Opinion

Reliford v. Brown

Court
District Court, D. Nevada
Filed
Aug 27, 2025
Cited by
0 cases
Authority
More cited than 39.1%

The opinion

1 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

2 DISTRICT OF NEVADA

3 * * *

4 Angela Reliford, individually, Case No. 2:25-cv-01088-GMN-BNW

5 Plaintiff,

ORDER

6 v.

7 Christopher M. Brown, et al.,

8 Defendants.

9

10 Before this Court are two motions by pro se Plaintiff: Application to Proceed In Forma

11 Pauperis (ECF No. 14) and Motion to Appoint Counsel (ECF No. 12). No responses were filed.

12 The parties are familiar with the facts of this case, so this Court will not repeat them. Because

13 Plaintiff submitted the declaration required by 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a) showing an inability to prepay

14 fees and costs or give security for them, this Court will grant her request to proceed in forma

15 pauperis. Id. However, Plaintiff has not established exceptional circumstances to justify

16 appointment of counsel, so this Court denies her motion to appoint counsel without prejudice.

17 I. DISCUSSION

18 A. Application to proceed in forma pauperis (ECF No. 14)

19 Although Defendant Sony removed this case to federal court and paid the filing fee,

20 Plaintiff still moves to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”). ECF No. 14. Before removal, Plaintiff

21 moved to proceed IFP, and the state court granted her request. See ECF No. 14. Because Plaintiff

22 submitted the affidavit required by 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a), showing an inability to prepay fees or

23 costs or give security for them, this Court finds no reason to deny her request. Plaintiff may

24 proceed IFP.

25 Courts ordinarily screen indigent plaintiffs’ complaints prior to service. See 28 U.S.C.

26 § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i); Calhoun v. Stahl, 254 F.3d 845, 845 (9th Cir. 2001) (per curiam). However,

27 when defendants file an answer or responsive pleading, such as a motion to dismiss, the need for

1 that the purpose of § 1915 is to ensure that “the targets of frivolous or malicious suits need not

2 bear the expense of responding”); see also Olausen v. Murguia, No. 3:13-CV-00388-MMD-VPC,

3 2014 WL 6065622, at *3 (D. Nev. Nov. 12, 2014) (“[T]he screening provision does not require a

4 court, either explicitly or implicitly, to screen every time a plaintiff seeks to amend the

5 complaint.”). Here, screening is not necessary as Defendant Sony filed a motion to dismiss. See

6 ECF No. 24.

7 B. Motion to Appoint Counsel (ECF No. 12)

8 Civil litigants do not have a Sixth Amendment right to appointed counsel. Storseth v.

9 Spellman, 654 F.2d 1349, 1353 (9th Cir. 1981). In very limited circumstances, federal courts are

10 empowered to request an attorney to represent an indigent civil litigant. For example, courts have

11 discretion, under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(1), to “request” that an attorney represent indigent civil

12 litigants upon a showing of “exceptional circumstances.” Agyeman v. Corrections Corp. of Am.,

13 390 F.3d 1101, 1103 (9th Cir. 2004). The circumstances in which a court will make such a

14 request, however, are exceedingly rare and require a finding of extraordinary circumstances.

15 United States v. 30.64 Acres of Land, 795 F.2d 796, 799–800 (9th Cir. 1986); Wilborn v.

16 Escalderon, 789 F.2d 1328, 1331 (9th Cir. 1986).

17 To determine whether the “exceptional circumstances” necessary for appointment of

18 counsel are present, the court evaluates (1) the likelihood of plaintiff’s success on the merits and

19 (2) the plaintiff’s ability to articulate his claim pro se “in light of the complexity of the legal

20 issues involved.” Agyeman, 390 F.3d at 1103 (quoting Wilborn, 789 F.2d at 1331). Neither of

21 these factors is dispositive and both must be viewed together. Wilborn, 789 F.2d at 1331. It is

22 within the court’s discretion whether to request that an attorney represent an indigent civil litigant

23 under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(1). Palmer v. Valdez, 560 F.3d 965, 970 (9th Cir. 2009).

24 Here, Plaintiff does not demonstrate the exceptional circumstances required for the

25 appointment of an attorney. As to the first prong, this Court is unable to evaluate Plaintiff’s

26 likelihood of success on the merits at this time given the case’s early procedural posture.

27 Defendant Sony removed approximately two-and-a-half months ago, there is a pending motion to

1 Court also notes that Plaintiff has been unable to obtain an attorney despite diligent efforts to do

2 so. ECF No. 12 at 2.

3 As to the second prong, Plaintiff has demonstrated an ability to articulate her claims

4 without an attorney in light of the complexity of the legal issues involved. She has filed well over

5 a dozen motions requesting various forms of relief, all of which speak to Plaintiff’s abilities and

6 her understanding of the litigation process. Her arguments that she is unable to afford an attorney

7 and that defendants are well resourced are not exceptional. These are common obstacles that pro

8 se litigants face, and they have not prevented her from navigating both state and federal civil

9 procedure thus far.

10 In addition, Plaintiff claims that she has a medical condition that “may occasionally

11 interfere with her ability to fully understand and comply with procedural requirements of the

12 federal court system.” ECF No. 12 at 2 (emphasis added). She has not identified what mental

13 health condition she has, nor affirmatively stated that her condition impacts her abilities to

14 articulate her claims. Without further explanation regarding if/how her condition impacts her

15 abilities, this Court is unable to find that exceptional circumstances exist, especially given that

16 Plaintiff has shown she can navigate the legal system, as discussed above.

17 Any pro se litigant “would be better served with the assistance of counsel.” Rand v.

18 Rowland, 113 F.3d 1520, 1525 (9th Cir. 1997) (citing Wilborn, 789 F.2d at 1331). Nonetheless,

19 so long as a pro se litigant can “articulate his claims against the relative complexity of the

20 matter,” the “exceptional circumstances” which might require the appointment of counsel do not

21 exist. Id. Therefore, this Court denies Plaintiff’s motion in its discretion.

22 II. CONCLUSION

23 IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Plaintiff’s request to proceed in forma

24 pauperis (ECF No. 14) is GRANTED.

25 / /

26 / /

27 / /

] IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff's motion for appointment of counsel (ECF

2 || No. 12) is DENIED without prejudice.

3

4 DATED: August 27, 2025

5

6 Lig a beatae aon

BRENDA WEKSLER

7 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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