Aquino, III v. Huntington National Bank

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO

EASTERN DIVISION

RAFAEL AQUINO, III, ) Case No. 1:25 CV 1332

)

Plaintiff ) JUDGE SOLOMON OLIVER, JR.

)

v. )

)

HUNTINGTON NATIONAL BANK, et al., )

) MEMORANDUM OPINION

Defendants ) AND ORDER

Pro se plaintiff Rafael Aquino III filed this civil rights action against Huntington National

Bank; Ulrich, Sassano, Deighton, Delaney & Higgins Co., L.P.A.; Judge John J. Spellacy; Clerk of

Court Nailah K. Byrd; Magistrate Gina Lunsford; Cuyahoga County Sheriff’s Department; and

Sheriff Harold Pretel. (Doc. No. 1). The allegations concern a foreclosure judgment entered against

Plaintiff in the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas.

Plaintiff also filed an application to proceed in forma pauperis (Doc. No. 2), which the Court

grants.

I. BACKGROUND

Plaintiff’s complaint contains very few facts. It appears, however, that Plaintiff is challenging

a foreclosure judgment entered against him in the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas, Case

No. CV-24-107908 (Cuy. Cty C.P. filed Nov. 26, 2024). Plaintiff states that he is a “living man,

equitable subrogee, and holder of beneficial interest in trust” to property on Oak Park Avenue,

Cleveland, Ohio. (Doc. No. 1 at 2). He claims that he tendered a $30 deposit to the state court “to

offset any debt,” but he was advised by a clerk to send payment to the bank. (Doc. No. 1 at 3).

Plaintiff states that he “tendered the special deposit of $1” to Huntington National Bank with

instructions to “use the equity to set off any alleged debts,” but the “bank defendants” ignored his

instructions and proceeded with the foreclosure. (Id.). Plaintiff alleges in a conclusory fashion that

“Defendants” received tendered value and failed to perform, they “acted in fraud and bad faith,” and

the “judicial officers and sheriffs acted beyond authority, ignoring standing tender and equitable

jurisdiction.” Plaintiff has attached as exhibits to the complaint various documents purportedly filed

in the state court foreclosure action, including a “motion to vacate void judgment and stay sheriff’s

sale.” (See Doc. No. 1-7). Plaintiff seeks monetary damages and asks this Court to vacate the state

court’s judgment.

Defendants Huntington National Bank and Ulrich, Sassano, Deighton, Delaney & Higgins

Co., L.P.A. filed a motion to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and

12(b)(6). (Doc. No. 6). The Court need not address this motion, however, because the Court finds,

upon its own review, that Plaintiff’s complaint warrants sua sponte dismissal.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Plaintiff filed an application to proceed in forma pauperis (Doc. No. 2). The Court grants

that application. Because Plaintiff is proceeding in forma pauperis, his complaint is subject to

screening under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e).

Pro se pleadings are liberally construed. Boag v. MacDougall, 454 U.S. 364, 365, 102 S.

Ct. 700, 70 L. Ed. 2d 551 (1982) (per curiam); Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520, 92 S. Ct.

594, 30 L. Ed. 2d 652 (1972). The district court, however, is required to dismiss an in forma

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pauperis action under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e) if it fails to state a claim upon which relief can be

granted, or if it lacks an arguable basis in law or fact. Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 328, 109

S. Ct. 1827, 104 L. Ed. 2d 338 (1989); Lawler v. Marshall, 898 F.2d 1196 (6th Cir. 1990);

Sistrunk v. City of Strongsville, 99 F.3d 194, 197 (6th Cir. 1996). A claim lacks an arguable basis

in law or fact when it is premised on an indisputably meritless legal theory or when the factual

contentions are clearly baseless. Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 327. A cause of action fails to state a claim

upon which relief may be granted when it lacks “plausibility in the complaint.” Bell Atl. Corp. v.

Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 564, 127 S. Ct. 1955, 167 L. Ed. 2d 929 (2007).

Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2), a pleading must contain a “short and plain

statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S.

662, 677-78, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 173 L. Ed. 2d 868 (2009). The factual allegations in the pleading

must be sufficient to raise the right to relief above the speculative level on the assumption that all

the allegations in the complaint are true. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. The plaintiff is not required

to include detailed factual allegations, but he or she must provide more than “an unadorned, the

defendant unlawfully harmed me accusation.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. A pleading that offers legal

conclusions or a simple recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not meet this pleading

standard. Id. The Court is “not bound to accept as true a legal conclusion couched as a factual

allegation.” Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286, 106 S. Ct. 2932, 92 L. Ed. 2d 209 (1986). In

reviewing a complaint, the Court must construe the pleading in the light most favorable to the

plaintiff. Bibbo v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 151 F.3d 559, 561 (6th Cir. 1998).

Furthermore, federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction and, “[i]f the court

determines at any time that it lacks subject-matter jurisdiction, the court must dismiss the action.”

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Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3). “[D]efects in subject matter jurisdiction cannot be waived by the parties

and may be addressed by a court on its own motion at any stage of the proceedings.” Owens v.

Brock, 860 F.2d 1363, 1367 (6th Cir. 1988) (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3)); Curry v. US. Bulk

Transp., Inc., 462 F.3d 536, 539 (6th Cir. 2006) (same) (citing Owens, 860 F.2d at 1367).

District courts are permitted to sua sponte dismiss a complaint for lack of subject matter

jurisdiction when the allegations of a complaint are “totally implausible, attenuated,

unsubstantial, frivolous, devoid of merit, or no longer open to discussion.” Apple v. Glenn, 183

F.3d 477, 479 (6th Cir.1999) (citing Hagans v. Lavine, 415 U.S. 528, 536-37 (1974)).

III. LAW AND ANALYSIS

A. Pleading Requirements

The Court recognizes that pro se pleadings are held to a less stringent standard than formal

pleadings drafted by lawyers. El Bey v. Roop, 530 F.3d 407, 413 (6th Cir. 2008). However, the

“lenient treatment generally accorded to pro se litigants has limits.” Pilgrim v. Littlefield, 92 F.3d

413, 416 (6th Cir. 1996). Liberal construction for pro se litigants does not “abrogate basic pleading

requirements.” Wells v. Brown, 891 F.2d 591, 594 (6th Cir. 1989). The Court is not required to

conjure unpleaded facts or construct claims against defendants on behalf of a pro se plaintiff. See

Beaudett v. City of Hampton, 775 F.2d 1274, 1278 (4th Cir. 1985) (District courts are not required

to conjure up questions never squarely presented to them or to construct full claims from sentence

fragments). Although specific facts are not required, to meet the basic minimum notice pleading

requirements of Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Plaintiff’s complaint must give the

defendants fair notice of what the plaintiff’s legal claims are and the factual grounds on which they

rest. See Bassett v. Nat’l Collegiate Ath. Ass’n, 528 F.3d 426, 437 (6th Cir. 2008); see also Scheid

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v. Fanny Farmer Candy Shops, Inc., 859 F.2d 434, 437 (6th Cir. 1988) (all complaints must contain

either direct or inferential allegations respecting all material elements of some viable legal theory

to satisfy federal notice pleading requirements) (citations omitted).

Here, Plaintiff”s Complaint, even liberally construed, fails to meet the most basic pleading

standard, as his pleading fails to set forth “a short and plain statement of [any] claim showing that

[Plaintiff] is entitled to relief[.]” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Plaintiff’s complaint fails to include

virtually any factual allegations supporting a discernible claim based on recognized legal authority.

Rather, the Complaint consists entirely of conclusory allegations against “Defendants” or “judicial

officers and sheriffs.” Plaintiff fails to connect any allegations to the named defendants or identify

how each defendant harmed him. Merely listing defendants in the caption of the complaint, but

raising no specific factual allegations against each defendant, is insufficient to raise a plausible

claim. See Gilmore v. Corr. Corp. of Am., 92 F. App’x 188, 190 (6th Cir. 2004) (citing Flagg Bros.

v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149, 155-57, 98 S. Ct. 1729, 56 L. Ed. 2d 185 (1978)). Plaintiff’s complaint is

therefore nothing more than conclusory defendants-unlawfully-harmed-me allegations that are

insufficient to state a plausible claim for relief. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.

B. The Foreclosure

Even if this action were not subject to dismissal as noted above, to the extent Plaintiff is

challenging the state court’s foreclosure judgment and asking this Court to vacate the state court

judgment and enter judgment in his favor, the Rooker-Feldman doctrine bars this Court’s

consideration of his claims.

Under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, a party losing his or her case in state court is barred

from seeking what in substance would be appellate review of the state judgment in a United States

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District Court based on the party’s claim that the state judgment itself violates his or her federal

rights. Berry v. Schmitt, 688 F.3d 290, 298-99 (6th Cir. 2012). Federal appellate review of state court

judgments can only occur in the United States Supreme Court. See Dist. of Columbia Court of

Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, 483, 103 S. Ct. 1303, 75 L. Ed. 2d 206 (1983); Rooker v. Fidelity

Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413, 415-16, 44 S. Ct. 149, 68 L. Ed. 362 (1923).

The Rooker-Feldman doctrine applies only where a party losing his or her case in state court

initiates an action in federal district court complaining of injury caused by a state court judgment

itself and seeks review and rejection of that judgment. Berry, 688 F.3d 298-99; In re Cook, 551 F.3d

542, 548 (6th Cir. 2009). To determine whether Rooker-Feldman bars a claim, the Court must look

to the “source of the injury the plaintiff alleges in the federal complaint.” McCormick v. Braverman,

451 F.3d 382, 393 (6th Cir.2006); see Berry, 688 F.3d at 299. If the source of the plaintiff’s injury

is the state court judgment itself, then the Rooker-Feldman doctrine bars the federal claim.

McCormick, 451 F.3d at 393. “If there is some other source of injury, such as a third party’s actions,

then the plaintiff asserts an independent claim.” Id.; see Lawrence v. Welch, 531 F.3d 364, 368-69

(6th Cir. 2008). In conducting this inquiry, the Court also considers the plaintiff’s requested relief.

Evans v. Cordray, 424 Fed. App’x. 537, 2011 WL 2149547, at *1 (6th Cir. 2011).

Here, the source of Plaintiff’s alleged injury is the Cuyahoga County Court of Common

Pleas’s judgment in foreclosure, and Plaintiff asks the Court to declare the judgment void and grant

judgment in his favor. Pursuant to Rooker-Feldman, this Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction to

do so.

To the extent Plaintiff seeks to relitigate the foreclosure issues as determined in the state

court foreclosure case, this claim is barred by res judicata. Res judicata precludes a party from

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bringing a federal civil rights action to relitigate matters that already have been decided in a state

court proceeding. Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90, 96-97, 101 S. Ct. 411, 66 L. Ed. 2d 308 (1980).

Under res judicata, a final judgment on the merits of an action precludes the parties from relitigating

issues that were or could have been raised in that action. Id. at 94. Plaintiff’s claims are barred by

res judicata because the issues concerning the foreclosure on Plaintiff’s property have been

determined by the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas, and there is no suggestion in

Plaintiff’s pleadings that he could not have raised any federal concerns he had in the context of the

state proceedings. All of Plaintiffs’ claims against all of the Defendants are therefore barred by res

judicata, inasmuch as they appear to relate to the foreclosure action. See, e.g., Clark v. Lender

Processing Servs., 949 F. Supp. 2d 763, 773-74 (N.D. Ohio 2013) (holding that res judicata barred

mortgagor’s state and federal claims challenging the propriety of a foreclosure where there was a

prior, final decision on the merits in an underlying state foreclosure action).

IV. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Court GRANTS Plaintiff’s application to proceed in forma

pauperis (Doc. No. 2) and DISMISSES the action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e). Additionally,

the Court DENIES Defendants’ motion to dismiss (Doc. No. 6) as moot. Further, the court certifies,

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3), that an appeal from this decision could not be taken in good

faith.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

/S/ SOLOMON OLIVER, JR.

SOLOMON OLIVER, JR.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

August 27, 2025

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