The opinion
[Cite as Property Junkie, L.L.C. v. Akron Dept. of Neighborhood Assistance, 2025-Ohio-3056.]
STATE OF OHIO ) IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
)ss: NINTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
COUNTY OF SUMMIT )
PROPERTY JUNKIE, LLC C.A. No. 31303
Appellant
v. APPEAL FROM JUDGMENT
ENTERED IN THE
CITY OF AKRON, DEPT. OF COURT OF COMMON PLEAS
NEIGHBORHOOD ASSISTANCE, et al. COUNTY OF SUMMIT, OHIO
CASE No. CV 2024-08-3554
Appellees
DECISION AND JOURNAL ENTRY
Dated: August 27, 2025
CARR, Judge.
{¶1} Appellant, Property Junkie, LLC, appeals the judgment of the Summit County
Court of Common Pleas. This Court affirms.
I.
{¶2} This matter concerns the residential property located at 1559 Hampton Road in
Akron (“the property”). In 2021, the property was purchased by Property Junkie, a business that
rehabilitates properties that have fallen into a state of disrepair. Property Junkie is a single-member
limited liability company owned by Shauntell Forney. At the time of the purchase, the property
was subject to a number of outstanding housing code violations, had been deemed unfit for
habitation, and had become a source of concern for neighbors. On June 20, 2023, the Akron
Housing Appeals Board (“the Board”) held a hearing concerning the property and ordered the
property demolished. The Board sent notice of its decision via regular and certified mail.
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{¶3} More than a year later, on August 16, 2024, Property Junkie filed a notice of appeal
and a request for injunctive relief in the trial court, as well as a motion for leave to file a delayed
appeal from the Board’s decision. The City of Akron Department of Neighborhood Assistance
(“the City”) moved to dismiss the appeal and filed a brief in opposition to the motion for leave.
Property Junkie filed a response to the motion to dismiss, and the City replied thereto. Property
Junkie then filed a motion for leave to amend its notice to appeal along with the amended notice
of appeal filed instanter. The City opposed the motion for leave and moved to strike the amended
notice of appeal, arguing that it was merely an attempt to reframe the timeline to appeal.
{¶4} The trial court subsequently issued a journal entry granting the motion to dismiss
on the basis that, because Property Junkie’s administrative appeal was untimely, the trial court was
without jurisdiction to hear the appeal. In light of its jurisdiction ruling, the trial court determined
that the issues pertaining to amending the notice of appeal were moot.
{¶5} On appeal, Property Junkie raises two assignments of error.
II.
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR I
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY DENYING APPELLANT’S MOTION FOR
LEAVE TO APPEAL.
{¶6} In its first assignment of error, Property Junkie argues that the trial court erred in
concluding that it did not have jurisdiction to consider Property Junkie’s motion for leave to file a
delayed administrative appeal. This Court disagrees.
Background
{¶7} Upon acquiring the Hampton Road property in May 2021, Property Junkie inherited
a number of orders requiring it to comply with various housing code provisions in the Akron Code
of Ordinances. After failing to comply with those orders, Ms. Forney, in April 2022, contacted
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the City’s Housing Division and requested that copies of the orders be sent to her via email. The
Housing Division complied with her request. In the year that followed, the Housing Division
continued to receive complaints about the property and Property Junkie failed to comply with the
outstanding orders pertaining to housing code violations. The Housing Division was unable to
contact Ms. Forney during that period despite repeated attempts to do so.
{¶8} A public hearing to consider demolition of the property was set for May 16, 2023.
The Board heard testimony on the matter on that date, but ultimately continued the hearing until
June 20, 2023. As had been done with the May 16, 2023 hearing, notice of the June 20, 2023
hearing was sent to Property Junkie via direct regular and certified mail. Notice of the June 20,
2023 hearing was also posted at the property and published in the Akron Beacon Journal. The
Board convened the hearing on June 20, 2023, but Ms. Forney did not appear. The Board ordered
the property demolished at the close of the hearing. One June 21, 2023, the Board notified Property
Junkie of its decision via regular and certified mail. The regular mail was returned as undelivered
but the certified mail was not returned. Notice of the Board’s decision was also posted at the
property on June 22, 2023.
{¶9} On August 16, 2024, Property Junkie filed a motion for leave to file an appeal from
the Board’s decision in the trial court. The motion for leave was accompanied by a notice of
administrative appeal and a request for injunctive relief. In support of its motion for leave,
Property Junkie argued that the trial court had authority to grant leave to appeal under R.C.
2505.04. Property Junkie attached the affidavit of Ms. Forney, who averred that she never received
notice of the demolition order in the mail because she relocated the mailing address for Property
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Junkie.1 The City moved to dismiss the attempted appeal on the basis that it was not timely filed
given that the Board’s demolition order became a final, appealable order when it was sent to
Property Junkie on June 21, 2023. The City also filed a brief in opposition to the motion for leave
wherein it argued that Property Junkie’s failure to perfect a timely administrative appeal divested
the trial court of jurisdiction to consider the case. Property Junkie filed a reply brief arguing that
R.C. 2505.04 and R.C. 2505.08 contemplate granting leave for delayed appeals. The City then
filed a brief in support of its motion to dismiss maintaining that the trial court did not have
discretion to consider a case where it lacked jurisdiction.
{¶10} The trial court subsequently issued a journal entry granting the City’s motion to
dismiss on the basis that it was without jurisdiction to hear the case because Property Junkie failed
to perfect a timely appeal. The trial court reasoned that strict compliance with R.C. 2505.04 was
required to perfect an administrative appeal and that the trial court was not afforded with discretion
to hear an untimely administrative appeal.
Discussion
{¶11} In support of its first assignment of error, Property Junkie argues that the trial court
erroneously concluded that it lacked jurisdiction to consider its motion for leave to file a delayed
administrative appeal. Emphasizing that jurisdiction is conferred by statute, Property Junkie
contends that because R.C. 2505.04 and R.C. 2505.08 contemplate the possibility of obtaining
leave to file a delayed appeal, “[i]t is not such that jurisdiction does not exist at all, but rather that
it is up to the court whether to accept or decline jurisdiction.” Property Junkie maintains that upon
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Ms. Forney further averred that she was on bedrest in late 2023 and early 2024 due to
complications with a pregnancy. The child was born in April 2024.
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the filing of its motion for leave to file a delayed appeal, the trial court had discretion to permit the
appeal.
{¶12} Jurisdictional questions that turn on statutory interpretation present issues of law
and are reviewed de novo. See Ross v. Cuyahoga Cty. Bd. of Revision, 2018-Ohio-4746, ¶ 8.
“When reviewing a matter de novo, this [C]ourt does not give deference to the trial court’s
decision.” Blue Heron Nurseries, L.L.C. v. Funk, 2010-Ohio-876, ¶ 5 (9th Dist.).
{¶13} The Ohio Constitution provides that “[t]he courts of common pleas and divisions
thereof shall have such original jurisdiction over all justiciable matters and such powers of review
of proceedings of administrative officers and agencies as may be provided by law.” Ohio Const.,
art. IV, § 4(B).
{¶14} R.C. 2505.07 provides that “[a]fter the entry of a final order of an administrative
officer, agency, board, department, tribunal, commission, or other instrumentality, the period of
time within which the appeal shall be perfected, unless otherwise provided by law, is thirty days.”
{¶15} As noted above, Property Junkie highlights the requirements for perfecting an
appeal set forth in R.C. 2505.04, which states:
An appeal is perfected when a written notice of appeal is filed, in the case of an
appeal of a final order, judgment, or decree of a court, in accordance with the Rules
of Appellate Procedure or the Rules of Practice of the Supreme Court, or, in the
case of an administrative-related appeal, with the administrative officer, agency,
board, department, tribunal, commission, or other instrumentality involved. If a
leave to appeal from a court first must be obtained, a notice of appeal also shall be
filed in the appellate court. After being perfected, an appeal shall not be dismissed
without notice to the appellant, and no step required to be taken subsequent to the
perfection of the appeal is jurisdictional.
{¶16} R.C. 2505.08 further provides as follows:
In the case of an administrative-related appeal other than an expedited appeal
brought under sections 2506.05 to 2506.08 of the Revised Code, within forty days
after the filing of a notice of appeal or the obtaining of a leave to appeal, as
described in section 2505.04 of the Revised Code, the administrative officer,
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agency, board, department, tribunal, commission, or other instrumentality whose
final order is being appealed shall prepare and file in the court to which the appeal
is taken a complete transcript of all the original papers, testimony, and evidence
offered, heard, and taken into consideration in issuing the final order. The costs of
the transcript shall be taxed as part of the costs of the appeal.
{¶17} “Perfection of [an administrative] appeal, as R.C. 2505.07 requires, must occur
within 30 days after the entry of the final order. And a public body creates an entry through the
act of making or entering a record. (Internal citations and quotations omitted.) State ex rel. Cox
v. Youngstown Civ. Serv. Comm., 2021-Ohio-2799, ¶ 26. The plain language of R.C. 2505.07
makes clear that the “entry of a final order” starts the clock for filing a timely appeal. “This Court
has held that a board enters its final order for purposes of perfecting an appeal when it sends written
notification of its decision to the party.” Chapman v. Hous. Appeals Bd., 1997 WL 537651. *3
(9th Dist. Aug. 13. 1997), citing Farinacci v. Twinsburg, 14 Ohio App.3d 20, 21 (9th Dist. 1984).
“[I]f the notice of appeal is filed with the administrative body after the 30-day period, then the
notice of appeal is untimely and the trial court lacks jurisdiction to consider the appeal.” Lavery
v. Akron Dept. of Neighborhood Assistance, 2020-Ohio-3439, ¶ 11 (9th Dist.), quoting Pyramid
Ents. L.L.C. v. City of Akron Dept. of Neighborhood Assistance, 2018-Ohio-2178, ¶ 8 (9th Dist.).
{¶18} To the extent that Property Junkie makes an argument pertaining to service of the
Board’s decision, we note that the Supreme Court in State ex rel. Youngstown Civ. Serv. Comm. v.
Sweeney, 2023-Ohio-3006, ¶ 16-17, considered whether a trial court retained jurisdiction under
R.C. 2505.07 to entertain an untimely administrative appeal from a decision of the Youngstown
Civil Service Commission under circumstances where the commission failed to comply with a
commission rule requiring the commission to serve notice of its decisions. The Supreme Court
concluded that the commission’s failure to serve its decision did not impact the timeliness
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requirement contained in R.C. 2505.07, and thus was irrelevant to the issue of the trial court’s
jurisdiction. Id. at 18-19.
{¶19} It follows that Property Junkie’s first assignment of error is without merit. Contrary
to Property Junkie’s assertion, the jurisdictional question here does not turn on whether Property
Junkie sought leave to file a delayed administrative appeal. A party must comply with all statutory
requirements in order to perfect an administrative appeal. See Ross, 2018-Ohio-4746, ¶ 9-11. This
Court has consistently held that a trial court lacks jurisdiction to consider an administrative appeal
when a party fails to file a notice of appeal with the administrative body within 30 days of the
administrative body sending written notice of its decision. See Lavery at ¶ 11; Helms v. Dept. of
Neighborhood Assistance, 2021-Ohio-2667, ¶ 7-10 (9th Dist.). Here, the Board sent Property
Junkie notice of its decision on June 21, 2023 via regular mail and certified mail. Property Junkie
moved for leave to appeal more than a year later, well outside the 30-day window set forth in R.C.
2505.07. Accordingly, the trial court did not err in concluding that it lacked jurisdiction to consider
the administrative appeal.
{¶20} Property Junkie’s first assignment of error is overruled.
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR II
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY DENYING APPELLANT’S MOTION TO
AMEND [THE] NOTICE OF APPEAL.
{¶21} In its second assignment of error, Property Junkie argues that the trial court erred
in denying its motion to amend its notice of appeal.
{¶22} After the parties had submitted briefs in the trial court on the jurisdictional issue,
Property Junkie moved for leave to amend its notice of appeal, arguing that it was necessary to
clarify the proper order from which it was appealing. Property Junkie simultaneously filed an
amended notice of appeal instanter. Although Property Junkie made reference in its motion to the
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June 20, 2023 demolition order and the June 21, 2023 notice of that order, Property Junkie argued
that “[Ms.] Forney did not receive the demolition order until she constructively did so through her
attorney when the City’s record was electronically served on August 28, 2024.” The State opposed
the motion for leave and moved to strike the amended notice of appeal.
{¶23} The trial court ultimately found the issue of amending the notice of appeal to be
moot in light of its determination that it lacked jurisdiction over the case. A review of the record
makes clear that the trial court was aware of all of the pertinent orders in rendering its jurisdictional
determination. As this Court has determined that the trial court did not err in concluding that it
lacked jurisdiction, we decline to address Property Junkie’s second assignment of error as it has
been rendered moot. See App.R. 12(A)(1)(c).
III.
{¶24} Property Junkie’s first assignment of error is overruled. This Court declines to
address Property Junkie’s second assignment of error as it has been rendered moot. The judgment
of the Summit County Court of Common Pleas is affirmed.
Judgment affirmed.
There were reasonable grounds for this appeal.
We order that a special mandate issue out of this Court, directing the Court of Common
Pleas, County of Summit, State of Ohio, to carry this judgment into execution. A certified copy
of this journal entry shall constitute the mandate, pursuant to App.R. 27.
Immediately upon the filing hereof, this document shall constitute the journal entry of
judgment, and it shall be file stamped by the Clerk of the Court of Appeals at which time the period
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for review shall begin to run. App.R. 22(C). The Clerk of the Court of Appeals is instructed to
mail a notice of entry of this judgment to the parties and to make a notation of the mailing in the
docket, pursuant to App.R. 30.
Costs taxed to Appellant.
DONNA J. CARR
FOR THE COURT
STEVENSON, P. J.
SUTTON, J.
CONCUR.
APPEARANCES:
STEPHEN P. HANUDEL, Attorney at Law, for Appellant.
DEBORAH S. MATZ, Director of Law, and JACQUENETTE S. CORGAN and JOHN R. YORK,
Assistant Directors of Law, for Appellees.