioner, Carlos Q. Garrison, has commenced this original action seeking a

writ of prohibition ordering respondents, Judge Daniel Hawkins and Judge Richard

Brown, to prohibit any further proceedings against him in the Franklin County Court of

Common Pleas because the court lacks jurisdiction and is not the proper venue.

Respondents have filed a motion to dismiss petitioner’s petition pursuant to Civ.R.

12(B)(6).

{¶ 2} Pursuant to Civ.R. 53 and Loc.R. 13(M) of the Tenth District Court of Appeals,

this matter was referred to a magistrate. The magistrate considered the action on its merits

and issued a decision, including findings of fact and conclusions of law, which is appended

hereto. The magistrate concluded that petitioner cannot establish that the trial court’s

No. 24AP-764 2

exercise of judicial power is unauthorized by law or that there is no other adequate remedy

at law. The magistrate further concluded that petitioner also cannot show that the trial

court patently and unambiguously lacks jurisdiction. Finally, the magistrate concluded that

petitioner also has an adequate remedy at law. Accordingly, the magistrate recommended

this court grant the motion to dismiss filed by respondents and dismiss petitioner’s action.

{¶ 3} No objections have been filed to the magistrate’s decision. “If no timely

objections are filed, the court may adopt a magistrate’s decision, unless it determines that

there is an error of law or other defect evident on the face of the magistrate’s decision.”

Civ.R. 53(D)(4)(c).

{¶ 4} Upon review, we have found no error in the magistrate’s findings of fact or

conclusions of law or other defect evident on the face of the magistrate’s decision.

Therefore, we adopt the magistrate’s decision as our own, including the findings of fact and

conclusions of law therein, and conclude that petitioner has not shown he is entitled to a

writ of prohibition, and his action must be dismissed.

Writ of prohibition denied;

complaint dismissed.

DORRIAN and MENTEL, JJ., concur.

________________

No. 24AP-764 3

APPENDIX

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO

TENTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

State ex rel. Carlos Q. Garrison, :

Relator, :

v. : No. 24AP-764

Judge Daniel Hawkins/Richard Brown, : (REGULAR CALENDAR)

Respondents. :

MAGISTRATE’S DECISION

Rendered on May 29, 2025

Carlos Q. Garrison, pro se.

Shayla D. Favor, Prosecuting Attorney, and Patrick A.

Stevens, for respondents.

IN PROHIBITION

ON RESPONDENTS’ MOTION TO DISMISS

{¶ 5} Petitioner, Carlos Q. Garrison, has commenced this original action seeking a

writ of prohibition ordering respondents, Judge Daniel Hawkins and Judge Richard Brown

to prohibit any further proceedings against him in the Franklin County Court of Common

Pleas because the court lacks jurisdiction and is not the proper venue. Respondents have

filed a motion to dismiss pursuant to Civ.R. 12(B)(6).

Findings of Fact:

{¶ 6} 1. Petitioner is an inmate in the Franklin County Correctional Center.

{¶ 7} 2. Judge Hawkins was a judge in the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas

No. 24AP-764 4

and presided over petitioner’s criminal case, Franklin C.P. No. 22 CR 3647 (“common pleas

case,” “underlying case,” or “case no. 22 CR 3647”). However, Judge Brown now presides

over petitioner’s common pleas case and is the proper respondent pursuant to Civ.R.

25(D)(1). Petitioner was indicted in case no. 22 CR 3647 on three counts of possession of

drugs and three counts of trafficking in drugs, with two major drug offender specifications.

{¶ 8} 3. On December 17, 2024, petitioner filed a motion to dismiss for lack of

jurisdiction and improper venue in case no. 22 CR 3647.

{¶ 9} 4. On December 30, 2024, petitioner filed the present petition for writ of

prohibition. In the petition, petitioner claims that based upon certain facts and evidence

presented at a January 9, 2024, suppression hearing in his common pleas case, the Franklin

County Court of Common Pleas lacks jurisdiction over his criminal case, and venue is not

proper in that court. Petitioner contends that venue is, instead, proper in Madison County.

{¶ 10} 5. As of the date of the filing of petitioner’s petition, the matter had not

proceeded to trial.

{¶ 11} 6. On February 3, 2025, respondents filed a motion to dismiss the petition for

writ of prohibition pursuant to Civ.R. 12(B)(6).

{¶ 12} 7. On February 20, 2025, petitioner filed a motion for default judgment based

upon respondents’ failure to file any responsive pleading. Petitioner also filed on February

20, 2025, a response to respondents’ motion to dismiss.

Conclusions of Law:

{¶ 13} The magistrate recommends that this court grant respondents’ motion to

dismiss this action.

{¶ 14} “The purpose of a writ of prohibition is to restrain inferior courts from

exceeding their jurisdiction.” State ex rel. Roush v. Montgomery, 2019-Ohio-932, ¶ 5,

citing State ex rel. Tubbs Jones v. Suster, 84 Ohio St.3d 70, 73 (1998). To demonstrate

entitlement to a writ of prohibition, a relator must establish that a respondent: (1) has

exercised or is about to exercise judicial or quasi-judicial power, (2) that the exercise of that

power is unauthorized by law, and (3) that denying the writ will cause injury for which no

other adequate remedy in the ordinary course of the law exists. Roush at ¶ 5. A party

challenging the court’s jurisdiction has an adequate remedy at law via an appeal from the

No. 24AP-764 5

court’s holding that it has jurisdiction. State ex rel. Rootstown Local School Dist. Bd. of

Edn. v. Portage Cty. Court of Common Pleas, 78 Ohio St.3d 489 (1997). The absence of an

adequate remedy at law is not a required element if it can be shown that the trial court

patently and unambiguously lacks jurisdiction. State ex rel. Martre v. Cheney, 2023-Ohio-

4594, ¶ 17, citing State ex rel. Jones v. Paschke, 2022-Ohio-2427, ¶ 6.

{¶ 15} Whether a court patently and unambiguously lacks jurisdiction for purposes

of a writ of prohibition is a question of the court’s subject-matter jurisdiction. State ex rel.

Eaton Corp. v. Lancaster, 40 Ohio St.3d 404, 409 (1988) (prohibition tests and determines

solely and only the subject-matter jurisdiction of the trial court). See also State ex rel.

Martre v. Cheney, 2023-Ohio-4594, ¶ 17, citing Jones, 2022-Ohio-2427 at ¶ 8 (prohibition

will generally lie only for an absence of subject-matter jurisdiction). Subject-matter

jurisdiction refers to a court’s power to entertain and adjudicate a particular class of cases.

Bank of Am., N.A. v. Kuchta, 2014-Ohio-4275, ¶ 19, citing Morrison v. Steiner, 32 Ohio

St.2d 86, 87 (1972). “ ‘A court’s subject-matter jurisdiction is determined without regard to

the rights of the individual parties involved in a particular case.’ ” Corder v. Ohio Edison

Co., 2020-Ohio-5220, ¶ 14, quoting Kuchta at ¶ 19. “Instead, ‘the focus is on whether the

forum itself is competent to hear the controversy.’ ” Id. at ¶ 14, quoting State v. Harper,

2020-Ohio-2913, ¶ 23, citing 18A Wright, Miller & Cooper, Federal Practice and

Procedure, Section 4428, at 6 (3d Ed.2017) (explaining that jurisdictional analysis should

be confined to the rules that actually allocate judicial authority among different courts).

{¶ 16} Common pleas courts “have such original jurisdiction over all justiciable

matters . . . as may be provided by law.” Ohio Const., article IV, § 4(B). Thus, when a

common pleas court patently and unambiguously lacks jurisdiction to hear a case, “ ‘it is

almost always because a statute explicitly removed that jurisdiction.’ ” Schlegel v. Sweeney,

2022-Ohio-3841, ¶ 14, quoting Ohio High School Athletic Assn. v. Ruehlman, 2019-Ohio-

2845, ¶ 9.

{¶ 17} A court may dismiss a complaint pursuant to Civ.R. 12(B)(6) if, after all

factual allegations in the complaint are presumed true and all reasonable inferences are

made in relator’s favor, it appears beyond doubt that relator could prove no set of facts

entitling him or her to the requested extraordinary writ. State ex rel. Turner v. Houk, 2007-

Ohio-814, ¶ 5. “Although factual allegations in the complaint are taken as true,

No. 24AP-764 6

‘unsupported conclusions of a complaint are not considered admitted * * * and are not

sufficient to withstand a motion to dismiss.’ ” Justice v. Jefferson-Pilot Life Ins., 1998 Ohio

App. LEXIS 6250 (10th Dist. Dec. 24, 1998), quoting State ex rel. Hickman v. Capots, 45

Ohio St.3d 324 (1989).

{¶ 18} The magistrate may take judicial notice of the pleadings and orders in related

cases when these are not subject to reasonable dispute, at least insofar as they affect the

present original action. State ex rel. Nyamusevya v. Hawkins, 2020-Ohio-2690, ¶ 33 (10th

Dist.), citing Evid.R. 201(B); State ex rel. Ohio Republican Party v. Fitzgerald, 2015-Ohio-

5056, ¶ 18; and State ex rel. Womack v. Marsh, 2011-Ohio-229, ¶ 8. Furthermore, a court

may take judicial notice of pleadings that are readily accessible on the internet. See

Draughon v. Jenkins, 2016-Ohio-5364, ¶ 26 (4th Dist.), citing State ex rel. Everhart v.

McIntosh, 2007-Ohio-4798, ¶ 8, 10 (a court may take judicial notice of appropriate matters,

including judicial opinions and public records accessible from the internet); and Giannelli,

1 Baldwin’s Ohio Practice Evidence, Section 201.6 (3d Ed.2015) (noting that the rule

generally precluding a court from taking judicial notice of other cases has been relaxed if

the record is accessible on the internet).

{¶ 19} In the present case, there is no dispute that the first element of a prohibition

action has been met, in that respondents have exercised and will continue to exercise

judicial power in case no. 22 CR 3647 by proceeding with the criminal action against

petitioner.

{¶ 20} With regard to the second and third elements, the magistrate finds that

petitioner cannot establish that the trial court’s exercise of judicial power is unauthorized

by law or that there is no other adequate remedy at law. Petitioner also cannot show that

the trial court patently and unambiguously lacks jurisdiction. Although the allegations

raised by petitioner in his petition relate largely to issues of venue, it is clear that the

Franklin County Court of Common Pleas has subject-matter jurisdiction over case no.

22 CR 3647. Article IV, Section 4(B) of the Ohio Constitution provides that “courts of

common pleas and divisions thereof shall have such original jurisdiction over all justiciable

matters . . . as may be provided by law.” R.C. 2931.03 provides that: “The court of common

pleas has original jurisdiction of all crimes and offenses, except in cases of minor offenses

the exclusive jurisdiction of which is vested in courts inferior to the court of common pleas.”

No. 24AP-764 7

See Smith v. Sheldon, 2019-Ohio-1677, ¶ 8 (finding that a common pleas court has subject-

matter jurisdiction over felony cases). Petitioner has failed to identify any statute that

explicitly removes or divests the trial court’s clear subject-matter jurisdiction here. Thus,

the magistrate finds that the trial court has subject-matter jurisdiction, and its exercise of

power is authorized by law, in this respect.

{¶ 21} Petitioner also has an adequate remedy at law. On December 17, 2024,

petitioner filed a motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction and improper venue, raising the

same arguments as he raises in the present case. Respondent Judge Brown has not ruled

on that motion. It has been held that extraordinary relief in prohibition generally does not

lie to challenge a decision on a motion challenging venue because appeal following a final

judgment provides an adequate legal remedy. See State ex rel. Banc One Corp. v. Walker,

86 Ohio St.3d 169, 173 (1999). The magistrate also notes that venue is neither a material

element of a criminal offense nor a jurisdictional issue, State v. Loucks, 28 Ohio App.2d 77

(4th Dist. 1971), but is a fact that must be proven by the state beyond a reasonable doubt at

trial. State v. Wogenstahl, 2024-Ohio-2714, ¶ 36 (explaining that venue is not a material

element of any crime but, unless waived, is a fact that must be proven at trial beyond a

reasonable doubt). At this juncture, petitioner’s arguments are based on testimony given at

a suppression hearing and no hearing or trial has taken place addressing the specific issue

of venue. Thus, petitioner has an adequate remedy at law by way of motion in the trial court,

argument at trial, or appeal.

{¶ 22} Accordingly, it is the magistrate’s decision that this court should grant

respondents’ motion to dismiss petitioner’s petition for writ of prohibition. Petitioner’s

February 20, 2025, motion for default judgment is denied.

/S/ MAGISTRATE

THOMAS W. SCHOLL III

NOTICE TO THE PARTIES

No. 24AP-764 8

Civ.R. 53(D)(3)(a)(iii) provides that a party shall not assign as

error on appeal the court’s adoption of any factual finding or

legal conclusion, whether or not specifically designated as a

finding of fact or conclusion of law under Civ.R. 53(D)(3)(a)(ii),

unless the party timely and specifically objects to that factual

finding or legal conclusion as required by Civ.R. 53(D)(3)(b). A

party may file written objections to the magistrate’s decision

within fourteen days of the filing of the decision.