The opinion
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
OCALA DIVISION
RAUL PARRILLA,
Petitioner,
v. Case No. 5:22-cv-209-WFJ-PRL
SECRETARY, DEPARTMENT OF
CORRECTIONS, and FLORIDA
ATTORNEY GENERAL,
Respondents.
________________________________/
ORDER
Raul Parrilla, a Florida prisoner, initiated this action by filing a petition for writ
of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. (Doc. 1). At the Court’s direction,
Respondents filed a response to the petition and relevant portions of the state court
record. (Doc. 10). Mr. Parrilla did not reply and his time to do so is expired. Thus, the
petition is ripe for review. Upon consideration, the petition is due to be dismissed.
Because the Court may resolve the petition based on the record, an evidentiary hearing
is not warranted. See Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases in the United States District
Courts, Rule 8(a).
I. BACKGROUND
On April 21, 2017, a state court jury found Mr. Parrilla guilty of one count of
robbery with a firearm. (Doc. 10-1 at 137, 168). On August 4, 2017, the state trial court
sentenced Mr. Parrilla to a 10-year minimum, 25-year maximum term of
imprisonment. (Doc. 10-1 at 171). Mr. Parilla’s counsel appealed by filing an Anders
brief.1 (Doc. 10-1 at 176, 1056–69). The Fifth District Court of Appeal (Fifth DCA)
per curiam affirmed. (Doc. 10-1 at 1071, 1073).
Mr. Parrilla moved to correct a sentencing error under Florida Rule of Criminal
Procedure 3.800(b)(2). (Doc. 10-1 at 1030–33). The postconviction court denied the
motion. (Doc. 10-1 at 1051–52). Mr. Parrilla moved for postconviction relief under
Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850. (Doc. 10-1 at 1083–1100). The state
postconviction court held an evidentiary hearing and denied the motion. (Doc. 10-1 at
1111–65). Mr. Parrilla appealed and the Fifth DCA per curiam affirmed. (Doc. 10-1 at
1620–21, 1690). Parilla moved for a rehearing and the Fifth DCA denied the motion.
(Doc. 10-1 at 1692–1711, 1713, 1715). Mr. Parrilla filed his petition for writ of habeas
corpus in this Court on April 25, 2022. (Doc. 1).
II. LEGAL STANDARDS
a. The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act
The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA) governs a state
prisoner’s federal habeas corpus petition. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254; Carroll v. Sec’y, DOC,
574 F.3d 1354, 1364 (11th Cir. 2009). Under the AEDPA, habeas relief can be granted
only if an applicant is in custody “in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of
the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a). Specifically, § 2254(d) provides that federal
1 An Anders brief is filed by counsel when their client wishes to appeal but they believe the appeal is
wholly frivolous. See Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 744 (1967).
habeas relief cannot be granted on a claim adjudicated on the merits in state court
unless the state court’s adjudication:
(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an
unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as
determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or
(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable
determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State
court proceeding.
For purposes of § 2254(d)(1), the phrase “clearly established Federal law”
encompasses the holdings only of the United States Supreme Court “as of the time of
the relevant state-court decision.” Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 412 (2000). This
section “defines two categories of cases in which a state prisoner may obtain federal
habeas relief with respect to a claim adjudicated on the merits in state court.” Id. at
404. First, a decision is “contrary to” clearly established federal law “if the state court
arrives at a conclusion opposite to that reached by [the Supreme] Court on a question
of law or if the state court decides a case differently than [the Supreme] Court has on
a set of materially indistinguishable facts.” Id. at 413.
Second, a decision involves an “unreasonable application” of clearly established
federal law “if the state court identifies the correct governing legal principle from [the
Supreme] Court’s decisions but unreasonably applies that principle to the facts of the
prisoner’s case.” Id. The AEDPA was meant “to prevent federal habeas ‘retrials’ and
to ensure that state-court convictions are given effect to the extent possible under law.”
Bell v. Cone, 535 U.S. 685, 693 (2002). Accordingly, “[t]he focus . . . is on whether the
state court’s application of clearly established federal law is objectively unreasonable,
and . . . an unreasonable application is different from an incorrect one.” Id. at 694. As
a result, to obtain relief under § 2254(d)(1), “a state prisoner must show that the state
court’s ruling on the claim being presented in federal court was so lacking in
justification that there was an error well understood and comprehended in existing law
beyond any possibility for fairminded disagreement.” Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S.
86, 103 (2011); see also Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 75 (2003) (stating that “[t]he
state court’s application of clearly established federal law must be objectively
unreasonable” for a federal habeas petitioner to prevail and that the state court’s “clear
error” is insufficient).
For purposes of § 2254(d)(2), “it is not enough to show that ‘reasonable minds
reviewing the record might disagree about the finding in question.’” Brown v.
Davenport, 596 U.S. 118, 135 (2022) (quotations omitted). “An unreasonable
determination of the facts occurs when the direction of the evidence, viewed
cumulatively, was too powerful to conclude anything but the petitioner[’]s factual
claim.” Teasley v. Warden, Macon State Prison, 978 F.3d 1349, 1355 (11th Cir. 2020)
(internal quotation marks and alterations omitted). A state court’s findings of fact are
presumed correct, and a petitioner can rebut the presumption of correctness afforded
to a state court’s factual findings only by clear and convincing evidence.
28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1).
Even when a petitioner succeeds in rebutting the presumption, he must show
that the state court’s decision was “based on” the incorrect factual determination. Pye
v. Warden, Ga. Diagnostic Prison, 50 F.4th 1025, 1035 (11th Cir. 2022). This is because
a state court decision may still be reasonable “even if some of the state court’s
individual factual findings were erroneous—so long as the decision, taken as a whole,
doesn’t constitute an ‘unreasonable determination of the facts’ and isn’t ‘based on’ any
such determination.” Id. (quoting Hayes v. Sec’y, Fla. Dep’t of Corr., 10 F.4th 1203, 1224–
25 (11th Cir. 2021) (Newsom, J., concurring)).
b. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
Ineffective assistance of counsel claims are analyzed under the test established
in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). Strickland requires a showing of
deficient performance by counsel and resulting prejudice. Id. at 687. Deficient
performance is established if, “in light of all the circumstances, the identified acts or
omissions [of counsel] were outside the wide range of professionally competent
assistance.” Id. at 690. But “counsel is strongly presumed to have rendered adequate
assistance and made all significant decisions in the exercise of reasonable professional
judgment.” Id.
A petitioner must also show that their counsel’s alleged error prejudiced the
defense because “[a]n error by counsel, even if professionally unreasonable, does not
warrant setting aside the judgment of a criminal proceeding if the error had no effect
on the judgment.” Id. at 691. To demonstrate prejudice, a petitioner must show “a
reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the
proceeding would have been different.” Id. at 694. “A reasonable probability is a
probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.” Id.
Obtaining relief on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel is difficult on
federal habeas review because “[t]he standards created by Strickland and § 2254(d) are
both highly deferential, and when the two apply in tandem, review is doubly so.”
Richter, 562 U.S. at 105 (internal quotation and citations omitted). “The question [on
federal habeas review of an ineffective assistance claim] ‘is not whether a federal court
believes the state court’s determination’ under the Strickland standard ‘was incorrect
but whether that determination was unreasonable—a substantially higher threshold.’”
Knowles v. Mirzayance, 556 U.S. 111, 123 (2009) (quoting Schriro v. Landrigan, 550 U.S.
465, 473 (2007)).
III. DISCUSSION
a. Ground One
Mr. Parrilla argues that the postconviction court violated his Sixth and
Fourteenth Amendment rights when it denied his motion to appoint counsel to
represent him in his postconviction proceedings. (Doc. 1 at 11–13). Respondents argue
that there is no right to appoint counsel in postconviction proceedings and the
postconviction court followed the proper Florida law procedures when denying
Mr. Parrilla’s motion to appoint counsel. (Doc. 10 at 11–16). Mr. Parrilla raised this
issue for the first time when appealing the denial of his Rule 3.850 motion. (Doc. 10-
1 at 1625–26, 1643–47). The Fifth DCA per curiam affirmed the denial of Mr. Parrilla’s
Rule 3.850 motion. (Doc. 10-1 at 1690).
There is no constitutional right to counsel in state postconviction proceedings.
Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 756 (1991) (citation omitted). Further, defects in
state collateral proceedings are not a cognizable basis for federal habeas relief. Carroll,
574 F.3d at 1365 (“The reasoning behind this well-established principle is
straightforward: a challenge to a state collateral proceeding does not undermine the
legality of the detention or imprisonment[.]”) (citation omitted). Therefore,
Mr. Parrilla is not entitled to relief on Ground One.
b. Ground Two
Mr. Parrilla argues that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to advise him
about the facts of his case “resulting in the loss of a favorable plea agreement.” (Doc. 1
at 14–18). Respondents argue that Mr. Parrilla’s trial counsel was not ineffective
because he adequately advised Parrilla regarding the plea offer. (Doc. 10 at 16–17).
Mr. Parrilla raised this issue for the first time in his Rule 3.850 motion.
(Doc. 10-1 at 1083–86). The postconviction court held an evidentiary hearing on the
motion. (Doc. 10-1 at 1111–53). During the hearing, Mr. Parrilla testified that: his trial
counsel gave him a plea offer in April 2016 that he had in his possession until the offer
expired in June 2016; counsel told him he had two months to accept the offer; counsel
never discussed the offer with him and instead only said “everything will be alright”;
he decided to go to trial because counsel told him he had a “good case”; if counsel told
him about the evidence “stacked” against him, he would have taken the plea offer.
(Doc. 10-1 at 1116, 1118–19). Mr. Parrilla also admitted that the state trial court
advised him of the maximum sentence he was facing multiple times; he read the offer
and understood that the thirteen years offered was less than his possible sentence; and
that he understood that the decision of whether to plead or go to trial was his decision
alone. (Doc. 10-1 at 1131–33). Trial counsel testified that he discussed the pros and
cons and evidence of the case numerous times with Mr. Parrilla; discussed the plea
offer and sentencing range with Mr. Parrilla; answered Mr. Parrilla’s questions; and
never gave any guarantees that he had a “good case” or that “everything would be
alright.” (Doc. 10-1 at 1141–45). Trial counsel also testified that Mr. Parrilla seemed
to understand their discussions and the sentencing range but did not want to take the
plea agreement because he “didn’t want to take any lengthy prison offers[,]” and
instead “wanted to go to trial.” (Doc. 10-1 at 1142–43).
The postconviction court applied Strickland and denied the motion. (Doc. 10-1
at 1154–65). The postconviction court found that Mr. Parrilla’s claim that his trial
counsel did not discuss the plea agreement with him was directly refuted by his
counsel’s credible testimony during the evidentiary hearing. (Doc. 10-1 at 1158). The
postconviction court also noted that the credibility of Mr. Parrilla’s testimony was
“greatly diminished” by his admission that he was “‘not really’ familiar with the
contents of his [Rule 3.850] motion.” (Doc. 10-1 at 1158). The Fifth DCA per curiam
affirmed the postconviction court’s ruling. (Doc. 10-1 at 1690).
The postconviction court’s finding that trial counsel’s testimony directly refuted
Mr. Parrilla’s contention that counsel did not discuss the State’s plea offer with him,
is a factual determination afforded a presumption of correctness. See Jenkins v. Comm’r,
Ala. Dep’t of Corr., 963 F.3d 1248, 1272 (11th Cir. 2020) (“The credibility of a witness
is a question of fact entitled to a presumption of correctness under AEDPA.”); Nejad
v. Att’y Gen., State of Ga., 830 F.3d 1280, 1292 (11th Cir. 2016) (“[f]ederal habeas courts
have no license to redetermine credibility of witnesses whose demeanor has been
observed by the state trial court, but not by them.”); Consalvo v. Sec’y, Dep’t of Corr., 664
F.3d 842, 845 (11th Cir. 2011) (“We consider questions about the credibility and
demeanor of a witness to be questions of fact.”). Mr. Parrilla does not present any
evidence to rebut the presumption of correctness. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1) (habeas
petitioners “have the burden of rebutting the presumption of correctness by clear and
convincing evidence”).
It is uncontested that Mr. Parrilla had the plea offer in his possession for two
months and knew of the offer, his potential maximum sentence, and that the decision
of whether to take the offer or proceed to trial was his. Mr. Parrilla does not identify a
specific fact or piece of adverse evidence of which counsel failed to advise him that
would have changed his mind regarding whether to plea. Mr. Parrilla’s conclusory
allegation that his counsel never discussed the plea offer or the evidence “stacked”
against him, without more, is insufficient to demonstrate his counsel’s unreasonable
representation or prejudice. See Cuevas v. United States, 2012 WL 1883761, at *6 (M.D.
Fla. May 22, 2012) (a petitioner’s “after the fact testimony concerning his desire to
plead, without more,” is insufficient to establish prejudice).
Mr. Parrilla fails to show that the state postconviction court’s decision was
contrary to clearly established federal law, involved an unreasonable application of
Strickland, or was based on an unreasonable factual determination. Therefore,
Mr. Parrilla is not entitled to relief on Ground Two.
c. Ground Three
Mr. Parrilla argues that his trial counsel was ineffective “for failing to accept a
mistrial when” the State’s witness “Chele Johnson testified using inadmissible and
highly prejudicial statements.” (Doc. 1 at 19–22). Respondents argue that counsel was
not ineffective because Ms. Johnson’s testimony was not so harmful as to merit a
mistrial. (Doc. 10 at 17–21).
During the trial, Mr. Parrilla’s girlfriend Chele Johnson testified about her
involvement in the robbery for which Parrilla was convicted. (Doc. 10-1 at 703–19,
724–805). A man came to a hotel under the guise of meeting Ms. Johnson for sex.
(Doc. 10-1 at 713–15). Shortly after he arrived, Mr. Parrilla and others robbed him.
(Doc. 10-1 at 713–15). At least six people were involved in the robbery in some
capacity. (Doc. 10-1 at 712). Trial counsel asked Ms. Johnson if anyone planned to
hide from the police in one of the hotel rooms. (Doc. 10-1 at 776). Ms. Johnson
responded that she heard someone mention that Raffi—Mr. Parrilla’s brother and co-
defendant—and Raffi’s girlfriend Brittany were going to get a room at the hotel to hide
out “if he got caught for robbing something one day[.]” (Doc. 10-1 at 712, 776).
Mr. Parrilla’s trial counsel tried to impeach Ms. Johnson with a prior inconsistent
statement she made to police. (Doc. 10-1 at 776–79). When confronted with her prior
statement, Ms. Johnson clarified that: “I said they planned on hiding there one day. I
didn’t say it was for the night of the robbery, though. I said about the previous
robberies that they had been doing that if they had to hide there one day after they
robbed.” (Doc. 10-1 at 779). Trial counsel immediately objected and moved to strike,
and the line of questioning ended. (Doc. 10-1 at 779).
In another line of questioning, Ms. Johnson testified that she was afraid that
Mr. Parrilla would send people after her. (Doc. 10-1 at 793–95). On recross,
Mr. Parrilla’s trial counsel asked Ms. Johnson if Mr. Parrilla sent people after her.
(Doc. 10-1 at 795). She began to answer, “he sent someone to my house,” but was cut
off by the trial court when it called counsel to the bench and asked, “do you want to
mistry the case right now?” (Doc. 10-1 at 795). The court then went on to say, “it
[mistrial] hasn’t happened yet, but it’s about to.” (Doc. 10-1 at 795). Trial counsel
explained that he was attempting to elicit testimony from Ms. Johnson that she never
reported any threats to the police, to undermine her credibility. (Doc. 10-1 at 795–76).
Because counsel did not know how Ms. Johnson would answer the question, the court
sent the jury away for counsel to ask the question outside the jury’s presence. (Doc. 10-
1 at 795–97). Ms. Johnson stated that Mr. Parrilla sent people to “bust down” her door
and retrieve his firearms. (Doc. 10-1 at 797–99). Trial counsel did not reinitiate the line
of questioning in front of the jury. (Doc. 10-1 at 800–01).
Mr. Parrilla takes issue with two statements by Ms. Johnson: the statement
about “previous robberies” and the statement that Mr. Parrilla sent people after her.
(Doc. 1 at 20). Mr. Parrilla claims the statements were inadmissible prior bad acts and
justified a mistrial.2 (Doc. 1 at 20–21). Mr. Parrilla raised this issue for the first time in
his Rule 3.850 motion. (Doc. 10-1 at 1087–89). The postconviction court held an
evidentiary hearing on the motion. (Doc. 10-1 at 1111–53). The postconviction court
applied Strickland and denied the motion. (Doc. 10-1 at 1158–61). The postconviction
court found that Ms. Johnson’s testimony discussed what Raffi and Brittany were
planning to do in the future, not what Mr. Parrilla did in the past, and noted that the
trial court did not “invite” counsel to move for a mistrial but rather warned counsel
that he was on the verge of causing a mistrial. (Doc. 10-1 at 1160). The court concluded
that neither statement provided a sufficient basis to move for a mistrial. (Doc. 10-1 at
1161). The Fifth DCA per curiam affirmed the postconviction court’s ruling. (Doc. 10-
1 at 1690).
Regarding the first statement, under Florida law, evidence of “other crimes,
wrongs, or acts” is “admissible when relevant to prove a material fact in issue,” “but
[] is inadmissible when the evidence is relevant solely to prove bad character or
propensity.” Fla. Stat. 90.404. When Ms. Johnson made the “previous robberies”
comment, she was discussing Raffi and Brittany’s plan to hide in the hotel, not
Mr. Parrilla. The postconviction court’s determination that the testimony did not
allude to Mr. Parrilla’s prior bad acts was reasonable because Mr. Parrilla was not
implicated in this line of questioning. Thus, counsel cannot be ineffective for failing to
2 Prior to trial, Mr. Parrilla’s trial counsel filed a motion in limine to exclude testimony by
Ms. Johnson of Mr. Parrilla’s “other acts” committed in the Virgin Islands and “other possible
robberies.” (Doc. 10-1 at 1159).
move for a mistrial on this basis. See Cave v. Sec’y for Dep’t of Corr., 638 F.3d 739, 755
(11th Cir. 2011) (“Counsel cannot be labeled ineffective for failing to raise issues which
have no merit”) (quoting Card v. Dugger, 911 F.2d 1494, 1520 (11th Cir. 1990)).
Regarding the second statement, when the trial court asked trial counsel if he
wanted to mistry the case, it was not making a genuine offer to move for a mistrial as
Mr. Parrilla contends. (Doc. 10-1 at 1160). The trial court was instead asking counsel
if he wanted to mistry the case in a rhetorical fashion. (Doc. 10-1 at 1160). This is
evidenced by the fact that the trial court went on to say: “it [a mistrial] hasn’t happened
yet, but it’s about to.” (Doc. 10-1 at 1160). This Court must defer to the state trial and
postconviction courts’ findings that there was no basis for a mistrial in this case. See
Agan v. Vaughn, 119 F.3d 1538, 1549 (11th Cir. 1997) (“state courts are the final arbiters
of state law, and federal habeas courts should not second-guess them on such
matters[]”). Further, it is hard to imagine that the trial court would have granted trial
counsel’s motion for a mistrial in that moment when it just said that a mistrial had not
yet happened. Because there was no basis for a mistrial, counsel cannot be ineffective
for failing to move for one. See Cave, 638 F.3d at 755 (Card, 911 F.2d at 1520).
Moreover, the fact that trial counsel almost caused a mistrial, but was stopped
by the trial court, is not a basis to grant federal habeas relief. Because the basis for a
mistrial did not materialize, Mr. Parrilla cannot show that he was prejudiced by his
trial counsel’s actions. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687 (a habeas petitioner must show
both unreasonable performance and prejudice to demonstrate ineffective assistance of
counsel).
Mr. Parrilla fails to show that the state postconviction court’s decision was
contrary to clearly established federal law, involved an unreasonable application of
Strickland, or was based on an unreasonable factual determination. Therefore,
Mr. Parrilla is not entitled to relief on Ground Three.
d. Ground Four
Mr. Parrilla argues that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to investigate
and move to suppress a statement he made to Officer George Hunley. (Doc. 1 at 23–
25). Respondents argue that Counsel was not ineffective because he correctly
determined that there was no basis to suppress the statement. (Doc. 10 at 21–23).
Officer Hunley was asked to assist in transporting Mr. Parrilla to jail after his
arrest. (Doc. 10-1 at 1162). Mr. Parrilla asked Officer Hunley to use the restroom.
(Doc. 10-1 at 1163). While walking to the restroom, Mr. Parrilla asked Officer Hunley
a question that was captured on Hunley’s body camera. (Doc. 10-1 at 1163).
Mr. Parrilla claims that he asked Officer Hunley whether the police found “any gun.”
(Doc. 1 at 23–24). Officer Hunley testified that Mr. Parrilla asked if the police “had
found his gun” (Doc. 10-1 at 812). Officer Hunley’s body camera footage was played
for the jury during which Mr. Parrilla could be heard saying “they still got my gun in
there?” (Doc. 10-1 at 812–13). On cross examination, Mr. Parrilla’s trial counsel asked
Officer Hunley if he may have misunderstood what Parrilla said. (Doc. 10-1 at 814).
Although Officer Hunley said, “not from what I remember hearing,” he admitted that
Mr. Parrilla’s English is broken.3 (Doc. 10-1 at 814). Mr. Parrilla now claims that his
counsel should have hired an audiovisual expert to decipher the statement, and if he
did, that would have resulted in the statement being suppressed. (Doc. 1 at 24).
Mr. Parrilla asserted this ground in his Rule 3.851 motion. (Doc. 10-1 at 1092–
95). The postconviction court applied Strickland and denied the motion finding there
was no basis to suppress the statement because it was not the product of police
interrogation, and counsel reasonably addressed the potential inaccuracy of the
statement during cross examination. (Doc. 10-1 at 1162–64). The Fifth DCA per curiam
affirmed the postconviction court’s ruling. (Doc. 10-1 at 1690).
To demonstrate an ineffective assistance of counsel claim based on counsel’s
failure to file a motion to suppress, Mr. Parrilla must demonstrate a “valid basis [] for
suppression of his statements[.]” Root v. Dep’t of Corr., 2021 WL 82857, at *8 (M.D.
Fla. Jan. 11, 2021) (citing Zakrzewski v. McDonough, 455 F.3d 1254, 1260 (11th Cir.
2006)). Mr. Parrilla does not put forth a valid basis for suppressing the statement.
Mr. Parrilla was not being interrogated when he made the statement, and thus, the
statement was not taken in violation of his Miranda rights. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384
U.S. 436, 444 (1966) (Miranda’s protections only apply when the speaker is subject to
custodial interrogation, i.e., “questioning initiated by law enforcement officers”); see
also Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291 (1980) (“the definition of interrogation can
extend only to words or actions on the part of police officers that they should have
3 Conversely, during the evidentiary hearing on Mr. Parrilla’s Rule 3.850 motion, Mr. Parrilla testified
that he does not have trouble speaking English. (Doc. 10-1 at 1126).
known were reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response[]”) (emphasis
omitted). Officer Hunley was not prohibited from “merely listening” to Mr. Parrilla’s
incriminating question. See Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 485 (1981); United States
v. Briggs, 273 F.3d 737, 740 (7th Cir. 2001) (“A police officer’s response to a direct
inquiry by the defendant does not constitute ‘interrogation.’”).
Further, it is not clear what an expert could have done to help establish that the
statement or video should have been suppressed. Trial counsel’s decision regarding
whether to retain an expert is a strategic decision entitled to a presumption of
correctness. Wiggins v. Smith, 529 U.S. 510, 521 (2003). Under Florida law, expert
testimony is “scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge [that] will assist the
trier of fact in understanding the evidence or in determining a fact in issue.” Fla. Stat.
90.702. This was a factual dispute that was appropriately left to the jury to decide after
hearing the video, Officer Hunley’s testimony, and counsel’s cross examination of
Officer Hunley. Mr. Parrilla’s conclusory allegation that an expert could have
“decipher[ed] the actual content of” his statement does not overcome the presumption
of correctness afforded to his trial counsel’s decision. (Doc. 1 at 24).
Mr. Parrilla’s disagreement over what he said to Officer Hunley is not a basis to
exclude the statement. The purpose of the exclusionary rule is to punish wrongful
officer conduct, but there was no wrongful conduct here. See Withrow v. Williams, 507
U.S. 680, 686–87 (1993). Because there was no basis to suppress Mr. Parrilla’s
statement to Officer Hunley, his trial counsel cannot be ineffective for failing to file a
motion to suppress. See Cave, 638 F.3d at 755 (Card, 911 F.2d at 1520). Mr. Parrilla
fails to show that the state postconviction court’s decision was contrary to clearly
established federal law or involved an unreasonable application of Strickland or was
based on an unreasonable factual determination. Therefore, Mr. Parrilla is not entitled
to relief on Ground Four.
e. Ground Five
Mr. Parrilla argues that even if Grounds Two, Three, and Four do not
individually amount to ineffective assistance of counsel, they do cumulatively. (Doc. 1
at 26–28). Respondents argue there can be no cumulative error because Mr. Parrilla’s
individual claims are meritless. (Doc. 10 at 23). Mr. Parrilla asserted this ground in his
Rule 3.851 motion. (Doc. 10-1 at 1097). The state postconviction court denied
Mr. Parilla’s claim finding that he suffered no cumulative error because none of his
individual claims were legally sufficient. (Doc. 10-1 at 1164). The Fifth DCA per
curiam affirmed the postconviction court’s ruling. (Doc. 10-1 at 1690).
As this Court already found, trial counsel did not render ineffective assistance
in Grounds Two, Three, or Four, and thus, there can be no cumulative error. See United
States v. Gamory, 635 F.3d 480, 497 (11th Cir. 2011) (“[w]here there is no error or only
a single error, there can be no cumulative error”). Mr. Parrilla fails to show that the
state postconviction court’s decision was contrary to clearly established federal law,
involved an unreasonable application of Strickland, or was based on an unreasonable
factual determination. Therefore, Mr. Parrilla is not entitled to relief on Ground Five.
IV. CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, the Court finds that Mr. Parrilla’s petition for writ
of habeas corpus (Doc. 1) is meritless. Therefore, the petition is dismissed with
prejudice. The Clerk is instructed to enter judgment accordingly, terminate any
pending motions, and close the file.
In addition, a certificate of appealability is denied. A prisoner seeking a writ of
habeas corpus has no absolute entitlement to appeal a district court’s denial of his
petition. 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1). “A [COA] may issue . . . only if the applicant has
made a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C.
§ 2253(c)(2). To make a showing, a plaintiff “must demonstrate that reasonable jurists
would find the district court’s assessment of the constitutional claims debatable or
wrong|.|” Tennard v. Dretke, 542 U.S. 274, 282 (2004) (internal citation and quotation
omitted). Alternatively, a plaintiff must demonstrate that “the issues presented were
adequate to deserve encouragement to proceed further.” Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S.
322, 336 (2003) (internal quotation and citation omitted). Mr. Parrilla has not made
the requisite showing. Because Mr. Parrilla is not entitled to a certificate of
appealability, he is not entitled to appeal in forma pauperis at this time.
DONE AND ORDERED in Tampa, Florida, on August 26, 2025.
lliethey
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
COPIES FURNISHED TO:
Counsel of Record
Raul Parrilla, pro se
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