Abramowitz v. Lake

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

MICHAEL ABRAMOWITZ, et al.,

Plaintiffs,

Vv. Case No. 1:25-cv-887-RCL

KARI LAKE, et al.,

Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

This dispute arises from yet another twist in the saga of the U.S. Agency for Global Media’s

efforts to dial back the operations of Voice of America contrary to statutory requirements. After

first being placed on administrative leave, then having his responsibilities as director reassigned

to another employee, and ultimately refusing an instruction to resign the directorship and accept

reassignment to North Carolina, Voice of America Director Michael Abramowitz was told he

would be subject to formal termination from Voice of America beginning August 31, 2025. He

contends that the foregoing actions are contrary to law, and violate the Administrative Procedure

Act, because the director of Voice of America “may only be . . . removed if such action has been

approved by a majority vote” of the International Broadcasting Advisory Board, 22 U.S.C.

§ 6205(e)(1), which has been without quorum since January and, therefore, has taken no such

action to date. Plaintiff Abramowitz has therefore filed the instant Motion for Partial Summary

Judgement, see ECF No. 49, and requests a permanent injunction barring Defendants Kari Lake

and the U.S. Agency for Global Media from removing him as Voice of America’s director without

the consent of the International Broadcasting Advisory Board. Following a slew of threshold

arguments why the Court should decline to reach the merits, Defendants raise just one defense as

to why the Court should decline to issue an injunction: they call upon the Court to declare that

§ 6205(e)(1) violates the separation of powers by unduly interfering with the President’s authority

to remove inferior officers. Because Supreme Court precedent on the President’s removal power

directly contradicts their position, the Court cannot do so. The motion will be GRANTED.

I. BACKGROUND

The law and facts underlying this dispute have been recounted by this Court in earlier

opinions. See, e.g., Widakuswara v. Lake, 779 F. Supp. 3d 10, 19-22 (D.D.C. 2025). The Court

will therefore presume familiarity with the broader circumstances of the case and will recite only

the key law and facts giving rise to this motion.

a. Relevant Law

The United States Agency for Global Media (“USAGM”) is an independent agency of the

Executive Branch. See 22 U.S.C. § 6203(a); 5 U.S.C. § 104. USAGM is led by a Chief Executive

Officer (“CEO”), who is appointed by the President subject to the advice and consent of the Senate.

22 U.S.C. § 6203(b)(1). The CEO “supervise[s] all broadcasting activities” undertaken by

USAGM and its subsidiaries. Id. § 6204(a)(1). That includes those activities undertaken by Voice

of America (“VOA”).

The International Broadcasting Advisory Board (the “Advisory Board” or “the Board”) is

a seven-member panel tasked with governance and oversight of USAGM and its networks. Id.

§ 6205(a), (d). The Advisory Board is independent from USAGM. 22 U.S.C. § 6205(a)

(providing that the Board “shall exist within the executive branch” as an independent establishment

(citing 5 U.S.C. § 104)). Six members of the Board are specially appointed for that role by the

President, subject to Senate advice and consent. Jd. § 6205(b)(1)(A). No more than three of those

members “may be affiliated with the same political party.” Jd. § 6205(b)(3). These six members

serve four-year terms that are not subject to renewal, id. § 6205(b)(4)(A), and must be

“distinguished in the fields of public diplomacy, mass communications, print, broadcast or digital

media, or foreign affairs,” id. § 6205(c)(2).

The Advisory Board thus bears many statutory hallmarks of a traditional, party-balanced

multimember commission of experts—yet Congress still subjected the Advisory Board to

significant presidential supervision. The President selects a chairperson from among the six

members just described, id. § 6205(b)(2), and the Secretary of State, a member of the President’s

cabinet, is the Board’s ex officio seventh member, id. § 6205(b)(1)(B), (b)(4)(B). Perhaps most

critically, the statute contains no language limiting the grounds for which the President may

remove members of the Advisory Board; they are subject to removal without cause. The

possibility of removal ensures that the Board’s authority remains “subject to the ongoing

supervision and control of the elected President.” Seila L. LLC v. Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau,

591 U.S. 197, 224 (2020).

But though the Board is not independent from the President, it does enjoy independence

from the CEO of USAGM. Congress has therefore empowered the Board, when necessary, to

serve as a check on the CEO. When Congress enacted the Voice of America charter in 1976, it

mandated that the network be “accurate, objective, and comprehensive,” and “present a balanced

and comprehensive projection of significant American thought and institutions” to the World. 22

U.S.C. § 6202(c)(1){2). So when a USAGM CEO unilaterally fired the heads of several networks

in June 2020, a bipartisan group of seven senators expressed “deep concern” that the removal of

the network heads threatened the networks’ “independence” and jeopardized their ability to “act

as a bulwark against disinformation through credible journalism.” Letter from Sens. Rubio,

Graham, Moran, Collins, Durbin, Leahy, and Van Hollen to Michael Pack, CEO, USAGM (July

1, 2020), at 1. The senators stated that the “credibility and independence of these networks” was

“required by law.” Jd. Consequently, Congress acted to shore up the statutory basis for such

independence by curtailing the authority of the USAGM CEO to unilaterally fire networks heads

without the input of the Board. Now, under current law, the director of Voice of America “may

only be. . . removed if such action has been approved by a majority vote of the Advisory Board.”

22 U.S.C. § 6205(e)(1). A five-member majority of the Board also “may unilaterally remove any

such head of network or grantee network” after “consulting with the Chief Executive Officer.” Td.

§ 6205(e)(2).

b. Key Facts

The following facts are undisputed. Michael Abramowitz was appointed as the director of

Voice of America on April 19, 2024, and the Advisory Board unanimously approved his

appointment. Statement of Undisputed Material Facts {{] 1-2, Ex. 2 to Mot., ECF No. 59-2

(“SUMF”).

In January 2025, President Trump fired six members of the Advisory Board, save for the

Secretary of State, and none of those members has since been replaced. Jd. {J 10. Then, on March

14, 2025, President Donald Trump issued an executive order directing the “eliminat[ion]” of “the

non-statutory components and functions” of USAGM “to the maximum extent consistent with

applicable law. Exec. Order No. 14,238, 90 Fed. Reg. 13043 (Mar. 14, 2025). As the Court has

described in its prior rulings, the order triggered a flood of activity within USAGM to dial back

the agency’s operations. See Widakuswara, 779 F. Supp. 3d at 20-22. Despite the Board’s

inquorate status, USAGM has since that time taken several steps to remove Michael Abramowitz

as director of Voice of America.

On March 15, 2025, Abramowitz, along with approximately 1,300 other Voice of America

employees, were placed on administrative leave “until further notice.” See Widakuswara, 779

F. Supp. 3d at 20-22. By the beginning of August 2025, the leadership of USAGM had trained

their attention on the official removal of Abramowitz from Voice of America. Like the other facts

recounted herein, the following timeline is not in dispute:

e July 8: Abramowitz met via videoconference with several members of USAGM

leadership, including the defendants. SUMF 45. Abramowitz was informed that

USAGM intended to reassign him to VOA’s transmitting station in Greenville,

North Carolina. Jd. Later in the day, then-acting CEO Morales sent Abramowitz

a memorandum titled “Notice of Directed Reassignment” (the “Reassignment

Memo”) indicating that VOA Director Michael Abramowitz would be reassigned

to arole as Chief Management Officer in Greenville, North Carolina effective

September 6, 2025. Reassignment Memo at 1, Attach. A to Abramowitz Decl.,

ECF No. 59-1; see also SUMF 46. The Reassignment Memo stated that if

Abramowitz did not accept the Greenville reassignment by July 29, 2025, he

would be removed as director of Voice of America. Jd.

e July 23: Abramowitz filed the instant motion.

e August 1: After concluding that Abramowitz had not accepted the reassignment,

USAGM Senior Advisor John Zadrozny sent a letter to Abramowitz indicating

that he will be removed from his position effective “no earlier than 30 days from

the date [Abramowitz] receive[d] the notice,” which would be August 31 7

Attach. A to Abramowitz Decl. at 1, ECF No. 64-1 (“Removal Letter”). The

Removal Letter explained that Abramowitz’s refusal to accept reassignment

“warrant[ed] removal from [his] position.” Jd. Kari Lake, who was by then the

acting CEO of USAGM, had made the decision to remove him. See id. at 5.

As of the most recent filing related to this motion, the Advisory Board remains inquorate and, thus,

has not taken action to ratify or refuse Abramowitz’s removal. SUMF 10-11.

c. Procedural History

This case originated with the filing of a Complaint and a TRO/PI motion on March 26,

2025, seeking emergency injunctive relief to halt actions taken in compliance with Executive

Order 14,238, including the placement of Abramowitz and other USAGM employees and

contractors on administrative leave. See Compl., ECF No. 1; Mot. for Temporary Restraining

Order/Preliminary Injunction, ECF No. 4.

1 Abramowitz declares that he received the letter on August 1. See Abramowitz Decl. {] 2, ECF No. 64-1.

Following briefing and a hearing on the PI motion and the related PI request in

Widakuswara,2 the Court granted a preliminary injunction ordering USAGM to (i) “restore all

USAGM employees and personal service contractors who were terminated pursuant to .

Executive Order 14238 ... to their status prior to March 14, 2025” and (ii) to “restore VOA

programming such that USAGM fulfills its statutory mandate that VOA ‘serve as a consistently

reliable and authoritative source of news.’” Preliminary Injunction at 3, ECF No. 29. This relief

mirrored part of the emergency relief the Court granted in Widakuswara. Id. The defendants

appealed to the D.C. Circuit and obtained a stay of the order to restore USAGM employees to their

prior status, which the en banc court left in place later that month. See Abramowitz v. Lake, No.

25-5145, Doc. No. 2117911 (D.C. Cir. May 28, 2025) (en banc). But the defendants did not appeal

the injunction to the extent it ordered compliance with USAGM’s statutory mandate.

The instant summary judgment proceedings began in July. On July 23, Abramowitz moved

for partial summary judgment on Counts I amd IV of his complaint, which raise claims under the

Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”) and the ultra vires doctrine, respectively, seeking

permanent injunctive relief barring the defendants from removing him as the director of Voice of

America without the consent of the Board. Mot. for Partial Summary J. (“Mot.”), ECF No. 59;

see also Mem. in Support of Mot., ECF No. 59-1 (“Mem.”). On August 4, Abramowitz informed

the Court that he had received the Removal Letter. See Notice of Termination Letter, ECF No. 64.

The defendants responded in opposition to summary judgment on August 5. Response to Mot. for

Partial Summary J., ECF No. 65 (“Opp.”). Abramowitz replied on August 12. Reply, ECF No.

68. The Court held a motion hearing on August 25, and the motion is now ripe.

2 The Widakuswara case originated in the Southern District of New York. After Judge Octken granted a TRO in

Widakuswara, the Abramowitz plaintiffs withdrew their TRO request and only pursued a PI. See Preliminary

Injunction at 3.

Il. LEGAL STANDARDS

A court “shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine

dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R.

Civ. P. 56(a). Partial summary judgment may be granted when a party is so entitled as to “part of

[a] claim or defense.” Jd. The burden is on the moving party to demonstrate that there is an

“absence of a genuine issue of material fact” in dispute. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317,

323 (1986). In this case, the parties’ filings show “[t]here is no serious dispute of fact,” so the

Court “must allow summary judgment” for Abramowitz unless the defendants show that he is not

entitled to relief a matter of law. Sherley v. Sebelius, 689 F.3d 776, 780 (D.C. Cir. 2012).

I. ANALYSIS

Before turning to the merits and the availability of relief, the Court addresses several

threshold issues raised by the defendants. The defendants contend that Abramowitz’s claim is not

ripe because he has not yet been formally removed; that Congress stripped the Court of jurisdiction

over his claim by channeling federal employment disputes to the Merit System Protection Board

(“MSPB”) through the Civil Service Reform Act (“CSRA”); and that his motion is improper

because his pleadings did not give fair notice that he might challenge his termination.

a. Claims related to Abramowitz’s removal are ripe.

Because Abramowitz’s removal has not yet taken effect, the defendants contend that his

claim is not ripe under both constitutional and prudential ripeness doctrines. See Opp. at 5-8.

“The ripeness doctrine generally deals with when a federal court can or should decide a

case.” Am. Petroleum Inst. v. EPA, 683 F.3d 382, 386 (D.C. Cir. 2012). The constitutional

dimension of ripeness “is subsumed into the Article III requirement” that the plaintiff present “an

injury-in-fact that is ‘imminent’ or ‘certainly impending.” Jd. (quoting Nat'l Treasury Emps.

Union v. United States, 101 F.3d 1423, 1427-28 (D.C. Cir. 1996)); see also Clapper v. Amnesty

Int’l USA, 568 U.S. 398, 411-12 (2013) (holding that to be cognizable, a future injury cannot be

“speculative” or “conjectural’’).

“Even if a case is ‘constitutionally ripe,’ . . . there may also be ‘prudential reasons for

refusing to exercise jurisdiction.’” Am. Petroleum Inst., 683 F.3d at 386 (quoting Nat'l Park Hosp.

Ass'n v. Dep’t of Interior, 538 U.S. 803, 808 (2003)). To assess prudential ripeness, a Court

evaluates “‘the fitness of the issues for judicial decision’ and the extent to which withholding a

decision will cause ‘hardship to the parties.’” Jd. at 387 (quoting Abbott Labs. v. Gardner, 387

U.S. 136, 149 (1967)).

There can be no doubt that Abramowitz’s request meets the constitutional test for ripeness

because the contents of the Removal Letter unambiguously signal that his formal removal became

certain after he declined the Greenville reassignment. For example, the Removal Letter

characterizes the earlier Reassignment Memo as having “stated in no uncertain terms that, should

[Abramowitz] decline to accept the reassignment, [he] would be subject to remova » Removal

Letter at 2. And it further says that the prior memo also “explicitly stated that failure to accept the

reassignment would subject [Abramowitz] to removal under adverse action procedures.” Id. at 4.

The defendants glaringly fail to address the Removal Letter in their ripeness argument.

Ignoring its contents, they suppose that “contingent future events” remain between the status quo

and Abramowitz’s potential removal. Opp. at 5. But the Removal Letter specifically rules out all

other courses of action. Ina section of the Removal Letter titled “[t]he adequacy and effectiveness

of alternative sanctions to deter such conduct in the future by the employee or others,” the letter

states an unequivocal intent to remove Abramowitz:

You were clearly told [in the Reassignment Memo] that declining

the reassignment could lead to removal from your position, and

despite that, you chose not to accept the reassignment to Greenville.

Because of that, a lesser action, like a warning, a letter of

reprimand, or suspension would not be effective. Your decision

shows that you were not willing to follow through on a critical

directive, even knowing the possible outcome. Under these

circumstances, removal is the most appropriate and effective course

of action. I find that the charge [of declining reassignment] on its

own is serious enough to warrant removal and there is no other

adequate or alternative sanction for this charge.

Removal Letter at 5 (emphases added). The Removal Letter did not leave Abramowitz’s

termination up to “guesswork” or “speculation.” Trump v. New York, 592 U.S. 125, 131-32 (2020)

(cited in Opp. at 5-6). His removal is certainly impending.

Nor do prudential considerations counsel against review. The defendants do not even

attempt to identify a reason to doubt “the fitness of the issue[] for judicial decision.” Am.

Petroleum Inst., 683 F.3d at 387. The fitness of an issue for judicial review “depends on whether

it is purely legal, whether consideration of the issue would benefit from a more concrete setting,

and whether the agency’s action is sufficiently final.” Jd. (quoting Atl. States Legal Found. v.

EPA, 325 F.3d 281, 284 (D.C. Cir. 2003). “A purely legal claim in the context of a facial challenge

... is presumptively reviewable.” Sanchez v. Off: of the State Superintendent of Educ., 959 F.3d

1121, 1125 (D.C. Cir. 2020) (Garland, J.) (quoting Nat’l Ass’n of Home Builders v. U.S. Army

Corp. of Eng’rs, 440 F.3d 459, 464 (D.C. Cir. 2006)). And the defendants confirmed at oral

argument that they intend to fire Abramowitz without the consent of the Advisory Board. So

waiting for the actual removal of Abramowitz would not make the purely legal merits question

before the Court—whether the removal structure for the director of Voice of America is

constitutional—any more amenable to resolution following Abramowitz’s actual removal. Cf

Nat’! Park Hosp. Ass’n v. Dep’t of the Interior, 538 U.S. 803, 812 (2003) (holding that addressing

a “purely legal [question]” about whether the Contract Disputes Act covered National Park Service

concession contracts should “await a concrete dispute about a particular ... contract”). The

“legality vel non” of such action will not “become clearer in a concrete setting.” Nat'l Ass’n of

Home Builders, 440 F.3d at 465.

The fact that this issue is fit for decision now also means that defendants begin their

hardship argument in a defensive posture. If “there are no significant agency or judicial interests

in militating in favor of delay,” such as when a case presents a pure question of law, “lack of

hardship” will rarely “tip the balance against judicial review.” Sanchez, at 1125 n.2 (quoting Nat ]

Ass’n of Home Builders, 440 F.3d at 465).

In any case, the defendants’ arguments are grounded in inapposite caselaw and are

unpersuasive. The defendants principally cite the injury-weighing analyses contained in D.C.

Circuit and Supreme Court decisions on applications for stays pending appeal of permanent

injunctions barring the removal of principal officers. See Opp. at 7 (first citing Dellinger v.

Bessent, 2025 WL 887518, at *4 (D.C. Cir. Mar. 10, 2025); then citing Trump v. Wilcox, 145 S.

Ct. 1415, 1415 (2025); and then citing Trump v. Boyle, 145 S. Ct. 2653, 2654 (2025)); see also

Nken v. Holder, 556 U.S. 418, 434 (2009) (asking, in relevant part, “whether the applicant will be

irreparably injured absent a stay” and whether a stay would “substantially injure the other parties

interested in the proceeding”). Weighing the hardship the government might suffer without such

a stay, important as such harms may be, is for the Court’s appellate overseers to decide should

defendants take an appeal. Before this Court, those harms offer no basis to withhold judgment on

the merits in the first instance, if Abramowitz is so entitled.

b. The Civil Service Reform Act does not strip the Court of jurisdiction

over this dispute.

District courts “have jurisdiction over civil actions arising under the Constitution,” but

Congress may alter that jurisdiction “by establishing an alternative statutory scheme for

10

administrative and judicial review.” AFGE AFL-CIO v. Trump, 929 F.3d 748, 754 (D.C. Cir.

2019). “Congress of course may do so explicitly, providing in so many words that district court

jurisdiction will yield,” but it “also may do so implicitly, by specifying a different method to

resolve claims about agency action.” Axon Enter., Inc. v. FTC, 598 U.S. 175, 185 (2023). In this

case, the defendants contend that the Civil Service Reform Act (“CSRA”), which provides for

administrative review through the Merit Systems Protection Board (““MSPB”) of government

employment-related claims, strips the Court of subject-matter jurisdiction over this case.

Although the Court sees the issue as less clear-cut than Abramowitz does, the Court ultimately

concludes that it has jurisdiction notwithstanding the CSRA.

Whether the creation of an alternative administrative claim structure, like the CSRA,

implicitly precludes federal district-court jurisdiction turns on whether “Congress intended that a

litigant proceed exclusively through a statutory scheme of administrative and judicial review.”

Jarkesy v. SEC, 803 F.3d 9, 15 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (citation omitted). The two-step framework for

ascertaining such intent emanates from the Supreme Court’s decision in Thunder Basin Coal Co.

v. Reich, 510 U.S. 200 (1994). The inquiry under Thunder Basin asks, first, whether “such intent

is ‘fairly discernible in the statutory scheme,’” and, second, whether “the litigants claims are ‘of

the type Congress intended to be reviewed within [the] statutory structure.’” Jarkesy, 803 F.3d at

15 (quoting Thunder Basin, 510 U.S. at 207, 212).

At step one, the defendants observe that when applying the Thunder Basin test, the

Supreme Court has inferred from “the CSRA’s text, structure, and purpose” that the statute

“establishe[s] a comprehensive system for reviewing personnel action taken against federal

employees.” Elgin v. Dep’t of Treasury, 567 U.S. 1, 5, 10 (2012) (citation and internal quotation

marks omitted). The Court agrees that the holding in Elgin is both binding and conclusive as to

11

the step one inquiry and requires the Court to assume that Congress intended to preclude federal-

employment suits “in the mine-run of cases.” Jarkesy, 803 F.3d at 16.

That does not mean, however, that the CSRA’s “statutory review scheme . . . necessarily

extend[s] to every claim concerning” the removal a federal officer. See Axon, 598 U.S. at 185.

Rather, as explained above, once the Court has concluded that Congress created a “comprehensive

review process,” the question remains “whether the particular claims brought were ‘of the type

Congress intended to be reviewed within this statutory structure.’” Id. at 186 (quoting Thunder

Basin, 510 U.S. at 212). Three considerations guide that inquiry: first, whether precluding

jurisdiction might “foreclose all meaningful judicial review”; second, whether the claim is “wholly

collateral to [the] statutory review provisions”; and third, whether the claims fall “outside the

agency’s expertise.” Id. at (quoting Thunder Basin, 510 U.S. at 212-13).

Although it poses a tricky practical dilemma, the first consideration favors USAGM:

channeling Abramowitz’s claim through the MSPB would not foreclose all meaningful judicial

review. The defendants contend that because the CSRA allows an eventual appeal to the Federal

Circuit, Abramowitz could “obtain review of [his] . . . claim[] through an appeal” in federal court,

even to the extent it implicates a dispute over the separation of powers. Axon, 598 U.S. at 190—

91: see also Elgin, 567 U.S. at 21 (explaining that appeals to the Federal Circuit allowed

“meaningful review” of constitutional claims “within the CSRA scheme”). Abramowitz responds

that the recent removal of MSPB members has rendered the MSPB (like the Advisory Board)

inquorate, and he contends that the “lack of quorum in the MSPB raise[s] serious question as to

whether the CSRA’s adjudicatory scheme continues to function as intended.” Mem. at 9 (quoting

Nat'l Ass'n of Immigr. Judges v. Owen, 139 F.4th 293, 305 (4th Cir. 2025)). Yet he cites no

authority, binding or otherwise, compelling the conclusion that the lack of a quorum factors into

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the Thunder Basin analysis—an omission that is notable given that the MSPB similarly lacked a

quorum from 2017 to 2022. See Jordan Ascher, Responding to a Quorumless Merit Systems

Protection Board, Yale J. on Reg. Notice & Comment Blog (May 23, 2025).

The second consideration favors Abramowitz: his removal challenge is “wholly collateral”

to the CSRA scheme. Whether a dispute is “collateral” requires analysis of the “nature of the

claim” and “what [the dispute is] about.” Axon, 598 U.S. at 194. The defendants seize on the

Supreme Court’s acknowledgment that a “challenge to removal is precisely the type of personnel

action regularly adjudicated by the MSPB and the Federal Circuit within the CSRA scheme.”

Elgin, 567 U.S. at 22. Yet Abramowitz’s claim is vastly different from the removal claim at issue

in Elgin. There, federal employees challenged their termination under a policy that mandated such

firing if an employee had willfully dodged registration in the Selective Service. Id. at 7. But

Abramowitz is not a mine-run federal employee; he is among a handful of USAGM network

directors to whom the law provides a specialized statutory removal framework. Nor does

Abramowitz dispute the defendants’ proffered reasons for firing him or challenge an underlying

USAGM employment policy akin to the Selective Service registration penalty in Elgin. Rather,

Abramowitz raises a “discrete” question: whether his termination is contrary to the structure of

USAGM and Voice of America—namely, the requirement to gain the Board’s approval. Axon,

598 U.S. at 194 (issue may be collateral if it “involves something discrete” and “independent of

the cause itself” (citation omitted)).

What’s more, that discrete question necessarily raises the issue—and indeed, the

defendants’ sole merits defense—of whether Congress’s structuring of the appointment and

removal of the director of Voice of America runs afoul of constitutional separation of powers. And

cases questioning the constitutionality of such statutes are routinely held to be “collateral” to

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agency review schemes, since they ultimately turn on the constitutionality of “the structure . . . of

> 66

an agency.” Axon, 598 U.S. at 189. Because Abramowitz is challenging the defendants’ “power

to proceed” with his termination at all, Axon, 598 U.S. at 192, not the substantive rationale

underlying his termination, cf. Elgin, 567 U.S. at 22, his challenge is collateral to the CSRA review

scheme.

Finally, Abramowitz’s claims do not “involve ‘threshold’ and other ‘questions unique to

the employment context’ that ‘fall[] squarely within the MSPB’s expertise,’” or, as already noted,

dispute the “substantive decision” to fire him. See Axon, 598 U.S. at 187-89. And the Supreme

Court has repeatedly made clear that challenges to agency structure raise “standard questions of

administrative law, which the courts are at no disadvantage in answering.” Free Enter. Fund v.

Pub. Co. Acct. Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 477, 491 (2010); see also Axon, 598 U.S. at 194 (On that

issue, Free Enterprise Fund could hardly be clearer.”). The MSPB has no “special” knowledge

“about the separation of powers” questions that undergird Abramowitz’s dispute. Axon, 598 U.S.

at 194. The lack of agency expertise weighs in favor of Abramowitz.

On balance, these considerations indicate that Congress did not intend to channel

Abramowitz’s removal claim through the CSRA scheme. When the Thunder Basin factors “point

in different directions,” the “ultimate question is . .. whether the statutory review scheme, though

exclusive where it applies, reaches the claim in question.” Jd. at 186. Here, the fact that the CSRA

scheme might not entirely foreclose judicial review is of less consequence to the Court’s analysis

than the plain fact that the MSPB has no comparative advantage when it comes to the separation

of powers issue at the heart of this dispute. See id. at 186 (explaining that factors two and three

“sive the agency a heightened role in the matters it customarily handles, and can apply distinctive

knowledge to”). The Court has jurisdiction.

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c. The Complaint gives fair notice that Abramowitz would challenge his

removal.

To ensure “that defendants receive fair notice of the claim being asserted,” Lee v. Nat'l

Elec. Contractor Ass’n, 322 F. Supp. 3d 43, 44 (D.D.C. 2018), Rule 8(a) requires a complaint to

provide “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.”

Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a). The defendants contend Abramowitz “raises a fundamentally new claim” in

his motion—by seeking a permanent injunction barring his termination without the Board’s

approval—that was not addressed in the Complaint. Opp. at 8. As such, they contend that

Abramowitz’s motion improperly “raise[s] new claims at the summary judgment stage.” 7. aylor

y. Mills, 892 F. Supp. 2d 124, 137 (D.D.C. 2012). The defendants say that Abramowitz would

need to file an amended complaint to bring a claim predicated on his purported firing. The Court

concludes that the factual allegations and the associated causes of action reasonably put the

defendants on notice that the efforts to remove Abramowitz as director would lead him to move

for relief in this case.

First, giving a reasonable construction to the Complaint, Abramowitz’s allegations placed

the defendants on fair notice that this suit seeks, in part, to prevent USAGM from removing him

as Voice of America director, whether constructively (by placing him on administrative leave and

reassigning his duties to others) or through formal termination. As the defendants acknowledge,

the Complaint identifies the statutory framework governing the removal of the Voice of America

director and challenges the lawfulness thereunder of Abramowitz’s placement on administrative

leave as part of a wider effort to wind down the agency. In particular, Abramowitz alleged that:

e “The 2021 amendments [to the International Broadcasting Act] require that the

[Advisory Board] approve by a majority vote the appointment and removal of the

heads of the broadcast entities, who are selected or dismissed by the CEO of

USAGM. 22 U.S.C. § 6205(e)(1).” Compl. { 57.

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e “Congress empowered the bipartisan and multi-member [Advisory Board] to

approve the appointment and removals of the heads of U.S. international

broadcasting agencies. This decision forges consensus in who should lead these

vital entities and protects their directors from arbitrary removal.” Jd. {| 85.

e “Congress deliberately safeguarded the VOA head’s position, recognizing that

VOA’s mission—to provide a ‘consistently reliable and authoritative’ news

source... could make it a target for those who oppose its journalistic content and

mission.” Id. { 86.

e Placing Abramowitz on administrative leave “deprived Plaintiff Michael

Abramowitz of his ability to continue directing ... VOA.” Id. 4 90.

These allegations placed the defendants on fair notice that Abramowitz’s challenge to the actions

taken in response to Executive Order 14,238 included a challenge to his placement on

administrative leave. Such allegations were not so “vague or ambiguous” that the defendants

would be unable to infer that Abramowitz would dispute his formal removal (if it violated statutory

requirements) for the same reason. Adm’rs of the Tulane Educ. Fund v. Ipsen Pharma SAS, 771

F. Supp. 2d 32, 42 (D.D.C. 2011) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(e)).

It is true, of course, that the most the Complaint says about Abramowitz’s potential removal

is related to his placement on administrative leave, since that was the extent of USAGM’s conduct

at that time. But that does not foreclose seeking partial summary judgment based, in part, on post-

pleading factual developments. See Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 846 & n.9 (1994)

(permitting a plaintiff, at summary judgment, to “rely, in the district court’s discretion, on

developments that postdate the pleadings and pretrial motions, as the defendants may rely on such

developments to establish that the [plaintiff] is not entitled to an injunction”). If Abramowitz

sought relief on a “categorically distinct” factual or legal theory, he would perhaps be obligated to

file a supplemental pleading. See Taylor, 892 F. Supp. 2d at 137. But here, the core factual and

legal predicate undergirding the Complaint is materially identical to what he now presses on

summary judgment.

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Second, Abramowitz seeks partial summary judgment on precisely the same causes of

action that he raises in the Complaint. Specifically, Abramowitz moves for partial judgment on

Count IV, alleging USAGM has acted ultra vires, or alternatively on Count I, which seeks relief

under the APA. The fact that he is not attempting to present a new cause of action or legal theory

makes this case unlike those cited in the defendants’ opposition, where the plaintiff sought to

survive summary judgment under a separate statutory provision than the provision cited in his

Complaint. Cf, e.g., id. at 137 (granting summary judgment to the defendants because the plaintiff

opposed summary judgment on hostile-work-environment grounds but had only pleaded a claim

under “the anti-retaliation provision of Title VII”). The Complaint gave the defendants notice of

what Abramowitz’s “claim is and the grounds upon which it rests,” so their Rule 8(a) challenge

must fail. Ipsen Pharma, 771 F. Supp. 2d at 42 (citation omitted).

d. The removal of Abramowitz is plainly contrary to law.

The foregoing brings the Court to the merits of Abramowitz’s claim. Abramowitz asks for

judgment on either Count I, which seeks relief under the APA, or Count IV, which seeks ultra

vires relief. Because the Court concludes that relief is available under the APA, ultra vires relief

is not. See Fed. Express Corp. v. U.S. Dep’t of Comm., 39 F.4th 756, 763 (D.C. Cir. 2022)

(explaining that ultra vires relief is available only where “there is no alternative procedure for

review of the statutory claim” (quoting Nyunt v. Chairman, Broad. Bd. of Governors, 589 F.3d

445, 449 (D.C. Cir. 2009))).

The APA only allows courts to review “final agency action.” 5 U.S.C. § 704. To constitute

final agency action, the action must mark the consummation of the agency’s decisionmaking

process” and it “must be one by which rights or obligations have been determined, or from which

legal consequences will flow.” Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 177-78 (1997) (citation and

17

internal quotation marks omitted). Courts “are to apply the finality requirement in a ‘flexible’ and

‘pragmatic’ way.” Ciba-Geigy Corp. v. EPA, 801 F.2d 430, 435 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (citation

omitted); see also U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs v. Hawkes Co., 578 U.S. 590, 599 (2016) (observing

that the Supreme Court has “long taken” a “‘pragmatic’ approach ... to finality” (citation

omitted)). The actions taken by USAGM to date readily meet this standard.

First, for the reasons discussed in the ripeness analysis supra, the Reassignment Memo

constituted the “consummation of the agency’s decisionmaking process.” Recall that in the

Removal Letter, USAGM leadership characterized the Reassignment Memo as “stat[ing] in no

uncertain terms that, should [Abramowitz] decline to accept the reassignment, [he] would be

subject to removal,” Removal Letter at 2, and that “there is no other adequate or alternative

sanction” for Abramowitz’s failure to accept the reassignment but to remove him, id. at 5.

Abramowitz’s removal from the position of Voice of America director was effectuated in the

Reassignment Memo, which instructed him that he could accept reassignment to a Soaition other

than VOA director or face termination from the agency. Abramowitz faced two doors, yet no

matter which door he chose, he would be removed from his position. The Court takes the agency

at its word that its decisionmaking has concluded and that its mind has been made up—for some

time now.

Second, concrete legal consequences follow from the actions the agency has already taken.

Although the formal removal of Abramowitz has yet to occur, as this Court has previously

explained, “final does not mean permanent.” Widakuswara, 779 F. Supp. 3d at 32. The

defendants’ own representations, in and out of court, indicate that they have already effectively

removed Abramowitz from his role as director. The defendants admit that they have reassigned

“the responsibilities of the Director position” to another USAGM employee. Opp. at 7; see also

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Rough Tr. at 28:14-17 (defense counsel explaining that “the former head of the Persia division”

is performing the functions of the director). They also have referred to Abramowitz in other filings

as “the former Director of Voice of America.” ECF No. 58, at 1 (emphasis added). And Defendant

Lake, in an August 11, 2025 post on the social-media platform X, referred to Abramowitz as the

“Former VOA director”? The agency’s actions have defrocked Abramowitz in all but title and

salary. Ciba-Geigy Corp., 801 F.2d at 436 (explaining that agency action bears the “indicia of

finality” if it carries “direct and immediate” consequences “on the day-to-day business of the

parties challenging the action” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)).

Final agency action violates the APA if it is “not in accordance with law,” 5 U.S.C.

§ 706(2)(A), by “fail[ing] to meet statutory, procedural, or constitutional requirements,” Citizens

to Pres. Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 414 (1971). The applicable statutory

requirements could not be clearer: the director of Voice of America “may only be... removed if

such action has been approved by a majority vote of the [International Broadcasting] Advisory

Board,” 22 U.S.C. § 6205(e)(1), or ifa five-member majority of the Board “unilaterally remove[s]”

him after “consulting with the Chief Executive Officer,” id. § 6205(e)(2). The defendants do not

even feign that their efforts to remove Abramowitz comply with that statutory requirement. How

could they, when the Board has been without a quorum since January? The Court thus concludes

that their actions violate § 706(2)(A) of the APA.

The defendants make just one argument in their own defense on the merits, inviting the

Court to declare § 6205(e)(1) unconstitutional on the ground that it “unlawfully impedes the

removal authority contemplated in Article II.” Opp. at 16. Abramowitz replies that the removal

3 Kari Lake (@KariLake), X (Aug. 11, 2025, 12:05 PM), available at https://perma.cc/85JM-LQPB. The Court takes

judicial review of this post, as its authenticity “can be accurately and readily determined from sources whose accuracy

cannot reasonably be questioned.” United States v. Flynn, 507 F. Supp. 3d 116, 126 n.6 (D.D.C. 2020) (quoting Fed.

R. Evid. 201(b)(2)).

19

structure is permissible because Abramowitz can be fired for any reason by the Board and by the

CEO, who in turn are removable without cause by the President. Abramowitz has the stronger

argument for several reasons.

First, the defendants argue incorrectly that that Board-approval requirement is akin to a

removal restriction of the ilk usually addressed in removal-power jurisprudence. That is simply

not so. Most such cases involve statutory restrictions that limit the substantive grounds on which

the President or the heads of departments can remove an officer under variations of a “good cause”

standard. Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 691 (1988) (independent counsels); see, e.g., Free

Enterprise Fund, 561 U.S. at 485-86 (under Sarbanes-Oxley Act, Public Company Accounting

Oversight Board (PCAOB) members could only be fired by SEC “for good cause shown,” after

findings “on the record” and “after notice and opportunity for a hearing” demonstrating violations

of the law or abuse of office); Humphrey's Executor v. United States, 295 U.S. 602, 620 (1935)

(FTC Commissioners may only be removed by the President for “inefficiency, neglect of duty, or

malfeasance in office”); Seila L. LLC v. Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau, 591 US. 197, 206-07 (2020)

(same, for CFPB director under the Dodd-Frank Act as originally enacted). Unlike those cases,

the laws governing Voice of America do not impose any substantive limitation on the grounds for

which the director may be fired. Nor are the principal officers tasked with the director's

appointment and removal—the CEO of USAGM and the members of the Board—subject to

statutory removal protections. To the contrary, all are removable at will—and have been

removed—by the President himself. Abramowitz is subject to removal for any reason, including

for no reason at all, by executive officers who report directly to the President. He is removable

without cause.

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Second, to the extent the Court agrees with the defendants that diffusing the removal power

among two government entities* fashions an extra step in the removal of a VOA director, which

under the right circumstances could cause a road bump in the removal process. Clearly, if the

President wanted to fire Abramowitz, and the USAGM CEO or a majority of the Board disagreed,

then the President would need to remove and replace some or all of those supervisors to effectively

remove the director. See Seila L., 591 U.S. at 204 (explaining that in practice, the President’s

ability to “supervise” the Executive Branch derives from the “power to remove”).

Yet binding precedent indicates that the inconveniences of replacing supervisors in the

course of firing an inferior officer does not violate the separation of powers. Au contraire, the

Supreme Court approved the constitutionality of an even more burdensome arrangement in Free

Enterprise Fund. The merits question in that case involved a challenge to the structure of the

PCAOB, whose members could be removed by the SEC upon finding that termination was

supported by “good cause” and after making specific findings on the record. 561 US. at 486.

Because SEC commissioners also enjoyed tenure protection—the President can remove SEC

commissioners only for “inefficiency, neglect of duty, or malfeasance in office”’—the Court had

no difficulty finding that, by erecting “two levels of protection from removal [by the President] for

those who nonetheless exercise significant executive power,” the PCAOB structure violated the

separation of powers. Jd, at 487,514. But it is what the Court did next that defeats the defendants’

argument: the Court severed the PCAOB removal protections, leaving them “removable by the

Commission at will,” while leaving the SEC Commissioners’ removal protections intact. Jd. at

509. In other words, to fire a member of the PCAOB over the objection of the SEC, the President

4 Recall that USAGM and the Board are separate “independent establishment[s]” under 5 U.S.C. § 104. See 22 U.S.C.

§ 6203(a); id. § 6205(a).

21

would need to fire and replace some number of the SEC’s commissioners—subject to senatorial

advice and consent and for-cause removal protection. It held that such an arrangement “d[{id] not

violate the separation of powers.” Jd. at 508. And the same conclusion is even stronger here, since

Abramowitz’s supervisors, unlike the SEC, are removable at will. To the extent the Board’s

current lack of quorum institutes a practical barrier to removing Abramowitz, the Broadcast Act

gives the President a straightforward remedy: replacing the removed members. See 22 U.S.C.

§ 6205(b)(5)(A) (“The President shall appoint, with the advice and consent of the Senate,

additional members to fill vacancies on the Advisory Board occurring before the expiration of a

term.”).

e. A permanent injunction is appropriate.

To obtain permanent injunctive relief, a movant must show “(1) that [he] has suffered an

irreparable injury; (2) that remedies available at law, such as monetary damages, are inadequate to

compensate for that injury; (3) that, considering the balance of hardships between the plaintiff and

defendant, a remedy in equity is warranted; and (4) that the public interest would not be disserved

by a permanent injunction.” Monsanto Co. v. Geertson Seed Farms, 561 U.S. 139, 156-57 (2010)

(citation omitted).

The core injury Abramowitz alleges is that “he is unable to carry out his duties as Director

of VOA.” Compl. 787. Impairing “a statutory right to function in a high-ranking public office”

is a cognizable harm. See Aviel v. Gor, No. 25-cv-778-LLA, 2025 WL 2374618, at *16 (D.D.C.

Aug. 14, 2025) (collecting cases). For the substantially the same reasons discussed in the

prudential ripeness analysis supra, cases analyzing comparative injuries to the parties on

applications for stays pending appeal do not provide a useful analog for the Court’s ruling in the

present posture. On a request for a permanent injunction, the merits are decided, and there is no

22

longer a question of whether the termination was unlawful. “[H]arms [that] ‘cannot be fully

compensated by later damages,” like the statutory right to lead VOA, “are irreparable.” See

Susman Godfrey LLP v. Exec. Off. of the President, No. 25-cv-1107-LLA, 2025 WL 1779830, at

*24 (D.D.C. June 27, 2025) (citation omitted). And the Court concludes that the balance of

equities and public interest are “essentially derivative of the parties’ arguments on the merits of

the case,” so these factors “weigh in favor of’ Abramowitz. See Am. Meat Inst. v. U.S. Dept of

Agric., 968 F. Supp. 2d 38, 83 (D.D.C. 2013), judgment reinstated, 760 F.3d 18 (D.C. Cir. 2014).

IV. CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing, the Court will GRANT the Motion for Partial Summary Judgment

on Count I by separate order.

G

Date: f-e t Royce C. Lamberth

United States District Judge

5 Defendants raise one last argument, which is that the Court lacks jurisdiction to enjoin the government from firing

an. executive branch official, even in a permanent injunction posture. See Opp. at 20-21 (“The government is likely

to succeed on its remedial challenge because the injunctive relief concocted by the district court is wholly

unprecedented and transgresses historical limits on our equitable authority.” (quoting Harris v. Bessent, No. 25-5037,

2025 WL 1021435, at *4 (D.C. Cir. Apr. 7, 2025) (Rao, J., dissenting))). But as Abramowitz points out, the dissent

on which the defendants rely is, by its nature, not the current state of the law. See Harris, 2025 WL 1021435, at *2

(en banc) (“The government likewise has not shown a strong likelihood of success on the merits of its claim that there

is no available remedy for Harris or Wilcox.”); Aviel v. Gor, No. 25-5105, 2025 WL 1600446, at *2 (D.C. Cir. June

5, 2025) (Kastas, J., concurring) (deferring to the en banc D.C. Circuit’s ruling that “the government [was] unlikely

to succeed in its contention that reinstatement is rarely if ever an available remedy for unlawfully removed officials”).

23