Stuppard-Wilson v. Muhammad

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA

ATLANTA DIVISION

TAMARRA E. STUPPARD-WILSON,

as administratrix for the estate of Dino

Vandarrel Walker, deceased,

Plaintiff,

v. CIVIL ACTION FILE

NO. 1:24-CV-3400-TWT

FULTON COUNTY, GEORGIA, et al.,

Defendants.

OPINION & ORDER

This is a civil rights action. It is before the Court on the Defendants’

individual Motions to Dismiss [Docs. 22, 23, 24] and the Plaintiff’s Motions for

Leave to File a Supplement to the First Amended Complaint [Doc. 36], for

Clarification [Doc. 37], and to Take Judicial Notice [Doc. 45]. For the following

reasons, the Plaintiff’s Motions to Supplement and for Clarification [Docs. 36,

37] are GRANTED. The Plaintiff’s Motion to Take Judicial Notice [Doc. 45] is

GRANTED in part and DENIED in part. The Defendant Fulton County’s

Motion to Dismiss [Doc. 22] is GRANTED; the Defendant Curt Muhammad’s

Motion to Dismiss [Doc. 23] is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part; and

the Defendant Patrick Labat’s Motion to Dismiss [Doc. 24] is GRANTED.

I. Background1

This case arises out of the murder of Dino Walker, who was an inmate

at the Fulton County Jail at the time of his death. (Suppl. Compl. § 1).2 The

Plaintiff, Tamarra E. Stuppard-Wilson, is the personal representative of

Walker’s estate. ( ¶ 4). On September 22, 2022, Walker was fatally stabbed

by another inmate at the jail using “an apparent makeshift knife or shank.”

( ¶ 14).

Walker first entered the jail in December 2020 as a pretrial detainee.

( ¶ 46). In April 2022, Walker was attacked within the jail by multiple

inmates. ( ¶ 47). Jail officials, including the Sheriff, were aware of the

attack. ( ¶¶ 48, 51). Walker remained housed in an area of the jail known as

7North after the attack, which the Plaintiff alleges houses “the jail’s most

dangerous detainees/inmates.” ( ¶¶ 50, 53). On September 22, 2022,

Defendant Curt Muhammad (“Officer Muhammad”) was assigned to 7North

for his shift as a detention officer. ( ¶ 54). At approximately 8:35 PM that

day, Officer Muhammad left 7North with the inmates out of their cells and

unattended. ( ¶ 57). It is Fulton County Sheriff’s Office policy that a

1 The Court accepts the facts as alleged in the Amended Complaint as

true for purposes of the present Motion to Dismiss.

, 941 F.3d 1116, 1122 (11th Cir. 2019).

2 As explained in Section II. A. a., , Plaintiff’s Supplemental

Complaint [Doc. 36] is the operative pleading for purposes of ruling on the

pending Motions to Dismiss.

2

detention officer conduct security rounds in a housing unit once per hour. (

¶ 56). At approximately 9:00 PM, inmates from the unit reported to the tower

officer that Walker was on the floor, unresponsive, and bleeding. ( ¶ 58). The

tower officer radioed Officer Muhammad to return to 7North. ( ¶ 60).

Another detention officer, Officer Hugger, left 7South to attend to the situation

in 7North. ( ¶ 62). After finding Walker face down in a pool of blood, Officer

Hugger called for medical help. ( ¶¶ 64-65). Officer Muhammad arrived back

at 7North around 9:15 PM, and Walker was pronounced dead at 10:12 PM. (

¶¶ 68, 71).

Inmates are able to fashion weapons like the one used to kill Walker

from the “crumbling physical infrastructure of the jail.” ( ¶¶ 27, 88). The jail,

which was built to hold up to 1,125 inmates, holds on average 3,600 inmates

at a time. ( ¶ 23). In the fall of 2021, Defendant Sheriff Patrick Labat

(“Sheriff”) gave the Fulton County Board of Commissioners a tour of the jail to

allow them to observe its deteriorating state as well as the conditions that

“contributed to the violent and dangerous atmosphere there.’ ( ¶ 26). The

United States Department of Justice (“DOJ”) initiated an investigation of the

jail and Defendant Fulton County on July 13, 2023, and representatives

conducted a site visit, including meeting with the Sheriff, on July 21, 2023.

( ¶¶ 32, 42, 72). The DOJ released its investigation report on November 14,

2024. ( ¶ 73). Among the DOJ’s findings in that report were that the jail is

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regularly understaffed, leading to inadequate security rounds in the jail’s

housing units. ( ¶¶ 109, 111).

The County, through the Fulton County Board of Commissioners

provides funding for the jail’s operations. ( ¶ 133). The Plaintiff alleges that

the Sheriff made “repeated funding requests” to the Board and, in January

2021, the Sheriff told the Board that “without additional funding or space he

would be unable to fulfill his constitutional obligations to detainees at the jail.”

( ¶ 139). The Plaintiff alleges that, despite these requests, the requested

funding was not provided. ( ¶ 138). The Plaintiff also alleges that the Sheriff

regularly misused funds in the “Inmate Welfare Fund” on items unrelated to

inmate welfare, prompting the Board to close the fund. ( ¶¶ 118, 169, 174).

This fund was originally intended for “recording all concession purchases,

sales, and other welfare disbursements.” ( ¶ 172).

The Plaintiff filed suit on July 31, 2024 raising six numbered claims:

liability under the 14th Amendment and 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the

County (Count I); deliberate indifference under the 14th Amendment and

§ 1983 against the Sheriff and Muhammad (Counts II and III); “violation of

ministerial duties under Georgia law” against Muhammad (Count IV); and two

claims for supervisory liability under § 1983 against the Sheriff (Counts V and

VI). ( ¶¶ 31-269). She also seeks wrongful death damages under Georgia law

against all of the Defendants and punitive damages against the Sheriff and

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Muhammad. ( ¶ 270-273). The Defendants’ individual Motions to Dismiss

all claims are presently before the Court, [Docs. 22-24], as well as the Plaintiff’s

Motion for Leave to File a Supplemental Complaint, [Doc. 36], Motion for

Clarification, [Doc. 37], and Motion for Judicial Notice [Doc. 45]. The Court will

address the Plaintiff’s procedural motions before turning to the Defendants’

Motions to Dismiss.

II. Discussion

A. Plaintiff’s Motions

a. Motions to Supplement and for Clarification [Docs. 36-37]

The Plaintiff seeks leave to supplement her First Amended Complaint

pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(d) to add references and citations to the DOJ

Report, which was released on November 14, 2024. [Doc. 36 at 1-6]. She asserts

that the DOJ Report references Mr. Walker’s death and implicates the claims

she has asserted against the Defendants. [ at 8-10]. The Plaintiff contends

that her request is undertaken in good faith and that permitting the

supplement would not prejudice the Defendants. [ at 15-18]. In her Motion

for Clarification, the Plaintiff states that she erroneously represented in her

Motion to Supplement that she conferred with defense counsel for consent prior

to filing. [Doc. 37 at 1-2].

The Court will grant the Plaintiff’s request and permit her to file her

proposed supplement to the First Amended Complaint. Rule 15(d) of the

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Federal Rules of Civil Procedure permits a party to move to “serve a

supplemental pleading setting out any transaction, occurrence, or event that

happened after the date of the pleading to be supplemented.” The Eleventh

Circuit has applied the same standards that govern leave to amend under Fed.

R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2) to motions for leave to supplement under Rule 15(a)(d).

, 36 F4th 1100, 1126 (11th Cir. 2002) (citing

, 544 F.3d 1201, 1211 (11th Circ. 2008). Rule 15(a)(2) provides

that a court should “freely” give leave to amend a pleading “when justice so

requires.” This decision is discretionary, but the Eleventh Circuit has

explained that “district courts should generally exercise their discretion in

favor of allowing amendments to reach the merits of a dispute.”

, 7 F.4th 989,

1000 (11th Cir. 2021).

Curiously, the Defendants argue that the Plaintiff has failed to identify

“what, if any, information happened after the date of her Complaint.” (Defs.’

Resp. in Opp. to Mot. to Suppl., at 3-6). The Plaintiff plainly and accurately

stated that the DOJ Report was not released until November 2024, a month

after the First Amended Complaint was filed. Given that leave to supplement

should be freely granted, the Court finds the release of this report to be an

event or occurrence within the meaning of Rule 15(d). Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(d)

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(noting that a supplemental pleading must set out “ transaction,

occurrence, or event that happened after the date of the pleading to be

supplemented” (emphasis added)). And to the extent the Defendants argue

that the DOJ Report does not constitute a “change in the facts,” the Court

disagrees—the release of the report signified that the DOJ had completed its

investigation into the Fulton County Jail. ( Defs.’ Resp. in Opp. to Mot. to

Suppl., at 6 (citing , 216 F.3d 970, 982 (11th Cir. 2000)). The

Defendants have not argued that granting the Plaintiff leave to supplement

would result in any prejudice, and the Court does not believe it would. So, the

Plaintiff’s Motion to Supplement [Doc. 36] will be granted.3 The Court will

consider the Supplemental Complaint for the purposes of addressing the

Defendants’ pending Motions to Dismiss.4

b. Motion to Take Judicial Notice [Doc. 45]

The Plaintiff also asks the Court to take judicial notice of “the existence

and contents of” a consent decree entered in another action in this district—

, 1:25cv0024-LMM (N.D.Ga.). (Pl.’s Mot.

to Take Judicial Notice, at 1). The Plaintiff essentially seeks to use Defendants

3 Although not truly a motion, the Court will nonetheless grant the

Plaintiff’s Motion for Clarification [Doc. 37].

4 Supplemental pleadings “represent additions to or continuations of

the earlier pleadings;” therefore, granting the Plaintiff’s Motion does not moot

the Court’s consideration of the Defendants’ pending Motions to Dismiss. 6A

Wright & Miller’s Federal Practice & Procedure § 1504 (3d ed. 2025).

7

Fulton County and Sheriff Labat’s agreement via the consent decree to address

certain issues in the jail as evidence in support of her claims against them in

the present action. ( at 6-14 (“[C]onstitutional and statutory violations

the Defendants deny in their respective Motions to Dismiss, are readily

admitted by their agreement to the remedial terms of the Consent Decree.”).

The Defendants oppose the Motion, arguing that the consent decree is not

relevant to the present action. (Defs.’ Resp. in Opp. to Pl.’s Mot. to Take

Judicial Notice, at 5-6).5

The Eleventh Circuit has noted that “the taking of judicial notice of facts

is, as a matter of evidence law, a highly limited process” because it “bypasses

the safeguards which are involved with the usual process of proving facts by

competent evidence.” , 120 F.3d 211, 214 (11th Cir. 1997).

Therefore, district courts can take notice of facts “only where the fact in

question is one not subject to reasonable dispute in that it is either (1) generally

known within the territorial jurisdiction of the trial court or (2) capable of

accurate and ready determination by resort to sources whose accuracy cannot

reasonably be questioned.” (citing Fed. R. Evid. 201(b)) (quotation marks

omitted). With regard to documents filed in other courts, a court may take

5 The Defendants also argue that the Plaintiff actually seeks to have the

Court take judicial notice of the DOJ Report rather than the consent decree.

The Court disagrees with this interpretation; the Plaintiff discusses the DOJ

Report but asks the Court to take judicial notice of the contents of the consent

decree.

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judicial notice “not for the truth of the matters asserted in the other litigation,

but rather to establish the fact of such litigation and related filings.”

, 29 F.3d 1549, 1553 (11th Cir. 1994) (quotation marks and

citation omitted). Specifically, a court can take judicial notice of another court’s

order “only for the limited purpose of recognizing the judicial act that the order

represents or the subject matter of the litigation.” (quotation marks and

citation omitted).

The Plaintiff’s request is plainly unsupported by the law of this Circuit.

In essence, the Plaintiff asks the Court to consider the terms of the consent

decree “for the truth of the matters asserted in the other litigation”—in other

words, as evidence that the Defendants have agreed to remedy issues leading

to the constitutional and statutory violations that the Plaintiff alleges were

committed here. , 29 F.3d at 1553. As an initial matter, the factual

findings in a court’s order cannot satisfy Rule 201(b)’s indisputability

requirement. Thus, relevancy arguments aside, the Court cannot take

judicial notice of the terms of the consent decree. In explaining the dangers of

expanding judicial notice beyond this limited scope, the Eleventh Circuit

opined that “if it were permissible for a court to take judicial notice of a fact

merely because it has been found to be true in some other action, the doctrine

of collateral estoppel would be superfluous.” The danger is even greater

here where there were no findings made in the other action, since parties may

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choose to resolve litigation by consent decree for a variety of reasons that do

not include admitting liability. It is for this reason that the law limits a court’s

ability to take judicial notice of another court’s order to recognizing the act of

entering the order.

The Defendants misread , 187 F.3d 1271 to

write a strict relevancy requirement into Rule 201. Setting aside the question

of whether that requirement exists in cases outside the scope of securities

fraud, the Defendants’ relevancy arguments touch only on the contents of the

consent decree rather than the entry of the consent decree itself. But Rule

201(c)(2) instructs that the court “must take judicial notice if a party requests

it and the court is supplied with the necessary information.” The Court will

thus grant the Plaintiff’s Motion [Doc. 45] in part and take judicial notice only

of the fact that a consent decree was entered in

, 1:25cv0024-LMM (N.D.Ga.) in accordance with the Eleventh Circuit’s

guidance in . The Motion will be denied in all other respects.

B. Defendants’ Motions to Dismiss

A complaint should be dismissed under Rule 12(b)(6) only where it

appears that the facts alleged fail to state a “plausible” claim for relief.

, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009); Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). A complaint may

survive a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, however, even if it is

“improbable” that a plaintiff would be able to prove those facts; even if the

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possibility of recovery is extremely “remote and unlikely.”

, 550 U.S. 544, 556 (2007). In ruling on a motion to dismiss, the court

must accept the facts pleaded in the complaint as true and construe them in

the light most favorable to the plaintiff.

, 711 F.2d 989, 994-95 (11th Cir.

1983); , 40 F.3d

247, 251 (7th Cir. 1994) (noting that at the pleading stage, the plaintiff

“receives the benefit of imagination”). Generally, notice pleading is all that is

required for a valid complaint. , 753

F.2d 974, 975 (11th Cir. 1985). Under notice pleading, the plaintiff need only

give the defendant fair notice of the plaintiff’s claim and the grounds upon

which it rests. , 551 U.S. 89, 93 (2007) (citing ,

550 U.S. at 555).

a. Fulton County [Doc. 22] – Count I

i. Liability

The Plaintiff asserts a claim against the County under the 14th

Amendment and 429 U.S. 1071 (1977) and seeks

damages under Georgia law for wrongful death pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 51-4-2.

The County argues that the claim against it must be dismissed under Rule

12(b)(6) because the Plaintiff has failed to establish any of the three elements

of a claim. (County’s Mot. to Dismiss, at 7-15). The County also argues

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that to the extent the Plaintiff has asserted a claim against it based on the

Sheriff’s conduct under a respondeat superior theory, it has no authority over

the Sheriff or his employees. ( at 16-17). In response, the Plaintiff argues

that the County violated Mr. Walker’s constitutional rights “through a

persistent and widespread practice of underfunding the jail thereby promoting

violence, understaffing and continuing physical deterioration of the Jail so that

weapons . . . might be crafted from the crumbling jail infrastructure.” (Pl.’s

Resp. in Opp. to County’s Mot. to Dismiss, at 8-9).

Under , a local government body is liable under § 1983 when the

execution of its policy or custom constitutes the “moving force” that inflicts

injury upon an individual in violation of her constitutional rights. , 436

U.S. at 694. To state a claim for § 1983 liability against a municipality or other

local government entity, a plaintiff must allege plausible facts showing (1) that

his constitutional rights were violated, (2) that the municipality had a custom

or policy that constituted deliberate indifference to his constitutional rights,

and (3) that the custom or policy caused his constitutional violation.

, 392 F.3d 1283, 1289 (11th Cir. 2004). A plaintiff “has two methods

by which to establish a county’s policy: identify either (1) an officially

promulgated county policy or (2) an unofficial custom or practice of the county

shown through the repeated acts of a final policymaker for the county.”

, 335 F.3d 1326, 1329 (11th Cir. 2003) (citations omitted).

12

The present case does not implicate an officially promulgated County policy, so

only the unofficial custom or practice inquiry is relevant here.

The Court agrees with the County that the Supplemental Complaint

fails to adequately allege a claim. The crux of the Plaintiff’s argument

is that the County’s failure to adequately fund the Jail resulted in a

proliferation of violence at the jail often carried out via handmade shanks, such

that this underfunding constituted deliberate indifference to Mr. Walker’s

constitutional rights. The Court will assume for the purposes of this analysis

that Mr. Walker suffered a violation of his constitutional rights. But as to the

second prong, Plaintiff has not properly alleged that the County had a

custom or policy that constituted deliberate indifference to those rights.

, 392 F.3d at 1289. The Supplemental Complaint identifies only one

specific request for increased funding, in January 2021, and otherwise

summarily states that the Sheriff made “repeated funding requests.” (Supp.

Compl. [Doc. 36] ¶¶ 134, 139). A single denied funding request and a general

allegation that other funding requests were denied are insufficient under

Eleventh Circuit law to establish a “persistent and wide-spread practice” of

underfunding the jail. , , 604

F.3d 1248, 1263 n.11 (11th Cir. 2010) (holding that a single, isolated incident

is insufficient to establish a custom or practice of deliberate indifference to

constitutional rights); , 392 F.3d at 1289-91 (“McDowell cannot rely

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on a generalized policy of understaffing.”). In any event, the Sheriff’s January

2021 funding request for $6.8 million dollars that the Plaintiff appears to cite

was granted.6 , at 4:48:00-6:09:39

(YouTube, Jan. 20, 2021), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Dv2TJh0C-XE.

Even if these allegations sufficiently established a custom or policy of

underfunding the jail, they do not rise to the level of deliberate indifference.

Under the facts of this case, deliberate indifference would require allegations

that the County “deliberate[ly] inten[ded] to inadequately” fund the jail,

despite “known or obvious consequences.” , 392 F.3d at 1291. While

the Plaintiff makes several allegations that the County—via its Board of

Commissioners—was aware of the deteriorating condition of the Jail and of the

increasing violence, knowledge and neglect do not rise to the “requisite degree

of culpability” that constitute deliberate indifference. (“Plainly stated, a

showing of simple or even heightened negligence is not enough.” (quotation

marks and citation omitted)). More critically, here, the Plaintiff alleges that

the County was informed of the ongoing issues with the state of the jail,

6 The County asks the Court to incorporate the video recording of the

January 2021 Board of Commissioners hearing based on the Plaintiff’s

references to that hearing in the Supplemental Complaint, and the Plaintiff

has not opposed that request. The Court finds that it can properly consider the

video recording under the factors outlined in , 975 F.3d 1140,

1144 (11th Cir. 2020). , 67 F.4th 1268,

1276-77 (11th Cir. 2023) (extending the incorporation by reference doctrine to

video footage).

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including the rise in handmade shanks and resulting violence, in the Fall of

2021 and ongoing into 2023. (Suppl. Compl. §§ 26-29). However, the only

funding request that the Plaintiff specifically identifies was made prior to that

in January 2021, and there are no allegations in the Supplemental Complaint

that the County was informed of the handmade weapons issue at that time.

( ¶ 139 (stating generally that the Sheriff told the County that “without

additional funding or space he would be unable to fulfill his constitutional

obligations to detainees at the Jail.”). Thus, even construing the facts in the

light most favorable to the Plaintiff, the Court cannot infer that the County

made any budget decisions a “plainly obvious consequence,”

i.e., Mr. Walker’s death by a handmade shank. , 392 F.3d at 1292-93.

Finally, the Plaintiff has not adequately alleged that the County’s

purported custom of underfunding the jail was the “moving force” behind Mr.

Walker’s death. at 1292. The connection that the Plaintiff alleges between

the County’s alleged practice of underfunding the jail and Mr. Walker’s death

by a handmade shank is too attenuated to be actionable under

, 285 F.3d 962, 967 (11th Cir.

2002) (“It is not sufficient for a government body’s policy to be tangentially

related to a constitutional deprivation.”). As the Eleventh Circuit aptly stated

in , “[w]hile it may be true that the Board's budget decision would

make a violation of his constitutional rights more that alone cannot give

15

rise to an inference that a policy maker's failure to scrutinize the budget

produced a specific constitutional allegation.” , 392 F.3d at 1292

(quotation marks, alterations, and citation omitted). The same holds true

here—although the Plaintiff has alleged that the County knew generally of the

deteriorating conditions in the jail when it denied the Sheriff’s funding

requests, the Court cannot infer on that basis that its alleged failure to

adequately fund the jail was the “moving force” behind Mr. Walker’s death.

, 945 F.3d 1320, 1331 (11th Cir. 2019) (noting that to

demonstrate causation for liability, the constitutional violation must

have been carried out “pursuant to” the custom or policy). For all of these

reasons, the Plaintiff’s claim against the County fails, and Count I will

be dismissed.

ii. Damages

The County further argues that the Plaintiff’s claim for damages under

the Georgia wrongful death statute is precluded because she failed to timely

present an ante litem notice under O.C.G.A. § 36-11-1 and, regardless, the

County is entitled to sovereign immunity under the Georgia constitution.

(County’s Mot. to Dismiss, at 17-19). The Plaintiff argues that the ante litem

notice was submitted to the County within the one-year period provided under

the statute and does not address the County’s sovereign immunity argument.

(Pl.’s Resp. in Opp. to Mot to Dismiss, at 16-19). Determining this issue will

16

require the Court to get into the weeds of statutory interpretation.

O.C.G.A. § 36-11-1 provides that “[a]ll claims against counties must be

presented within 12 months after they accrue or become payable or the same

are barred.” The Georgia high courts have not yet addressed the question of

whether a claim is “presented” so long as an ante litem notice is properly

mailed before the 12-month period runs, or if the claim must be received by the

county defendant before the 12-month deadline. The Supreme Court of Georgia

has addressed the statute’s municipal counterpart, O.C.G.A. § 36-33-5, which

contains the same presentment language. In discussing the history of both

statutes, the court approved of “look[ing] to cases interpreting and applying

the municipal ante litem notice statute as an aid to its understanding of

O.C.G.A. § 36-11-1,” going as far as to say that “the municipal ante litem notice

and county presentment statutes have similar objects and purposes, and they

generally ought to be construed consistently, except, of course, where the

statutory text indicates otherwise.” , 301 Ga. 380, 383

(2017). Interpreting O.C.G.A. § 36-11-1 consistently with O.C.G.A. § 36-33-5

also squares with Georgia’s longstanding adherence to the doctrine of in pari

materia. , 365 Ga. App. 124, 135 (2022) (“It is true that

a statute must be construed in relation to other statutes of which it is a part,

and all statutes relating to the same subject-matter . . . are construed together,

and harmonized whenever possible, so as to ascertain the legislative

17

intendment and give effect thereto.”).

O.C.G.A. § 36-33-5 expressly states that a claim under that statute may

be made by certified mail or statutory overnight delivery but is silent about

whether the claim must be received by the would-be defendant before the

12-month period elapses. The Supreme Court of Georgia very recently

addressed this subsection, O.C.G.A. § 36-33-5(f), and indicated that mailing

the notice “to the correct address by any of the permitted statutory methods”

constitutes substantial compliance with the service requirement of the statute.

, 2025 WL 1737102, at *4 (Ga. June 24, 2025).

In so finding, the court noted that it “would make little sense to require

plaintiffs to get the ante litem notice into the hands” of the proper official given

that, in context, “to deliver something means to give or transfer possession of

it.” In buttressing this conclusion, the court cited with approval

, 268 Ga. 192 (1997), the case the Plaintiff here relies on

in support of her position that the ante litem notice was timely delivered to the

County. So, it seems that the ante litem notice here—mailed on September 22,

2023, and received by the County on September 25, 2023—was timely

presented to the County within 12 months of Mr. Walker’s death on September

22, 2022.7 ( First Am. Compl., [Doc. 20], Ex. C). Therefore, O.C.G.A.

7 The County asked the Court to certify this issue to the Supreme Court

of Georgia but raised this request for the first time in its reply brief. (

County’s Reply in Supp. of Mot. to Dismiss, at 8). The Court thus declines to

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§ 36-11-1 does not bar the Court’s consideration of the Plaintiff’s claim for

wrongful death damages.

The County also asserts that it is entitled to sovereign immunity unless

its immunity has been waived by statute, Ga. Const. Art. I, § 2, ¶ 9, and

the Plaintiff has not identified any such statute here. Once a defendant raises

the sovereign immunity defense, it is the plaintiff’s burden to demonstrate that

immunity has been waived.

, 371 Ga. App. 762, 762-63 (2024). As the Plaintiff here failed to

respond to the County’s sovereign immunity argument, the County is entitled

to sovereign immunity. The County’s Motion to Dismiss [Doc. 22] will be

granted as to this claim.

b. Officer Muhammad – [Doc. 24]

i. 14th Amendment Deliberate Indifference – Count III

The Plaintiff asserts a deliberate indifference claim against Officer

Muhammad, alleging that “abandoning his post of duty” constituted deliberate

indifference to the substantial risk of harm to Walker. (Suppl. Compl.

¶ 224-31). In his Motion to Dismiss, Officer Muhammad argues that he had no

knowledge of Walker’s serious medical needs in advance and, when he

observed Walker in distress, he acted immediately. (Officer Muhammad’s Mot.

consider it. , 739 F.3d 678, 682-83 (11th Cir.

2014).

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to Dismiss, at 8-9). However, the Plaintiff did not raise a claim of deliberate

indifference to a serious medical need; the Supplemental Complaint makes

clear that her claim is for deliberate indifference to Walker’s safety and a

resulting failure to protect him. Moreover, Officer Muhammad’s motion cites

the now-overruled “more than gross negligence” standard for deliberate

indifference rather than the current standard of subjective recklessness.

, 106 F.4th at 1255.8 Officer Muhammad also asserts that qualified

immunity bars “any claims” the Plaintiff has against him, but his arguments

touch only on the Plaintiff’s claim for violation of ministerial duties under state

law. ( Officer Muhammad’s Mot. to Dismiss, at 11-14 (“Contrary to

Plaintiff’s asserted legal conclusion, the Complaint is devoid of any factual

allegations that would indicate that Defendant Muhammad was engaged in a

ministerial act at the time of the subject incident such that qualified immunity

would be inappropriate.”)). Out of an abundance of caution, the Court will

address qualified immunity with regard to the Plaintiff’s deliberate

8 Officer Muhammad does cite the correct standard in his reply brief,

but he fails to interact with the standard beyond merely stating that his

conduct did not rise to the level of subjective recklessness. (Officer

Muhammad’s Reply in Supp of Mot. to Dismiss, at 2-3). While Officer

Muhammad addresses the reasonableness of the actions he was undertaking

while he was absent from 7North, he does not address the reasonableness of

the act the Plaintiff alleges constituted deliberate indifference—the act of

leaving 7North completely unattended for approximately 45 minutes while the

inmates were out of their cells. ( at 3-4); (Suppl. Compl. ¶¶ 57, 68,

227-29).

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indifference claim because “it is proper to grant a motion to dismiss on qualified

immunity grounds when the complaint fails to allege the violation of a clearly

established constitutional right.” , 929 F.3d 1304, 1311 (11th

Cir. 2019) (quotation marks and citation omitted).

“Qualified immunity protects government officials performing

discretionary functions from suits in their individual capacities unless their

conduct violates clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which

a reasonable person would have known.” , 884 F.3d 1290,

1296 (11th Cir. 2018) (quotation marks omitted). “A defendant who asserts

qualified immunity has the initial burden of showing he was acting within the

scope of his discretionary authority when he took the allegedly

unconstitutional action.” at 1297. Once that is shown (and it is not

challenged here), “the burden shifts to the plaintiff to establish that qualified

immunity is not appropriate by showing that (1) the facts alleged make out a

violation of a constitutional right and (2) the constitutional right at issue was

clearly established at the time of the alleged misconduct.” The Court has

discretion to decide these issues in either order depending on the

circumstances, but the Plaintiff must demonstrate both prongs to survive a

qualified-immunity defense. , 871 F.3d 1203, 1208

(11th Cir. 2017).

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“A prison official acted with deliberate indifference if he (1) had

subjective knowledge of a risk of serious harm, (2) disregarded that risk, and

(3) engaged in conduct that amounts to subjective recklessness.”

, 124 F.4th 1273, 1283 (11th Cir. 2024) (citation omitted). To make the

subjective recklessness showing, a plaintiff must show that “the defendant was

subjectively aware that his own conduct put the plaintiff at substantial risk of

serious harm—with the caveat that, in any event, a defendant who responds

reasonably to a risk, even a known risk, cannot be found liable.”

, 106 F.4th 1251, 1255 (11th Cir. 2024) (quotation marks, brackets,

and citation omitted).

The Court finds that the Plaintiff has carried her burden of showing that

Officer Muhammad violated Walker’s clearly established constitutional rights

by knowingly leaving the inmates of 7North unattended and that Officer

Muhammad is therefore not entitled to qualified immunity as to the Plaintiff’s

deliberate indifference claim. Here, the Plaintiff has alleged that 7North was

one of the most violent areas of the jail. She alleged that Officer Muhammad

knew that Walker had been previously attacked by another inmate in 7North.

She also alleged that Officer Muhammad was assigned as the only detention

officer for 7North on the night of Walker’s death and that he knew the inmates

were out of their cells when he left 7North to attend to other matters. Viewing

these allegations in the Plaintiff’s favor, is not a great leap for the Court to find

22

that Muhammad knew that leaving inmates unattended in one of the most

violent areas of the jail for approximately 45 minutes—especially given the

Plaintiff’s allegations of the condition of the jail and the inmates’ proclivities

for crafting weapons out of the jail’s infrastructure—carried a risk of serious

harm to Walker. ( Suppl. Compl. ¶¶ 15, 50, 51, 53, 57, 68, 69). Officer

Muhammad disregarded that risk by leaving the inmates, and specifically

Walker, unattended. To that end, Officer Muhammad does not rebut the

Plaintiff’s assertion that he took no measures to abate the risk his absence

might impose by, for example, asking another detention officer to monitor

7North in his absence. (Pl.’s Resp. in Opp. to Officer Muhammad’s Mot. to

Dismiss, at 9). Plainly, there is no colorable argument here that Officer

Muhammad’s decision to leave 7North completely unattended was

appropriate, and these allegations clearly satisfy the subjective recklessness

standard. , 106 F.4th at 1255 (holding that a defendant acts with

subjective recklessness when he “was subjectively aware that his own conduct

put the plaintiff at substantial risk of serious harm”)); at 1258 (noting that

“in addition to subjectively recognizing the substantial risk, the prison official

must also subjectively be aware that his actions were inappropriate in light of

that risk” (citation and brackets omitted)).

While Officer Muhammad attempts to negate this conclusion by arguing

that he responded reasonably once the tower officer alerted him that Walker

23

was found lying face down in a pool of blood, (Suppl. Compl. ¶¶ 58, 60-61), the

law only allows him to escape liability for his actions “if he responded

reasonably .” , 106 F.4th at 1257 (emphasis added). Officer

Muhammad’s actions in returning to 7North once he was radioed are irrelevant

because, at that point, the risk of harm to Walker (i.e., a fatal attack) had

already materialized. In other words, it was too little too late. Having shown

that Officer Muhammad’s conduct amounted to deliberate indifference, and

therefore that Walker’s constitutional rights were violated, the Plaintiff must

still establish that the right at issue was clearly established at the time in

order to avoid the application of qualified immunity.

The Eleventh Circuit has explained that, to be clearly established, “the

contours of the right must be sufficiently clear that a reasonable official would

understand that what he is doing violates that right.” , 929

F.3d 1304, 1311 (11th Cir. 2019) (citation omitted). To that end, “an official's

awareness of the existence of an abstract right . . . does not equate to knowledge

that conduct infringes the right.” at 1312 (quotation marks and citation

omitted). “This is not to say that an official action is protected by qualified

immunity unless the very action in question has previously been held

unlawful, but it is to say that in the light of the pre-existing law the

unlawfulness must be apparent.” (quoting , 483 U.S.

635, 640 (1987)). With this backdrop in mind, there are three ways a plaintiff

24

can show that the right at issue was clearly established. First, she can show

that “a materially similar case has already been decided;” second, she can show

“that a broader, clearly established principle should control the novel facts of

a particular situation;” or third, she can show that “her case fits within the

exception of conduct which so obviously violates the constitution that prior case

law is unnecessary.” (quotation marks, brackets, and citations omitted).

Viewing the facts in the Plaintiff’s favor, the Court easily finds that the

third prong is satisfied here. Given that Walker had a constitutional right to

physical safety in the jail, it is obvious that leaving a cellblock unattended with

inmates out of their cells for approximately 45 minutes seriously threatened

the inmates’ safety, including Walker’s. , 936 F.3d

1227, 1233 (11th Cir. 2019) (“It is well settled that prison officials must take

reasonable measures to guarantee the safety of the inmates.” (quotation marks

and citation omitted)). And there is no question that, under the facts alleged

in the Supplemental Complaint, Officer Muhammad knew he failed to take

reasonable measures to guarantee the safety of the 7North unit when he left it

unattended. , 929 F.3d at 1311 (providing that “the contours of the right

must be sufficiently clear that a reasonable official would understand that

what he is doing violates that right.”). Accordingly, the Court finds the clearly

established prong is satisfied, so Officer Muhammad is not entitled to qualified

immunity on the Plaintiff’s deliberate indifference claim. , 884 F.3d at

25

1296-97. And since Officer Muhammad did not truly raise a failure to state a

claim argument as to this claim, ( Officer Muhammad’s Mot. to Dismiss, at

7-9), the claim may proceed, and his Motion to Dismiss [Doc. 23] is due to be

denied as to the deliberate indifference claim.

ii. Violation of Ministerial Duties under State Law – Count

IV

In Count IV, the Plaintiff alleges that Officer Muhammad committed a

constitutional violation under Ga. Const. Art. I, § I, ¶¶ I & II based on his

failure to conduct his ministerial duties during the hour of Walker’s death;

namely, for failing to perform a visual welfare check of 7North every 30

minutes in accordance with the Fulton County Sheriff’s Office’s policies.

(Suppl. Compl. ¶¶ 233-240). The Plaintiff does not identify what state law she

seeks to bring this claim under, but given the reference to the Georgia

Constitution, it appears that she seeks to bring the state law equivalent of a

§ 1983 claim.

The Georgia Court of Appeals recently reiterated its longstanding

precedent that “Georgia law contains no equivalent to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which

gives a claim against a state officer individually for certain unconstitutional

acts . . . [b]ased on this authority, there is no viable private cause of action

against [an officer] for his alleged constitutional violations.” ,

369 Ga. App. 282, 286-87 (2023) (citing , 222 Ga. App. 868,

871 (1996) (quotation marks omitted). The Plaintiff therefore fails to state a

26

claim against Officer Muhammad for any purported violation of his ministerial

duties. Accordingly, the Court will grant Officer Muhammad’s Motion to

Dismiss [Doc. 23] as to Count IV.

iii. Punitive Damages

The Plaintiff seeks punitive damages from Officer Muhammad based on

her deliberate indifference claim. Officer Muhammad argues that the Plaintiff

has not stated a claim for punitive damages because his actions of

acknowledging the tower officer’s call for help for Walker, responding within

minutes, and calling for medical assistance do not constitute willful or

malicious conduct. Officer Muhammad’s arguments miss the mark. The

conduct at issue in the Plaintiff’s deliberate indifference claim is not what

Officer Muhammad did after the attack on Walker was reported, it is the act

of leaving 7North unattended. This conduct is what must be “motivated by evil

motive or intent or . . . involve[] reckless or callous indifference to the federally

protected rights of others” in order for a punitive damages claim to lie.

, 818 Fed. App’x 923, 931 (11th Cir. 2020) (citing , 461

U.S. 30 (1983)). Viewing the facts in the Plaintiff’s favor, it is plausible that

Officer Muhammad’s act of leaving 7North unattended constituted reckless or

callous indifference to Walker’s right to reasonable safety within the jail. That

is enough for the Plaintiff’s punitive damages claim to survive at this stage.

See , 556 U.S. at 678; , 550 U.S. at 556. Thus, the Court will

27

deny Officer Muhammad’s Motion to Dismiss [Doc. 23] as to the punitive

damages claim against him.9

c. Sheriff Labat – [Doc. 23]

The Plaintiff asserts claims against the Sheriff in his individual capacity

under § 1983 for deliberate indifference, supervisory liability arising from

Muhammad’s alleged failure to perform security rounds during the hour of Mr.

Walker’s death, and supervisory liability for failing to relocate Mr. Walker in

April 2022. She also seeks damages under Georgia law for wrongful death as

well as punitive damages. The Sheriff argues that the federal claims against

him are barred by qualified immunity and the state law claims are barred by

official immunity. (Sheriff’s Mot. to Dismiss, at 13-18). He also argues that the

Plaintiff fails to state any of her claims under Rule 12(b)(6) and that, because

all of her underlying claims are due to be dismissed, her claim for punitive

damages also fails. ( at 7-13, 18-19).

Because immunity entitles a defendant to “immunity from suit rather

than a mere defense to liability,” the Court is obliged to address the Sheriff’s

immunity arguments before addressing, if need be, his merits arguments.

, 502 U.S. 224, 227 (1991). The Plaintiff here has failed to

9 The Court notes that although the Plaintiff seeks damages against

Officer Muhammad for wrongful death under Georgia law, (Suppl. Compl.

¶¶ 270-71), he did not move to dismiss this claim. ( Officer

Muhammad’s Motion to Dismiss).

28

state any claims under § 1983 against the Sheriff because he is entitled to

qualified immunity under the facts alleged in the Supplemental Complaint on

the Plaintiff’s deliberate indifference and supervisory liability claims.

i. 14th Amendment Deliberate Indifference – Count II10

As an initial matter, the Plaintiff has not challenged the Sheriff’s

assertions that, for qualified immunity purposes, he was acting within the

scope of his discretionary authority in utilizing funds from the Inmate Welfare

Fund. , 884 F.3d at 1297. Thus, the burden shifts to the Plaintiff to

demonstrate that the facts alleged make out a violation of a clearly established

constitutional right. As pled, the Plaintiff’s allegations with regard to

this claim do not make out a violation of a clearly established constitutional

right. , 884 F.3d at 1296; , 711 F.2d at

994-95. She alleges that the Sheriff’s misuse of the Inmate Welfare Fund

diverted funds from being used to improve or staff the jail, which the Plaintiff

contends would have “arguably discouraged the knife attack on Dino Walker,”

and that the Sheriff’s misuse of the funds constitute deliberate indifference to

10 Walker was a pretrial detainee at the time of his death. (Suppl.

Compl. ¶ 46). Accordingly, these claims arise under the Fourteenth

Amendment rather than the Eighth Amendment.

, 402 F.3d 1092, 1115 (11th Cir. 2005).

Nonetheless, the standards applicable to deliberate indifference claims under

the Eighth Amendment are identical to those under the Fourteenth

Amendment. , 718 F.3d 1325, 1331-32 (11th Cir. 2013).

Thus, the Court will rely in part on cases addressing deliberate indifference

under the Eighth Amendment.

29

Walker’s constitutional rights. (Suppl. Compl. ¶¶ 169-70, 174, 201, 207-12,

218). She further alleges that the Sheriff’s misuse of the funds “was a direct

and proximate cause of the injuries, damages, and death” of Walker. ( ¶ 220).

The Plaintiff has not shown that the facts alleged make out a viable

deliberate indifference claim against the Sheriff. First, viewing the

Supplemental Complaint in the light most favorable to the Plaintiff, she does

allege that the Sheriff knew of a substantial risk of harm to Walker based on

the April 2022 attack he suffered in 7North. ( Suppl. Compl. ¶ 51).

However, under , this is not enough. makes clear that to state a

claim of deliberate indifference, the substantial risk must be “caused” by the

defendant’s “own conduct—again, his own actions or inactions.” , 106

F.4th at 1258. But the action the Plaintiff alleges the Sheriff took, misusing

the Inmate Welfare Fund, did not the risk of harm to Walker. Instead,

the most favorable reading of the Supplemental Complaint is that the Sheriff’s

misuse of the funds meant a failure to attempt to mitigate the already existing

risk to Walker’s personal safety posed by the deteriorating condition of the jail.

( Suppl. Compl. ¶¶ 165-67 (noting that the Sheriff took office in January

2021 and, in the same month, asserted to the County that the lack of funding

to improve the jail would prevent him from discharging his constitutional

duties)). Put another way, Walker (and other inmates at the jail) faced the

substantial risk of harm owed to the jail’s deteriorating condition “in the

30

abstract,” independently of the Sheriff’s alleged misuse of the funds. ,

106 F.4th at 1259 (interpreting Supreme Court precedent to say that the focus

is on “whether the official knew that his own conduct . . . put the inmate at

risk, not just whether the inmate confronted a risk in the abstract.”).

Moreover, even assuming the Sheriff’s alleged misuse of the Inmate

Welfare Fund caused a substantial risk of serious harm to Walker, the Plaintiff

has not adequately pleaded that the Sheriff’s conduct amounted to subjective

recklessness because, under the facts alleged, he was not aware that his

conduct put Walker at risk. For example, the Plaintiff alleges more than once

that the Sheriff was not aware of the ordinance and oversight committee

governing the use of the Inmate Welfare Fund and therefore was unaware that

he was misusing the funds under that ordinance, and he was simultaneously

fighting for funding from the County to make improvements to the jail. (

, Suppl. Compl. ¶¶ 119, 164, 166, 168, 179, 186, 197 (stating that “[s]ince

becoming Sheriff . . . Defendant Labat has made numerous efforts to persuade

[the County] to increase its funding to the Sheriff’s Office [to alleviate the

overcrowding, staffing, infrastructure, and violence issues]” and “Defendant

Labat acknowledged to a WSB-TV reporter that he had no knowledge of the

county ordinance governing the Inmate Welfare Fund until shortly before his

staff provided it to the local reporter.”)). The Plaintiff alleges that the WSB

interview during which the Sheriff learned of the ordinance and oversight

31

committee took place on October 31, 2023, long after Walker’s murder. Thus,

at least as the Plaintiff has pled it, the Sheriff was unaware he was misusing

the funds until that date, which negates any argument that he knew his

specific conduct put Walker at risk of substantial harm. Additionally, the

Plaintiff has not alleged that the Sheriff’s alleged misuse of the funds put

Walker specifically—as opposed to the inmate population generally—at

substantial risk of serious harm.

Finally, under the facts alleged in the Supplemental Complaint, the

Sheriff acted reasonably in trying to secure funding from the County to

improve the jail’s condition from the very beginning of his tenure. ,

106 F.4th at 1257 (noting that “a prison official who acts reasonably cannot be

found liable under the [8th Amendment].” (quotation marks, brackets, and

citation omitted)). While the knowledge component of the deliberate

indifference standard is subjective, the reasonable response component is

objective. , 966 F.3d 1265, 1270-71 (11th Cir. 2020). Given

that, as the Plaintiff pleads it, the Sheriff was unaware of his alleged misuse

of the Inmate Welfare Fund until after Walker’s death, his actions over the

course of nearly two years in meeting with the Board of Commissioners to

request funding, taking Commissioners on tours of the jail, and involving the

DOJ in an investigation of the jail in order to shed light on the critical

infrastructure issues it had were objectively reasonable. at 1271 (noting

32

that the objective reasonableness inquiry is judged based on the facts the

prison official knew at the time he responded to the risk of harm to the inmate).

In the Court’s view, at the time of Walker’s September 2022 death, the Sheriff

had been working in earnest to secure funding for much needed improvements

at the jail. In fact, the Plaintiff herself alleges that the Sheriff “over a period of

several years, repeatedly and vociferously decried the lack of Fulton

County-allocated funds for urgent jail priorities.” (Suppl. Compl ¶ 168). Under

these facts, even viewed in the light most favorable to the Plaintiff, the Court

cannot find that the Sheriff’s response was unreasonable.

For all of these reasons, the Plaintiff has failed to adequately allege that

the Sheriff acted with deliberate indifference to Walker’s constitutional rights.

Because she has failed to carry her burden of establishing a violation of

Walker’s constitutional rights, the Sheriff is entitled to qualified immunity as

to the Plaintiff’s deliberate indifference claim. , 884 F.3d at 1296. So, the

Court need not address the clearly established prong and the Plaintiff’s

arguments as to that prong. , 871 F.3d at 1208. Accordingly, the Court

will grant the Sheriff’s Motion to Dismiss [Doc. 24] as to Count II.

ii. Supervisory Liability of Officer Muhammad for Alleged

Failure to Perform Security Rounds – Count V

Next, the Plaintiff alleges that the Sheriff is liable for Officer

Muhammad’s act of leaving his post in 7North unattended on the night Walker

was murdered because, due to the Sheriff’s alleged failure to adequately staff

33

the jail, Officer Muhammad was the only officer assigned to 7North that night

and 7North is a notoriously violent area of the jail. (Suppl. Compl ¶¶ 244-45,

249-50). She contends that by failing to provide for the continuous presence of

detention officers in 7North when inmates were not in their cells, the Sheriff

personally participated in violating Walker’s constitutional rights. ( ¶ 249).

The Sheriff argues that he did not personally participate in any alleged

violation of Walker’s constitutional rights as that phrase is defined under the

applicable law. (Sheriff’s Mot. to Dismiss, at 10-11).

The standard for holding a supervisor liable for the actions of his

subordinate is “extremely rigorous.” , 124 F.4th 1273, 1288

(11th Cir. 2024). Supervisory officials are not liable under § 1983 for the

unconstitutional acts of their subordinates under theories of respondeat

superior or vicarious liability. , 746 F.3d 1288, 1298 (11th

Cir. 2014). “Therefore, a plaintiff seeking to hold a supervisor liable for

constitutional violations must show that the supervisor either participated

directly in the unconstitutional conduct or that a causal connection exists

between the supervisor’s actions and the alleged constitutional violation.”

The causal connection can be established in one of three ways: (1) “when a

history of widespread abuse puts the responsible supervisor on notice of the

need to correct the alleged deprivation, and he fails to do so;” (2) “when a

supervisor’s custom or policy results in deliberate indifference to constitutional

34

rights;” or (3) “when facts support an inference that the supervisor directed the

subordinates to act unlawfully or knew that the subordinates would act

unlawfully and failed to stop them from doing so.” (brackets and citation

omitted). “A custom is an unwritten practice that is applied consistently

enough to have the same effect as a policy with the force of law.”

, 510 F.3d 1312, 1332 (11th Cir. 2007). To constitute widespread

abuse, a deprivation must be “obvious, flagrant, rampant, and of continued

duration, rather than [an] isolated occurrence[].” , 746 F.3d at 1298

(quotation marks and citation omitted).

As previously discussed, the Plaintiff stated a plausible claim of

deliberate indifference against Officer Muhammad for leaving 7North

unattended during the hour of Walker’s death. Because the Plaintiff’s

supervisory liability claim against the Sheriff here is based on the same

underlying conduct, whether the Sheriff is entitled to qualified immunity turns

on whether the Plaintiff has adequately alleged a causal connection between

the Sheriff’s actions and Officer Muhammad’s act of leaving 7North

unattended.

Although not entirely clear, the Plaintiff appears to assert that the

Sheriff had a custom of understaffing the jail and that “[b]y not providing for

the continuous presence of detention officers on 7-North when detainees were

outside their cells, [the Sheriff] personally participated in the violation of

35

Walker’s constitutional rights.” (Suppl. Compl. ¶ 249). She also appears to

assert that the history of “widespread inmate-on-inmate abuse and violence”

put the Sheriff on notice of the need to ensure the detention units were

adequately staffed. ( ¶¶ 245-48). The Court finds that, under the facts

alleged, the Sheriff had a practice of assigning only one detention officer to a

housing unit even though he admitted that “three officers who constantly move

through the six housing zones” is the ideal staffing level. ( ¶¶ 204-05). She

further alleges that the Sheriff was aware that, with only one officer assigned

to a housing unit, if that officer left to attend to other matters, “nearly 200 out

of cell detainees in the housing zones, including on 7-North,” would be left

unattended.” ( ¶ 256). And she alleges that the Sheriff was “in charge of the

Jail [and] Jail staff.” (Suppl. Compl. ¶ 8). The problem with the Plaintiff’s

argument is that she alleged (and the Court found) that Officer Muhammad’s

act of leaving 7North unattended is what constituted deliberate indifference to

Walker’s rights, not the fact that Officer Muhammad was the sole detention

officer assigned to that unit. And the Sheriff’s alleged custom of regularly

staffing the housing units with one detention officer is not facially

unconstitutional; nor does the Plaintiff allege that it is. Thus, the Plaintiff has

to show that the Sheriff was aware that this staffing practice regularly resulted

in detention officers leaving the housing units unattended. , 510

F.3d at 1332 (“[S]upervisory liability for deliberate indifference based on the

36

implementation of a facially constitutional policy requires the plaintiff to show

that the defendant had actual or constructive notice of a flagrant, persistent

pattern of violations.). But the Plaintiff does not allege that detention officers

were regularly forced to leave their housing units unattended—in fact, she

does not identify any other instance where, as a result of the Sheriff’s alleged

practice of assigning only one detention officer to a housing unit, a detention

officer left his assigned housing unit unattended. Thus, the Plaintiff cannot

establish a causal connection sufficient to overcome qualified immunity on this

basis.

The Plaintiff’s widespread abuse argument also fails. Again, this

supervisory liability claim against the Sheriff hinges on Officer Muhammad’s

act of leaving 7North unattended. That is the act that the Court found

constituted deliberate indifference to Walker’s constitutional right to

reasonable safety. While widespread inmate-on-inmate violence in the jail is

certainly a serious problem under the facts alleged, the Plaintiff does not

explain how the existence of widespread violence would have put the Sheriff

on notice that Officer Muhammad (or any detention officer) might leave 7North

unattended. , 746 F.3d at 1298 (holding that to hold a supervisor

liable, the plaintiff must establish that the widespread abuse “puts the

responsible supervisor on notice of the need to correct the alleged deprivation”).

And to the extent the Plaintiff alleges that the Sheriff’s custom of understaffing

37

the housing units was itself a widespread abuse that resulted in Officer

Muhammad’s actions, the Plaintiff has failed to show that the staffing decision

resulted in a “flagrant, persistent pattern” of detention officers leaving their

housing units unattended. at 1301. This is because the Plaintiff has not

identified any other instances of a detention officer leaving his assigned

housing unit unattended as a result of understaffing.

For these reasons, the Plaintiff has not met the extremely rigorous

standard of demonstrating a plausible causal connection between any action

or inaction of the Sheriff and Officer Muhammad’s actions. , 124 F.4th

at 1288. Accordingly, the Sheriff is entitled to qualified immunity for the

alleged deliberate indifference of Officer Muhammad. , 746 F.3d at

1298 (holding that to hold a supervisor liable for the unconstitutional acts of

his subordinates, a plaintiff must demonstrate a causal connection between

the supervisor’s actions and the alleged constitutional violation); , 884

F.3d at 1296 (holding that to overcome qualified immunity, the plaintiff must

show that the facts alleged make out a constitutional violation). The Sheriff’s

Motion to Dismiss [Doc. 24] will be granted as to Count V.

iii. Supervisory Liability of Correctional Officers for Alleged

Failure to Relocate Walker in April 2022 – Count VI

The Plaintiff asserts a second supervisory liability claim against the

Sheriff on the grounds that jail staff failed to relocate Walker from 7North after

he was attacked by another inmate in April 2022. (Suppl. Compl. ¶¶ 262-68).

38

The Sheriff contends that the Plaintiff has failed to establish a widespread

abuse regarding failure to transfer inmates who have been attacked such that

he cannot be held liable for any failure to transfer Walker. (Sheriff’s Mot. to

Dismiss, at 10-11).

As an initial matter, the Plaintiff has not alleged any facts supporting

the existence of a custom or policy of failing to transfer inmates who have been

attacked, nor are there allegations that the Sheriff directed subordinates not

to transfer Walker after the attack. Thus, only the first avenue of establishing

a causal connection is at issue. The Court agrees with the Sheriff that the

Plaintiff has failed to allege facts presenting a widespread abuse with regard

to failing to transfer inmates. First, as the Sheriff points out, the Plaintiff does

not allege that Walker ever requested to be transferred after he was attacked.

Nor does the Plaintiff allege another incident where an inmate was attacked

at the jail and was not transferred away from his or her attacker. The Plaintiff

argues in response that her allegations of severe overcrowding and systemic

violence bridge the causal connection gap and that the widespread abuse here

“was the Sheriff squandering funds that could have been used to hire staff.”

(Pl.’s Resp. in Opp. to Sheriff’s Mot. to Dismiss, at 7). But the alleged

deprivation at issue here was the jail staff’s failure to transfer Walker, not the

generalized existence of unsafe conditions inside the jail. And without

allegations that other inmates were attacked and not subsequently

39

transferred, the facts here indicate that any failure to transfer Walker was an

“isolated occurrence” rather than another instance in an “obvious” or “flagrant”

history of constitutional violations. , 746 F.3d at 1298. Nor has

the Plaintiff explained how the Sheriff’s misuse of funds, which she alleges is

the widespread abuse at issue, caused the alleged failure to transfer Walker

after he was attacked. Therefore, because the Plaintiff has not adequately

alleged a causal connection between the Sheriff’s actions and the failure to

transfer Walker, the Sheriff is entitled to qualified immunity on this claim.

, 746 F.3d at 1298; , 884 F.3d at 1296. The Motion to Dismiss

[Doc. 24] will be granted as to Count VI.

iv. Damages

Because the Plaintiff’s substantive claims against the Sheriff under

§ 1983 are barred, her corresponding punitive damages claim against him is

due to be dismissed as well. , 919 F.2d 665, 671 (11th

Cir. 1990) (noting that punitive damages may be imposed in § 1983 cases only

if the defendant “has acted willfully and with gross disregard for the plaintiff’s

rights.”). Because qualified immunity bars the Plaintiff’s substantive claims

against the Sheriff, she necessarily fails to show that this standard has been

met.

With regard to the Plaintiff’s claim for wrongful death damages, the

Sheriff asserted the same argument as the County that the ante litem notice

40

requirement in O.C.G.A. § 36-11-1 was not met here. For the same reasons as

explained , Section II. B. a. ii., that argument fails because the ante litem

notice here was timely. The Sheriff also asserts that he is entitled to official

immunity under Georgia law as to this claim. Under Georgia law, official

immunity protects “public officers and employees for discretionary actions

taken within the scope of their official authority, and done without willfulness,

malice or corruption.” , 367 Ga. App. 411, 414 (2023). The Sheriff

argues that all of the actions the Plaintiff challenges were discretionary actions

because they were undertaken as part of his official duties as Sheriff. (Sheriff’s

Mot. to Dismiss, at 17-18). The Plaintiff does not raise any argument against

the application of official immunity. (See generally Pl.’s Resp. in Opp. to

Sheriff’s Mot. to Dismiss). Accordingly, the Court finds the Sheriff is entitled

to official immunity against the Plaintiff’s claim for wrongful death damages,

so the Sheriff’s Motion to Dismiss [Doc. 24] will be granted as to the Plaintiff’s

damages claims.

III. Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, the Defendant Fulton County’s Motion to

Dismiss [Doc. 22] is GRANTED; the Defendant Curt Muhammad’s Motion to

Dismiss [Doc. 23] is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part; and the

Defendant Patrick Labat’s Motion to Dismiss [Doc. 24] is GRANTED. The

Plaintiff’s Motions to Supplement and for Clarification [Docs. 36, 37] are

41

GRANTED. The Plaintiffs Motion to Take Judicial Notice [Doc. 45] is

GRANTED in part and DENIED in part. The Clerk is directed to docket the

Plaintiff's Supplemental Complaint [Doc. 36].

SO ORDERED, this 28th day of August, 2025.

A termeoa. WA Ferre g_

THOMAS W. THRASH, JR. ~

United States District Judge

42