The opinion
NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the
internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
APPELLATE DIVISION
DOCKET NO. A-4145-23
R.J., a minor by his Guardian
Ad Litem, PENNYANNE
SIMONS-JACKSON,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
ALEX R. BROWN-ESKENGREN,
Defendant-Appellant,
and
JAKE JOSEPH JACOBSON,
N.D., ANTHONY VELTRI,
RICHARD VELTRI, LISA
VELTRI, RAY BROWN,
NICHOLAS DINAPOLI
and JESSICA DINAPOLI,
Defendants-Respondents.
____________________________
Argued December 17, 2024 – Decided August 27, 2025
Before Judges Smith and Chase.
On appeal from an interlocutory order of the Superior
Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Monmouth
County, Docket No. L-1952-22.
Frank J. Caruso argued the cause for appellant
(Hoagland, Longo, Moran, Dunst & Doukas, LLP,
attorneys; Frank J. Caruso, of counsel and on the brief).
Jacqueline DeCarlo argued the cause for respondent
R.J., a minor (Hobbie & DeCarlo, PC, attorneys;
Jacqueline DeCarlo, of counsel and on the brief).
PER CURIAM
Defendant Alex R. Brown-Eskengren appeals two Law Division orders
compelling his deposition and compelling him to answer questions regarding his
guilty plea allocution. We affirm.
I.
On May 21, 2022, defendant, with two accomplices, attacked minor
plaintiff R.J. after a party. Defendant eventually pled guilty to third-degree
aggravated assault 1 on the condition that he be admitted to pretrial intervention
(PTI). Defendant then gave a factual allocution regarding the attack, testifying
that he struck plaintiff.
Plaintiff sued defendant for injuries he suffered during the attack. When
plaintiff sought defendant's deposition, the trial court ordered that it be
1
N.J.S.A. 2C:12-1(b)(7).
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adjourned until the resolution of defendant's criminal charges. After defendant's
plea, he was deposed on May 13, 2024. During the deposition, plaintiff's
counsel sought to impeach defendant using his guilty plea allocution. Defense
counsel objected on the grounds that defendant's plea allocution was
inadmissible. After being contacted by counsel, the trial court ordered that
defendant could be cross-examined regarding his plea allocution. Defense
counsel then unilaterally cancelled the deposition.
In response, plaintiff sought to compel defendant's deposition. On July
19, 2024, the motion court granted the application and ordered defendant's
deposition be taken within forty-five days. In a separate order issued the same
day, the court also compelled defendant to answer questions regarding "sworn
statement and testimony in the criminal case." The court found that the question
of admissibility could be addressed closer to trial, and that neither Rule 4:10-2
nor State v. Lavrik, 472 N.J. Super. 192 (App. Div. 2022) prevented plaintiff
from cross-examining defendant regarding his guilty plea allocution at the
deposition.
Defendant appeals both orders, contending that the questions related to
his guilty plea allocution should be barred.
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II.
"In evaluating the trial court's evidentiary rulings, . . . appellate courts
'generally defer to a trial court's disposition of discovery matters unless the court
has abused its discretion or its determination is based on a mistaken
understanding of the applicable law.'" State v. Brown, 236 N.J. 497, 521-22
(2019) (quoting Pomerantz Paper Corp. v. New Cmty. Corp., 207 N.J. 344, 371
(2011)) (internal quotation marks omitted). "The abuse of discretion standard
instructs us to 'generously sustain [the trial court's] decision, provided it is
supported by credible evidence in the record.'" Ibid. (alteration in original)
(quoting Estate of Hanges v. Metro. Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 202 N.J. 369, 384
(2010)).
Defendant argues that our decision in Lavrik renders guilty pleas and their
corresponding allocutions inadmissible pending the completion of PTI. We are
unpersuaded and conclude that defendant's admissibility arguments are
premature.
"'New Jersey's discovery rules are to be construed liberally in favor of
broad pretrial discovery.'" Lipsky v. N.J. Ass'n of Health Plans, Inc., 474 N.J.
Super. 447, 463 (App. Div. 2023) (quoting Payton v. N.J. Tpk. Auth., 148 N.J.
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4
524, 535 (1997)); see also Trenton Renewable Power, LLC, v. Denali Water
Sols., LLC, 470 N.J. Super. 218, 227 (App. Div. 2022). Our court system
adheres to the view that "essential justice is better achieved when there has been
full disclosure so that the parties are conversant with all the available facts."
Lipsky, 474 N.J. Super. at 464 (quoting Jenkins v. Rainner, 69 N.J. 50, 56
(1976)) (internal quotation marks omitted). "Consequently, to overcome the
presumption in favor of discoverability, a party must show 'good cause' for
withholding relevant discovery . . . ." Cap. Health Sys., Inc. v. Horizon
Healthcare Servs., Inc., 230 N.J. 73, 80 (2017).
Rule 4:10-2(a) states:
Parties may obtain discovery regarding any matter, not
privileged, which is relevant to the subject matter
involved in the pending action, whether it relates to the
claim or defense of the party seeking discovery or to
the claim or defense of any other party, including the
existence, description, nature, custody, condition and
location of any books, documents, electronically stored
information, or other tangible things and the identity
and location of persons having knowledge of any
discoverable matter. It is not ground for objection that
the information sought will be inadmissible at the trial
if the information sought appears reasonably calculated
to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence . . . .
"[(emphasis added).]"
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"Nevertheless, the parties' discovery rights are not unlimited." Piniero v.
N.J. Div. of State Police, 404 N.J. Super. 194, 204 (App. Div. 2008). "Under
[Rule 4:10-2(a)], relevancy 'is congruent with relevancy pursuant to N.J.R.E.
401, namely, a tendency in reason to prove or disprove any fact of consequence
to the determination of the action.'" Davis v. Disability Rights N.J., 475 N.J.
Super. 122, 141-42 (App. Div. 2023) (quoting R.L. v. Voytac, 402 N.J. Super.
392, 408 (App. Div. 2008)).
Rule 4:10-3, which governs protective orders, authorizes a court to "make
any order that justice requires to protect a party or person from annoyance,
embarrassment, oppression, or undue burden or expense." Such an order may
provide, among other things, that "discovery may not be had," R. 4:10-3(a), or
"[t]hat certain matters not be inquired into, or that the scope of discovery be
limited to certain matters," R. 4:10-3(d). "The limiting factors underlying Rule
4:10-3 must be weighed against the presumptively broad scope of discovery
authorized in Rule 4:10-2 and other discovery provisions in our Rules of Court."
Serrano v. Underground Utils. Corp., 407 N.J. Super. 253, 267 (App. Div. 2009).
"Implicit in R[ule] 4:10-3 is the notion that the movant bears the burden of
persuading the court that good cause exists for issuing the protective order."
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Kerr v. Able Sanitary & Env't Servs., Inc., 295 N.J. Super. 147, 155 (App. Div.
1996).
Defendant does not contend that his guilty plea allocution is privileged,
R. 4:10-2, or would cause "annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, or undue
burden or expense," requiring a Rule 4:10-3 protective order.2 Instead,
defendant simply argues that his allocution is inadmissible at trial. "The test
[under Rule 4:10-2] is limited to whether the evidence is relevant, not
admissible." Marrero v. Feintuch, 418 N.J. Super. 48, 62 (App. Div. 2011).
"In view of the sweeping nature of our discovery rules designed to ensure,
with few exceptions, the ability to obtain all relevant facts before trial," Ibid.,
we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in compelling
defendant's attendance at deposition and permitting cross-examination of him
regarding his guilty plea allocution. As the trial court correctly found, the
ultimate question of admissibility is to be determined after the deposition.
Affirmed.
2
"'[A]n issue not briefed is deemed waived.'" Arsenis v. Borough of
Bernardsville, 476 N.J. Super. 195, 204 n.3 (App. Div. 2023) (first citing
Pressler & Verniero, Current N.J. Court Rules, cmt. 5 on R. 2:6-2 (2023); and
then citing Telebright Corp. v. Dir., N.J. Div. of Tax., 424 N.J. Super. 384, 393
(App. Div. 2012)).
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