Hicks v. PennyMac Loan Services, LLC

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO

EASTERN DIVISION

LAUREN HICKS, ) CASE NO. 1:25-CV-1053

)

Plaintiff, ) JUDGE CHARLES E. FLEMING

)

v. )

) MEMORANDUM OPINION AND

PENNYMAC LOAN SERVICES, LLC, ) ORDER

)

Defendant. )

)

)

Pro se Plaintiff, Lauren Hicks, filed an action in the Cuyahoga County Court of Common

Pleas against Defendant, challenging the foreclosure action against her in Case No. CV-23-984447

regarding property located on Glenallen Avenue, Solon, Ohio. (ECF No. 1). On May 22, 2025,

Defendant filed a notice of removal of Plaintiff’s complaint to this Court. (Id.). For the following

reasons, this action is DISMISSED.

I. BACKGROUND

On June 13, 2024, the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas entered a foreclosure

judgment against Plaintiff and in favor of Defendant concerning the property located on Glenallen

Avenue, Solon, Ohio. (ECF No. 1, PageID #71–76). See PennyMac Loan Services, LLC v. Lauren

Hicks, et al., Case No. CV-23-984447 (Cuy. Cty. C.P. filed Aug. 24, 2023). On January 27, 2025,

the Sheriff held a sale of the property at issue, and the property was sold to a third party. (ECF

No. 1, PageID #90). On April 17, 2025, Plaintiff filed a complaint against Defendant (“Petition

for Writ of Quia Timet to Remove Cloud on Title”) in which she challenged the validity of the

mortgage and the foreclosure on her property. (ECF No. 1, PageID #10–12). In this complaint,

Plaintiff claimed that she is the proper owner of the property and Defendant’s “invalid or false

claim of title or interest” is threatening to “disturb [her] possession” of the property. (Id. at PageID

#10–11). Plaintiff asks the Court to find that she is the lawful owner of the property, free of any

lien or interest claimed by Defendant, and to vacate or void the judgment issued in Defendant’s

favor. (Id. at PageID #11–12).

Defendant removed Plaintiff’s complaint to this Court (ECF No. 1) and moved to dismiss

the complaint pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, claiming

Plaintiff’s claims are barred by res judicata. (ECF No. 3). Thereafter, Plaintiff amended her

complaint to include new claims alleging a violation of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act

(“FDCPA”), the Fair Credit Reporting Act (“FCRA”), due process, and “Ultra Vires Action Under

Title 12.” (ECF No. 8). The amended complaint continues to contest the foreclosure action, and

Plaintiff asks the Court to declare the foreclosure void, to declare Plaintiff the lawful owner of the

Glenallen property, and to enjoin Defendant from continuing any foreclosure or eviction

proceedings. (Id.). Plaintiff also filed a motion for temporary restraining order and motion for

preliminary injunction. (ECF No. 5). Following Plaintiff’s amended complaint, Defendant filed

a second motion to dismiss addressing Plaintiff’s additional claims, asserting once again that

Plaintiff’s complaint is barred by res judicata and her complaint fails to state a claim upon which

relief can be granted. (ECF No. 10). Plaintiff opposes Defendant’s motions. (ECF Nos. 7 and

11).

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), a party may move for the dismissal of

claims when the claimant has failed to “state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” Fed. R.

Civ. P. 12(b)(6). When deciding a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), the function of the Court

is to test the legal sufficiency of the complaint. See Mayer v. Mylod, 988 F.2d 635, 638 (6th Cir.

1993). In reviewing the complaint, the Court must construe the pleading in the light most favorable

to Plaintiff, accept all factual allegations as true, and determine whether the complaint contains

“enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly,

550 U.S. 544, 555 and 570 (2007); Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). Legal conclusions

and unwarranted factual inferences, however, are not entitled to a presumption of truth. Twombly,

550 U.S. at 555; see also Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286 (1986) (The Court is “not bound

to accept as true a legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation.”).

Additionally, courts must read Rule 12(b)(6) in conjunction with Federal Civil Procedure

Rule 8(a)(2)’s requirement that a plaintiff need offer “only ‘a short and plain statement of the claim

showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.’” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93 (2007) (citing

Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). To meet the basic minimum notice pleading requirements of Rule 8,

Plaintiff’s complaint must give Defendant fair notice of what Plaintiff’s legal claims are and the

factual grounds on which they rest. Bassett v. National Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 528 F.3d 426,

437 (6th Cir. 2008). Plaintiff’s obligation to provide the grounds for relief “requires more than

labels and conclusions” or a “formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action.” Twombly,

550 U.S. at 555. Factual allegations “must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative

level.” Id.

Pro se pleadings are liberally construed, Boag v. MacDougall, 454 U.S. 364, 365 (1982)

(per curiam); Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972). The Court holds a pro se complaint to

a less stringent standard than one drafted by an attorney. Spotts v. United States, 429 F.3d 248,

250 (6th Cir. 2005) (citing Haines, 404 U.S. at 520). The Court is not required, however, to conjure

up unpleaded facts or construct claims on Plaintiff’s behalf. See Grinter v. Knight, 532 F.3d 567,

577 (6th Cir. 2008).

III. DISCUSSION

No matter how Plaintiff labeled her complaint, she is attacking the foreclosure judgment

entered against her in the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas Case No. CV-23-984447.

Res judicata therefore bars this Court’s consideration of Plaintiff’s claims.

Federal courts must give the same preclusive effect to a state-court judgment as that

judgment receives in the rendering state. 28 U.S.C. § 1738; Abbott v. Mich., 474 F.3d 324, 330

(6th Cir. 2007). To determine the preclusive effect a prior state court judgment would have on the

present federal action, the Court must apply the law of preclusion of the state in which the prior

judgment was rendered. Migra v. Warren City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ., 465 U.S. 75, 81 (1984).

This Court must therefore apply Ohio law to determine whether the Ohio foreclosure judgment

would preclude litigation of the validity of the foreclosure action.

In Ohio, the doctrine of res judicata dictates that “a final judgment or decree rendered upon

the merits, without fraud or collusion, by a court of competent jurisdiction is conclusive of rights,

questions, and facts in issue as to the parties and their privies, and is a complete bar to any

subsequent action on the same claim or cause of action between the parties or those in privity with

them.” Johnson’s Island, Inc. v. Bd. of Twp. Tr. of Danbury Twp., 431 N.E.2d 672, 674 (Ohio

1982) (quotation marks and citation omitted). Application of the doctrine of res judicata does not

depend on whether the original claim explored all possible theories of relief. Brown v. Dayton,

730 N.E.2d 958, 962 (Ohio 2000) (citation omitted). Rather, “a valid, final judgment rendered

upon the merits bars all subsequent actions based upon any claim arising out of the transaction or

occurrence that was the subject matter of the previous action.” Grava v. Parkman Twp., 653 N.E.2d

226, 229 (Ohio 1995). A second action is barred when there is: (1) a prior final, valid decision on

the merits by a court of competent jurisdiction; (2) the second action involves the same parties or

their privies as the first; (3) the second action raises claims that were or could have been litigated

in the previous action; and (4) the second action arises out of the transaction or occurrence that

was the subject matter of the previous action. Hapgood v. City of Warren, 127 F.3d 490, 493 (6th

Cir. 1997).

Here, the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas entered a foreclosure judgment

against Plaintiff, and in Defendant’s favor, in connection with the property located on Glenallen

Avenue. (ECF No. 1, PageID #71–76). This action involves the same parties as the state court

foreclosure proceedings. Plaintiff has not alleged facts plausibly suggesting that the claims and

defenses she asserts in this action relating to the propriety of the foreclosure action were not, or

could not have been, asserted in the state foreclosure action. See Forgues v. Select Portfolio

Servicing, Inc., 690 F. App’x 896, 900–01 (6th Cir. 2017) (finding Plaintiff’s claims under FDCPA

and FCRA barred by res judicata because each claim related to an allegation concerning her

mortgage loan in the prior action); Berman v. Arlington Bank, No. 4:12 CV 2888, 2013 WL

682814, *10 (N.D. Ohio Feb. 22, 2013) (stating Plaintiff “could have and should have asserted his

claims of denial of due process in his appeal from the state court foreclosure judgment” and finding

res judicata barred his claims); Clark v. Lender Processing Servs. Inc., 949 F. Supp. 2d 763, 773–

74 (N.D. Ohio 2013) (holding that res judicata barred mortgagor’s claims under the FDCPA and

Ohio’s Consumer Sales Practices Act where there was a prior, final decision on the merits in an

underlying state foreclosure action).

Finally, Plaintiff’s claims arise from the same transaction or occurrence as the state court

foreclosure proceedings. Accordingly, Plaintiff’s claims in this action are barred by res judicata.

IV. CONCLUSION

For these reasons, the Court DENIES Plaintiff's emergency motion for temporary

restraining order and motion for preliminary injunction (ECF No. 5), DENIES Plaintiffs

remaining motions (ECF Nos. 4, 12, and 15), and GRANTS Defendant’s motion to dismiss (ECF

No. 10). Further, the Court CERTIFIES, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §1915(a)(3), that an appeal from

this decision could not be taken in good faith.

IT ISSO ORDERED.

Date: August 27, 2025 ‘adi Ff Haney

CHARLES E. FLEMING

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE