Opinion

Abdulghani v. United States Medical Licensing Examination

Court
District Court, E.D. New York
Filed
Jul 29, 2025
Cited by
0 cases
Authority
More cited than 39.1%

The opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

NABIL ABDULGHANI,

Plaintiff,

-against-

25-CV-5730 (LTS)

UNITED STATES MEDICAL LICENSING

TRANSFER ORDER

EXAMINATION; FEDERATION OF STATE

MEDICAL BOARDS; NATIONAL BOARD

OF MEDICAL EXAMINERS,

Defendants.

LAURA TAYLOR SWAIN, Chief United States District Judge:

Plaintiff Nabil Abdulghani, who resides in Brooklyn, Kings County, New York, brings

this pro se action under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging that Defendants violated his federally protected

rights. Named as Defendants are the United States Medical Licensing Examination (“USMLE”);

the Federation of State Medical Boards (“FSMB”); and the National Board of Medical

Examiners (“NBME”). Plaintiff alleges that “the USMLE is a collaborative program of FSMB

and NBME involved in assessing physician licensure eligibility,” and that Defendants have

violated his right to a “fair opportunity to complete the licensure process.” (ECF 1 at 2, 3.)

Plaintiff provides addresses for USMLE and FSMB in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania and Euless,

Texas, respectively. According to Plaintiff, venue is proper in this District under 28 U.S.C.

§ 1391(b) because he “resides in Kings County, New York, and the events giving rise to the

claim have effects within this judicial district.” (Id.)

For the following reasons, the Court transfers this action under 28 U.S.C. § 1406 to the

United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York.

DISCUSSION

Under 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b), a civil action may be brought in

(1) a judicial district in which any defendant resides, if all defendants are residents

of the State in which the district is located; (2) a judicial district in which a

substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred, or a

substantial part of property that is the subject of the action is situated; or (3) if

there is no district in which an action may otherwise be brought as provided in

this section, any judicial district in which any defendant is subject to the court’s

personal jurisdiction with respect to such action.

Under Section 1391(c), a “natural person” resides in the district where the person is

domiciled, and an “entity with the capacity to sue and be sued” resides in any judicial district

where it is subject to personal jurisdiction with respect to the civil action in question. See 28

U.S.C. § 1391(c)(1), (2).

Plaintiff provides addresses for Defendants in Texas and Pennsylvania, and claims that

venue is proper in this district because he “resides in Kings County, New York, and the events

giving rise to the claim have effects within this judicial district.” (Id. at 2.) Kings County falls

within the Eastern District of New York, however, and not in this district. 28 U.S.C. § 112(c).

Plaintiff does not allege that any defendant resides in this district, or that a substantial part of the

events or omissions giving rise to his claim occurred here. From the face of the complaint,

therefore, it is clear that venue is not proper in this court under Section 1391(b)(1), (2).1

Under 28 U.S.C. § 1406, if a plaintiff files a case in the wrong venue, the Court “shall

dismiss, or if it be in the interest of justice, transfer such case to any district or division in which

it could have been brought.” 28 U.S.C. § 1406(a). The complaint suggests that Plaintiff’s claims

may have arisen in Kings County, which is in the Eastern District of New York.2 Accordingly,

1 This judicial District, the Southern District of New York, is comprised of the following

New York State counties: (1) New York (New York City Borough of Manhattan); (2) Bronx

(New York City Borough of the Bronx); (3) Westchester; (4) Dutchess; (5) Rockland;

(6) Orange; (7) Putnam; and (8) Sullivan. See 28 U.S.C. § 112(b).

2 The Court takes no position on whether Plaintiff’s complaint establishes that

Defendants are subject to personal jurisdiction in the Eastern District of New York under Section

1391.

venue appears to lie in the Eastern District of New York, 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b)(2), and in the

interest of justice, the Court transfers this action to the United States District Court for the

Eastern District of New York, 28 U.S.C. § 1406(a).

CONCLUSION

The Clerk of Court is directed to transfer this action to the United States District Court

for the Eastern District of New York. Whether Plaintiff should be permitted to proceed further

without prepayment of fees is a determination to be made by the transferee court. A summons

shall not issue from this Court. This order closes this case in this court.

The Court certifies, pursuant to 28 U.S.C § 1915(a)(3), that any appeal from this order

would not be taken in good faith, and therefore in forma pauperis status is denied for the purpose

of an appeal. See Coppedge v. United States, 369 U.S. 438, 444-45 (1962).

SO ORDERED.

Dated: July 29, 2025

New York, New York

/s/ Laura Taylor Swain

LAURA TAYLOR SWAIN

Chief United States District Judge

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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