The opinion
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
JAMES TATE,
Plaintiff,
Case No. 23-cv-03493-SPM
v.
SYDELLE FULK,
Defendant.
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
MCGLYNN, District Judge:
Plaintiff James Tate initiated this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 while an inmate of
the Illinois Department of Corrections (IDOC) alleging violations of his constitutional rights. In
the First Amended Complaint, Plaintiff alleges that although he was designated as seriously
mentally ill and referred to a residential housing unit, on June 7, 2023, he was transferred to
Pinckneyville Correctional Center (Pinckneyville) and placed in general population. While at
Pinckneyville, Plaintiff was in a depressed state of mind and had thoughts of hurting himself. The
timeline of events is not entirely clear, but at some point, he was taken to the health care unit and
treated by Defendant Mental Health Professional Sydelle Fulk, who told him he was weak and that
if he cut himself, he should make sure to “hit [his] A C so [he] could bleed out and then [she]
would tell the nurses [he was] ready to receive medical attentions.” (Doc. 37-3, p. 2). A few days
after his transfer, Plaintiff was involved in a physical fight with his cellmate and placed in
segregation. While, in segregation he attempted suicide by cutting his arms and was taken to the
health care unit. Plaintiff was seen again by Defendant Fulk, who told Plaintiff he would not
receive medical attention for his injuries. Fulk not only denied Plaintiff medical treatment but also
harassed him by making racist remarks and telling him to kill himself. (Id. at p. 5). Fulk then placed
Plaintiff on crisis watch without providing him medical care. Following a merit review of the First
Amended Complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, Plaintiff is currently proceeding on the
following claims:
Count 2: Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference claim against Fulk for
denying Plaintiff treatment for his mental and physical health.
Count 3: Fourteenth Amendment equal protection claim against Fulk.
(Doc. 41).
This matter is before the Court on a motion for summary judgment on the issue of
exhaustion filed by Defendant Sydelle Fulk. (Doc. 55). Plaintiff has filed responses in opposition.
(Doc. 61, 63, 65, 67). For the following reasons, the motion for summary judgment will be granted.
LEGAL STANDARDS
Summary judgment is proper only if the moving party can demonstrate “that there is no
genuine issue as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”
See FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). In determining a
summary judgment motion, the Court views the facts in the light most favorable to, and draws all
reasonable inferences in favor of, the nonmoving party. Apex Digital, Inc. v. Sears, Roebuck &
Co., 735 F.3d 962, 965 (7th Cir. 2013) (citation omitted).
II. Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies
Lawsuits filed by inmates are governed by the provisions of the Prison Litigation Reform
Act (“PLRA”). 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). The PLRA states, in pertinent part, that “no action shall be
brought with respect to prison conditions under section 1983 of this title, or any other Federal law,
by a prisoner confined in any jail, prison, or other correctional facility until such administrative
remedies as are available are exhausted.” Id. The Seventh Circuit requires strict adherence to the
PLRA’s exhaustion requirement. Dole v. Chandler, 438 F.3d 804, 809 (7th Cir. 2006). “To exhaust
remedies, a prisoner must file complaints and appeals in the place, and at the time, the prison’s
administrative rules require.” Pozo v. McCaughtry, 286 F. 3d 1022, 1025 (7th Cir. 2002).
Furthermore, exhaustion of available administrative remedies must occur before the suit is filed.
Ford v. Johnson, 362 F.3d 395, 398 (7th Cir. 2004).
III. Grievance Procedures
As an inmate in the custody of IDOC at the time of filing, Plaintiff was required to follow
the grievance procedure laid out in the Illinois Administrative Code (“grievance procedures”). 20
ILL. ADMIN. CODE § 504.800, et seq. The grievance procedures direct an inmate is to file a
grievance first with the Counselor within 60 days of the discovery of an incident. See 20 ILL.
ADMIN. CODE § 504.810(a). The grievance form must:
[C]ontain factual details regarding each aspect of the offender’s complaint,
including what happened, when, where, and the name of each person who is the
subject of or who is otherwise involved in the complaint. This provision does not
preclude an offender from filing a grievance when the names of individuals are not
known, but the offender must include as much descriptive information about the
individual as possible.
20 ILL. ADMIN. CODE § 504.810(c). Grievances that are unable to be resolved through routine
channels are then sent to a Grievance Officer. See 20 ILL. ADMIN. CODE § 504.820(a). The
Grievance Officer will review the grievance and provide a written response to the inmate. See 20
ILL. ADMIN. CODE § 504.830(a). The Grievance Officer must submit his findings to the Chief
Administrative Officer (CAO) within two months after receiving the grievance. 20 ILL. ADMIN.
CODe § 504.830(e). The CAO then reviews the findings and recommendation of the Grievance
Officer and issues a written decision to the inmate. Id. If the inmate is not satisfied with the
response, he can file an appeal with the Administrative Review Board (ARB). See 20 ILL. ADMIN.
CODE § 504.850(a). The ARB must receive the appeal within 30 days after the date of the decision
by the CAO, and copies of “the Grievance Officer’s report and the Chief Administrative Officer’s
decision should be attached.” Id. Only after a grievance is reviewed by the ARB is it deemed
exhausted. See Pozo, 286 F.3d at 1023–24.
ANALYSIS
The only grievance at issue in this case is Grievance #232557, dated June 28, 2023. (Doc.
67, p. 3). In Grievance #232557, Plaintiff grieves that on June 9, 2023, a correctional officer
claimed that Plaintiff had a fight with his cellmate and was smoking. Plaintiff claims that these
allegations were “made up [and] a lie.” He writes that he was issued a disciplinary ticket and placed
in segregation. While in segregation, he began cutting himself and “banging his head…” He
showed Mental Health Professional (MHP) Ms. S cuts on his arms, and he was eventually taken
to the health care unit. He states that he was not seen by a nurse or other medical staff for his
injuries. Plaintiff alleges in the grievance that he was told that he wants to die “so die.” He states
that Defendant Fulk came into the room, but he did not talk to Defendant Fulk because she “was
talking to [him] unkind and rude.” Then he was taken to a crisis cell. (Id. at p. 4). In his request
for relief, Plaintiff asks for the disciplinary ticket to be removed from his record, for his A-grade
status to be reinstated, to be removed from “confinement,” for proper mental health treatment, and
to receive compensation for the mental stress he has endured. (Id. at p. 3).
On August 4, 2023, the grievance officer recommended for Plaintiff’s grievance to be
denied because he was never issued a disciplinary ticket. (Doc. 67, p. 2). The chief administrative
officer concurred in the recommendation on August 8, 2023, and Plaintiff appealed the decision
on August 13, 2023. (Id.). The ARB responded to the appeal on January 18, 2024, stating that the
disciplinary report had been expunged. (Doc. 56-1, p. 11).
Plaintiff appears to be arguing that Grievance #232557 serves to exhaust his claims against
Defendant Fulk because the grievance was fully exhausted at the time he filed the First Amended
Complaint on April 2, 2024. (Doc. 63, 67). It is true that when an inmate amends his complaint to
raise a new claim, the inmate may proceed on the new claim if he exhausted his administrative
remedies after filing his original compliant, but prior to ‘the filing of the amended complaint.’”
Lofquist v. Cecil, No. 20-cv-169-RJD, 2022 WL 622005, at *3 (quoting Barnes v. Briley, 420 F.
3d 673, 678 (7th Cir. 2005)). This, however, is not the situation here.
Plaintiff initiated this case on October 3, 2023, naming Defendant Fulk and others, and
asserting the same allegations as stated in the First Amended Complaint – that he was improperly
placed in general population at Pinckneyville, mistreated and harassment by staff, and denied
mental and physical health care. The Court dismissed the original Complaint for failure to state a
claim and granted Plaintiff leave to amend. (Doc. 34). Although the First Amended Complaint was
filed after Grievance #232557 had received a final determination by the ARB, Plaintiff was
required under the PLRA to have administratively exhausted his remedies when he first brought
the suit on October 3, 2023. See Hoban v. Anderson, 688 F. App’x 385, 389 (7th Cir. 2017);
Thompson v. Swisher, No. 19-cv-1058-RJD, 2022 WL 2817438, at *4 (S.D. Ill. 2022) (holding
that the plaintiff had not exhausted where the original and amended complaint related to the same
incident). Because Plaintiff filed this case before receiving a response from the ARB for Greivance
#232557, and there is no evidence that Plaintiff otherwise properly exhausted his administrative
remedies regarding the claims in this case, the motion for summary judgment is granted.
DISPOSITION
For the reasons provided, the Court GRANTS the motion for summary judgment (Doc.
55) filed by Defendant Sydelle Fulk. COUNTS 2 and 3 and this ENTIRE CASE are DISMISSED
without prejudice for failure to exhaust. The Clerk of Court is DIRECTED to close this case and
enter judgment accordingly.
If Plaintiff wishes to appeal this dismissal, his notice of appeal must be filed with this Court
within thirty days of the entry of judgment. FED. R. APP. P. 4(a)(1)(A). A motion for leave to appeal
in forma pauperis should set forth the issues he plans to present on appeal. See FED. R. APP. P.
24(a)(1)(C). If Plaintiff does choose to appeal, he will be liable for the $605.00 appellate filing fee
irrespective of the outcome of the appeal. See FED. R. APP. P. 3(e); 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2);
Ammons v. Gerlinger, 547 F.3d 724, 725-26 (7th Cir. 2008); Sloan v. Lesza, 181 F.3d 857, 858-
59 (7th Cir. 1999); Lucien, 133 F.3d at 467. Moreover, if the appeal is found to be nonmeritorious,
Plaintiff may also incur a “strike.” A proper and timely motion filed pursuant to Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 59(e) may toll the 30-day appeal deadline. FED. R. APP. P. 4(a)(4). A Rule 59(e)
motion must be filed no more than twenty-eight (28) days after the entry of the judgment, and this
28-day deadline cannot be extended.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED: September 2, 2025
s/Stephen P. McGlynn
STEPHEN P. MCGLYNN
United States District Judge