The opinion
In the United States Court of Federal Claims
No. 24-1868
Filed: August 29, 2025
________________________________________
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SALAHUDIN SHAHEED, )
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Plaintiff, )
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v. )
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THE UNITED STATES, )
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Defendant. )
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________________________________________ )
Salahudin Shaheed, pro se.
Bryan M. Byrd, Trial Attorney, United States Department of Justice, Civil Division, Commercial
Litigation Branch, Washington, D.C., with whom were Steven J. Gillingham, Assistant Director,
Patricia M. McCarthy, Director, and Brian M. Boynton, Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney
General, for Defendant.
OPINION AND ORDER
I. Background
Plaintiff Salahudin Shaheed is incarcerated in federal prison. ECF No. 1 at 9; 1 ECF No.
10 at 1. Since his initial incarceration in 2015, the Bureau of Prisons (“BOP”) has relocated Mr.
Shaheed twice. ECF No. 1-2 at 30. BOP first placed Mr. Shaheed at Federal Corrections
Institute (“FCI”) Berlin in New Hampshire. ECF No. 1-2 at 30. In February 2023, he was
transferred to FCI McKean in Pennsylvania. Id. BOP moved him once more in November 2023,
this time to FCI Pollock in Louisiana, where he is currently being held. Id.; ECF No. 10 at 2.
While in custody at FCI Berlin, Mr. Shaheed unsuccessfully moved to withdraw his
guilty plea. United States v. Shaheed, 688 F. App’x 120, 121 (3d Cir. 2017). After exhausting
all his appeals, Mr. Shaheed requested his defense attorney send his entire case file to FCI
Berlin. ECF No. 1-2 at 2-4; id. at 30. Pursuant to a court order, Mr. Shaheed’s defense attorney
sent Mr. Shaheed’s case file to FCI Berlin, ECF No. 1-2 at 2-4, which consisted of forty
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Because Mr. Shaheed’s complaint is not consecutively paginated, the court refers to the page
numbering in the ECF header.
computer discs, ECF No. 1-2 at 8-12; ECF No. 1 at 9. FCI Berlin received all forty discs. ECF
No. 1-2 at 8-12.
FCI Berlin’s policies allow inmates to view their legal materials on a computer if both the
inmate and a witness sign a document titled “Rules Governing the Use of Electronic Storage
Media to View Legal Materials” (“Rules Document”). Id. at 6. The Rules Document contains
the following relevant language: “I, inmate, . . . agree to abide by the following rules of use. I
understand that any violation of these rules will result in my suspension from the program and
disciplinary action.” Id.
Mr. Shaheed wanted to view his legal material but asked for more information about the
Rules Document before signing it. ECF No. 11 at 8-9. At this point, Mr. Shaheed had a
conversation with a BOP officer. Id. The BOP officer described the document as a contract with
the government in which he “assured the safety of Mr. Shaheed’s property.” 2 Id. This
conversation “persuaded” Mr. Shaheed to sign the Rules Document. Id.; ECF No. 14 at 1-2.
The BOP officer signed on as the witness. ECF No. 11 at 8; ECF No. 14 at 2.
In February 2023, BOP transferred Mr. Shaheed to FCI McKean. ECF No. 1-2 at 30.
FCI McKean inventoried and catalogued all forty discs. Id.
Finally, in November 2023, BOP transferred Mr. Shaheed to FCI Pollock. Id. While at
FCI Pollock, Mr. Shaheed reached out to the Innocence Project. ECF No. 1 at 10; ECF No. 1-2
at 14-16. The Innocence Project responded in a letter which asked for more information about
his case. ECF No. 1 at 10; ECF No. 1-2 at 14-16. Mr. Shaheed then requested the discs be
returned so he could send them to the Innocence Project. ECF No. 1 at 9-10. At this point, it
was discovered that ten of the forty discs were missing because FCI Pollock could only return
thirty of the forty discs, and the prison’s records show they only received thirty discs from FCI
McKean. ECF No. 1-2 at 30; ECF No. 1 at 9-10. Neither FCI Berlin nor FCI McKean have the
ten missing discs. ECF No. 1-2 at 26. Mr. Shaheed argues that an officer at FCI McKean lost
the discs, because that officer was the last person Mr. Shaheed saw in possession of all forty
discs. ECF No. 1 at 11; ECF No. 1-2 at 30. The specific DNA information the Innocence
Project requested is on the ten missing discs. ECF No. 1 at 10.
Accordingly, Mr. Shaheed initiated an administrative remedy process at FCI Pollock.
ECF No. 1-2 at 18-26. FCI Pollock denied Mr. Shaheed’s claim because “the administrative
remedy process is not the appropriate avenue to seek [monetary] relief . . . . [T]he appropriate
avenue to seek relief is through a TORT claim.” Id. at 26. Mr. Shaheed appealed the decision to
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Mr. Shaheed describes this conversation in his affidavit through the following statement:
The “U.S., employee under the job title supervisor” stated to SALAHUDIN
SHAHEED that, [he] had the authority to delegate on behalf of the U.S., in
contracts and gave SALAHUDIN SHAHEED assurance that [his] property would
be safe with the United States and explained how SALAHUDIN SHAHEED
could take possession of [his] property. The aforesaid verbal communication,
persuaded SALAHUDIN SHAHEED to tender [his] property to the United States.
ECF No. 14 at 1-2 (quotation and capitalization in the original).
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the Regional Director of BOP, who denied Mr. Shaheed’s appeal because he did “not allege[] a
physical injury actionable under the Federal Torts Claims Act . . . [and,] [t]here is no evidence
[he] experienced a compensable loss as a result of negligence on [the] part of any BOP
employee.” Id. at 34. The decision further advised Mr. Shaheed that he may “bring an action
against the United States in an appropriate United States District Court within six (6) months of
the date of this letter.” Id.
Mr. Shaheed then sued the United States in this court seeking damages based on a Bivens
action, conversion, and a breach of a bailment contract. ECF No. 1 at 9. He seeks $10,000,000.
ECF No. 1 at 11. Mr. Shaheed also seeks leave to proceed in forma pauperis. ECF No. 2. The
Government moved to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1) of
the Rules of the United States Court of Federal Claims, or, in the alternative, for failure to state a
claim upon which relief can be granted under Rule 12(b)(6). ECF No. 10 at 6-9.
II. Standard of Review
To survive a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, a complaint must contain
“sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its
face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550
U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). For factual allegations to be plausible, they need not be “detailed.”
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. They must, however, be more than “[t]hreadbare recitals of the
elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.
The court will “assume all well-plead factual allegations are true and indulge in all reasonable
inferences in favor of the nonmovant.” United Pac. Ins. Co. v. United States, 464 F.3d 1325,
1327-28 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (quoting Anaheim Gardens v. United States, 444 F.3d 1309, 1314-15
(Fed. Cir. 2006)). Finally, a pro se litigant’s pleadings will be held to “less stringent standards
than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972).
III. Discussion
Mr. Shaheed’s complaint appears to include three theories of recovery: a Bivens action
(his complaint states it is “by way of a ‘Bivens,’” ECF No. 1 at 9), conversion, id. at 10, and
breach of bailment contract, id. at 9. The Government moved to dismiss the Bivens claim and
the conversion claims for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. In his response, Mr. Shaheed
explained that he mistakenly filed the statement of facts from another case that was premised on
Bivens, but he does not base any claim in this court on Bivens. ECF No. 11 at 1. “Mr.
SHAHEED emphatically states ‘he’s NOT filing [his] civil complaint premised on Bivens.’” Id.
at 3 (alteration in original). He similarly abandoned the conversion claim, stating that the
Government sought to dismiss the tort claim “despite the fact that Mr. Shaheed isn’t raising a tort
claim.” Id. He claims instead to bring a “conversion-by-bailee” claim, which Mr. Shaheed
claims has different elements. Id. That said, it appears that conversion by bailee is simply the
tort of conversion committed by one acting as a bailee. But Mr. Shaheed clarifies what he
means—he states that he is alleging that the Government breached a bailment contract. Id. In
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other words, the only claim that Mr. Shaheed is pursuing in this court is for the alleged breach of
contract by BOP. 3
The Government moves to dismiss the breach of contract claim for failure to state a claim
under Rule 12(b)(6). To survive the Government’s motion to dismiss, Mr. Shaheed must
plausibly allege that he entered a bailment contract with the United States. “A bailment
relationship is said to arise where an owner, while retaining title, delivers personalty to another
for some particular purpose upon an express or implied contract. The relationship includes a
return of the goods to the owner or a subsequent disposition in accordance with his instructions.”
Lionberger v. United States, 371 F.2d 831, 840 (Ct. Cl. 1967). An express or implied contract
contains four elements: “(1) mutuality of intent, (2) consideration, (3) an unambiguous offer of
acceptance, and (4) ‘actual authority’ on the part of the government’s representative to bind the
government in contract.” Hanlin v. United States, 316 F.3d 1325, 1328 (Fed. Cir. 2003). The
requirements for implied and express contracts “are the same” even though “the nature of the
evidence differs.” Id. “An implied-in-fact contract is one founded upon a meeting of minds and
‘is inferred, as a fact, from the conduct of the parties showing, in the light of the surrounding
circumstances, their tacit understanding.’” Id. (quoting Balt. & Ohio R.R. v. United States, 261
U.S. 592, 597 (1923)). Mr. Shaheed fails to adequately allege a bailment contract with the
United States.
A. Mr. Shaheed fails to plausibly allege that he voluntarily delivered the discs to
the BOP.
Mr. Shaheed argues that he voluntarily delivered the discs to BOP when they were
transferred from his prior defense counsel to FCI Berlin. ECF No. 1 at 9. But there was nothing
voluntary about this transfer. Mr. Shaheed succeeded in getting a district court to order his
former counsel to deliver his case file to him at FCI Berlin. ECF No. 1-2 at 2, 4. When the case
file arrived at FCI Berlin, BOP did not deliver them to Mr. Shaheed. Instead, BOP took
possession of the case file (the 40 computer discs) pursuant to its police power to secure the
facility. See 28 C.F.R. §§ 543.10-.11. This undermines Mr. Shaheed’s argument because, to
plausibly allege that he voluntarily delivered personalty, Mr. Shaheed must show “a delivery of
the chattel by the bailor and its acceptance by the bailee.” Studco Bldg. Sys. US, LLC v. 1st
Advantage Fed. Credit Union, 133 F.4th 264, 276 (4th Cir. 2025) (quoting Crandall v. Woodard,
143 S.E.2d 923, 927 (1965)).
In the context of a bailment relationship with the government, this court has been hesitant
to find that seized property pursuant to governmental police powers was voluntarily delivered.
See Husband v. United States, 90 Fed. Cl. 29, 37 (2009) (holding that, although the government
issued a receipt for the return of the plaintiff’s ring after he was arrested, it was nonetheless
originally seized and cannot have been voluntarily delivered); see also Kam-Almaz v. United
States, 682 F.3d 1364, 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (holding that seizure of a computer by a customs
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If Mr. Shaheed had not clarified that he seeks only to recover for an alleged breach of contract,
this court would dismiss the Bivens and conversion claims. This court lacks jurisdiction over
Bivens actions. Brown v. United States, 105 F.3d 621, 624 (Fed. Cir. 1997). This court also
lacks jurisdiction over conversion claims because they sound in tort. Kant v. United States, 123
Fed. Cl. 614, 616-17 (2015); 28 U.S.C. § 1491(a)(1).
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agent at an airport was not voluntarily delivered, even though the customs agent explicitly
promised the return of the computer). In other words, Mr. Shaheed did not deliver the computer
discs to BOP for it to hold; Mr. Shaheed’s former attorney sent them to Mr. Shaheed at FCI
Berlin and the BOP took possession of—i.e., seized—them when they arrived at the facility.
BOP did so pursuant to regulations allowing it to control what entered the facility, see 28 CFR
§§ 543.10-.11, not because Mr. Shaheed volunteered them.
This is not to say that there can never be a bailment when the government seizes
something. Kam-Almaz, 682 F.3d at 1370; Kosak v. United States, 465 U.S. 848, 860 n.22
(1984); see also Pearsons v. United States, 723 F. Supp. 3d 825, 835 (C.D. Cal. 2024) (denying
the government’s motion to dismiss because simply arguing that the government seized the
plaintiff’s property is insufficient to show that the plaintiff has not plausibly alleged a breach of a
bailment contract). The court simply concludes that there was nothing voluntary about the
delivery of the computer discs to BOP in this case—in fact, there was no delivery to BOP in this
case. BOP intercepted the delivery to Mr. Shaheed and dictated to him the terms under which he
could access the computer discs. That was not voluntary.
Nor can Mr. Shaheed plausibly allege that he could direct the computer discs be returned
to him “in accordance with his instructions.” Kam-Almaz, 682 F.3d at 1370. This is because the
regulations, not Mr. Shaheed’s instruction, set the terms under which the Government would
allow Mr. Shaheed to view the computer discs. 28 C.F.R. §§ 553.10-.11. In plain terms, the
Government dictated the access Mr. Shaheed would have to the computer discs—he could not
instruct BOP to do anything different. And if Mr. Shaheed violated the terms the Government
imposed on his access, he would lose access to the computer discs. ECF No. 1-2 at 6.
B. Mr. Shaheed fails to adequately allege the existence of an express or implied
contract with the United States.
Even if Mr. Shaheed could have established that he voluntarily delivered the computer
discs to BOP and that BOP was required to return them to Mr. Shaheed based on his instruction,
he cannot establish that there was either an express or implied contract between him and the
Government regarding the safekeeping of the computer discs.
Mr. Shaheed cannot show the Rules Document constitutes an express contract with the
Government for several reasons. First, the document does not reflect any intent to contract on
behalf of the Government. To the contrary, the document states that Mr. Shaheed agrees to
follow certain rules that BOP imposed, but BOP nowhere promised to hold Mr. Shaheed’s
property or do anything else. ECF No. 1-2 at 6. Nor was there any offer to contract. The Rules
Document here is akin to the agreement that the plaintiff signed in Shelton v. United States, 539
F. App’x 1011 (Fed. Cir. 2013), which the Federal Circuit concluded was not a contract. There,
Mr. Shelton signed a document agreeing to participate in a program that encouraged inmates to
pay certain financial obligations, including “special assessments, fines, court costs, court-ordered
restitution, and other government obligations.” Id. at 1011-12. Like here, the document Mr.
Shelton signed (and a BOP official signed as a witness) did not constitute a contract because
“[t]he document concerns only [Mr. Shelton’s] understanding of the [program] and his pledge to
submit payments according to the specified schedule, and it indicates that prison staff
participated only in providing information on the program and witnessing [Mr. Shelton’s]
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signature.” Id. at 1013. This rationale applies to Mr. Shaheed’s claim as well. The Rules
Document merely reflects his understanding of the rules that he must follow to access the
computer discs, but it does not obligate the Government to do anything. And like Shelton, the
BOP signature on the Rules document was a “Staff Witness Signature” that reflects that the BOP
official witnessed Mr. Shaheed sign. It does not reflect an intent to contract.
Second, the Rules Document makes clear that there was not consideration, which is
required for there to be a contract. To show consideration, Mr. Shaheed must plausibly allege
the existence of “a performance or a return promise [that] must be bargained for.” Restatement
(Second) of Contracts § 71 (1981). “A performance or return promise is bargained for if it is
sought by the promisor in exchange for his promise and is given by the promisee in exchange for
that promise.” Id. Consideration must be legally “sufficient and valuable[,] . . . which has been
defined by ‘([a]) detriment incurred by the promisee, or a benefit received by the promisor at the
request of the promisor.’” Estate of Bogley v. United States, 514 F.2d 1027, 1032 (Ct. Cl. 1975)
(citing 1 Williston, Contracts 102 (1957)).
The Rules Document shows only that Mr. Shaheed promised to abide by the rules BOP
dictated for him to have access to the computer discs. ECF No. 1-2 at 3. But the Government
did not agree to do anything—the document only reflects Mr. Shaheed’s unilateral agreement to
abide by the rules. Mr. Shaheed does not argue that the Government agreed to do anything in the
Rules Document. And a review of that document reveals that the only thing any BOP official
would do was issue the computer discs to Mr. Shaheed in the computer room and log the discs
out to Mr. Shaheed and then log them back in when he was done to ensure he did not take them
with him. ECF No. 1-3 at 3. BOP had a pre-existing duty to make these materials available to
Mr. Shaheed. 28 C.F.R. §§ 543.10-.11. That is not consideration because “[p]erformance of a
pre-existing legal duty is not consideration.” Am. Red Ball Int’l, Inc. v. United States, 79 Fed.
Cl. 474, 478 (2007) (citing Allen v. United States, 100 F.3d 133, 134 (Fed.Cir.1996)).
Mr. Shaheed’s argument that a “benefit to the promisor is unnecessary” does not salvage
his claim or overcome the need for consideration. ECF No. 11 at 5 (cleaned up). Mr. Shaheed
misunderstands the law. The question is not whether there is a benefit to the promisor; the
question is whether there was a bargained for exchange. In other words, Mr. Shaheed must still
allege facts sufficient to establish that there was a bargained-for exchange. Restatement
(Second) of Contracts § 79 (1981). Even reading the complaint in the light most favorable to
Mr. Shaheed, he has not done so. Because the Rules Document lacks several requirements
needed to form a contract, it does not constitute an express contract between Mr. Shaheed and
the Government.
Mr. Shaheed’s argument that his conversation with the BOP official persuaded him to
sign the Rules Document does not salvage his claim. He claims that this BOP official stated that
he had “authority . . . on behalf of the U.S., in contracts and gave SALAHUDIN SHAHEED
assurance that [his] property would be safe with the United States and explained how
SALAHUDIN SHAHEED could take possession of [his] property. The aforesaid verbal
communication, persuaded SALAHUDIN SHAHEED to tender [his] property to the United
States.” ECF No. 14 at 1-2. Apparently, Mr. Shaheed needed this persuasion to tender his
property to the Government because he purports to have had other options. Specifically, he
asserts that he could have rejected the Government’s “offer,” retained legal representation, and
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have the new lawyers print the computer files on paper and deliver the paper to him. ECF No.
11 at 3-4. Even if the court accepts as true the BOP official’s statement, it does not help Mr.
Shaheed. Again, Mr. Shaheed did not tender his property to BOP voluntarily; BOP took
possession and control of the computer discs when they arrived at the facility. The Rules
Document and the conversation with the BOP official were merely explanations to Mr. Shaheed
of the terms by which the Government would allow him to access the computer discs. There was
no offer by the Government for Mr. Shaheed to reject. And the hypothetical chain of events that
could have happened—that he could have hired a new lawyer, he could have sent the computer
discs to the lawyer, and that the lawyer could have delivered the contents of these computer discs
on paper—is too speculative to survive the Government’s motion. Mr. Shaheed did not have an
attorney to send the computer discs to—he only had them because he had to get a court to order
his former attorney to turn them over. ECF No. 1-2 at 1.
In the end, there is no plausible allegation that Mr. Shaheed and the Government entered
a bailment agreement regarding the computer discs.
IV. Conclusion
For the forgoing reasons, the court GRANTS the Government’s motion to dismiss, ECF
No. 10. The court also GRANTS Mr. Shaheed’s motion to proceed in forma pauperis, ECF No.
2. The Clerk’s Office is directed to enter judgment accordingly.
It is so ORDERED.
s/ Edward H. Meyers
Edward H. Meyers
Judge
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