concluding that “the appeal period was neither tolled nor started anew by the filing of the petitions for reconsideration, . . . nor was it restarted when they were denied”
How later courts described this case
- concluding that “the appeal period was neither tolled nor started anew by the filing of the petitions for reconsideration, . . . nor was it restarted when they were denied”
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA
In re: Appeal of Prestige Design :
on Jefferson LLC :
:
v. :
:
Board of Revision of Taxes :
Philadelphia, School District :
of Philadelphia, and City of :
Philadelphia :
:
Appeal of: Prestige Design on : No. 343 C.D. 2024
Jefferson LLC : Submitted: July 7, 2025
BEFORE: HONORABLE MICHAEL H. WOJCIK, Judge
HONORABLE CHRISTINE FIZZANO CANNON, Judge
HONORABLE MARY HANNAH LEAVITT, Senior Judge
OPINION NOT REPORTED
MEMORANDUM OPINION
BY JUDGE FIZZANO CANNON FILED: August 27, 2025
Prestige Design on Jefferson LLC (Prestige on Jefferson) appeals from
an order of the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County (Common Pleas)
disposing of an appeal from the refusal of the Board of Revision of Taxes of
Philadelphia (Board) to allow a nunc pro tunc appeal from the denial of a tax
abatement application. Common Pleas granted a motion to quash the appeal and
dismissed the appeal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. In the same order, and
notwithstanding its quashal for lack of jurisdiction, Common Pleas also purported to
deny the appeal for lack of merit and affirm the Board’s refusal to entertain an
appeal. Upon review, we affirm Common Pleas’ dismissal of the appeal for lack of
subject matter jurisdiction and vacate Common Pleas’ denial of the appeal on the
merits and affirmation of the Board’s action.
I. Background
On June 14, 2017, Prestige on Jefferson’s predecessor in interest
received a building permit for construction on property located at 1441 N. 7th St.,
Philadelphia (Property). Reproduced Record (RR) at 91a. The City of Philadelphia
(City) offers property tax abatement for certain construction projects; it is undisputed
that to qualify for abatement, an application for abatement must be submitted to the
City’s Office of Property Assessment (OPA) within 60 days after issuance of the
relevant building permit. See id. at 96a & 135a. Here, therefore, the tax abatement
application had to be filed by August 13, 2017. Id. at 43a. However, no abatement
application was submitted to the OPA until May 18, 2019, almost two years after
issuance of the building permit. Id. at 43a & 93a; see also id. at 135a-36a (admitting
that no tax abatement application was filed in 2017 or 2018). The OPA denied the
abatement application as untimely. Id. at 93a & 96a.
In August 2019, Prestige on Jefferson’s previous attorney filed a
petition to appeal the denial to the Board, requesting nunc pro tunc relief to allow
late filing of the tax abatement application. RR at 45a-46a & 98a-99a. The petition
listed the petitioner’s address as “534 E. Girard Avenue, Phila, PA 19125” and stated
as justification for nunc pro tunc relief that “Prestige [on Jefferson] had a fire and
subsequent water damange [sic] to the office[1] and a partial collapse [sic] which
destroyed records. Additionally, personnel quit and records could not be located.”
Id. at 96a.
1
The fire allegedly occurred in approximately May 2017 in the private residence of Ofir
Komerian (Komerian), the sole owner of Prestige on Jefferson. RR at 131a & 136a. Before
Common Pleas, Komerian did not testify that loss of any records in the fire caused untimely filings
related to the tax abatement, but rather, only that his hired agents, an expediter and prior legal
counsel, did not make timely filings. See id. at 136a-38a.
2
The Board scheduled a hearing on March 10, 2020, and sent notice of
the impending hearing to the address for Prestige on Jefferson that had been listed
on the petition to the Board. RR at 101a. Prestige on Jefferson asserts that it had
relocated its business office 8 to 10 years before and that, as a result, neither Prestige
on Jefferson nor its previous attorney received notice of the hearing. Id. at 138a.
When no one appeared at the hearing on behalf of Prestige on Jefferson, the Board
entered a non pros determination. Id. at 39a, 43a & 103a. No appeal to Common
Pleas was ever taken from the Board’s decision.
Over three years later, on October 30, 2023, Prestige on Jefferson,
through new counsel, submitted to the OPA what purported to be a new tax
abatement application for the Property, based on the same June 2017 building
permit but listing the beginning tax year for abatement as 2023. RR at 21a & 23a.
The second application, like the first, was denied by the OPA as untimely. Id. at 22a
& 69a. Prestige on Jefferson then sought to file what it asserted was a timely appeal
to the Board from the OPA’s denial of the second application. Id. at 20a-21a. The
Board refused to accept the appeal form, explaining in two email communications
that it had already held a hearing in 2020 related to the same building permit, that
the appeal had been marked abandoned for failure to appear, and that the Board’s
decision following that hearing had not been appealed. Id. at 16a-17a & 75a-76a.
Prestige on Jefferson appealed to Common Pleas. RR at 71a-72a. The
City filed a motion to quash the appeal, asserting that Common Pleas lacked
jurisdiction over the appeal because the Board had decided the question of nunc pro
tunc relief in 2020, and Prestige on Jefferson had not appealed that decision. Id. at
26a-30a. Common Pleas deferred ruling on the motion to quash so that both the
appeal and the motion could be considered together. See id. at 50a-52a.
3
Common Pleas then scheduled a hearing at which it held oral argument
and, over repeated objections from Prestige on Jefferson’s counsel, took additional
evidence in the form of live testimony from Komerian. RR at 129a-43a. Komerian’s
testimony consisted solely of answering questions from the Common Pleas judge.
See id. at 135a-40a. Komerian stated that neither he nor his former attorney received
notice of the scheduling of the Board hearing on the 2019 application for nunc pro
tunc relief. Id. at 138a. Komerian further maintained that neither he nor counsel
received notice of the Board’s 2020 decision denying nunc pro tunc relief. Id. at
139a. Thus, current counsel argued that exceptional non-negligent circumstances
entitled Prestige on Jefferson to nunc pro tunc relief.
The City opposed the request for nunc pro tunc relief and also offered
argument in support of its motion to quash the appeal. The City posited that the
Board’s 2020 determination entering an order of non pros was the final
determination in the case. Therefore, Prestige on Jefferson could not create a new
right of appeal by submitting a new abatement application for the same project and
based on the same 2017 building permit as the original application. The City
contended that if Prestige on Jefferson believed it was entitled to nunc pro tunc relief,
it had to request that relief by seeking to appeal the 2020 Board decision to Common
Pleas, not by submitting a new abatement application and then trying to appeal to
the Board from the denial of that application. Thus, the City maintained that the
Board had properly refused to consider the 2023 appeal or hold a hearing and that
Common Pleas lacked jurisdiction over the appeal of the Board’s determination.
After the hearing and review of post-hearing memoranda from both
parties, Common Pleas issued the following order:
AND NOW, this 20th day of March 2024, upon
consideration of the Appeal filed on behalf of Prestige
4
Design on Jefferson, LLC, (“Prestige [on Jefferson]”)
seeking review of the October 31, 2023 electronic
communication that had been generated by the [Board],
rejecting Prestige [on Jefferson]’s Application for Nunc
Pro Tunc Appeal of the denial of Appellant’s 2017 real
estate tax abatement for the property located at 1441 N.
7th Street, Philadelphia, PA 19122, by the . . . OPA[], any
responses thereto, and the City[’s] Motion to Quash
Prestige [on Jefferson’s] Appeal, and the responses
thereto, and of the oral arguments and testimony submitted
on February 21, 2024, it is hereby ORDERED and
DECREED that the Appeal of Prestige [on Jefferson] is
DENIED for lack of merit.
It is further ORDERED and DECREED that the City[’s]
Motion to Quash is GRANTED, and the Appeal of
Prestige [on Jefferson] is DISMISSED due to lack of
subject matter jurisdiction and as an untimely filing of the
subject appeal.
It is further ORDERED and DECREED that the contested
[Board] and OPA adjudications are AFFIRMED.
RR at 156a-57a. Prestige on Jefferson then appealed to this Court.
II. Issues
On appeal,2 Prestige on Jefferson raises several issues, which we
reorganize into three issues and summarize as follows.
2
Where an agency record is insufficiently complete to allow a common pleas court to rule
on the questions presented, the court may hold a de novo hearing and accept additional evidence.
See Churchill Cmty. Dev., LP v. Allegheny Cty. Health Dep’t, 225 A.3d 596, 605 (Pa. Cmwlth.
2019). Here, counsel for Prestige on Jefferson objected to Common Pleas’ rather lengthy
questioning of Komerian, but the judge explained that more information was needed in order to
make necessary findings of fact. See RR at 137a (judge’s explanation that “I’m trying to figure
out what happened. So if you’re coming to me in 2024 relative to an application abatement that
should have been filed in 2017, so, there is quite a bit of ground to cover.”). Moreover, Common
Pleas also accepted additional documentary evidence at the hearing. Id. at 129a. Thus, the
proceeding before Common Pleas constituted a de novo hearing. “Where the lower court has heard
5
First, Prestige on Jefferson asserts that its appeal to Common Pleas was
proper and should not have been dismissed. Prestige on Jefferson insists that it
followed the correct procedure for seeking nunc pro tunc relief in 2023, given its
previous lack of awareness of the Board’s 2020 hearing and resulting non pros.
Second, on the merits, Prestige on Jefferson contends that it is entitled
to nunc pro tunc relief to allow an untimely tax abatement application. Prestige on
Jefferson alleges that the OPA and the Board failed to send notices to the correct
address, resulting in a breakdown of the administrative process and lack of notices
concerning denial of the original application and the Board’s subsequently scheduled
2020 hearing. Further, Prestige on Jefferson seeks nunc pro tunc relief from
untimeliness, alleging non-negligent conduct of Komerian and Prestige on
Jefferson’s current counsel. Prestige on Jefferson points to the purported failure of
a hired expediter and a previous attorney to make timely submissions on Prestige on
Jefferson’s behalf and the previous attorney’s purported failure to supply the City
with the correct address for service of notices.
Third, Prestige on Jefferson complains that the Common Pleas judge
erred by questioning Komerian excessively at the hearing.
the case de novo, this Court’s . . . review is [limited] to determin[ing] whether the facts found by
the trial court are supported by competent evidence and . . . correct[ing] any conclusions of law
erroneously made.” Med. Shoppe, Ltd. v. Wayne Mem’l Hosp., 866 A.2d 455, 459 n.10 (Pa.
Cmwlth. 2005) (citing Dep’t of Transp., Bureau of Driver Licensing v. Boros, 620 A.2d 1139 (Pa.
1993)).
6
III. Discussion
A. Common Pleas’ Quashal of the Appeal
1. The City’s Argument
At the hearing and argument before Common Pleas, the City explained
at length its motion to quash Prestige on Jefferson’s appeal to Common Pleas. RR
at 130a-31a. We paraphrase the City’s argument as follows.
The building permit concerning the Property was issued in 2017.
Prestige on Jefferson did not submit a tax abatement application through its previous
attorney until 2019. Based on the 60-day deadline for filing a tax abatement
application after issuance of a building permit, the OPA denied the application as
untimely. Prestige on Jefferson appealed the OPA’s denial to the Board, seeking
nunc pro tunc relief to allow an untimely tax abatement application . The Board
scheduled a March 2020 hearing and mailed notice of the hearing to the address
listed on the appeal as the mailing address.3 No one appeared on behalf of Prestige
on Jefferson at the Board hearing. The Board, therefore, entered an order dismissing
the appeal. See RR at 17a & 39a.
More than three years passed. In October of 2023, having ostensibly
just learned of the 2020 dismissal of its appeal to the Board, Prestige on Jefferson
submitted a second untimely tax abatement application, which the OPA again
denied. Prestige on Jefferson then filed a second appeal to the Board seeking relief
nunc pro tunc to allow an untimely application. The Board explained in
correspondence that it could not entertain the appeal because, having already entered
an order denying such relief regarding tax abatement related to the Property in 2020,
3
As set forth below, Prestige on Jefferson maintains that was not the correct address and
that the Board should have mailed the notice to its previous attorney’s office address as it appeared
on his cover letter.
7
the Board lacked jurisdiction to revisit the matter. RR at 130a. Prestige on Jefferson
appealed to Common Pleas from that correspondence.
The City then filed its motion to quash Prestige on Jefferson’s appeal
to Common Pleas, contending the Board correctly determined that it lacked
jurisdiction to entertain Prestige on Jefferson’s appeal from OPA’s denial of the
second application for tax abatement. The Board had already dismissed, in 2020,
Prestige on Jefferson’s appeal from the denial of its tax abatement application. The
City posited that if Prestige on Jefferson believed the Board’s 2020 order was in
error such that Prestige on Jefferson was entitled to nunc pro tunc relief, the correct
procedure was to appeal the Board’s 2020 order to Common Pleas, which has
jurisdiction over appeals from Board orders, in 2023, when Prestige on Jefferson
allegedly learned about the Board’s 2020 order. Prestige on Jefferson did not do
that; instead, it appealed the wrong order. RR at 130a-31a & 133a.
2. Prestige on Jefferson’s Argument
In response, Prestige on Jefferson argued before Common Pleas that no
one on Prestige on Jefferson’s behalf knew about the Board’s 2020 hearing and
subsequent order until October 2023. Prestige on Jefferson conceded that its
previous attorney “mistakenly, admittedly” provided “a stale address” for Prestige
on Jefferson when filing the initial petition for relief to the Board. RR at 131a.
Prestige on Jefferson argued, however, that its previous attorney’s office address
was on his cover letter. Id. Thus, Prestige on Jefferson implied that the purported
address error was that of the Board. Id.
Prestige on Jefferson also attempted to restart the appeal period to the
Board in late 2023 by submitting a second abatement application, obtaining a second
8
denial from OPA, and then attempting to appeal that denial to the Board. At the
hearing before Common Pleas, however, rather than acknowledging having
submitted a second application for tax abatement relating to the Property based on
the 2017 building permit, current counsel for Prestige on Jefferson misleadingly
described events as follows:
[W]hat must have happened, Judge, is we have been trying
to clear up this [P]roperty and why there is no abatement
on it. We have been waiting for the decision letter. So I
have been communicating with the OPA about the
decision. That is probably what triggered this October 27,
2023 letter denying the abatement, which I appealed
immediately.
So there is clear jurisdiction by the [Board]. It is not
legally correct that there is no jurisdiction to the [Board].
It says on the letter itself: Appeals can be taken to the
[Board] within 30 days, which I did. I appealed it within
two days. And then [the Board] tells me, [o]h, sorry, Mr.
DeMarco [(counsel for Prestige on Jefferson)]. Yeah, we
know we issued you this letter, but, you know what?
Forget the letter. We actually held a hearing three years
ago and you didn’t show. So we are not going to let you
have a hearing. But that’s completely contrary to the
wording of the letter.
Id. at 132a. Not only was counsel’s explanation contrary to the record, but it also
mischaracterized the OPA’s form letter denying tax abatement as a communication
from the Board authorizing an appeal. Not misled by counsel’s conflating of the
OPA’s October 27, 2023 denial form letter with the Board’s subsequent emails
explaining its refusal to entertain an appeal from that letter, Common Pleas initiated
the following clarifying colloquy:
THE COURT: Now, the letter that you’re referencing, it’s
dated . . . October 27, 2023. So you’re referencing the
letter dated October 27, 2023.
9
MR. DEMARCO: Right.
THE COURT: Wherein, it’s checked off by the [OPA]
that the application for tax abatement of the above
[P]roperty is denied because it’s late.
MR. DEMARCO: Exactly, Judge.
THE COURT: Thereafter, you received the subject
communication from the [Board], and . . . that
communication from the [Board] from a Sara O’Connell,
is []explaining, despite the new date of the [OPA denial]
letter, we cannot accept the late abatement appeal. And
referencing the decision letter as to Application No:
25632, and indicating that it had already been appealed
and had been scheduled for a hearing on March 10, 2020,
and that because of the three-year time, it couldn’t
consider it as an abandonment lift. That one, that’s what
we are talking about.
So when you filed the appeal, sir, you’re appealing the
[Board’s] refusal and the denial of the application; do I
understand that correctly?
MR. DEMARCO: I believe so, Judge. Obviously, Exhibit
A was my attempt to appeal the October 27, 2023
letter. . . .
Id. (emphasis added).
3. Analysis
Common Pleas agreed with the City’s argument that Prestige on
Jefferson acted incorrectly by attempting to appeal to Common Pleas from the
Board’s 2023 email correspondence. Common Pleas agreed that Prestige on
Jefferson should, instead, have appealed to Common Pleas seeking nunc pro tunc
relief, if supportable, from the Board’s 2020 dismissal of the appeal from the OPA’s
initial denial of tax abatement. We likewise agree and conclude that Common Pleas
10
did not err in dismissing Prestige on Jefferson’s appeal from the Board’s 2023
correspondence.
Regardless of when or how Prestige on Jefferson learned of the Board’s
dismissal of the initial appeal from the OPA’s original denial of the tax abatement
application, and regardless of who was at fault for any alleged delay in notification,
the undisputed fact remains that Prestige on Jefferson certainly knew not later than
late 2023 that the Board had held a hearing and dismissed Prestige on Jefferson’s
appeal of the OPA’s determination in March 2020. That dismissal was never
appealed. If Prestige on Jefferson had a supportable argument for nunc pro tunc
relief, the correct procedure would have been an appeal to Common Pleas from the
Board’s 2020 dismissal, seeking such nunc pro tunc relief. Instead, Prestige on
Jefferson attempted an end run around the Board’s 2020 dismissal through the
subterfuge of submitting a new tax abatement application to the OPA in 2023 for the
same Property based on the same 2017 building permit. When the OPA, predictably,
denied that application as untimely, Prestige on Jefferson filed an appeal to the
Board. The Board properly refused to entertain that appeal because it had already
dismissed Prestige of Jefferson’s appeal in 2020. Notably, the Board did not issue a
new order or other determination. Instead, recognizing that it had no jurisdiction to
entertain another appeal of a tax abatement denial for the same Property, the Board
merely sent two emails explaining why no appeal from the OPA’s 2023 denial letter
was possible. Prestige on Jefferson then compounded its previous misstep of failing
to seek relief from the Board’s 2020 dismissal. Instead of appealing to Common
Pleas from the 2020 dismissal at that time and seeking nunc pro tunc relief, Prestige
on Jefferson attempted to appeal from the Board’s 2023 emails declining to entertain
what was clearly an improper second appeal.
11
A party who has failed to meet a jurisdictional appeal deadline cannot
restart the filing period by the subterfuge of trying to trigger a new decision on the
same matter and then appealing the new decision. The doctrine of administrative
finality, similar to the principles of issue and claim preclusion, forbids such a ploy.
The doctrine of administrative finality “precludes a collateral attack of an
administrative action where the party aggrieved by the action foregoes his statutory
appeal remedy.” Potratz v. Pa. Dep't of Env’t Prot., 897 A.2d 16, 19 (Pa. Cmwlth.
2006) (citing Pa. Dep’t of Env’t Prot. v. Peters Twp. Sanitary Auth., 767 A.2d 601
(Pa. Cmwlth. 2001)); accord Pickford v. Dep’t of Env’t Prot., 967 A.2d 414, 420
(Pa. Cmwlth. 2008) (concluding that, under the doctrine of administrative finality,
an appellant who had failed to timely appeal the issuance of a DEP permit could not
collaterally challenge that earlier DEP permit decision by trying to appeal from a
subsequent letter that “merely affirmed the status quo of the permit[] issued”);
Appeal of Sgro, 447 A.2d 325, 327 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1982) (concluding that “the appeal
period was neither tolled nor started anew by the filing of the petitions for
reconsideration, . . . nor was it restarted when they were denied”); Strickler v. United
Elevator Co., 391 A.2d 614, 617–18 (Pa. Super. 1978)4 (explaining that the effect of
failing to follow established procedures for an appeal from a final order waived any
right to gain reconsideration through a collateral attack; to allow such circumvention
“would undermine the validity of the appellate process and permit a party to escape
the procedural requirements of perfecting an appeal”).
Here, Prestige on Jefferson had a right to appeal from the denial of its
tax abatement application in 2019. It also then had a right to appeal the Board’s
4
“In general, Superior Court decisions are not binding on this Court, but they offer
persuasive precedent where they address analogous issues.” Lerch v. Unemployment Comp. Bd.
of Rev., 180 A.3d 545, 550 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2018).
12
2020 denial of nunc pro tunc relief to allow an untimely abatement application.
Regardless of any issues of timeliness of such an appeal, however, Prestige on
Jefferson’s sole remedy was to seek to appeal the Board’s 2020 decision to Common
Pleas and to request nunc pro tunc relief to do so out of time if such relief was legally
and factually supportable. Having failed to seek any appeal of the Board’s 2020
decision, Prestige on Jefferson was precluded by the doctrine of administrative
finality from mounting a collateral attack on that decision by starting the application
process over, seeking a new denial of the tax abatement application from the OPA,
and trying to appeal that denial to the Board. We, like Common Pleas, reject Prestige
on Jefferson’s attempt to evade the effect of the Board’s 2020 dismissal of the appeal
from the OPA’s 2019 denial of tax abatement by eliciting a fresh denial of the same
abatement and then trying to appeal to the Board from that denial. Accordingly, we
discern no error in Common Pleas’ dismissal of Prestige on Jefferson’s appeal.
B. Remaining Issues
Because we conclude that Common Pleas correctly dismissed Prestige
on Jefferson’s appeal for lack of jurisdiction, the remaining issues raised by Prestige
on Jefferson before this Court are moot. We observe, however, that, having
concluded it lacked jurisdiction to entertain Prestige on Jefferson’s appeal, Common
Pleas erred by also considering and deciding the appeal on its merits.5 Accordingly,
we vacate Common Pleas’ denial of the appeal on the merits and affirmation of the
Board’s refusal to entertain an appeal.
5
We recognize that Common Pleas was likely providing its disposition on the merits as an
alternative, in the interest of judicial economy, in the event this Court determined that Common
Pleas did have subject matter jurisdiction of Prestige on Jefferson’s appeal.
13
IV. Conclusion
Based on the foregoing discussion, we affirm the portion of Common
Pleas’ order that quashed the appeal of Prestige on Jefferson for lack of jurisdiction.
We vacate that portion of Common Pleas’ order that denied the appeal on its merits
and affirmed the Board’s refusal to entertain an appeal.
__________________________________
CHRISTINE FIZZANO CANNON, Judge
14
IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA
In re: Appeal of Prestige Design :
on Jefferson LLC :
:
v. :
:
Board of Revision of Taxes :
Philadelphia, School District :
of Philadelphia, and City of :
Philadelphia :
:
Appeal of: Prestige Design on : No. 343 C.D. 2024
Jefferson LLC :
ORDER
AND NOW, this 27th day of August, 2025, the March 20, 2024 order of the
Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County (Common Pleas) is AFFIRMED IN
PART and VACATED IN PART. Common Pleas’ quashal of the appeal for lack of
subject matter jurisdiction is AFFIRMED. Common Pleas’ denial of the appeal for
lack of merit and affirmation of the refusal of Board of Revision of Taxes of the City
of Philadelphia to entertain an appeal are VACATED.
__________________________________
CHRISTINE FIZZANO CANNON, Judge