Green v. City of Willoughby Hills

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO

EASTERN DIVISION

JONATHAN MICHAEL GREEN, ) CASE NO. 1:25-cv-1513

)

Plaintiff, ) JUDGE CHARLES E. FLEMING

)

v. )

)

CITY OF WILLOUGHBY HILLS, et al., ) MEMORANDUM OPINION AND

) ORDER

Defendants. )

)

I. INTRODUCTION

Plaintiff Jonathan Michael Green, proceeding pro se, filed a Civil RICO Complaint against

the City of Willoughby Hills (“City”), as well as ten individual defendants who are City employees

or officials. He asserts RICO claims related to an alleged unlawful traffic stop and search,

subsequent state court proceedings, obstruction and suppression of evidence, and retaliatory

actions. (ECF No. 1).

With his complaint, Plaintiff filed a motion to proceed in forma pauperis. (ECF No. 2).

That motion is GRANTED. For the reasons discussed below, Plaintiff’s complaint is

DISMISSED.

II. BACKGROUND

On June 28, 2025, three police officers initiated and conducted a traffic stop of Plaintiff

regarding his window tint; they handcuffed and detained Plaintiff. (ECF No. 1, PageID #2–3).

After the traffic stop, Plaintiff was issued two traffic citations for violating City ordinances

regarding open containers and tinted glass (both minor misdemeanors), which resulted in the

initiation of state court proceedings against Plaintiff in the Willoughby Municipal Court on July

14, 2025. See City of Willoughby Hills v. Green, Nos. 25CRB01375, 25TRD02827 (Willoughby

Mun. Ct. July 14, 2025). These state court proceedings are currently pending, with bench trials

set for September 17, 2025. See id.

On July 21, 2025, Plaintiff initiated this federal action by filing his initial civil rights

complaint. (ECF No. 1). The complaint provides various allegations that police officers and

various City employees and officials manipulated and suppressed evidence, obstructed

investigations, and sent retaliatory letters to Plaintiff. (Id. at PageID #2–6). The complaint asserts

two RICO claims against the defendants: (i) COUNT I – 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c); and (ii) COUNT II

– 18 U.S.C. § 1962(d). (Id. at PageID #7). The complaint alleges Plaintiff has suffered emotional

injury, ongoing retaliation, legal instability, loss of public trust, and economic destabilization.

(Id.). For relief, Plaintiff requests damages, referral of this case to federal prosecutors, and

injunctive relief. (Id. at PageID #8)

III. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Plaintiff is proceeding in forma pauperis, so his complaint is subject to initial screening

under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). Under that statute, federal district courts are expressly required

to screen all in forma pauperis complaints filed in federal court, and to dismiss before service any

such complaint that the court determines is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim upon which

relief may be granted, or seeks monetary damages from a defendant who is immune from such

relief. See Hill v. Lappin, 630 F.3d 468, 470–71 (6th Cir. 2010) (holding that the dismissal

standard articulated in Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009) and Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550

U.S. 544 (2007) for determining a motion to dismiss under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12 (b)(6) governs

dismissals for failure to state a claim under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)).

To survive a dismissal for failure to state a claim, a pro se complaint must set forth

sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a plausible claim for relief on its face. Id. at

471. “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court

to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal,

556 U.S. at 678. Although detailed factual allegations are not required, the “allegations must be

enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. A pleading

that offers legal conclusions or a simple recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not

meet this pleading standard. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. Even though the standard of review for pro

se pleadings is liberal, the generous construction afforded pro se plaintiffs has limits. Pilgrim v.

Littlefield, 92 F.3d 413, 416 (6th Cir. 1996). Pro se plaintiffs must still meet basic pleading

requirements, and courts are not required to conjure allegations on their behalf or “guess at the

nature” of their claims. Wells v. Brown, 891 F.2d 591, 594 (6th Cir. 1989). The Court is not

required to conjure unpleaded facts or construct claims against defendants on behalf of a pro se

plaintiff. See Beaudett v. City of Hampton, 775 F.2d 1274, 1278 (4th Cir. 1985) (District courts

are not required to conjure up questions never squarely presented to them or to construct full claims

from sentence fragments. To do so would “require ... [the courts] to explore exhaustively all

potential claims of a pro se plaintiff ... [and] would ... transform the district court from its legitimate

advisory role to the improper role of an advocate seeking out the strongest arguments and most

successful strategies for a party.”) (citation omitted).

IV. DISCUSSION

Having reviewed the complaint and the attached documents, the Court finds that Plaintiff’s

RICO claims fail as a matter of law and are subject to dismissal. “[T]o state a civil RICO claim,

a plaintiff must allege (1) two or more predicate racketeering offenses, (2) the existence of an

enterprise affecting interstate commerce, (3) a connection between the racketeering offenses and

the enterprise, and (4) injury by reason of the above.” Grow Mich., LLC v. LT Lender, LLC, 50

F.4th 587, 594 (6th Cir. 2022); see also 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961, 1962, 1964. First, the Court has serious

doubts that Plaintiff sufficiently alleged the existence of an enterprise that is engaged in or whose

actions affect interstate commerce. The enterprise alleged by Plaintiff is a collection of various

government employees and officials whose supposed purpose is to stymie both Plaintiff’s various

records requests and his attempts to initiate investigations into government misconduct. (See ECF

No. 1, PageID #2–6). The pleadings themselves do not allege any connection between this

enterprise, or its predicate RICO actions, with interstate commerce, nor do the pleadings imply

any such connection.

Regardless, Plaintiff’s RICO claims fail because he lacks standing to assert such claims.

To state a civil RICO claim, a plaintiff must allege injury to “business or property by reason of”

the alleged violations under § 1962. See 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c). The Sixth Circuit has consistently

held that this statutory language excludes recovery for personal injuries. See, e.g., Jackson v.

Sedgwick, 731 F.3d 556, 563–65 (6th Cir. 2013) (en banc) (“[C]ourts ‘have uniformly recognized

that the ordinary meaning of the phrase ‘injured in his business or property’ excludes personal

injuries, including the pecuniary losses therefrom.’”); Drake v. B.F. Goodrich Co., 782 F.2d 638,

644 (6th Cir. 1986). Here, Plaintiff has failed to allege any damages to his “business or property”

and solely alleged damages related to personal injuries. The pleadings do not mention the word

property or business and the factual allegations and Plaintiff’s claims are clearly related to and

intimately associated with injury to his own person. It appears that Plaintiff is attempting to recast

any potential civil claims against Defendants as a RICO action, which is the improper vehicle to

seek relief for his personal injury claims. As such, Plaintiff’s RICO claims should be dismissed

for lack of standing. See Aces High Coal Sales, Inc. v. Cmty. Bank & Tr., 768 F. App’x 446, 458

n.5 (6th Cir. 2019) (“The ‘injury to business or property’ requirement excludes personal injuries

and is sometimes characterized as ‘statutory standing.’”); Arnold v. Alphatec Spine, Inc., No. 1:13-

cv-714, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 87079, at *21-24 (S.D. Ohio June 26, 2014) (“Specifically,

Plaintiffs lack statutory standing under the civil RICO provisions because they fail to allege injury

to their ‘business or property.’ . . . It is well settled that personal injury is not cognizable under

RICO’s civil remedies provision.”); Lewis v. Drouillard, 788 F. Supp. 2d 567, 570 (E.D. Mich.

2011) (“Because Plaintiffs’ alleged damages are intimately related to their personal injuries, they

do not have standing to sue under RICO.”). The Court declines to grant any leave to amend

because amendment of the complaint would be futile. Accordingly, Plaintiff's RICO claims are

DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.

V. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the complaint is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE pursuant

to 28 U.S.C. §1915(e). Plaintiffs pending motions (ECF Nos. 3, 5) are DENIED as MOOT.

IT ISSO ORDERED.

Date: August 27, 2025 “ads Hinvg

CHARLES E.FLEMING ts

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE