Ashraf v. Providence Newberg Medical Center

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF OREGON

MUHAMMAD ASHRAF, Case No. 3:24-cv-02166-JR

Plaintiff,

FINDINGS AND

v. RECOMMENDATION

PROVIDENCE NEWBERG MEDICAL

CENTER,

Defendant.

_________________________________

RUSSO, Magistrate Judge:

Defendant Providence Newberg Medical Center moves to dismiss pro se plaintiff

Muhammad Ashraf’s complaint pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). For the reasons stated below,

defendant’s motion is granted.

BACKGROUND

In October 2022, plaintiff began working for defendant as a medical sonographer. Am.

Compl. pg. 5 (doc. 3). During this time, he was also “teaching at [and being compensated by]

concord career institute.” Id.

Plaintiff alleges that his senior manager, “Rose, being [B]ritish,” disliked him “because [he

is] from Pakistan,” and preferred another male sonographer, “Aaron.” Id. As a result, plaintiff “was

never given due share of downtime, breaks, overtime, and on call work hours.” Id. Additionally,

plaintiff alleges that “Siri Dixon at concord . . . was an [I]ndian and never like [him] because of

[his] national origin.” Id.

At some unspecified time, a Concord Career Institute student named Hazmik began doing

clinical rotations with defendant, at which point Rose and Aaron “made a plan to get rid of

[plaintiff]” and hire Hazmik. Id. “Aaron started teaching her and a couple of complaints were

engineered against [plaintiff].” Id. In particular, Hazmik and an unnamed employee (on behalf of

a patient) made complaints against plaintiff that “target[ed] [his] gender.” Id. “At the same time

[an unnamed] cardiologist . . . suddenly realized after 18 months that [plaintiff was] not trained

enough to work” as a medical sonographer. Id. Plaintiff thereafter “reported to HR.” Id.

Separately, Dixon “engineered a situation at concord to make [plaintiff] quit [his]

Providence job for Hazmik” by “provid[ing] a six month old incident investigated at Concord” to

defendant. Id. As part of that incident or in addition thereto, plaintiff “was blamed of HIPPA

violation[s] while teaching students,” even though he did “obtain patient consent.” Id.

Plaintiff was ultimately terminated from his employment with defendant. Id. In “May or

June 2024,” plaintiff “filed a complaint at EEOC against [his] termination, which triggered

retaliation and [the] incident used to terminate [his] employment was reported to Oregon board of

medical imaging.” Id. at pgs. 5-6. Plaintiff concludes:

[M]y national origin is [the] primary reason for my termination, but I have reasons

to believe that my rel[i]gion, race, gender, and age were also contributing factors.

It is true I had all these when hired but . . . there was an acute shortage of

professionals with expertise in my profession. I was fired when they found an

alternative. There were occasions when some female patients, including employees

of our medical center, were sent to other locations as they were not comfortable

being scanned [b]y a male sonographer. Some employees and patients were not

comfortable with my name and rel[i]gion.

Id.

In December 2024, plaintiff initiated this lawsuit. He filed an amended complaint in

January 2025, alleging discrimination and retaliation based on age, race, gender, religion, and

national origin in violation of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (“ADEA”) and Title

VII of the Civil Rights Act (“Title VII”). Id. at pgs. 3-4.

STANDARDS

Where the plaintiff “fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted,” an action must

be dismissed. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). To survive a motion to dismiss, the complaint must allege

“enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly,

550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). For purposes of a motion to dismiss, the complaint is liberally construed

in favor of the plaintiff and its allegations are taken as true. Rosen v. Walters, 719 F.2d 1422, 1424

(9th Cir. 1983). Bare assertions, however, that amount to nothing more than a “formulaic recitation

of the elements” of a claim “are conclusory and not entitled to be assumed true.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal,

556 U.S. 662, 681 (2009). Rather, to state a plausible claim for relief, the complaint “must contain

sufficient allegations of underlying facts” to support its legal conclusions. Starr v. Baca, 652 F.3d

1202, 1216 (9th Cir. 2011).

Pro se pleadings are held to a less stringent standard than those drafted by lawyers. See,

e.g., Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972). The court, in many circumstances, instructs the

pro se litigant regarding deficiencies in the complaint and grants leave to amend. Eldridge v. Block,

832 F.2d 1132, 1136 (9th Cir. 1987). Nevertheless, a pro se plaintiff’s claims may be dismissed

without leave to amend where it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts

that would entitle him or her to relief. Barrett v. Belleque, 544 F.3d 1060, 1061-62 (9th Cir. 2008).

DISCUSSION

Defendant argues that dismissal is warranted because plaintiff “pleads no non-conclusory

facts to state a viable claim for discrimination or retaliation against Providence on any basis.”

Def.’s Mot. Dismiss 2 (doc. 17). Specifically, defendant asserts that the complaint neglects to plead

facts demonstrating discriminatory intent, causation, and that plaintiff “performed his job

adequately” and “similarly situated individuals outside his protected class were treated

differently.” Id. at 5-9.

Initially, plaintiff cannot introduce new facts via his briefing and instead must include any

relevant facts in the complaint itself (or as an attachment or exhibit thereto). See Schneider v. Cal.

Dep’t of Corr., 151 F.3d 1194, 1197 n.1 (9th Cir. 1998) (when reviewing the sufficiency of

pleadings, “a court may not look beyond the complaint to a plaintiff’s moving papers”). Further,

plaintiff’s opposition is silent as to the myriad purported pleading defects raised by defendant in

its motion. See generally Pl.’s Resp. to Mot. Dismiss (doc. 19); see also Justice v. Rockwell

Collins, Inc., 117 F.Supp.3d 1119, 1134 (D. Or. 2015), aff’d, 720 Fed.Appx. 365 (9th Cir. 2017)

(“if a party fails to counter an argument that the opposing party makes . . . the court may treat that

argument as conceded”) (citation and internal quotations and brackets omitted).

Turning to the substance of the complaint, “a plaintiff alleging that an employer engaged

in discriminatory conduct adversely affecting plaintiff’s employment must establish a prima facie

case1 by demonstrating that: (1) he is a member of a protected class; (2) he was qualified for his

position; (3) he experienced an adverse employment action; and (4) similarly situated individuals

outside his protected class were treated more favorably, or other circumstances surrounding the

adverse employment action give rise to an inference of discrimination.” Hittle v. Stockton, Cal.,

101 F.4th 1000, 1011-12 (9th Cir. 2024), cert. denied, 145 S.Ct. 759 (2025) (Title VII); Coleman

v. Quaker Oats Co., 232 F.3d 1271, 1281 (9th Cir. 2000) (ADEA). Furthermore, to prevail on a

disparate treatment claim under the ADEA, a plaintiff must prove age was the “but for” cause of

the adverse employment action. Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., Inc., 557 U.S. 167, 176 (2009); but see

Hittle, 101 F.4th at 1012 (“[u]nder Title VII, the plaintiff need only demonstrate that race, color,

religion, sex, or national origin was a motivating factor for any employment practice”) (citation

and internal quotations and brackets omitted).

In sum, the plaintiff must allege sufficient facts from which a reasonable inference could

be drawn that race, religion, age, gender, and/or national origin played a role in the adverse

employment action to plausibly state a claim in this context. As discussed below, the complaint in

this case is simply devoid of any specific facts that link plaintiff’s termination to a protected

1 To be sure, the “prima facie case [requirement] under McDonnell Douglas . . . is an evidentiary

standard, not a pleading requirement.” Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 510 (2002).

Although “a plaintiff is not required to plead a prima facie case of discrimination or retaliation in

order to survive a motion to dismiss . . . courts still look to the elements of the prima facie case to

decide, in light of judicial experience and common sense, whether the challenged complaint

contains sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim for relief that is plausible on its

face.” Cloud v. Brennan, 436 F.Supp.3d 1290, 1300-01 (N.D. Cal. 2020) (citations and internal

quotations omitted). In other words, the elements for establishing a prima facie case may be a

“useful tool” in determining whether a complaint satisfies Rule 8’s pleading standards. Hamm v.

Nielsen, 2019 WL 6499209, *8 (C.D. Cal. July 30, 2019) (citations and internal quotations

omitted).

characteristic. Cf. Mayes v. Kaiser Found. Hosps., 917 F.Supp.2d 1074, 1079-80 (E.D. Cal. 2013)

(the plaintiff failed to state a discrimination claim where, “although [he] describes some of the

events leading to his termination, he provides no meaningful detail suggesting the termination was

because of his race or sex”); see also Maeve v. Centennial Sch. Dist. No. 28J, 2025 WL 458826,

*21 (D. Or. Feb. 11, 2025) (dismissing a gender discrimination claim where the plaintiff neglected

“to allege facts that support a plausible inference that the protected characteristic of sex was a

motivating factor for the employment decision”).

Notably, the complaint does not include facts intimating that plaintiff was qualified for his

job or performing it adequately. In fact, plaintiff’s pleadings suggest the opposite: a cardiologist

resolved he was “not trained enough to work at [his] job,” two employees made complaints against

him, and a third-party reported that plaintiff engaged in HIPAA violations to defendant. Am.

Compl. pg. 5 (doc. 3); see also Ashcroft, 556 U.S. at 680-82 (an allegation is not plausible where

there is an “obvious alternative explanation” for the alleged wrongful conduct) (citation and

internal quotations omitted).

Likewise, plaintiff does not plead any facts suggesting that defendant treated similarly

situated employees outside the protected class more favorably. The complaint does not provide the

age, race, religion, gender, or national origin of Aaron, Hazmik, the unnamed cardiologist who

determined plaintiff was not qualified, or the unnamed employee who filed a complaint against

him (although plaintiff does use “she” and “he” pronouns to refer to Hazmik and Aaron,

respectively). See Boltz v. PeaceHealth, 2025 WL 552582, *3-4 (D. Or. Feb. 19, 2025) (granting

the defendant’s Rule 12(b)(6) motion where the plaintiff failed to allege facts evincing that at least

one similarly situated individual outside of her protected class was treated more favorably);

Niemeyer v. NW Permanente, 2024 WL 4693894, *5 (D. Or. Nov. 6, 2024) (same); see also

Swierkiewicz, 534 U.S. at 514 (a complaint gives fair notice under Rule 8 of an ADEA and Title

VII claim when it “detail[s] the events leading to [the plaintiff’s] termination, provide[s] relevant

dates, and include[s] the ages and nationalities of at least some of the relevant persons involved”).

While Rose is identified as a British female, there is no other information about her

protected characteristics (if any), and as a senior manager, she is not similarly situated and there

is no allegation of similar misconduct.2 Id.; see also Karthauser v. Columbia 9-1-1 Commc’ns

Dist., 647 F.Supp.3d 992, 1008 (D. Or. 2022) (comparators must “have similar jobs and display

similar conduct” to establish the fourth prima facie element for a claim under Title VII) (citation

and internal quotations omitted); Jones v. Denver Post Corp., 203 F.3d 748, 753 (10th Cir. 2000),

abrogated on other grounds by Nat'l R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101 (2002) (an

employee is not similarly situated to that employee’s manager). Moreover, Hazmik is a student,

and neither Hazmik nor Aaron are alleged to have engaged in similar misconduct. See Mitchell v.

Toledo Hosp., 964 F.2d 577, 583 (6th Cir. 2002) (any purported comparators must “have been

subject to the same standards and have engaged in the same conduct without such differentiating

or mitigating circumstances that would distinguish their conduct or the employer’s treatment of

them for it”).

Plaintiff’s retaliation claim also fails at the pleading level. To state a prima facie retaliation

case under Title VII or the ADEA, “a plaintiff must show that (1) she engaged in a protected

2 Although not dispositive, the Court notes that, where “the same actor is responsible for both the

hiring and the firing of a discrimination plaintiff, and both actions occur within a relatively short

period of time, a strong inference arises that there was no discriminatory action.” Coghlan v. Am.

Seafoods Co., 413 F.3d 1090, 1096 (9th Cir. 2005) (citation and internal quotations omitted); see

also Bradley v. Harcourt, Brace & Co., 104 F.3d 267, 270-71 (9th Cir. 1996) (employer’s initial

willingness to hire the discrimination plaintiff is strong evidence the employer is not biased against

that protected class). Plaintiff does not precisely define the timeline of his hiring and termination

but the complaint suggests Rose may have been responsible for both decisions.

activity, (2) she suffered an adverse employment action, and (3) there was a causal link between

her protected activity and the adverse employment action.” Karthauser, 647 F.Supp.3d at 1012.

As to the third element, the Supreme Court has held that a plaintiff must establish “her protected

conduct was a but-for cause of the alleged adverse action by the employer.” Id. (citing Univ. of

Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, 570 U.S. 338, 360 (2013)). Here, the only protected activity plaintiff

identifies is filing a charge with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission contesting his

termination.3 Am. Compl. pg. 5 (doc. 3); see also Pl.’s Resp. to Mot. Dismiss 2 (doc. 19) (alleged

HIPPA violation was “reported to the Oregon Board of Medical Imaging . . . after Plaintiff filed a

charge of discrimination with the EEOC”). These allegations are therefore inadequate to state a

claim – namely, because the protected activity occurred after the adverse employment action. In

other words, the lack of a causal connection is fatal to plaintiff’s retaliation claims. See, e.g., Boltz,

2025 WL 552582 at *6.

RECOMMENDATION

For the reasons stated herein, defendant’s Motion to Dismiss (doc. 17) should be granted.

Any motion to amend the complaint must be filed within 30 days of the District Judge’s order.

This recommendation is not an order that is immediately appealable to the Ninth Circuit

Court of Appeals. Any notice of appeal pursuant to Rule 4(a)(1), Federal Rules of Appellate

Procedure, should not be filed until entry of the district court’s judgment or appealable order. The

parties shall have fourteen (14) days from the date of service of a copy of this recommendation

within which to file specific written objections with the court. Thereafter, the parties shall have

3 Plaintiff also alleges: “Everything was done in a way that I had no difficulty understanding the

actual motive, which I reported to HR.” Am. Compl. pg. 5 (doc. 3). But the complaint does not

specify what was actually communicated to HR, whether the decision-maker was privy to that

information, and the overall timeline of events.

fourteen (14) days within which to file a response to the objections. Failure to timely file objections

to any factual determination of the Magistrate Judge will be considered as a waiver of a party’s

right to de novo consideration of the factual issues and will constitute a waiver of a party’s right

to appellate review of the findings of fact in an order or judgment entered pursuant to this

recommendation.

DATED this 4th day of August, 2025.

________/_s/_ J_o_l_ie_ _A_._ R_u_s_s_o________

Jolie A. Russo

United States Magistrate Judge