The opinion
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
ORLANDO DIVISION
ERIC DE FORD, SANDRA BADER,
SHAWN R. KEY, Individually and on
Behalf of All Others Similarly Situated,
Plaintiffs,
v. Case No: 6:22-cv-00652-PGB-DCI
JAMES KOUTOULAS and LGBCoin,
LTD.,
Defendants.
ORDER
Pending before the Court are two motions to file documents under seal: 1) Defendants’
Motion to Seal (Doc. 478); and 2) Plaintiffs’ Motion to Seal Exhibits to Opposition to Defendants’
Amended Motion for Summary Judgment and Rule 56(F) Cross Motion for Partial Summary
Judgment (Doc. 487). For the reasons below, the motions are due to be DENIED.
I. BACKGROUND
On May 22, 2025, Defendants James Koutoulas and LGBCoin, LTD. (collectively,
Defendants) filed an Amended Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 477) (Summary Judgment
Motion) and a motion to seal Exhibits J and K to the Amended Motion for Summary Judgment.
Doc. 478 (Defendants’ Motion to Seal). Exhibit J is Defendant James Koutoulas’ response to
Plaintiffs’ Interrogatory No. 19. Doc. 478 at 1. Exhibit K is the rough transcript of the deposition
of James Koutoulas. Id. Defendants seek to file these documents under seal because “Defendant,
James Koutoulas, has designated the entirety of his deposition and response to Interrogatory No.
19 as ‘Highly Confidential’ and portions of each are quoted and referred to in the Motion for
Summary Judgment.” Id. at 2.
On June 12, 2025, Plaintiffs filed a response in Opposition to Defendants’ Amended
Motion for Summary Judgment and Rule 56(f) Cross Motion for Partial Summary Judgment. Doc.
486 (the Response). Plaintiffs concurrently filed a motion to seal exhibits E, F, and I to the
Response. Doc. 487 (Plaintiffs’ Motion to Seal). Plaintiffs describe the documents as: 1) the
“March 3, 2025 Transcript of Deposition of James Koutoulas;” 2) “Koutoulas-PL 000390;” and 3)
“Koutoulas-PL 000399.” Doc. 487 at 1. Plaintiffs seek to file these documents under seal because
“Defendant James Koutoulas has designated these documents as ‘Confidential’ or ‘Highly
Confidential.’” Id. at 1-2.
Defendants’ Motion to Seal and Plaintiffs’ Motion to Seal are unopposed. The Court will
refer to the five exhibits the Parties seek to seal as “the Documents.”
II. LEGAL STANDARD
The filing of items under seal is governed by Local Rule 1.11(b), which provides as
follows:
(b) Motion to Seal. A motion to seal an item:
(1) must include in the title “Motion to Seal Under [Statute, Rule, or
Order]” or, if no statute, rule, or order applies, “Motion to Seal”;
(2) must describe the item;
(3) must establish:
(A) that filing the item is necessary,
(B) that sealing the item is necessary, and
(C) that using a redaction, a pseudonym, or a means other
than sealing is unavailable or unsatisfactory;
(4) must include a legal memorandum;
(5) must propose a duration for the seal;
(6) must state the name, mailing address, email address, and
telephone number of the person authorized to retrieve a sealed,
tangible item;
(7) must certify the name, mailing address, email address, and
telephone number of any non-party the movant knows or reasonably
should know has an interest in establishing or maintaining the seal
and the day on which, and the means by which, the movant served
or otherwise delivered the motion to the non-party; and
(8) must include the item, which is sealed pending an order resolving
the motion.
Local Rule 1.11(b).
Once the court has assessed compliance with the Local Rule, the Court then must determine
whether the movant has shown good cause for sealing the documents. In deciding whether to grant
a motion to seal, the Court must remain cognizant of a “presumptive common law right to inspect
and copy judicial records.” U.S. v. Rosenthal, 763 F.2d 1291, 1292-93 (11th Cir. 1985) (citing
Nixon v. Warner Commc’ns, Inc., 435 U.S. 589, 597 (1978)). This common law right “is
instrumental in securing the integrity of the [judicial] process.” See Chicago Tribune Co. v.
Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc., 263 F.3d 1304, 1311 (11th Cir. 2001) (per curiam); Wilson v. Am.
Motors Corp., 759 F.2d 1568, 1571 (11th Cir. 1985) (per curiam) (“The district court must keep
in mind the rights of a third party—the public, ‘if the public is to appreciate fully the often
significant events at issue in public litigation and the workings of the legal system.’”) (citation
omitted). Although the common law right of access creates a presumption against sealing court
records, a party may overcome that presumption with a showing of good cause. Romero v.
Drummond Co., 480 F.3d 1234, 1246 (11th Cir. 2007); see also Perez-Guerrero v. U.S. Att'y Gen.,
717 F.3d 1224, 1235 (11th Cir. 2013).
III. DISCUSSION
A review of Defendants’ Motion to Seal and Plaintiffs’ Motion to Seal (collectively, the
Motions) reveals that they are nearly identical, boilerplate motions. See generally Docs. 478, 487.
The only substantive differences between the Motions are the list of exhibits to be sealed,
Plaintiffs’ addition of two facts under paragraph three in Plaintiffs’ Motion to seal, and slight
changes in wording to reflect which party has filed the motion and which filing the exhibits pertain
to. Id. That Plaintiffs and Defendants (collectively, the Parties) submitted virtually the same
motion underscores the extent to which the Motions lack the requisite detail required by Rule
1.11.1 Specifically, the Parties have failed to establish: 1) that sealing the Documents is necessary;
2) that good cause exists to overcome the presumptive public right of access; and 3) that using a
redaction or a means other than sealing is unavailable or unsatisfactory. For these reasons, the
Motions are due to be denied.
First, the Parties have not established that sealing the Documents is necessary, as required
by Local Rule 1.11(b)(3)(B). The Parties assert that sealing is necessary “considering the
substantive nature of the document, the risks inherent in disclosure, and the potential breach of the
Confidentiality Agreement.” Doc. 478 at 5; Doc. 487 at 6. But neither Plaintiffs nor Defendants
explain the substantive nature of the Documents nor the risks inherent in disclosure. To the extent
the Parties’ basis for relief is that Defendant James Koutoulas previously designated the materials
“Confidential,” the Parties do not have the right to stipulate what judicial records will be sealed.
See Wilson v. Am. Motors Corp., 759 F.2d 1568, 1571 (11th Cir. 1985). Local Rule 1.11 specifies
that “sealing is not authorized by a confidentiality agreement, a protective order, a designation of
1 Given that the Motions are nearly identical, the Court will address the Motions’ shortcomings
collectively.
confidentiality, or a stipulation.” Local Rule 1.11(a). The Parties’ one-sentence blanket assertion
that sealing is necessary is insufficient.
Further, the Parties’ confidentiality agreement does not militate sealing here. Although the
Parties quote from the Second Amended Case Management and Scheduling Order (CMSO)—
seemingly implying that the Court has already committed to enforcing the Parties’ confidentiality
agreement—the quoted language is pulled from the section of the CMSO addressing “Discovery.”
Doc. 478 at 2; Doc. 487 at 2 (“The 2nd Amended Case Management and Scheduling Order states
that ‘the Court will enforce a written agreement to protect the confidentiality of information
produced during discovery,’ subject to conditions.”). Under the section of the CMSO addressing
“Motions,” the Court included a sub-section on “Motions to File Under Seal” and explained:
Whether documents filed in a case may be filed under seal is a
separate issue from whether the parties may agree that produced
documents are confidential. Motions to file under seal are
disfavored, and such motions will be denied unless they comply
with Local Rule 1.11.
Doc. 427 at 7. Accordingly, the Court has already conveyed the distinction between designating
documents as confidential in discovery and seeking to file documents under seal in the context of
motion practice.
Second, the Parties have not shown that good cause exists to overcome the public right of
access. As the Court considers the Parties’ summary judgment briefings, the evidence the Court
relies upon becomes an integral part of the judicial record and subject to the public right of access.
Chicago Tribune Co. v. Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc., 263 F.3d 1304, 1312 (11th Cir. 2001) (per
curiam) (“[D]iscovery material filed in connection with pretrial motions that require judicial
resolution of the merits is subject to the common-law right [of access.]”); see also Regions Bank
v. Kaplan, 2017 WL 11025768, at *2 (M.D. Fla. Dec. 11, 2017) (“Stated another way, although
there is no common law right to obtain discovery material, a party that submits documents in
connection with a motion for summary judgment puts the information into the public domain and
triggers greater public right of access.”). Thus, the Court must evaluate whether good cause for
the seal exists. But the Parties have not articulated the harm that public disclosure of the
Documents would cause. Loc. Access, LLC v. Peerless Network, Inc., 2017 WL 2021761, at *3
(M.D. Fla. May 12, 2017) (“Good cause is established by showing that disclosure will cause ‘a
clearly defined and serious injury.’”) (citations omitted). And conclusory assertions that entire
items are confidential are insufficient to show good cause. Aldora Aluminum & Glass Prods., Inc.
v. Poma Glass & Specialty Windows, Inc., 2016 WL 7666128, at *2 (M.D. Fla. June 13, 2016)
(“Defendant's blanket assertion that the filings contain confidential business and/or financial
information does not show good cause for sealing the filings.”).
Further, the Parties’ contention that “the public’s interest in accessing the subject document
is minimal” because the matter “involves private parties” is unavailing. Doc. 478 at 4; Doc. 487
at 6. Almost all cases before the court involve private parties. The Eleventh Circuit has reaffirmed
the public’s right to access court records: “As we have long recognized, when ‘a matter is brought
before a court for resolution, it is no longer solely the parties’ case, but also the public’s case.’”
Callahan v. United Network for Organ Sharing, 17 F.4th 1356, 1365 (11th Cir. 2021)) (citing
Brown v. Advantage Eng'g, Inc., 960 F.2d 1013, 1016 (11th Cir. 1992)). While this action may
not involve public figures, a federal class action concerning allegations of fraudulent
cryptocurrency dealings (see Doc. 74) is a matter of public concern. In addition, to the extent the
Parties cite NXP B.V. v. Rsch In Motion, Ltd., 2013 WL 4402833, at *2 (M.D. Fla. Aug. 15, 2013)
for the proposition that sealing might be appropriate because the “case involves private parties”
and “keeping the document confidential will not impair judicial functions,” the Court finds that
decision unpersuasive. In NXP, the parties carried their burden of establishing that a seal was
necessary where the documents “contain[ed] confidential technical information about Defendants'
devices and business operations.” Here, the Parties have only provided blanket, conclusory
statements to support their Motions.
Third, the Parties have not established that “using a redaction, a pseudonym, or a means
other than sealing is unavailable or unsatisfactory” as required by Local Rule l.11(b)(3)(C).
Plaintiffs make a blanket assertion that:
Using a redaction, a pseudonym, or a means other than sealing is
unavailable or unsatisfactory because a redaction or pseudonym will
render the item useless for purposes of the Court’s review[.]
Moreover, absent sealing the document, no other means exist to
protect the Defendants’ asserted interest in the confidentiality of,
and preventing disclosure and dissemination of, any alleged
sensitive information contained in the document.
Doc. 478 at 3; Doc. 487 at 4. The Parties have submitted five distinct items for seal and have not
articulated why partial sealing or redactions would be inappropriate for each item. And blanket
and conclusory assertions do not provide this Court with the information it needs to assess whether
lesser measures could be appropriate for some of the Documents. Therefore, the Parties have not
satisfied Local Rule 1.11(b)(3)(C).
Litigation is an inherently public process. Certainly, the Court does not regularly issue
secret, sealed orders in civil cases. And if the information at issue is necessary to the Court’s
decision, the Court may discuss it in an eventual order. Thus, the confidential information at issue
may become public regardless of whether the Court allows the parties to seal their briefing or
exhibits. Of course, if the confidential information is not necessary to the Court’s decision, the
parties should probably not provide it to the Court, sealed or not. See Local Rule 1.11(c)(3)(A).
Nevertheless, it is expected that information obtained via discovery or otherwise in the
possession of the Parties is available to all Parties for the purpose of seeking and opposing
dispositive motions made to the Court, and this Order should not be construed as a mechanism to
prevent a party from utilizing such discovery or other materials in this case for all appropriate
purposes. Thus, to the extent a party has concluded that a provisions of the Parties’ confidentiality
agreement (or some other confidentiality agreement) prevents them from filing their motions and
the exhibits thereto on the public record, it is hereby ORDERED that the Parties are given leave
of court to file those Documents at issue in the Motions on the public record in relation to the
dispositive motions.
If there is information in the Documents that a party deems confidential and that is not
necessary for the Court’s consideration of the underlying motion for summary judgment, the Court
expects that information to be minimally redacted prior to public filing—the Court will not
consider any information that is redacted.
IV. CONCLUSION
Accordingly, it is ORDERED that:
1. Defendants’ Motion to Seal (Doc. 478) is DENIED; and
2. Plaintiffs’ Motion to Seal Exhibits to Opposition to Defendants’ Amended Motion
for Summary Judgment and Rule 56(F) Cross Motion for Partial Summary
Judgment (Doc. 487) is DENIED.
ORDERED in Orlando, Florida on August 29, 2025.
ae —
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Copies furnished to:
Counsel of Record