Allen Jr. v. Pennsylvania State Police Carlisle Troop H

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

THURMOND ALLEN JR., :

Plaintiff : CIV. ACTION NO. 3:25-CV-106

v. : (JUDGE MANNION)

PENNSYLVANIA STATE POLICE :

CARLISLE TROOP H, et al.,

:

Defendants

:

MEMORANDUM

This is a prisoner civil rights case filed pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §1983 in

which plaintiff alleges civil rights violations arising from an alleged sexual

assault and several other incidents. For the reasons set forth below, the

complaint will be dismissed in part with prejudice, and the case will be

allowed to proceed solely with respect to plaintiff’s claims against defendant

Voorstad.

I. BACKGROUND

Plaintiff, Thurmond Allen Jr., filed this case on December 31, 2024,

and the court received and docketed her1 complaint on January 17, 2025.

(Doc. 1). Although no parties were initially served with the complaint, on

March 28, 2025, counsel for defendant Wellpath LLC and other defendants

employed by Wellpath entered an appearance and then filed a suggestion of

bankruptcy and request for stay based on Wellpath’s filing for bankruptcy

protection in the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of

Texas. (Doc. 19). On May 15, 2025, Wellpath informed the court that it had

emerged from bankruptcy protection and that the automatic bankruptcy stay

no longer applied to this case. (Doc. 20). Allen accordingly filed a motion to

“proceed to the case” on August 1, 2025. (Doc. 22). The case is now before

the court for a mandatory screening review pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §1915A(a)

and 28 U.S.C. §1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).

1 In an earlier case filed by plaintiff, the court referred to plaintiff by the

masculine pronouns “he” and “him,” which was in accordance with plaintiff’s

pronoun usage in that case. See Allen v. Wellpath LLC, No. 1:24-CV-1536,

Docs. 37-38 (M.D. Pa. Aug. 20, 2025). The court now refers to plaintiff by

the feminine pronouns “she” and “her” because plaintiff states in the

complaint in this case that she identifies as a transgender woman and uses

feminine pronouns.

The complaint asserts numerous civil rights claims arising from events

that occurred in late 2022 and early 2023. As explained below, several of

these claims are patently untimely because they are based on events that

occurred more than two years before the filing of Allen’s complaint. Because

these claims cover the first 65 pages of Allen’s 142-page complaint, the court

will not summarize these claims in the interest of judicial economy.

According to the complaint,2 Allen was incarcerated in SCI-Camp Hill’s

restricted housing unit (“RHU”) on January 3, 2023. (Id. at 65). defendant

Voorstad, a doctor in the prison, came to the RHU and stated that he needed

to assess Allen’s abdominal pain. (Id.) Defendants Ressler and John Doe 1

then purportedly strip-searched Allen, handcuffed her, and transported her

to a medical cell. (Id.)

Voorstad began examining Allen in the medical cell. (Id.) Defendants

Ressler and John Does 1-6 were present in the room. (Id.) Voorstad

instructed Allen to lie on the bed in the cell and “rubbed and ran his hand all

over [Allen’s] abdomen.” (Id. at 66). Voorstad purportedly stated that he

2 The complaint contains numerous allegations of hundreds of

defendants taking mundane actions such as, for example, filing information

in electronic logging systems, responding to grievances and related appeals,

and walking through cell blocks without doing or saying anything else. In the

interest of judicial economy, the court summarizes these allegations only

when they are pertinent to Allen’s claims.

would order H-Pylori, stool, and thyroid tests for Allen. (Id.) Allen told

Voorstad that she had regular constipation and that her intestines were “full

of feces” sometime in July 2022. (Id.) John Doe 1 then stated, “yeah, he’s

full of shit.” (Id.)

At this point, Voorstad purportedly stated that he would perform a rectal

examination on Allen. (Id.) He directed her to lie down on her left side, facing

the wall, with handcuffs on. (Id.) Voorstad then allegedly pulled down her

underwear and exposed her buttocks. (Id.) Allen asked if she could be turned

so that her buttocks were facing away from the other people in the room, but

Voorstad said this could not be done because he could perform the

examination better with his right hand. (Id.) Allen asked if the officers could

leave the room, but they instructed her that at least one had to remain in the

room. (Id.) John Doe 1 stayed in the room, and the others exited, though

defendant Ressler remained just outside the cell. (Id.)

Voorstad allegedly placed his hand on Allen’s hip and held her down

before allegedly placing his finger in Allen’s anus. (Id. at 66-67). Voorstad

then allegedly “cupped his fingers together and slid his entire right hand into

the plaintiff’s anus, very fast and violently, holding it there with the same initial

force” he had used to put his finger in her anus. (Id. at 67). Voorstad

purportedly “moved his fingers around” and “turned them into a fist” inside

Allen’s anus. (Id.) Allen purportedly wanted to scream and cry because of

the pain and tried to fight back against Voorstad’s touch but could not

because she was handcuffed and facing the wall. (Id.) John Doe 1

purportedly observed this and called John Doe 2 over to look into the cell as

Voorstad’s entire right hand was inside Allen’s anus. (Id.) At that point,

Voorstad removed his hand from Allen’s anus, which allegedly caused a

large amount of lubrication to “pour[] out all over the plaintiff’s buttocks, the

medical bed, and on the floor.” (Id.) John Doe 2 allegedly laughed and said,

“what the fuck, man.” (Id.) Voorstad allegedly handed Allen six paper towels

and told her to wipe herself. (Id.) The complaint asserts that Voorstad’s

actions constituted sexual assault and that defendants Ressler and John

Does 1 and 2 failed to intervene to prevent the assault. (Id.) Ressler and

John Doe escorted Allen back to her cell. (Id. at 68). At that point, she

attempted to wipe herself off with a towel, but the wiping caused significant

pain. (Id.) Allen continued to experience significant pain and felt like she

could not sit down. (Id.) She also allegedly felt “drafts … up her anus.” (Id.)

At approximately 4:00 PM on the day of the alleged assault, Allen was

escorted to the prison’s medical dispensary. (Id.) Allen asked defendants

Stepanski and Billow, two nurses in the dispensary, whether Voorstad had

followed the correct procedures for a rectal exam. Stepanski and Billow

purportedly “appeared appalled” and told her he had not. (Id.) Stepanski and

Billow allegedly began making phone calls to inform others of Allen’s

allegations of sexual assault. (Id. at 70). Allen began “uncontrollably crying.”

(Id.) Defendant Duggan, a correctional officer, instructed Allen to remove her

clothing and placed the clothing in a Zip-loc evidence bag. (Id.)

Allen was transported to the emergency room at an outside hospital at

approximately 5:31 PM. (Id.) At the emergency room, Allen was placed in a

wheelchair and taken to an examination room where a CAT scan and blood

work were performed on her. (Id.) Two nurses performed a rape kit

examination on her. (Id. at 71). The nurses concluded that there were

lacerations, abrasions, and redness present on Allen’s anus that were

consistent with a sexual assault. (Id.) The nurses prescribed her Tylenol,

stated that the wounds would heal on their own in a week, and instructed her

to wait “a while” before attempting to defecate. (Id.) Allen asked the nurses

and the doctor who were present in the room what the correct procedure was

for a rectal examination, and they purportedly stated, “just a finger or two.”

(Id.) Allen again began to cry. (Id.) The doctor purportedly concluded that

she had been sexually assaulted. (Id.)

Defendants Carey and Gooley, officers with the Pennsylvania State

Police (“PSP”), interviewed Allen at the hospital and collected the rape kit as

evidence. (Id.) Defendant Highhouse, another officer with the PSP allegedly

examined the rape kit between 2:00 AM and 5:00 AM. (Id.) Allen was

transported back from the hospital, where defendant Voorstad allegedly

placed her under 23-hour observation in retaliation for complaining about his

conduct. (Id. at 72). Voorstad also purportedly contacted the hospital and

asked if detailed medical records could be released. (Id.) Defendant Bartrow,

a correctional officer in the prison, placed Allen in a psychiatric observation

cell in accordance with Voorstad’s orders. (Id.) After she was placed in the

cell, Voorstad purportedly entered the “Sapphire System” and manipulated

Allen’s medical records. (Id.)

Officers in the housing block where Allen was housed purportedly

denied her pain medications, a blanket, and medical follow-up. (Id.) They

also purportedly “slammed” the door of the unit at all hours of the night to

keep Allen from sleeping. (Id.) Defendant Cirri purportedly falsified

information indicating that she had seen Allen for medical care during this

period. (Id.) Allen requested pain medications and a “coolant for her rectum

and anus” from defendant Bogue, but Bogue allegedly denied the request.

(Id.)

At approximately 2:00 PM on January 4, 2023, defendants Harrell and

Cirri, two nurses in the prison, came to Allen’s cell. (Id. at 73). Allen began

to tell them what Voorstad had done, but a John Doe officer interrupted the

conversation. (Id.) Allen told him to mind his own business. (Id.) Allen then

finished telling Harrell and Cirri what happened, at which point Harrell and

Cirri went into another room. (Id.) Defendants Fultz, Timpe, and John Doe 3

arrived in the housing block, at which point Allen overheard Fultz telling

Harrell and Cirri to “not give that motherfucker Allen shit.” (Id.) Allen then

yelled that they were planning to retaliate against her. (Id.)

At approximately 3:00 AM on January 5, 2023, John Does 16 and 17

purportedly came to Allen’s cell, impersonated “PREA lieutenants,”3 and

asked Allen various questions about the alleged assault. (Id.) At

approximately 7:00 PM that night, defendants Kaser, Swearingen, and

multiple John Doe correctional officers escorted Allen away from the

observation cell and back to the RHU, where they strip-searched her and

placed her in a “suicide camera cell.” (Id. at 74).

Allen’s cell in the RHU purportedly had feces on the wall, no heat, and

continuous cold air blowing through the vents. (Id.) Officers purportedly did

not give Allen any extra clothing or blankets for the cold. (Id.) It was allegedly

3 The court takes judicial notice that “PREA” refers to the “Prison Rape

Elimination Act,” a statute that, inter alia, sets rules and standards for prison

investigations into allegations of sexual misconduct by prison officials.

so cold in the cell that Allen could see her breath. (Id.) She was also allegedly

unable to flush the toilet in her cell, which led to the continuous smell of feces

in the cell. (Id.) Allen purportedly remained in this cell until January 10, 2023.

(Id.) Allen allegedly saw defendants Vega and Swearingen throw away her

outgoing mail during this period. (Id.) Allen asked defendant Barnes whether

the cold temperatures in the cell could be fixed on January 10, 2023, and

Barnes purportedly stated that a work order had been placed. (Id.)

John Doe 2 moved Allen to another cell on January 10, 2023, after

defendant Schneck asked other prison officials if Allen could be moved. (Id.

at 75). The other cell, however, also had feces on the wall and trash and dirt

on the floor and was very cold. (Id.) Shortly after her placement in this cell,

she was escorted back to the medical department to recover some of her

belongings that were there. (Id.) Her mail had purportedly been sitting in the

“wicket” of her old cell since January 4, 2023, but the officers escorting her

did not allow her to get the mail. (Id.) Instead, defendant Swearingen brought

the mail to her at approximately 5:58 PM that day. (Id.) The mail included a

response to one of her grievances, which was dated January 4, 2023. (Id.)

The complaint alleges that this date was placed on the response fraudulently

and that the response was not actually written on that date. (Id.)

On January 11, 2023, Allen asked defendants Timpe, Fultz, Campaign,

Jones, Arentz, Miller, and John Does 2 and 12 if they could help her with the

cold temperatures in the cell, but they allegedly ignored or denied her

requests for help. (Id. at 76-77). On January 12, 2023, defendants Smith and

John Doe 3 allegedly denied Allen a breakfast tray, a shower, and yard time.

(Id. at 78). Allen called for Fultz’s help, but Fultz purportedly ignored her. (Id.)

The complaint states that Allen was “convinced” that she was being denied

“heat, law library, food, sleep, exercise (yard), healthcare (medical and

mental), and showers for retaliatory, personal vendetta, hateful, racist and

sexist reasons.” (Id.) Later that day, officers deliver Allen’s lunch but failed to

give her a “bread bag with condiments.” (Id.) Allen then purportedly heard

Smith say to John Doe 12, “oh you mean chicks with dicks over there in 12,”

referring to Allen. (Id.) The complaint alleges that around this time,

defendants Duggan, Kaser, and Swearingen denied Allen grievance forms.

(Id. at 80). Allen, however, was “eventually” able to file a grievance. (Id.)

On January 13, 2023, unnamed officers in the RHU purportedly turned

on the exhaust fan in the unit, which made it significantly colder. (Id.) Allen

asked defendants Vito, Timpe, Fultz, Miller, Masiti, Williams, and John Doe

38 to turn off the fan and turn up the heat, but they allegedly ignored her or

failed to remedy the situation. (Id. at 80-81). On the same day, John Doe 3

purportedly gave Allen a lunch tray with soy ingredients, despite her being

on a no-soy diet. (Id. at 81). The exhaust fan was turned off at approximately

11:00 AM. (Id.) The heat was then turned on at 2:15 PM. (Id.)

Defendant Rutherford purportedly came to Allen’s cell for a medical

sick call at approximately 3:35 PM on January 13, 2023. (Id.) Rutherford

noticed that Allen’s feet were very cold and stated that he would approve an

extra blanket for her, but did not provide foot warmers, thermal socks, or

“diabetic/soft” shoes. (Id.) Defendant Antwi and John Doe 28 purportedly

denied Allen paid medication later that day. (Id.) John Doe 28 also allegedly

denied Allen a blanket, foot warmers, or thermal socks. (Id. at 82). On

January 13, 2023, unnamed officers in the RHU again turned off the heat

and turned on the exhaust fan. (Id.)

On January 16, 2023, John Does 9-11 strip searched Allen and then

escorted her out of her RHU cell and in the prison’s security office. (Id.) While

in the office, defendants Forcey and Stepanchik, two officers with the PSP,

interviewed Allen pursuant to their investigation of the alleged sexual assault

by Voorstad. (Id.) During the interview, Forcey purportedly threatened Allen

that she would be criminally charged if it was determined that she was lying

about her allegations against Voorstad. (Id.)

On January 18, 2023, defendants Harrell and Gordon, two nurses in

the prison, provided follow-up care for Allen’s injuries suffered in the alleged

assault. (Id.) Allen purportedly learned during this time that officers were

recording all of her movements in the prison on handheld cameras, which

they purportedly were not doing for any other inmates. (Id. at 84-85). On

January 22, 2023, and January 23, 2023, defendants Duggan, Kaser, Eaton,

Swearingen, Vega, Kithcart, and other unnamed officers purportedly

destroyed 24 pieces of Allen’s outgoing mail. (Id. at 85). The complaint

additionally alleges that between December 27, 2022, and February 15,

2023, Allen was only allowed to use the prison law library twice. (Id. at 86).

On January 25, 2023, defendant Henderson purportedly issued

misconduct charges against Allen for refusal to obey an order. (Id. at 89).

After conducting a hearing on the misconduct charges, defendant Schneck

found Allen not guilty of the charges. (Id.)

On January 27, 2023, defendants Henderson and Hunter purportedly

put “red cleaner solution” in Allen’s food. (Id.) Allen allegedly felt sick after

consuming the meal. (Id. at 89-90). Defendants Henderson and Kithcart then

purportedly gave her a dull, used razor later that day. (Id. at 90). After using

the razor, Allen developed “large ingrown hairs and razor bumps” which

became infected and caused significant pain. (Id.)

On February 1, 2023, defendants Campaign and Timpe purportedly

denied Allen a bread bag with one of her meals. (Id.) On February 2, 2023,

several defendants allegedly arranged to have another inmate, “Triz,” placed

in a cell directly across the hall from Allen’s cell to “harass and intimidate”

her. (Id. at 91). Triz and other inmates purportedly began verbally harassing

Allen immediately. (Id. at 92). Defendants Vito and Yox allegedly denied

Allen another bread bag on February 5, 2023. (Id.) Vito allegedly called Allen

a “rat and snitch,” and stated that she would be placed in disciplinary

custody. (Id.) Vito then filed misconduct charges against Allen for threatening

a staff member. (Id. at 93). In the charges, Vito stated that after Allen asked

for her bread bag, she stated, “fuck you pussy, I’ll max out, find you in the

streets.” (Id.) The complaint alleges that these allegations were false. (Id.)

On February 13, 2023, defendants Zimmerman and John Doe 19 came

to Allen’s cell, strip searched her, and then handcuffed her to escort her to

the prison’s shower facilities. (Id. at 93-94). However, defendants

subsequently denied her a shower. (Id. at 94). On February 15, 2023,

defendants Zimmerman and John Does 34 and 42 purportedly destroyed

three pens from Allen’s cell. (Id. at 96). Later that day, John Doe allegedly

called Allen a racial slur after escorting to a room for a call with an attorney.

(Id. at 97). Later that day, defendant Miller, a unit manager in the prison,

asked Allen if she wanted to be transferred back to general population. (Id.

at 98). Allen agreed and was transferred several hours later. (Id.)

On February 17, 2023, Allen passed two other inmates on a walkway,

one of whom stated that he knew Allen “dropped the slip” on his cellmate,

which Allen interpreted as an accusation that Allen had reported the inmate’s

misconduct to authorities. (Id. at 99). The inmate stated that he had seen

“the paperwork,” and that it would be “handled,” and threatened to kill Allen.

(Id.) Allen approached John Doe 25 and asked if she could wait there for the

other two inmates to leave the area, but John Doe 25 denied her request.

(Id.) Allen subsequently saw the other two inmates in another area of the

prison, and reported her safety concerns to defendants “St. Pierre,

Bengham, Chizzler, and Howdyshell.” (Id. at 100). On February 24, 2023,

Allen was transferred from SCI-Camp Hill to SCI-Mahanoy. (Id. at 101).

In March 2023, defendant Forcey prepared a search warrant for

medical records from the hospital that treated Allen following the alleged

sexual assault. (Id. at 102). Defendant Hair-Larue, an attorney with the

Cumberland County District Attorney’s Office, and defendant Delozier, a

magisterial district justice in the Cumberland County Court of Common

Pleas, approved the warrant. (Id.) After serving the warrant and reviewing

the medical records, Forcey purportedly concluded that Allen had not

suffered any physical injuries during the incident. (Id. at 102-03). Forcey

subsequently prepared a criminal complaint against Allen for falsely

accusing Voorstad, which Hair-Larue approved. (Id.) Delozier signed an

affidavit of probable cause for the complaint. (Id. at 103). Charges were

subsequently filed against Allen on April 19, 2023. (Id.)

Allen was subsequently transferred back to SCI-Camp Hill in

preparation for her criminal case and was placed in the RHU. (Id. at 106).

On her way to her cell, defendant Marshall purportedly took several legal

documents from her that Allen needed to prepare for the criminal case. (Id.)

Allen’s cell in the RHU purportedly had feces, trash, and dirt on the floor and

walls and the lights in the housing block were always on. (Id.) Officers in the

housing block allegedly denied her showers and use of the exercise yard.

(Id. at 107). On May 14, 2023, Allen was denied breakfast and lunch. (Id.)

On May 15, 2023, defendant Delozier conducted a preliminary hearing

on Allen’s criminal charges, after which he scheduled a trial in the case

before a judge on the Cumberland County Court of Common Pleas. (Id. at

107-110). When Allen returned to the RHU, correctional staff denied her a

meal. (Id. at 110-11). Allen alleges that from May 11, 2023, to May 30, 2023,

she was only allowed to use the law library twice, and that the law library did

not have a working toilet or sink and smelled like feces, urine, and trash. (Id.)

The complaint alleges that some time in late May 2023, an inmate on

the floor above Allen’s floor “did a parachute,” i.e., flushed a sheet or towel

down the toilet in his cell, which purportedly caused a “violent rush” of feces

and other material coming out of Allen’s toilet and the other toilets on her

floor. (Id. at 113). Defendants Kaser, Marshall, Henderson, Eaton, Bob, and

several John and Jane Does allegedly moved all the inmates off of the floor

except for Allen and one other inmate. (Id.) Allen remained in her cell until

May 30, 2023, when she was transferred back to SCI-Mahanoy. (Id. at 114).

Allen’s criminal charges proceeded to trial before defendant Guido, a

judge on the Cumberland County Court of Common Pleas, from May 3, 2023,

to May 8, 2023. (Id. at 118). During the trial, Allen purportedly learned that

Forcey had only obtained ten pages of her medical records when he sought

the records. (Id.) The full records—which were obtained by Allen’s counsel

and placed into evidence during the trial—purportedly established that Allen

suffered physical injuries during the alleged assault by Voorstad. (Id. at 118-

19). At the conclusion of the trial, the jury acquitted Allen of all charges. (Id.

at 119). The complaint asserts that this acquittal establishes that there was

no probable cause for the charges against Allen. (Id.)

The complaint asserts the following claims for relief:4 (1) sexual assault

in violation of the Eighth Amendment; (2) assault and battery under

Pennsylvania law; (3) placement in the RHU that violated Allen’s right to due

process under the Fourteenth Amendment; (4) deliberate indifference to a

serious medical need in violation of the Eighth Amendment; (5) negligence

and medical malpractice in Allen’s medical care; (6) negligence by the

defendants involved in the alleged sexual assault; (7) cruel and unusual

punishment in violation of the Eighth amendment based on the conditions of

Allen’s confinement; (8) negligence, assault, and battery under Pennsylvania

law based on the conditions of Allen’s confinement; (9) deliberate

indifference, defamation, slander, negligence, invasion of privacy, intrusion

upon seclusion, and gender discrimination based on defendants’ verbal

harassment of Allen and statements indicating that she was a snitch; (10)

malicious prosecution, false imprisonment, false arrest, intrusion of privacy,

false light invasion of privacy, intrusion upon seclusion, injurious falsehood,

4 Because plaintiff’s claims are set out over 19 pages, assert hundreds

of individual claims, and contain innumerable subparts, asides, and

statements of claims that are not clearly explained, the court limits its

summary of plaintiff’s claims to the nineteen categories of claims that can

reasonably be understood based on the text of the complaint. To the extent

any other claims are advanced, they are dismissed for failure to state a claim

upon which relief may be granted because Allen has not adequately

explained the factual basis of the claims.

abuse of process, defamation, slander, libel, and negligence based on the

initiation of criminal charges against Allen for her allegations against

Voorstad; (11) cruel and unusual punishment, assault, battery, and

negligence based on the placement of cleaning solution in plaintiff’s food;

(12) denial of Allen’s right of access to courts and negligence based on her

limited access to the prison law library; (13) deliberate indifference, invasion

of privacy, intrusion upon seclusion, and negligence based on defendants

allegedly telling other inmates that plaintiff had informed on them; (14)

interference with Allen’s right to communicate with an attorney; (15) violation

of Allen’s right to due process during various disciplinary proceedings; (16)

retaliation and civil conspiracy; (17) negligent misrepresentation, fraudulent

misrepresentation, deceit, fraud, and negligence based on various

statements that Allen alleges were false; (18) medical malpractice,

negligence, and lack of informed consent against Voorstad; and (19)

spoliation of evidence and negligence based on defendants alleged failure

to preserve evidence for her claims against Voorstad.5 (Id. at 121-39).

5 Plaintiff additionally asserts various claims based on defendants

interfering with her ability to practice her religion, viewing her naked, throwing

her shower shoes away, placing her in cells with various cellmates, and

interfering with her personal property, (see id. at 128-29, 135), but these

claims are based on facts that are outside the limitations period and will

therefore be dismissed as untimely as explained below.

II. DISCUSSION

This court must review a complaint when “a prisoner seeks redress

from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity.”

28 U.S.C. §1915A(a). If a complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief

may be granted, the court must dismiss the complaint. Id. §1915A(b)(1). The

court has a similar screening obligation regarding actions filed by prisoners

proceeding in forma pauperis. Id. §1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) (“[T]he court shall

dismiss the case at any time if the court determines that . . . the action or

appeal . . . fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted.”).

In screening legal claims under Sections 1915A(b) and 1915(e)(2)(B),

the court applies the standard governing motions to dismiss filed pursuant to

Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See, e.g., Coward v.

City of Philadelphia, 546 F. Supp. 3d 331, 333 (E.D. Pa. 2021); Smith v.

Delaware, 236 F. Supp.3d 882, 886 (D. Del. 2017).

To avoid dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6), a plaintiff must set out

“sufficient factual matter” to show that the claim is facially plausible. Ashcroft

v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). This plausibility standard requires more

than a mere possibility that the defendant is liable for the alleged misconduct.

“[W]here the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more than the

mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has alleged – but it has not

‘show[n]’ – ‘that the pleader is entitled to relief.’” Id. at 679.

When evaluating the plausibility of a complaint, the court accepts as

true all factual allegations and all reasonable inferences that can be drawn

from those allegations, viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Id.

However, the court must not accept legal conclusions as true, and “a

formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action” will not survive a

district court’s screening under Section 1915A and 1915(e)(2). Bell Atl. Corp.

v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555-56 (2007).

Courts must liberally construe complaints brought by pro se litigants.

Sause v. Bauer, 585 U.S. 957, 960 (2018). Pro se complaints, “however

inartfully pleaded, must be held to less stringent standards than formal

pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007)

(quoting Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976)).

Plaintiff’s claims are filed pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §1983. Section 1983

authorizes redress for violations of constitutional rights and provides in

relevant part:

Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance,

regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory . . .

subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United

States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the

deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the

Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an

action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for

redress . . . .

42 U.S.C. §1983. Thus, to establish a successful claim under Section 1983,

a plaintiff must demonstrate that the challenged conduct was committed by

a person acting under color of state law and deprived the plaintiff of rights,

privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution or laws of the United

States. Lake v. Arnold, 112 F.3d 682, 689 (3d Cir. 1997). By its terms,

Section 1983 does not create a substantive right, but merely provides a

method for vindicating federal rights conferred by the United States

Constitution and the federal statutes that it describes. Baker v. McCollan,

443 U.S. 137 (1979).

A defendant cannot be liable for a violation of a plaintiff’s civil rights

unless the defendant was personally involved in the violation. Jutrowski v.

Twp. of Riverdale, 904 F.3d 280, 289 (3d Cir. 2018). The defendant’s

personal involvement cannot be based solely on a theory of respondeat

superior. Rode v. Dellarciprete, 845 F.2d 1195, 1207 (3d Cir. 1988). Rather,

for a supervisor to be liable for the actions of a subordinate, there must be

allegations of personal direction or actual knowledge and acquiescence. Id.

A. Untimely Claims

The court begins its analysis by dismissing several of Allen’s claims as

untimely. Section 1983 civil rights complaints brought by inmates in

Pennsylvania are governed by Pennsylvania’s two-year statute of limitations

for personal injury actions. Wisniewski v. Fisher, 857 F.3d 152, 157 (3d Cir.

2017). The limitations period begins to run on the date that the plaintiff knew,

or should have known, of the injury upon which the claim is based. Id. (citing

Sameric Corp. of Del. v. City of Phila., 142 F.3d 582, 599 (3d Cir. 1998)). A

district court may dismiss a complaint as untimely pursuant to a screening

review under 28 U.S.C. §1915(e)(2) and 28 U.S.C. §1915A if the

untimeliness is clear from the face of the complaint. McPherson v. United

States, 392 F. App’x 938, 943 (3d Cir. 2010).

Here, Allen filed her complaint on December 31, 2024.6 Thus, to be

timely, her claims must be based on events that occurred on or after

December 31, 2022. Her complaint, however, contains numerous

allegations—spanning the first 65 pages of the 142-page complaint—that

occurred before that date. Allen has not presented any basis to toll the

limitations period for these claims, nor has she shown that the claims are

timely under the continuing violations doctrine because her claims are based

on numerous discrete events rather than a single continuing pattern of

6 Pursuant to the prisoner mailbox rule, the complaint is deemed filed

on the date it was submitted to prison officials for mailing. See Pabon v.

Mahanoy, 654 F.3d 385, 391 n.8 (3d Cir. 2011)

conduct by the defendants. See Cowell v. Powell Twp., 263 F.3d 286, 292

(3d Cir. 2001) (noting that under the continuing violations doctrine, “when a

defendant's conduct is part of a continuing practice, an action is timely so

long as the last act evidencing the continuing practice falls within the

limitations period”). Accordingly, the court will dismiss the complaint with

prejudice as untimely to the extent it asserts claims based on events that

occurred prior to December 31, 2022.

B. Plainly Meritless Claims

The court will next dismiss numerous claims in the case that are plainly

meritless. Allen’s complaint advances hundreds of claims, many of which

appear to be based on nothing more than defendants’ mere presence, stray

remarks made towards her that did not cause her any harm, or trivial and

petty annoyances from her life in prison. Having extensively reviewed all 142

pages and 1,755 numbered paragraphs in the complaint under the liberal

construction afforded to pro se filings, the court finds that the only claims that

warrant extensive analysis are: (1) claims arising from defendant Voorstad’s

alleged sexual assault; (2) claims relating to the conditions of Allen’s

confinement; (3) claims arising from alleged tampering with Allen’s food; and

(4) claims relating to the alleged malicious prosecution during Allen’s criminal

case. All other claims will be dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which

relief may be granted because Allen has simply failed to allege sufficient

facts to state any other claims even on a very liberal construction of her

complaint.

C. Sexual Assault and Related Claims

Turning next to the claims arising from defendant Voorstad’s alleged

sexual assault, the court first finds that Allen has adequately stated a claim

upon which relief may be granted against Voorstad. Allen alleges that

Voorstad anally penetrated her with his entire fist without her consent in the

guise of conducting a medical examination. This is clearly sufficient to allege

a violation of Allen’s civil rights under the Eighth Amendment. See Ricks v.

Shover, 891 F.3d 468, 475 (3d Cir. 2018) (“[A] single incident of sexual

abuse, if sufficiently severe or serious, may violate an inmate’s Eighth

Amendment rights no less than repetitive abusive conduct.” (internal

emphasis omitted) (quoting Crawford v. Cuomo, 796 F.3d 252, 257 (2d Cir.

2015))). The allegations against Voorstad are also plainly sufficient to assert

state law claims for assault, battery, negligence, and malpractice based on

a lack of informed consent.

No other defendants, however, can be held be liable for Voorstad’s

alleged sexual assault. Although seven correctional officers were present or

nearby during the alleged assault, there is no allegation that the officers were

aware that Voorstad was sexually assaulting Allen. Rather, it appears from

the four corners of the complaint that the officers believed Voorstad was

conducting a legitimate rectal examination on Allen. Their mere presence

during the alleged assault is not sufficient to establish their personal

involvement. Similarly, numerous defendants are named in the complaint

based on their failure to adequately respond to Allen’s complaints and

grievances about the alleged assault, but a defendant’s after-the-fact

response to a grievance or complaint about an event is not sufficient to

establish the defendant’s personal involvement. Dooley v. Wetzel, 957 F.3d

366, 375 (3d Cir. 2020). Thus, the case will be allowed to proceed against

defendant Voorstad, but the claims against all other defendants arising from

Voorstad’s alleged assault will be dismissed.

D. Conditions of Confinement Claims

To state a claim for violation of a plaintiff’s rights based on the

conditions of her confinement, a plaintiff must allege that: (1) she was

incarcerated under conditions posing a substantial risk of serious harm; (2)

the defendants were deliberately indifferent to that risk; and (3) the

defendants’ deliberate indifference caused her harm. Williams v. Sec’y Pa.

Dep’t of Corrs., 117 F.4th 503, 514 n.58 (3d Cir. 2024).

Allen’s conditions of confinement claim is based on cold temperatures

on her housing block, the denial of several other meals, malfunctioning

toilets, and several other conditions. These conditions, either alone or in

combination, are not sufficient to state a claim upon which relief may be

granted. To begin, although exposure to cold temperature may be the basis

for a deliberate indifference claim when prison officials fail to take sufficient

measures to ensure the prisoner’s protection from the cold, see, e.g.,

Mamanna v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 934 F.3d 368, 373 (3d Cir. 2019) (citing

Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 304 (1991)), the claim may only proceed if

the conditions were extreme or the plaintiff suffered—or was likely to suffer—

significant harm. See, e.g., Bracey v. Sec’y Pa. Dep’t of Corrs., 686 F. App’x

130, 136 (3d Cir. 2017); Freeman v. Miller, 615 F. App’x 72, 79 (3d Cir. 2015).

Here, the complaint alleges that Allen endured cold temperatures for over a

week in the RHU, but it does not appear from the complaint that these

conditions were particularly extreme, and it is not alleged that Allen suffered

any risk of harm from the cold. Similarly, there is no allegation in the

complaint that the conditions posed by the malfunctioning toilets in the prison

posed any risk of harm to Allen’s health or safety other than having to deal

with the obviously unpleasant smell of feces and urine.

The denial of meals violates the Eighth Amendment only when a

substantial number of meals has been denied. Washington v. Rozich, 734 F.

App’x 798, 801 (3d Cir. 2018); Lindsey v. O’Connor, 327 F. App’x 319, 321

(3d Cir. 2009). Here, Allen alleges she was denied a handful of meals over

several months. This sporadic denial of meals is not substantial enough to

violate the Eighth Amendment. See Washington, 734 F. App’x at 801. Finally,

all other conditions of confinement alleged in Allen’s complaint appear to be

nothing more than trivial annoyances with her confinement. Thus, because

the conditions of confinement alleged simply do not violate the Eighth

Amendment, Allen’s conditions of confinement claim will be dismissed.

E. Food Tampering

The court next considers Allen’s claim that defendants Hunter and

Henderson violated her civil rights by putting “red cleaner solution” in her

“dinner pasta (red sauce).” (See Doc. 1 at 89-90). This claim does not set

out “sufficient factual matter” to state a claim upon which relief may be

granted. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. Allen has not alleged any facts to show that

she had personal knowledge that defendants poisoned her food, nor has she

alleged that she or anybody else saw the defendants place a foreign

substance in the food. Rather, it appears from the complaint that Allen simply

ate a meal and felt sick and then speculated that it must have been poisoned.

This unsupported speculation is not sufficient to “nudge” the claim “across

the line from conceivable to plausible.” Id. at 680.

F. Malicious Prosecution and Related Claims

Finally, the court considers Allen’s claims that Forcey, Hair-Larue, and

others wrongfully initiated a criminal prosecution against her. These claims

sound in malicious prosecution, false arrest, and false imprisonment.7

To state a claim for malicious prosecution under Pennsylvania law, a

plaintiff must allege: (1) the defendants initiated a criminal proceeding; (2)

the criminal proceeding ended in the plaintiff's favor; (3) the proceeding was

initiated without probable cause; and (4) the defendants acted maliciously or

for a purpose other than bringing the plaintiff to justice. Merkle v. Upper

Dublin Sch. Dist., 211 F.3d 782, 791 (3d Cir. 2000). Claims for malicious

prosecution, false arrest, and false imprisonment all require the absence of

probable cause. See, e.g., McNeil v. City of Easton, 694 F. Supp. 2d 375,

399 (E.D. Pa. 2010). The plaintiff’s acquittal on the underlying criminal

charges is not by itself sufficient to establish the absence of probable cause

7 Allen also asserts claims for intrusion of privacy, false light invasion

of privacy, intrusion upon seclusion, injurious falsehood, abuse of process,

defamation, slander, libel, and negligence arising from her criminal case, but

these claims will be dismissed for failure to state a claim because Allen has

not sufficiently explained the factual basis for the claims in her complaint.

for the charges. Fleck v. Trs. of Univ. of Pa., 995 F. Supp. 2d 390, 409 (E.D.

Pa. 2014) (citing Turano v. Hunt, 631 A.2d 822, 824 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1993)).

Here, the only basis Allen has alleged for the absence of probable

cause is that she was eventually found not guilty of the underlying criminal

charges. (See Doc. 1 at 119). This is not sufficient to show the absence of

probable cause. Fleck, 995 F. Supp. 2d at 409. Moreover, it appears from

the complaint that defendants did have probable cause to initiate the criminal

charges. It is alleged that Forcey initiated the criminal charges against Allen

after reviewing her medical records and concluding that she had not suffered

any physical injuries. (See Doc. 1 at 102-03). It is then alleged, however, that

during the trial, it became clear that Forcey had erroneously only obtained

the first ten pages of the medical records and that the remainder of the

medical records established that Allen actually did suffer physical injuries.

See id. at 118-19. There is no allegation that Forcey intentionally or

knowingly reviewed incomplete medical records; rather, it appears that he

obtained incomplete medical records because of an error made by the

hospital.8

8 The complaint asserts in conclusory fashion that Forcey obtained the

records “knowingly,” but this conclusory assertion is not entitled to the

assumption of truth. (See id. at 118).

Furthermore, there is no allegation that Forcey, Hair-Larue, or anybody

else involved in initiating criminal charges did so with malice or for any

improper purpose. It appears from the complaint that Forcey and Hair-Larue

were simply acting in their professional capacities as an officer with the PSP

and an attorney with the DA’s office in investigating whether to file criminal

charges against Allen. There are no facts alleged as to why these individuals

would have any motive to file improper criminal charges against Allen. It does

not appear that either individual had any personal relationship with Allen or

personal knowledge of her prior to their investigation.

Thus, because it appears that Forcey and Hair-Larue had probable

cause to initiate criminal charges against Allen and because there is no

allegation of malice or any improper purpose, the claims for malicious

prosecution, false arrest, and false imprisonment will all be dismissed.

G. Leave to Amend Will Be Denied

Before dismissing a civil rights claim for failure to state a claim, a district

court must permit a curative amendment unless the amendment would be

inequitable or futile. Phillips v. County of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 245 (3d

Cir. 2008). The court will deny leave to amend as futile in the instant case.

Allen’s current complaint is 142 pages and 1,755 numbered paragraphs

long, and includes seemingly every interaction she has had with any of the

over 200 named defendants she had during the relevant period. In light of

Allen’s extensive recollection of the events giving rise to the complaint, the

court finds it highly unlikely that there are any additional facts that could cure

the pleading defects the court has identified that have not already been

included in the complaint.

III. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the court will dismiss with prejudice all

claims in this case except plaintiff’s sexual assault, assault, battery,

negligence, and malpractice claims against defendant Voorstad. All other

defendants will be terminated from the case. Plaintiff’s “motion to proceed to

case” will be denied as moot. An appropriate order shall issue.

s/ Malachy E. Mannion

Malachy E. Mannion

United States District Judge

Dated: August 26, 2025

25-106-01