Rogers v. Orleans Parish Sheriff Office

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA

SHEILA ROGERS, ET AL. * CIVIL ACTION

VERSUS * NO. 22-5303

ORLEANS PARISH SHERIFF * SECTION “P” (2)

OFFICE, ET AL.

ORDER AND REASONS

Before me is Plaintiff Sheila Rogers’ Motion to Quash Rule 45 subpoenas and for a

Protective Order. ECF No. 45. Defendant Susan Hutson filed a timely Opposition Memorandum.

ECF Nos 58. No party requested oral argument in accordance with Local Rule 78.1, and the court

agrees that oral argument is unnecessary.

Having considered the record, the submissions and arguments of counsel, and the

applicable law, Plaintiff’s Motion to Quash Rule 45 subpoenas and for a Protective Order is

DENIED WITHOUT PREJUDICE for the reasons stated herein.

I. BACKGROUND

Plaintiff Sheila Rogers is a former employee of the Orleans Parish Sherriff’s Office

(“OPSO”). ECF No. 41. She alleges she began her employment in 2015, at which time she

informed OPSO of her disability—an eye disease that causes blurred vision and sensitivity to light

and glare—that required certain accommodations, which OPSO accommodated until Rogers was

assigned a new supervisor (Latoya Armwood) in 2020. Id. at 4-5 (¶¶ 2-7) . Rogers alleges that,

while under Armstrong’s supervision, she faced disability discrimination, unwarranted

reprimands, retaliation, intimidation, and a hostile working environment. See id. at 5-8 (¶¶ 8-32).

Rogers and her husband originally filed this action against Armwood and OPSO, asserting

claims under (a) the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”), 42 U.S.C. § 12101, et seq. (Counts

I, II, and III); (b) Louisiana employment discrimination law (“LEDL”), LA. REV. STAT. § 23:323,

et seq. (Count IV); (c) Louisiana whistleblower law, LA. REV. STAT. § 23:967, et seq. (Count V);

and (d) Louisiana tort law for intentional infliction of emotional distress (“IIED”) and for vicarious

liability (Counts VI, VII). ECF No. 1 at 10-16. After considering OPSO and Armwood’s motions

to dismiss,1 Judge Darrel Papillion dismissed with prejudice the claims against OPSO because it

lacked the capacity to be sued and dismissed with and without prejudice claims against Armwood,

but Judge Papillion allowed Rogers leave to file an amended complaint. ECF No. 37.

Rogers filed a substantially similar amended complaint but substituted Sheriff Susan

Hutson in her official capacity as a defendant in place of OPSO and added additional factual

allegations to support Rogers’ IIED claim. See ECF No. 41. Sheriff Hutson and Armstrong then

moved for, among other things, dismissal of Rogers’ IIED claim, which Judge Papillion granted,

leaving only the claims against Sheriff Hutson. ECF No. 46.

Hutson’s February 24, 2025, discovery requests included a request for an executed

authorization to obtain Rogers’ employment records from her other employers. ECF Nos. 54-4,

58-1 at 26 (RFP No. 14). After expiration of the thirty-day response period, on April 2, 2025,

Rogers requested an additional 30 days to respond, and Hutson agreed but asserted that any

objection were waived. ECF Nos. 54-5, 54-6. On May 2, 2025, Rogers served her responses.

ECF No. 58-1.

On July 23 and 30, 2025, Defendant issued Rule 45 subpoenas duces tecum to a subsequent

former employer of Rogers,2 requesting production of:

A full and complete copy of any and all employment records in [its]

possession or control regarding the employment of Sheila Rogers [ ], including but

not limited to her application, resume/CV, interview records, personnel file, e-mail

1 ECF Nos. 8, 22.

2 See ECF Nos. 54-9 at 1, 54-10 at 2; see also ECF No. 58-1 at 9-10 (Rogers’ response to Hutson’s Interrogatory No.

9, identifying, among others, the Mississippi Division of Medicaid as an employer of hers since resigning from OPSO).

and attachments during recruitment, any performance-related documents or

evaluations, compensation and benefits, documents/plans (salary, bonus,

incentives, commission, etc.) coachings, disciplinary actions, investigations, or

complaints.

ECF Nos. 54-9 at 5, 54-10 at 5.3 After the first return date, Rogers filed this Motion to Quash Rule

45 subpoenas and for a Protective Order and an ex parte motion for expedited consideration. ECF

Nos. 54, 55. The Court held a conference on August 11, 2025, to address the expedited hearing

request, during which defense counsel explained that the first subpoena was withdrawn as

defective and that the subpoenaed party had raised objections to the second subpoena, thus

suspending any return date. ECF No. 57; see FED. R. CIV. P. 45(d)(2)(B).

II. THE PENDING MOTION

Rogers now asks the Court to quash the subpoenas pursuant to Rule 45(d) or, alternatively,

enter a Rule 26(c) protective order prohibiting disclosure of the subpoenaed information, as the

requests are irrelevant, overly broad, and disproportionate to the needs of the case and intrude on

her privacy interest. ECF Nos. 54 at 1-2, 54-1 at 12. She first argues Defendant did not meet and

confer in accordance with Rule 37(a)(1) before issuing the subpoenas. ECF No. 54-1 at 3. She

then contends that she has a privacy interest in her employment records. Id. at 5. If the documents

are produced, her reputation in law enforcement and employment prospects are put at risk by the

subpoenas. Id. at 5, 8. Rogers argues her records from former employers are irrelevant because

her prior employment has no bearing on whether Sheriff Hutson violated federal disability laws or

created a hostile work environment. Id. at 7, 10-11. Further, the subpoenas are overly broad as

they seek her entire employment file and may contain documents unrelated to the case. Id.

3 The July 23rd subpoena has an August 8, 2025, response deadline, while the July 30th subpoena has an August 15,

2025, response deadline. ECF Nos. 54-9 at 2, 54-10 at 2.

In Opposition, Hutson first notes that she is “agreeable to the entry of an appropriate

protective order.” ECF No. 58 at 1. Hutson then argues that she was under no obligation to meet

and confer before issuing the subpoenas, and she appears to argue that Rogers has waived any

relevance objections by not asserting timely objections to her discovery requests. See id. at 4-5.

Hutson argues that courts have repeatedly denied motions to quash subpoenas for employment

records and contends the documents are relevant for three issues: (1) application materials, payroll

records, and documents establishing whether Rogers is still employed are relevant to mitigation;

(2) requests for accommodation are relevant to her disability and need for accommodation; and (3)

disciplinary records, performance reviews, and any complaints made by Rogers are relevant to her

state of mind and credibility with respect to her allegation that an unwarranted reprimand was

improper or discriminatory. Id. at 5-6. Hutson also argues Rogers has not shown good cause for

a protective order because she has only alleged a generalized privacy interest. Id. at 7.

III. APPLICABLE LAW

A. Scope of Discovery

Rule 26 authorizes the parties to

obtain discovery regarding any nonprivileged matter that is relevant to any party’s

claim or defense and proportional to the needs of the case, considering the

importance of the issues at stake in the action, the amount in controversy, the

parties’ relative access to relevant information, the parties’ resources, the

importance of the discovery in resolving the issues, and whether the burden or

expense of the proposed discovery outweighs its likely benefit. Information within

this scope of discovery need not be admissible in evidence to be discoverable.

FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1). Information is relevant if it bears on, or reasonably could lead to other

matters that could bear on, any issue related to the claim or defense of any party.4 If relevance is

4 Leonard v. Martin, 38 F.4th 481, 489 (5th Cir. 2022) (quoting Coughlin v. Lee, 946 F.2d 1152, 1159 (5th Cir. 1991)).

in doubt, a court should allow discovery.5

Rule 26(b)(2)(C) mandates that the court limit the frequency or extent of discovery

otherwise allowed, if it determines: (i) the discovery sought is unreasonably cumulative or

duplicative, or can be obtained from some other source that is more convenient, less burdensome,

or less expensive; (ii) the party seeking discovery had ample opportunity to obtain the information;

or (iii) the proposed discovery is outside the scope of Rule 26(b)(1).

B. Motion to Quash

Discovery may be obtained from non-parties pursuant to Rule 45 of the Federal Rules of

Civil Procedure. A non-party served with a subpoena duces tecum may object by sending written

objections to the issuing party within 14 days of service or before the return date, whichever is

earlier. FED. R. CIV. P. 45(d)(2)(B). If the non-party timely provides written objections, it has

satisfied its obligations. The serving party may then file a motion to compel seeking compliance.

FED. R. CIV. P. 45(d)(2)(B)(i).

Although governed in the first instance by Rule 45, non-party subpoenas are also subject

to the parameters of Rule 26.6 “Both Rules 45 and 26 authorize the court to modify a subpoena

duces tecum when its scope exceeds the boundaries of permissible discovery or otherwise violates

the parameters of Rule 45.”7 The person filing the motion to quash bears the burden of proof to

5 E.E.O.C. v. Simply Storage Mgmt., L.L.C., 270 F.R.D. 430, 433 (S.D. Ind. 2010) (quoting Truswal Sys. Corp. v.

Hydro–Air Eng’g, Inc., 813 F.2d 1207, 1212 (Fed. Cir. 1987)).

6 In re Application of Time, Inc., No. 99-2916, 1999 WL 804090, at *7 (E.D. La. Oct. 6, 1999) (citations omitted),

aff'd, 209 F.3d 719 (5th Cir. 2000); see also Zamora v. GC Servs., LP, No. 15-48, 2017 WL 1861843, at *3 (W.D.

Tex. Feb. 17, 2017) (citing Chamberlain v. Farmington Sav. Bank, No. 06-1437, 2007 WL 2786421, at *1 (D. Conn.

Sept. 25, 2007) (citing, inter alia, FED. R. CIV. P. 45 advisory committee’s notes to 1970 amendment (stating “the

scope of discovery through a subpoena is the same as that applicable to Rule 34 and the other discovery rules”)));

Romac Env’t Servs., LLC v. Wildcat Fluids, LLC, No. 20-581, 2022 WL 1924106, at *4 (W.D. La. June 3, 2022).

7 Hahn v. Hunt, No. 15-2867, 2016 WL 1587405, at *2 (E.D. La. Apr. 20, 2016) (citing FED. R. CIV. P. 45(d)(3);

26(c)(1)(D)), aff’d, No. 15-2867, 2016 WL 6518863 (E.D. La. Nov. 2, 2016).

demonstrate that compliance would impose undue burden or expense.8 To determine whether the

subpoena presents an undue burden, the Fifth Circuit considers the following factors: (1) relevance

of the information requested; (2) the need of the party for the documents; (3) the breadth of the

document request; (4) the time period covered by the request; (5) the particularity with which the

party describes the requested documents; and (6) the burden imposed.9 “Whether a burdensome

subpoena is reasonable ‘must be determined according to the facts of the case,’ such as the party's

need for the documents and the nature and importance of the litigation.”10 “Further, if the person

to whom the document request is made is a non-party, the court may also consider the expense and

inconvenience to the non-party.”11 Modification of a subpoena is preferable to quashing it.12

C. Standing to Quash/Modify a Subpoena

To quash a subpoena duces tecum issued to a non-party, the movant must first have

standing, meaning the movant must: (1) be in possession or control of the requested material; (2) be

the person to whom the subpoena is issued; or (3) have an alleged personal right or privilege in the

subject matter of the subpoena.13 Courts, including courts in the Fifth Circuit, have held that an

8 See Wiwa v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 392 F.3d 812, 818 (5th Cir. 2004) (citation omitted); McLeod, Alexander,

Powel & Apffel, P.C. v. Quarles, 894 F.2d 1482, 1485 (5th Cir. 1990) (citation omitted) (finding party resisting

discovery must show why each discovery request is not relevant or otherwise objectionable).

9 Wiwa, 392 F.3d at 818 (internal citations omitted).

10 Id. (citation omitted).

11 Id. (citation omitted).

12 Id.; Tiberi v. CIGNA, Ins. Co., 40 F.3d 110, 112 (5th Cir. 1994); see also Linder v. Nat'l Sec. Agency, 94 F.3d 693,

698 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (“[M]odification of a subpoena is generally preferred to outright quashing . . . .”) (citation

omitted).

13 Black v. DMNO, LLC, No. 16-2708, 2018 WL 488991, at *2 (E.D. La. Jan. 19, 2018) (citing Brown v. Braddick,

595 F.2d 961, 967 (5th Cir. 1979); Johnson v. Mixon, No. 13-2629, 2014 WL 1764750, at *4 (E.D. La. May 2, 2014));

McHugh v. St. Tammany Par., No. 24-1300, 2024 WL 3617535, at *10 (E.D. La. Aug. 1, 2024) (Long, J.) (“A party

has standing to move to quash a subpoena issued to a third party if the party ‘allege[s] any personal right or privilege

with respect to the materials subpoenaed’; the party’s claim of a personal right or privilege need not ultimately prevail

in order for the party to have standing to move to quash.” (quoting Brown, 595 F.2d at 966); and citing Burkette v. E.

Feliciana Par. Sheriff, 606 F. Supp. 3d 297, 303 n.26 (M.D. La. 2022))); Bounds v. Cap. Area Fam. Violence

Intervention Ctr., Inc., 314 F.R.D. 214, 218 (M.D. La. 2016) (citation omitted) (“Parties have limited standing to

quash subpoenas served on non-parties pursuant to Rule 45.”); see also Weatherly v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Ins. Co.,

No. 07-4371, 2009 WL 1507353, at *2 (E.D. La. May 28, 2009) (holding that defendant did not have standing to

challenge the subpoena where it had no privilege over the documents); Guzman v. Latin Am. Ent., LLC, No. 13-41,

2014 WL 12599345, at *1 (S.D. Tex. July 2, 2014) (citing U.S. Bank Nat’l Ass'n v. James, 264 F.R.D. 17, 18–19 (D.

employee has a personal right to her employment records and therefore has standing as a party to

challenge a non-party subpoena for them.14

However, a party cannot quash a non-party subpoena on the basis that the subpoena is

overly broad or seeks irrelevant information, even if the party has standing via a personal right or

privilege,15 because only the respondent can object and seek to quash a Rule 45 subpoena on those

grounds.16 That party does have standing to challenge the subpoena as overly broad or seeks

irrelevant information via a motion for a protective order under Rule 26(c).17 Also, because the

scope of discovery through a Rule 45 subpoena is governed by Rule 26(b),18 and the court must

“on its own” limit the frequency or extent of discovery if it determines the proposed discovery “is

Maine 2010) (“The general rule is that a party has no standing to quash a subpoena served upon a third party, except

as to claims of privilege relating to the documents being sought.”)); Frazier v. RadioShack Corp., No. 10-855, 2012

WL 832285, at *1 (M.D. La. Mar. 12, 2012) (citations omitted) (“As an initial matter, it should be noted that a plaintiff

cannot challenge a Rule 45 subpoena directed to a third party on the basis that it violates another person's privacy

rights . . . that the subpoena is overly broad, or that the subpoena seeks information that is irrelevant because only the

responding third party can object and seek to quash a Rule 45 subpoena on those grounds.”).

14 See Zamora, 2017 WL 1861843, at *4 (quoting Garcia v. Pro. Servs., Inc., No. 15-585, 2017 WL 187577, at *1

(W.D. Tex. Jan. 17, 2017); and citing Singletary v. Sterling Transp. Co., 289 F.R.D. 237, 239 (E.D. Va. 2012)

(“[N]umerous courts from within a wide variety of circuits have approved” that “a party possesses a personal right in

the information contained in employment records sufficient to confer standing.” (listing illustrative cases)); Gehring

v. Case Corp., 43 F.3d 340, 342 (7th Cir. 1994) (stating that turning over personnel files would invade privacy of

employees)); Rice v. Reliastar Life Ins. Co., No. 11-44, 2011 WL 5513181, at *1 (M.D. La. Nov. 10, 2011); MC

Trilogy Tex. v. City of Heath, No. 22-2154, 2023 WL 7190652, at *3 (N.D. Tex. Nov. 1, 2023) (“[A] party may

establish a ‘personal right’ to subpoenaed materials in limited circumstances, including when a subpoena seeks to

discover . . . employment records . . . .” (citing Crispin v. Christian Audigier, Inc., 717 F. Supp. 2d 965, 974 (C.D.

Cal. 2010) (citing cases))).

15 MC Trilogy Tex., LLC v. City of Heath, No. 22-2154, 2023 WL 7004442, at *3 (N.D. Tex. Oct. 24, 2023) (citing

Steel Dust Recycling, LLC v. Robinson, No. 19-2818, 2023 WL 4946533, at *4 (S.D. Tex. Mar. 30, 2023)).

16 Salmon v. Waffle House, Inc., No. 19-1349, 2020 WL 6708382, at *2 (E.D. La. Nov. 16, 2020) (citing Frazier, 2012

WL 832285, at *1).

17 Bounds, 314 F.R.D. at 218; Humphries v. Progressive Corp., No. 20-548, 2022 WL 1018404, at *2 (N.D. Tex. Apr.

5, 2022); Singletary, 289 F.R.D. at 240 n.2 (citing cases); Artis v. Murphy-Brown LLC, No. 14-237, 2018 WL 3352639,

at *2 (E.D.N.C. July 8, 2018) (citing Brown v. Mountainview Cutters, LLC, No. 15-204, 2016 WL 3045349, at *2

(W.D. Va. May 27, 2016) (“[E]ven if the court could find that [the movant] did not have standing to quash the

subpoenas under Rule 45 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, she would still have standing under Rule 26 to

challenge the subpoenas as irrelevant and overbroad.”)).

18 Zamora, 2017 WL 1861843, at *3 (citing Chamberlain, 2007 WL 2786421, at *1 (citing, inter alia, FED. R. CIV.

P. 45 advisory committee’s notes to 1970 amendment (stating “the scope of discovery through a subpoena is the same

as that applicable to Rule 34 and the other discovery rules”))); Romac Env’t Servs., 2022 WL 1924106, at *4.

outside the scope permitted by Rule 26(b)(1),”19 the court must quash a non-party subpoena duces

tecum that is overly broad or seeks irrelevant information.20

D. Standard for Protective Order

Under Rule 26, a “court may, for good cause, issue an order to protect a party or person

from annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, or undue burden or expense.” FED. R. CIV. P.

26(c)(1). “Good cause” exists when disclosure will result in a clearly defined and serious injury

to the party seeking the protective order.21 In determining good cause, the court must balance the

risk of injury without the protective order and the requesting party's need for information.22 The

party seeking the protective order bears the burden of showing that a protective order is necessary,

“which contemplates a particular and specific demonstration of fact as distinguished from

stereotyped and conclusory statements.”23 And, “under Fifth Circuit law, the party resisting

discovery must show specifically how each discovery request is not relevant or otherwise

objectionable,” including “on a [Federal Rule of Civil Procedure] 26(c) motion for a protective

order.”24

Rule 26 offers a variety of potential options that the court may use to protect the moving

party, including forbidding or limiting the scope of discovery into certain matters. FED. R. CIV. P.

26(c)(1)(D). A district court may exercise its sound discretion in determining how far to restrict

19 FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(C)(iii).

20 See Zamora, 2017 WL 1861843, at *3 (“[W]hile ‘Rule 45 does not list irrelevance or overbreadth as reasons for

quashing a subpoena[,] . . . the [c]ourt must review . . . subpoena duces tecum under the relevancy standards set forth

in Rule 26(b).’” (quoting HDSherer LLC v. Nat’l Molecular Testing Corp., 292 F.R.D. 305, 308 (D.S.C. 2013)));

Singletary, 289 F.R.D. at 241 (“Thus, regardless of whether the Court considers Plaintiff’s Motion under Rule 45 or

Rule 26, the Court must review Defendant’s subpoenas under the relevancy standards set forth in Rule 26(b).”).

21 Pansy v. Borough of Stroudsburg, 23 F.3d 772, 786 (3d Cir. 1994) (citation and quotation omitted).

22 Blanchard & Co., Inc. v. Barrick Gold Corp., No. 02-3721, 2004 WL 737485, at *5 (E.D. La. Apr. 5, 2004).

23 E.E.O.C. v. BDO USA, L.L.P., 876 F.3d 690, 698 (5th Cir. 2017) (citing In re Terra Int’l, 134 F.3d 302, 306 (5th

Cir. 1998) (quoting United States v. Garrett, 571 F.2d 1323, 1326 n.3 (5th Cir. 1978))).

24 Humphries, 2022 WL 1018404, at *2 (quoting Samsung Elecs. Am. Inc. v. Chung, 325 F.R.D. 578, 593 (N.D. Tex.

2017)).

discovery, and in particular, the decision whether to grant or deny a request for a protective order

is entrusted to the district court’s sound discretion.25 The trial court enjoys wide discretion in

setting the parameters of a protective order.26

E. Rule 26(c)(1) Certification

A motion for a protective order pursuant to Rule 26(c)(1) “must include a certification that

the movant has in good faith conferred or attempted to confer with other affected parties in an

effort to resolve the dispute without court action.” These requirements are the same as that of Rule

37(a)(1).27 Conference requirements are no “empty formality”:28

Conference requirements encourage resolving discovery disputes without

judicial involvement. Failure to confer or attempt to confer may result in

unnecessary motions. When the court must resolve a dispute that the parties

themselves could have resolved, it must needlessly expend resources that it could

better utilize elsewhere. Failure to confer generally serves as a basis for denying a

discovery motion.29

Courts retain discretion to waive strict compliance with Rule 26(c)(1) and generally do so when a

conference would be a “waste of time” or when “it is clear that the motion is opposed and that a

conference would neither have eliminated nor narrowed the parties dispute.”30 While Rule 45 does

not require certification that parties (and non-parties) have met and conferred before filing a motion

25 Nguyen v. Excel Corp., 197 F.3d 200, 209 n.27 (5th Cir. 1999) (citation omitted).

26 See Seattle Times Co. v. Rhinehart, 467 U.S. 20, 36 (1984) (“To be sure, Rule 26(c) confers broad discretion on the

trial court to decide when a protective order is appropriate and what degree of protection is required.”).

27 FED. R. CIV. P. 37(a)(1) (“The motion must include a certification that the movant has in good faith conferred or

attempted to confer with the person or party failing to make disclosure or discovery in an effort to obtain it without

court action.”); see also Riverbend Env’t Servs., LLC v. Crum & Foster Specialty Ins. Co., No. 22-31, 2023 WL

2563228, *3 (S.D. Miss. Mar. 17, 2023) (“Both [Rule] 26(c)(1) and [Rule] 37(a)(1) require a certification of good

faith.”); Prince v. Transportes Zuazua LLC, No. 17-21, 2018 WL 2985910 (S.D. Tex. Apr. 6, 2018) (noting meet-

and-confer certification required for a Rule 26(c)(1) motion is the “same” required for a Rule 37 motion to compel);

Brown v. Bridges, No. 12-4947, 2015 WL 11121361, at *3 (N.D. Tex. Jan. 30, 2015); Baxter v. Louisiana, No. 21-

555, 2022 WL 1509118, at *2 n.11 (M.D. La. May 12, 2022).

28 Riverbend, 2023 WL 2563228, *3.

29 Bridges, 2015 WL 11121361, at *3 (internal quotations and citations omitted).

30 Id. at *5 (quoting Pulsecard, Inc v. Discover Card Servs., Inc., 168 F.R.D. 295, 302 (D. Kan. 1996); Vinewood

Cap., L.L.C. v. Al Islami, No. 06-316, 2006 WL 3151535, at *2 (N.D. Tex. Nov. 2, 2006); Obregon v. Melton, No.

02-1009, 2002 WL 1792086, at *1 n.3 (N.D. Tex. Aug. 2, 2002)).

to quash, when such a motion is filed in conjunction with a Rule 26(c)(1) motion, the movant is

required to meet and confer and provide the necessary certification.31

IV. ANALYSIS

Contrary to Rogers’ contention, Hutson is not required to meet and confer before issuing a

subpoenas duces tecum.32 Rather, a party issuing a subpoena need only serve notice and a copy

of the subpoena on the other party before service upon the person to whom the subpoena is

directed. FED. R. CIV. P. 45(a)(4). In contrast, however, because Rogers has filed a motion for

a protective order in conjunction with her motion to quash, she is required to comply with Rule

26(c)(1)’s meet-and-confer and certification requirements.33 Rogers has failed to provide the

requisite pre-filing certification, and it does not appear she attempted to confer with Hutson at any

point between the issuance of the first subpoena and the filing of this motion.34 The failure to

engage in a fulsome meet and confer prior to filing a motion constitutes sufficient reason in itself

to deny the motion.35 Indeed, courts routinely deny discovery motions for failure to comply with

Rule 37(a)(1).36

31 UMB Bank, N.A. v. Sanofi, No. 15-8725, 2017 WL 3738457, at *1 n.1 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 10, 2017); accord. 4R4 Sons,

LLC v. Tru G. Wilhelm, Inc., No. 21-1081, 2022 WL 1359827, *2 (D. Nev. Feb. 8, 2022) (denying party’s motion to

quash non-party subpoena or for a protective order because the party did not properly meet and confer).

32 See Noatex Corp. v. King Constr. of Hous., LLC, 864 F. Supp. 2d 478, 491 (N.D. Miss. 2012); see also Shi v. Cent.

Ariz. Coll., No. 08-80131, 2008 WL 4001795, at *1 n.1 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 27, 2008); Spencer v. Greenwald, No. 20-

440, 2022 WL 2180052, at *4 (D. Idaho June 15, 2022); cf. Brown & Root Indus. Servs. v. Brown, No. 21-291, 2023

WL 3480882, at *2 (M.D. La. May 16, 2023) (“[T]he meet and confer requirement of Rule 37 do not apply to motions

brought pursuant to Rule 45 (citing cases)).

33 See Hardy v. Scandinavian Airline Sys., No. 21-1591, 2025 WL 416106, at *8 (E.D. La. Feb. 6, 2025) (citing Sanofi,

2017 WL 3738457, at *1 n.1).

34 See ECF No. 58 at 3.

35 Shaw Grp. Inc. v. Zurich Am. Ins. Co., No. 12-257, 2014 WL 4373197, at *3 (M.D. La. Sept. 3, 2014); see also

Forever Green Athletic Fields, Inc. v. Babcock Law Firm, LLC, No. 11-633 (M.D. La. July 2, 2014) (denying motion

to compel where defense counsel made a single attempt by email to meet and confer and did not do so in a good faith

effort to resolve the dispute without court intervention).

36 See, e.g., Greer v. Bramhall, 77 F. App’x 254, 255 (5th Cir. 2003) (finding the district court did not abuse its

discretion in denying motion to compel for failing to follow Rule 37); D.H. Griffin Wrecking Co., Inc. v. 1031 Canal

Dev., L.L.C., No. 20-1051, 2020 WL 8265341, at *3 (E.D. La. Apr. 16, 2020) (citations omitted).

Many of the issues raised in this motion could have, and should have, been resolved by the

parties after a good faith meet-and-confer, without the need for court intervention.37 For instance,

courts routinely address a plaintiff’s privacy or reputational concerns incident to a release of

employment records via a protective order limiting the use and disclosure of the documents to

purposes of the litigation only.38 Likewise, with respect to personnel files, the court must balance

the competing interests of discovery and privacy in a considered manner with regard for the

breadth of the federal discovery rules.39 Personnel files often contain tax records, drug tests results,

and other such personal, sensitive material.40 In light of these concerns, courts typically require

that a party requesting employment information specify the needed requests with particularity41

rather than allowing a blanket request for complete personnel files, which no doubt contain private

or personal information of no relevance to any claim or defense.42

With this guidance, the parties are directed to meet and confer regarding the discovery

sought. If, after a fulsome conference, the parties are then unable to reach an agreement as to the

protections governing any produced documents and the proper scope of the request for

37 See ECF No. 58 at 1 (indicating Defendant is agreeable to the entry of an appropriate protective order).

38 See, e.g., Clark v. Schlumberger Tech. Corp., No. 18-93, 2019 WL 13253888, at *2-3 (W.D. Tex. Sept. 18, 2019);

Cunningham v. Concentrix Sols. Corp., No. 20-661, 2021 WL 425099, at *3 (E.D. Tex. Feb. 8, 2021); Rice, 2011

WL 5513181, at *2-3, *5. A sample order of the undersigned is available on the court’s website. See The

Honorable Donna Phillips Currault, UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA,

http://www.laed.uscourts.gov/judges-information/judge/honorable-donna-phillips-currault (last visited August 22,

2025) (“Sample Documents”).

39 In re Gulf Inland Contractors, Inc., No. 22-2453, 2023 WL 11884364, at *3 (E.D. La. Sept. 25, 2023) (citing George

v. Entergy Servs., Inc., No. 09-3676, 2010 WL 3802452, at *4 (E.D. La. Sept. 17, 2010)); see also Dufrene v. Am.

Tugs, Inc., No. 18-554, 2018 WL 6448838, at *9 (E.D. La. Dec. 10, 2018) (stating that “personnel files have a specific

discovery test in the Fifth Circuit for a reason: They are special”).

40 Dufrene, 2018 WL 6448838, at *9 (“The privacy concerns implicated by a personnel file are distinct from those

presented by a custodial file, because they are far more likely to contain personal, sensitive material”) (citing Williams

v. Roy O. Martin Lumber Co. L.L.C., 51 F. App’x 483, 2002 WL 31319337, at *6 (5th Cir. 2002) (noting that “alimony

and child support garnishment, tax records, and drug test results” may be found in a personnel file)).

41 Gulf Inland Contractors, 2023 WL 11884364, at *3 (citing Dufrene, 2018 WL 6448838, at *9).

42 See Hamm v. Acadia Healthcare Co., No. 20-1515, 2023 WL 8237270, at *7 (E.D. La. Nov. 28, 2023) (finding that

Plaintiff’s request for the complete personnel file of each and every supervisory employee “far exceeds the ultimate

and necessary boundaries of discovery”); Canon U.S.A., Inc. v. S.A.M., Inc., No. 07-01201, 2008 WL 11350298, at

*8 (E.D. La. June 19, 2008) (“In seeking the contents of [employee’s] employment file, the Court notes that

[defendant] attempts to engage in a fishing expedition.”).

employment records, the parties may then file a proper motion. At this time, however, the request

for court intervention is premature.

V. CONCLUSION

Accordingly, for the foregoing reasons,

IT IS ORDERED that Plaintiff's Motion to Quash Rule 45 subpoenas and for a Protective

Order (ECF No. 54) is DENIED WITHOUT PREJUDICE for the reasons stated herein.

New Orleans, Louisiana, this 27th day of August, 2025.

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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