The opinion
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
WESTERN DIVISION
Jane Doe 1, et al., Case No. 3:22-cv-1122
Plaintiffs,
v. MEMORANDUM OPINION
AND ORDER
Manish Gupta, et al.,
Defendants.
I. INTRODUCTION
On March 19, 2020, Manish Raj Gupta was indicted by a federal grand jury on one count of
sex trafficking by force, fraud, or coercion, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1591(a) and (b)(1), and one
count of illegally dispensing a controlled substance, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) and (b)(7).
See United States v. Gupta, Case No. 3:20-cr-208 (N.D. Ohio). These charges arose from allegations
that Manish had surreptitiously drugged women before engaging in sex acts with them without their
consent. Manish subsequently pled guilty to both charges. On June 26, 2022, two of Manish’s
victims initiated this litigation,1 asserting claims against Manish, his father (Raj Gupta), and his now-
former wife (Shraddha Gupta) under state and federal law. (Doc. No. 1); (see also Doc. No. 23).
On December 11, 2024, Manish filed an amended counterclaim, (Doc. No. 106), after I
granted him leave to do so. (Doc. No. 105). Plaintiffs moved to dismiss the amended counterclaim.
1 I previously granted Plaintiffs’ motion to proceed using the pseudonyms “Jane Doe 1” and “Jane
Doe 2.” (Doc. No. 42).
(Doc. No. 109). Manish filed a brief in opposition. (Doc. No. 113). For the reasons stated below, I
grant Plaintiff’s motion.
II. BACKGROUND
I briefly summarized the underlying criminal proceedings in my September 27, 2023
Memorandum Opinion and Order:
Manish previously was a board-certified plastic surgeon and owner of Artisan
Surgery Center, LLC. Plaintiffs allege Manish began drugging and sexually assaulting
women, including women like Plaintiffs who worked as escorts, as early as 2013.
(Doc. No. 1 at 3). Manish allegedly used prescription drugs he obtained through his
medical practice to incapacitate the women before filming himself performing sexual
acts with them. Manish allegedly drugged and raped Jane Doe 2 in 2013, while on a
business trip to Las Vegas, Nevada, and in 2017, while on a business trip to Detroit,
Michigan. (Id. at 4-5). Manish allegedly drugged and raped Jane Doe 1 in 2016,
while on a business trip to Los Angeles, California. (Id.). Plaintiffs allege Manish
planned these assaults before his trips and that he would take a bag with sex toys,
lubricants, a camera, and narcotics with him while he traveled. (Id. at 3, 7-10, 12-13).
(Doc. No. 44 at 2-3).
On April 27, 2021, Manish pled guilty to both counts as charged in the indictment. United
States v. Gupta, Case No. 3:20-cr-208, (Doc. No. 39). Judge Carr sentenced Manish to a term of 235
months in prison and 10 years on supervised release. Id., (Doc. No. 53). He also ordered Manish to
pay a $250,000.00 fine, as well as restitution in the amount of $57,285.00. Id. Manish appealed the
restitution portion of the judgment entry, but the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth
Circuit dismissed the appeal after concluding Manish knowingly and voluntarily waived his right to
appeal the restitution amount. United States v. Gupta, No. 21-4140, (Doc. No. 33) (6th Cir. June 27,
2023).
In his amended counterclaim, Manish contends the invoices Jane Doe 1 submitted in
support of her restitution request “do not represent actual damages incurred and/or were not paid
to said providers” by Jane Doe 1. (Doc. No. 106 at 2). He asserts claims for negligent and
fraudulent misrepresentation, as well as unjust enrichment “as a result” of those alleged
misrepresentations. (Id.).
III. DISCUSSION
Plaintiffs move to dismiss Manish’ counterclaim, arguing: (1) it is barred by the doctrine of
res judicata; (2) he is estopped from contesting his restitution order; (3) he fails to state a plausible
ground for relief; and (4) he would be unjustly enriched if granted relief because his ex-wife paid the
restitution, and not Manish. (Doc. No. 109). I conclude Manish fails to state a claim upon which
relief may be granted and do not reach Plaintiffs’ other arguments.
Rule 12 permits a defendant to move to dismiss a plaintiff’s complaint on the ground the
complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). When
ruling on a motion to dismiss, a court construes the complaint in the light most favorable to the
plaintiff and accepts as true well-pleaded factual allegations. Daily Servs., LLC v. Valentino, 756 F.3d
893, 896 (6th Cir. 2014) (citing Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 679 (2009)). Factual allegations must
be sufficient to state a plausible claim for relief. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. Legal conclusions and
unwarranted factual inferences are not entitled to a presumption of truth. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly,
550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007).
Courts must read Rule 12(b)(6) in conjunction with Rule 8(a)(2)’s requirement that a plaintiff
need offer “only ‘a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to
relief.’ Specific facts are not necessary; the statement need only ‘give the defendant fair notice of
what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.’” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93
(2007) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555); see also Sensations, Inc. v. City of Grand Rapids, 526 F.3d 291,
295-96 (6th Cir. 2008).
Rule 9 carves out an exception to the notice pleading standard. That Rule provide that “[i]n
alleging fraud . . . a party must states with particularity the circumstances constituting fraud . . . .”
Fed. R. Civ. P. 9(b). Pursuant to Rule 9(b), a claimant must allege the time, place, and content of the
allegedly fraudulent misrepresentation. See, e.g., U.S. ex rel. Marlar v. BWXT Y-12, L.L.C., 525 F.3d
439, 444 (6th Cir. 2008) (citations omitted).
Manish has not pled a plausible claim for fraudulent misrepresentation. “It is well-
established law in Ohio that a fraud claim may not be based on a misrepresentation made to a third
party.” Wiles v. Miller, 3 N.E.3d 226, 239 (Ohio Ct. App. 2013) (noting a party cannot pursue an
action for fraud “where the fraudulent representations were not made directly to him to induce him
to act on them in matters affecting his own interests.”) (citation and internal quotation marks
omitted). Even if I were to accept as true Manish’s conclusory allegation that Jane Doe 1
fraudulently misrepresented her damages in submitting her restitution request to Judge Carr, he does
not allege she made any such misrepresentations directly to him. (See Doc. No. 106 at 1-2).
Therefore, he has not plausibly alleged a fraudulent misrepresentation claim.
In his opposition brief, Manish also seeks to characterize his counterclaim as one for
“fraudulent inducement,” contending that his claim arises from “the quasi-contractual issue of the
applicability of the criminal court ordered restitution payment in [principle] to the facts of the
criminal case.” (Doc. No. 113-1 at 2). But Manish did not make any reference to “fraudulent
inducement” in his amended counterclaim, (see Doc. No. 106), and he cannot amend his pleading
through his opposition brief. See, e.g., Travelers Cas. & Sur. Co. of Am. v. Perk Co., Inc., No. 1:21-CV-
1940, 2025 WL 987695, at *3 (N.D. Ohio Apr. 2, 2025) (citing Bates v. Green Farms Condo. Ass’n, 958
F.3d 470, 483 (6th Cir. 2020); Lucid Health, Inc. v. Premier Imaging Ventures, LLC, No. 2:20-CV-01055,
2020 WL 4933919, at *3 (S.D. Ohio Aug. 24, 2020)). Moreover, Jane Doe 1’s right to restitution in
Manish’s criminal case was a statutory right, not a contractual one. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 1593 and
3663A.
Nor has Manish plausibly alleged a claim for negligent misrepresentation. Ohio law permits
a party to bring a claim for negligent misrepresentation against:
[O]ne who, in the course of his business, profession or employment, or in any other
transaction in which he has a pecuniary interest, supplies false information for the
guidance of others in their business transactions, is subject to liability for pecuniary
loss caused to them by their justifiable reliance upon the information, if he fails to
exercise reasonable care or competence in obtaining or communicating the
information.
Leal v. Holtvogt, 702 N.E.2d 1246, 1253 (Ohio Ct. App. 1998) (quoting Textron Fin. Corp. v. Nationwide
Mut. Ins. Co., 684 N.E.2d 1261, 1269 (Ohio 1996) (emphasis in Textron) (quotation marks omitted)).
Thus, a negligent misrepresentation claim requires: “(1) a defendant who is in the business of
supplying information; and (2) a plaintiff who sought guidance with respect to his business
transactions from the defendant.” Malek v. eResearch Tech., Inc., 199 N.E.3d 573, 584 (Ohio Ct. App.
2022) (citations and quotation marks omitted). Manish has not plausibly alleged any of the required
elements of a negligent misrepresentation claim. Therefore, I grant Plaintiffs’ motion to dismiss this
claim as well.
Finally, I also dismiss Manish’s unjust enrichment claim. Under Ohio law, “unjust
enrichment is a claim under quasi-contract law against a person in receipt of benefits that he is not
justly and equitably entitled to retain.” Crawford v. Hawes, 995 N.E.2d 966, 975 (Ohio Ct. App. 2013)
(citing Hummel v. Hummel, 14 N.E.2d 923 (Ohio 1938)). As I noted above, Jane Doe 1’s right to
restitution arose under federal criminal law, not Ohio contract law. Therefore, Manish has not pled
a plausible claim for relief.
IV. CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, I grant Plaintiffs’ Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss Defendant
Manish Gupta’s counterclaim. (Doc. No. 109).
So Ordered.
s/ Jeffrey J. Helmick
United States District Judge